F.D. 30400- 10/25/84 - PAGES- 3606 - 3664

BEFORE THE

2 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

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In the Batter of:

SANTA FE SOUTHERN FACIFIC CORPORATION : Finance Docket

6 -- CONTROL --: 30400 et al.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSFORTATION :

3 COMPANY

Hearing Room A

12th & Constitution, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, October 25, 1984

The hearing in the above-entitled matter was convened, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. BEFCRE:

JAMES E. HCFKINS,

Administrative Law Judge

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APPEARANCES AS HERETOFCRE NOTED, WITH THE FOLLOWING

ADDITION:

On behalf of Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation:

JCSEPH B. TOMPKINS, JR., ESO.

Sidley & Austin

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On tehalf of the Atchiscn, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company:

RONALD A. LANE, ESC.

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On behalf of the Railway Labor Executives'
Association:

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$\underline{\mathsf{C}}\ \underline{\mathsf{O}}\ \underline{\mathsf{N}}\ \underline{\mathsf{T}}\ \underline{\mathsf{E}}\ \underline{\mathsf{N}}\ \underline{\mathsf{T}}\ \underline{\mathsf{S}}$

3	WITNESS		DIRECT	CROSS	REDIRECT	RECROSS
4	William	J. Baumol				
5	By Mr.	Tompkins Morse	3608	3610		
6	By Mr. By Mr.	Leary		3690 3714		
7	By Mr.	Bleakney Livingston		3719 3730		
8	By Mr.			3740		
9	John F.	Frestel, Jr. and				
10		R. Peifer				
11	By Mr.		3783	3786		
12	By Ms.	Madigan		3838		
13	By Mr.			3894	3906	
	The second second second					

EXHIBITS

15

14

Exhibit No.	IDENTIFIED	RECEIVED
MKT-C-54		3781
MKT-C-55	3635	3781
MKT-C-56	3654	3781
MKT-C-57	3670	3781
MKT-C-58	3670	3781
KCS-C-14 thru 17	3713	3780

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PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE HOFKINS: Let's come to order, please.

Let's call the next witness.

MR. TOMPKINS: Your Honor, my name is Joseph E. Tompkins, Jr., from Sidley and Austin in Washington, appearing on behalf of applicants.

I have entered an appearance with the rescriter.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Thank you.

MR. TOMPKINS: Our next witness is Professor

Baumol .

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JUDGE HOPKINS: Mr. Baumol, please.

Whereurer,

WIIIIAM J. BAUMOL

was called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, took the stand, was examined, and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. TOMPKINS:

- O Would you state your name and address for the record, please?
- A Yes, my name is Hilliam J. Baumol. My address is 61 Jefferson Road, Frinceton, New Jersey.
- Q Dr. Paumol, have you prepared a verified statement consisting of 44 pages with an attachment of

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And finally, the last of these vital changes

is on Fage 39, where there is a redundant "z" in

"retaliation" on line 2.

BY MR. MORSE:

- Q Good morning, Professor Baumol.
- A Good morning.

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- Q Would you please start off this morning by describing for us what you did to prepare the statement which you have submitted in this proceeding?
- I discussed the general circumstances of the proposed merger with Mr. Weicker and one of my colleagues. I laid out the outline and on the basis of the outline I wrote it. I also drafted the relevant -- well, I drafted it in effect in two parts.

The analytical material I drafted with

reference just to my own experience with the relevant economic considerations. The empirical statements, which in that testimony are highly limited and circumscribed, I based on materials derived from other witnesses as indicated in the footnotes.

- O All right. We will get into that in a mcment, but first let me ask you to identify for the record the Mr. Weicker that you mentioned in your statement.
 - A He is attorney for Santa Fe.

- Q You mentioned that preliminarily you had discussed this matter with one of your colleagues. Could you identify that colleague for the record?
- A Yes. That colleague is Charles Berry, with whom I work frequently. He is professor of economics and associate dean at Frinceton University, an economist of considerable repute.
- Q Did he play any role in preparing any of the materials which are found in your statement?
- A He may have suggested some corrections, put in a word or two, but the statement is for all practical purposes written entirely by me.
- Q Did anyone else at Princeton, whether student or faculty, assist you in the preparation of any materials found in your statement?
 - A As far as I remember, absclutely not.

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brief outline of the case and the issues and answers to

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my questions about, A, the nature of the testimony that
was in course of preparation, and B, a general
description of the competitive circumstances.

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Q Were there any other materials that were presented to you by way of a factual nature?

A Well, ultimately, I did receive a number of pieces of testimony, but those had not yet been prepared at the time I was first drafting my testimony.

O Is it true therefore that prior to submitting your statement in final form, you had copies of other people's testimony in this case?

testimony, because, as I remember it, and this is some months ago, mine was finished before anyone else's was. There were materials available in the course of preparation for the other pieces of testimony, and of course what became the final form was submitted as a tentative draft, all subject to change, on the basis of what would emerge from other people's associated research.

O Did your statement change from this -- in ultimate form to the final form on the basis of any materials submitted to you from others?

- A No, it did not.
- O Did you request any materials from the

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attorneys for the Santa Fe cr Scuthern Facific that for one reason or another simply weren't made available to you?

A No.

Q Anything that you had thought of to ask for, they made available to you?

A That is correct.

Q Lid you have occasion to discuss you: statement or a draft of your statement with any person who also submitted a statement in these proceedings?

A No, sir.

Q You talked to no other witness who has put a statement in in this proceeding?

A That is correct.

Q Did you have any independent source materials of your cwn which you consulted in preparation of your statement?

A Not relating to this merger in particular, materials relating to the analysis certainly, materials relating to the industry in general. Basically I consulted some of my past testimony, but no, nothing relating in particular to this case.

Why don't you tell us what you did consult with regard to your past testimony?

A Oh, I locked at, for example, my testimory in

the CSX-ABL case. I don't recall any other -- any piece in Articular that I looked at.

Q Did you look at your testimony in the UP

Q Did you look at your testimony in the UP case?

A I recall that testimony, but I did not review it, no.

Q But you do recall it?

A Yes. And I am not ashamed of a word of it.

Q The lady doth protest too much, me thinks.

Are there any materials relating to your other consulting assignments other than the testimony in CSX that you referred to in connection with your testimony?

A Not as I remember it.

Q Is it therefore true from what I am hearing that you have made no independent factual studies of your own in preparation of this statement?

A That is absolutely correct. I had a limited assignment. I was there to help to provide one piece of the puzzle. It was up to other witnesses to provide the other pieces. I provided what I think I was intended to provide, no more.

And all you are asked to provide, therefore, was the analytical framework, and not the underlying facts upon which that framework is based? Is that correct?

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A That is absolutely correct.

Q At Page 23 of your restimony, if I could direct your attention there for a moment, you begin your analysis of the efficiency consequences of the mercer, and you scare, do you not, that you have to rely on the testimony of others more intimately experienced than you are in the workings of the railroad industry for the factual predicate for your conclusions. Is that correct?

A That is correct. I am also careful to point out that there are a number of inferences that can be drawn from general knowledge of the railroad industry, and I have been doing work on the railroad industry for, I think, over 30 years, and other things one can rely on on the basis of analytical principles, but you are nevertheless correct in interpreting my statement.

Professor, I have vowed today in light of reading previous transcripts to keep my questioning period substantially shorter than your testimony, and you will be able to help me if you will answer the questions precisely as I ask them, and I don't need to have the explanation as to why an answer is yes or no.

All I need is a yes or no.

A Well, sometimes a yes or no, as we both no, is misleading, but I will try and comply with that request

as much as possible.

JUDGE HOIKINS: I thank both of you.

BY MR. MCRSE: (Resuming)

Isn't it also correct, Professor, that in the first part of your testimony, where you set forth the conclusions on the competitive aspect of the merger, that you also rely exclusively on the testimony of others more intimately experienced than you in the workings of the railroad industry for the factual underpannings?

MR. TOMPKINS: Could I ask counsel to clarify what he means by the first part of the testimony? Do you have a specific page reference:

MR. MORSF: Yes. We are talking about Pages 1 to 22.

THE WITNESS: In a word, no.

BY ME. MCESE: (Resuming)

You did not rely exclusively on the testimony of there for the factual underpinnings of your conclusions?

A That is correct. I did not rely exclusively on the testimony of others. I relied very heavily on my own experience and knowledge of the railroad industry in general, as well as the testimony of others.

Q All right. Is it fair to say, Professor, that

with regard to the various crinions that you have rendered in your statement, that by and large the factual predicate for those opinions are contained in the various statements that have been filed by the witnesses for Santa Fe and Southern Pacific in this proceeding?

A Absolutely.

Q In particular, Professor, isn't it true that at Fages 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 26, 33, 34, 35, and 36 of your testimony, you rely on various statements which have been filed by witnesses for the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe 2, this proceeding for the factual predicate of your corolusions?

MR. TOMPKINS: Your Honor, I think it may be easier and more accurate if we took those one at a time, unless the witness is prepared to take all those page numbers and give an answer.

JUDGE HORKINS: I would be inclined to think that this witness could handle it. If you can, go ahead and do it.

THE WITNESS: Subject to verification, I assume you have checked it correctly, and I am prepared to take your word for that assertion, because it is certainly true for at least several pages I have checked as you went along.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Trank you.

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

Q Are there any other sources of data other than the verified statements and attached data which have been submitted by the witnesses that I have just referred to upon which you relied other than your general knowledge for the factual predicate of the opinions contained in your verified statement?

A No, sir.

O Is it not a fact that you have made no attempt to check any of the factual assertions made in any of the statements upon which you have relied in coming to the conclusions presented in your statement?

A No attempt is somewhat of an exaggeration, but I have made no systematic study of any of the data.

That is correct.

Q Have you made a nonsystematic study of the data?

A I have looked at some countries of testimony, examined what sorts of evidence they provide. That is how one judges a professional piece anywhere. I don't normally go and as I read a piece in a journal and get a research assistant to check each datum in that piece.

In that sense, I have checked, as I check in

most of my reading cf factual pieces, but you are still right. I have made no systematic study of them.

- Q Well, in fact, sitting here today, you have no independent verification of the facts which are contained in the statements upon which you relied?
 - A Yes. I am net disagreeing with you.
- O Isn't it also a fact, Professor, that should those statements prove incorrect in any substantial way, that your opinion would be incorrect?
- A Oh, absolutely. If it should prove that the two railroads were controlled by the Mafia, and that this were a serious plot to take over the United States, I would oppose it absolutely.
- Q Well, Professor, that is indeed entertaining, but none of the verified statements that you relied upon deal in that area, do they?
- A No, but the point I am making is correct.

 JUDGE HOFKINS: Allow him to finish. Gc
 ahead. On this I will allow you.

THE WITNESS: The point I am making is correct, and the point you are making is correct. That is, it is true that if the facts turn out to be diametrically opposite from what is shown by or claimed by the witnesses in quertion, then my opinion would rolonger hold. I agree.

But that can be made to sound very different from what it means, and that is the only point I am making, in addition to agreeing with you.

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

- Q I think you stated a moment ago that you had seen at least some preliminary information relating to statements which have been submitted by other witnesses in this proceeding. Is that correct?
- A I believe so. This is a long time ago, and I am not prepared --
- Q Are you prepared to tell us which witnesses they related to?
 - A I don't remember.
- Q You have no recollection today of what witnesses you looked at?
- A No.

- O How long ago was this?
- A This was, I would imagine, about nine months ago, but since then I have finished a book. I am working on a new edition of the second book. I have a lot of materials passed over my desk since then.
- Q Did you make any suggestions for material to be either added or deleted from those draft materials of other witnesses?
 - A No. sir.

- O So in fact you indicated what facts you needed developed in order to support your conclusions?
 - A I am quite sure I didn't.

- Q Did you ever so indicate to any of the attorneys representing the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific in this case?
- A Yes, as best I remember. I mean, I am speaking from my normal procedure, and I have no reason to believe I deviated from it in this case.
- Q Well, we went through some of the footnotes before, and you agreed with me that those are the statements upon which you relied for your conclusions.

I would like to direct your attention to Page 9 cf your testimony. See if you can help me find the factual support for the conclusion contained at that page of your testimony.

You state, "Typically trucks and barges will compete for the same traffic, and that competition will circumscribe the prices that the single railroad can charge."

Do you see that, Professor?

A Certainly.

- Q Is there a statement or statements submitted by some witness in this proceeding upon which you hase that conclusion?
- A This is my own statement. I am talking about railroading in general.
 - Q Railroading in general?
 - A That's right.
- Q Are you talking about this particular merger, or railroading in general?
- A It says what this implies for the case of transportation. I think it is very clear that I am talking about railroading in general here, and discussing the logic of principles.
- Q If you will give me a second to pick out a few questions I was going to ask later, but it seems appropriate now.

Professor, do you recall ever -- well, I will be more specific. Do you recall testifying in your verified statement submitted in the CSX case to which you referred earlier that, "There is very little or no direct competition between railroads and barges generally?"

MR. TOMPKINS: Let me ask, is counsel quoting

from the witness's statement in the CSX case, or is he paraphrasing?

MR. MORSE: I am quoting exactly. It is cr Page 16 of the verified statement of William J. Paumcl.

THE WITNESS: I believe, subject to my locking at the testimony, that what I said was that there was very little point to point direct competition between the CSX Failroad and those barges.

I was not characterizing the industry generally, and I also went on to say, and this I am sure of, that there was plenty of indirect competition between them.

That is, even though they did not traverse exactly parallel routes, that there was competition in terms of origins, in terms of destinations, and in terms of commedities.

Here is a clear example where a yes or no answer would have been misleading.

BY MR . MORSE: (Resuming)

Q Well, we are glad to have your explanation, but you did say at Page 16 that there is very little or no direct competition between railroads and barges generally, and then you went on in that same sentence, and here I am paraphrasing, to talk about the specific situation in CSX.

MR. TOMPKINS: Your Honor, if counsel is going 1 to ask about this quote, I would ask that he show the 2 witness the testimony the quotes come from, so we can 3 see in in context of what the testimony is. 4 MR. MORSE: I have no further questions on 5 that, Your Honor. 6 JUDGE HOPKINS: You have no further questions 7 on that? Go ahead. 8 BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming) 9

Q Professor, I notice attached to your statement is your curriculum vitae. It is dated January 19th, 1984. And on Page 47 of your testimony is a list of books published.

Is that correct?

A Yes.

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I notice that the last book listed is entitled Contestable Markets and The Theory of Industry Structure. Did you write that with J.C. Panzar and R.E. Willig?

A Yes, and I see there is another typographical error. Panzar will not forgive me for being misspelled.

- O How is that spelled?
 - A P-a-n-z-a-r.
 - O Could you identify Mr. Panzar for us?

A	Yes. He is professor of economics at
Northwest	ern University.
Q	Northwestern? Could you identify Mr. Willig
fcr us?	
A	Yes, he is professor of economics at Princeton
University	
Q	Do you consider Professor Panzar to be a
reputable	economist?
A	Absolutely.
Q	Topnotch?
A	Yes.
0	Ic you consider Professor Willig to be a
reputable	economist?
A	Cutstanding.
0	Would you characterize his degree of
reputation	n as outstanding?
A	Yes.
0	Would you characterize Professor Panzar to be
a cclleage	ue of yours?
A	Ch, certainly.
Q	Would you characterize Professor Willig to be
a cclleag	ue of yours?
A	Yes.
9	Do you generally agree with the conclusions of
Professor	Panzar in his writings and publications?
	Northwests Q fcr us? A University Q reputable A Q reputable A Q reputation A Q a cclleage A Q a cclleage A

1	A Senerally.
2	Q Do you generally agree with the conclusions of
3	Professor Willig in his writings and publications?
4	A Generally.
5	
6	several articles, is he not?
7	A That's correct.
8	O And in fact has written extensively on your
9	theory of contestable markets. Is that not correct?
10	A That's not on cur theories of contestable
11	markets. That's correct.
12	Q I didn't mean to shortchange Professor
13	Willig.
14	A Y am very glad. Thank you. You will get me
15	into trouble otherwise.
16	Q Well, then, I will be super-careful on the
17	next question that I ask.
18	Would you identify an Elizabeth Bailey for me?
19	A Yes. Elizabeth Bailey is dean, I believe, of
20	the School of Industrial Administration at Carnegle
21	Mellon University, a former vice chairman of the Civil
22	Aerchautics Foard, a former student of mine, and the
23	first woman Ph.D. from the Economics Department at

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Q Well, it sounds like you have good reason to

Princeton University, and I am very provid of her.

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be proud of Dean Bailey. Do you consider her to be a reputable economist?

- A That is hardly worth answering. The answer is obviously yes.
- This is cutstanding plus then for Dean Bailey?
- A Well, all of them.
- Q Would you characterize Dean Bailey as a colleague of yours?
 - A Yes.
- And do you generally agree with her conclusions in her writings and publications?
 - A Yes.
- Q let me switch tracks on you a little bit here. Most of your testimony addresses the parallel aspects of this merger where the auticompetitive concerns are more obvious. However, at Page 10 of your testimony, you state that, "The merger under consideration is to a considerable degree" -- why don't you turn to Page 10, and I will start the quote again.

At Page 10, you state that, "The perger under consideration is to a considerable degree characterized by elements which can be described as end to end or vertical in character." Is that correct?

A That's correct.

O Have you made any attempt to determine as a quantitative matter what percentage of this merger is characterized by elements which can be described as end to end versus those which can be characterized by

A A, I have made no such attempt. Secondly, I wouldn't even know how to define such a percentage.

O Well, either as a percentage of total trackage

O Or as tons of commodities shipped, or on any

A I am guibbling new about a detail of wording. In substance, I can get you out of your difficulty by agreeing that I would have -- I have made no independent study to judge even qualitatively the degree to which

Q All right. At Page 10 of your testimony again, you state, do you not, that an end to end merger with some exceptions will not usually enhance market power. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

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O What are those exceptions?

A There are a number of cases in which -- which are recognized in the literature where end to end

mergers either may enhance market rower or, to save you the trouble of asking me, or facilitate its exercise.

That is, in which it is considered to have objectionable features.

The most notable of those cases involves the ability to carry out successful predation by means of the end to end merger, that is, in which in one of the sectors in the vertical union the merger permits the merging railroad to drive out all competitors or most competitors and in which there is no realistic prospect of their returning.

That second feature is absolutely crucial for this basic case of the possibility of monopoly power emerging from a vertical merger because unless there is some way in which reentry can be effectively prevented, the predation becomes a suicidal act for the predator, since predation only works through a losing initial arrangement that makes life unviable for the rivals, and if those -- the losses that are incurred in the process of driving the rivals cut can be recoured, and more, once the field has been emptied of competitors.

So, that is the first case. Two other cases that are fairly standard in the literature are not cases in which monopoly power emerges from the end to end merger, but in which its exercise is facilitated. The

one standard case is the case in which price discrimination is impractical for the railroad or the firm with the monopoly power.

That is, we assume that we have one firm that has monopoly or market power to begin with. That firm, in order to derive full advantage from it, must somehow be able to discriminate in price or service or some other way among customers it is prevented by legal impediments, institutional constraints, or something else from exercising that discrimination.

It acquires another firm which has no moncroly power itself, but through a vertical relationship is enabled to discriminate in prices. The standard example that is given is that of a manufacturer of computer equipment which must sell the equipment to everyone at the same price, but can overcharge for punch cards — this is ancient history — and thereby derive more revenues from the larger, the heavier users of the equipment.

The third standard example of the sort of situation you are referring to is the case where the firm that would have market power is prevented from exercising it by the fact that it is closely regulated. Its rate of return is limited. It is able to acquire another firm which because it is competitive is

unregulated.

It is able to perform magic in its accounting, so that costs from the acquired firm are passed on to the acquiring firm in the parable, as I have told it. Thereby the acquiring firm is in fact able to disguise excess profits by passing them through to the acquired firm.

Those are illustrations. Those are the prime three cases that appear in the literature. There are undoubtedly other examples that have appeared here and there, but I think they illustrate the issue.

All right. I see you are getting warmed up.

Let me go back, though, because you do raise some very,

very important points, and I don't want to misinterpret

the conclusions of your statement, and certainly we

don't want that to happen in this proceeding.

So, let me go back, and I understand, then, that when you conclude that an end to end merger with some exceptions will not usually enhance market power, that is really not the end of the inquiry, is it?

- A That is absolutely right.
- Q We must go and take a lock at whether or not some of the exceptions that you have pointed out to us apply in this acquisition.

Isn't that correct?

- A And that is precisely what I have done.
- O In the end to end context?

- A In the end to end context.
- Q Ckay. Have you addressed in your testimony that the end to end aspects of this accuisition may facilitate the exercise of market power even though it doesn't necessarily increase it?

A You see, here is another example where a yes or no answer will be completely misleading. Of course, I have not done it explicitly in terms of those three cases. What I have done, and that is logically equivalent, I think you will have to admit, is accepting the testimony of the other witnesses cited, and I am not retracting my reliance on them, but if one accepts their evidence.

And their evidence does claim that virtually throughout the system the merged railroad will face competition in a variety of forms, and in forms in which exit and entry is quick, cheap, and easy, that in all those cases, all three of my exceptions are immediately precluded.

Case 1 is precluded by ease of entry and reentry. I emphasize that that is a necessary condition for Case 1 to arise. Case 2, the firm in question must have market power, but if there is plenty of

competition, and there is plenty of ease of entry, and if incidentally these firms in question have such excess market power that they can barely earn enough to survive, where is that magnificent market power that they will be able to exercise either through price discrimination or through avoidance of regulation?

So, what I am saying is, no, I did not address myself to those cases in particular. The short answer to your question is no. But the illuminating answer to your question is that by examining on the basis of the materials that were provided by other witnesses, the degree of competition that is faced by the railroads in question now and that can be expected to be faced by them in the future.

In both ends of the end to end elements of the merger, I have effectively dealt with each and every one of those exceptions. I am aware, incidentally, that of course Professor Willig and others have written on such issues, and I think you will find that what they have written is entirely consistent with what I have just described to you.

Q Well, I think that what we will find, because we are about to mark it as an exhibit for identification, that they agree that these factors must be taken into consideration. What I think is still an

1 open question, Professor, is whether you have done 2 that. 3 A I have done precisely that. 4 MR. MOBSE: I would like to have marked for identification at this time an article entitled 5 6 Non-Price Anticompetitive Fehavior By Dominant Firms 7 Toward The Producers of Complementary Products, by J.A. 8 Ordover, A.C. Sykes, and R.D. Willia, dated December, 9 1983, and it is indicated that this paper, which is a 10 paper at the present time, will be published by the MIT 11 Press. 12 JUDGE HOPKINS: That will be marked for 13 identification. (The document referred to 14 15 was marked for 16 identification as Exhibit 17 Number MKT-C-55.) 18 BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming) 19 Professor, would you please look at that 20 exhibit? 21 A Certainly. 22 It is MKT-C-55, counsel's exhibit. 23 Is this the article, or one of the articles to

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which you had reference in your previous testimony?

A That's correct.

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O I would like to direct your attention to the first sentence of this article. "In a variety of market settings, dominant firms have an incentive to engage in anticompetitive practices that disadvantage the producers of complementary products." Do you agree with that statement? I agree with everything but its grammar. Well, for someone who has trouble spelling --"Disadvantage" is not a verb. Well, perhaps after this proceeding is over, you and Professor Willig can get together, and he will teach you spelling and you can teach him grammar. 13 A Right. I would appreciate it. 14 Q I take it then that the answer is yes, you do 15 agree with him? A Yes. 16 17 Q The article indicates -- are you familiar with 18

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the article, what it contains?

A I received it yesterday, and I studied it last night with great admiration.

Q You denerally approve of the conclusions that are reached in this article?

A Yes. I have not cone through every bit of the logic in as much detail as I would like, but I dc.

Q I think at this time we will leave the article

the way it is and deal with it in other testimony down the line. Well, one more question. Again, from the same article, do you agree with this statement?

"Thus, contrary to conventional learning, a firm with market power at one stage of production or over one component of the product may nevertheless have an incentive to extend its market power to other stages of production or to other product components."

Mb. TOMPKINS: May I ask counsel, is that a quotation from this article?

MR. MORSE: Yes, it is.

MR. TOMPKINS: Would you point us to it?

JUNGE HOPKINS: Would you refer us to the page, please?

MR. MORSE: It is the first sentence on the top of Page 2.

BY MR. MORSE: (Fesuming)

O Do you agree with that sentence, Frofessor?

A I must quibble with it again, because I think that conventional learning does not disagree with it. I agree with the substance of the statement. I just don't agree with its attempted guarrel with conventional learning. I think lots of people would agree with that statement.

O Including you?

A Including myself, yes.

at that statement. Let's try to apply that statement to the railroad context. Would you agree that in the railroad context, this means that under certain circmustances there can be anticompetitive effects with regard to the end to epi aspects of a rail merger?

A I don't agree, because one of the premises that underlies every case, as I remember it, in this article is an impediment to reentry.

That is, in a market in which railroads face competition by trucks, barges, ccean, water transportation, none of these cases apply automatically, because as the authors are careful to emphasize, these are real cases, these are important cases, that they are cases which apply in special circumstances which they list.

And as I remember it, in each case one of the necessary requirements is an impediment to reentry.

They are all examples of my first case, where successful predation is in effect possible.

Q Well, with regard to the exercise, the facilitating the exercise of market power as opposed to increasing it, and with regard to the articles focusing in on the complementary product problem, wasn't the

predicate for the article's conclusion there the inability to have a perfect price squeeze vertically?

A That is correct, and then it goes on to say, as I remember it, that in order to use the vertical arrangement to remedy the limitations on the exercise of the market power in the models of this article, it is necessary for there to be effective impediments to reentry.

- Q Well, I am not going to quibble with you.
- assumption of the argument. If you want me to agree with them, I have already done so. If you want me to judge the applicability of their results to the circumstances of the merger in guestion, you must be able to show me that the merger does in fact satisfy the premises of their cases, when in fact I am telling you that my -- to the extent my knowledge of railroads applies, those premises are distinctly violated.
- I felt I didn't deserve one. I think you might have misheard my question. I wasn't talking about this merger. Let me ask you the question again that started this. I asked you whether you agreed that in the railroad context the sentence we read at the top of Fage 2 means that under certain circumstances there can be

anticompetitive effects with regard to the end to end aspects of a rail merger.

A In theory, it is true, but what I said, I think, at the beginning of my answer was that to the extent that railroads' operations are competitive, to the extent that they compete with transport modes such as water and trucking, that no such problem arises.

Q All right. I think then that you would agree in this merger or in rail mergers generally that if we are talking about an end to end effect in which it can be demonstrated that there is no substantial competition from truck or harge, then there certaitly do exist circumstances in which there can be anticompetitive effects with regard to that end to end aspect of a merger.

A That's correct. Or -- let me amend that. Or competition from other forms that have similar abilities to enter and exit.

Q Professor, do you agree with the following statement? "The majority of most railroads' traffic is involved in some sort of interconnection with another carrier." Do you agree with that?

A I don't know about the majority.

O Fxcuse me. I thought that a large part of the first portion of your testimony in this case, Pages 1

through 22, was based on -- the factual predicate was based on your general knowledge of the railroad industry. Is that not correct?

A That's right.

Q Well, I took it for granted that you had a general knowledge of the railroad industry.

A That's correct, and I know that a substantial proportion of the traffic is correctly characterized by that statement. I don't know whether it's a majority. I am not a compendium of statistics on the railroad industry.

You do agree, though, that certainly a substantial portion of railroad traffic is involved in some sort of interconnection with another carrier? Is that correct?

A Certainly, that's correct.

Whether you agree with the following statement, that "That factor is a key to understanding the consequences of major rail consclidation as wherever possible the combining carriers can be expected to reroute traffic interchanged with unaffiliated companies to the new combination."

MR. TOMPKINS: Can I ask counsel, is he quoting from a witness's statement in this proceeding,

or is that his own statement?

MR. MORSE: I am quoting from Exhibit

KCS-C-1. It is a confidential exhibit where the precise

quotation has been quoted to other witnesses in this

proceeding.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Gc ahead.

THE WITNESS: Can you read that again, please?

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

Q Yes, I would be happy to. Sorry for the interruption.

A Not at all.

Q I want you to keep in mind your agreement with the fact that a substantial portion of most railroads' traffic is involved in some sort of interconnection with another carrier, and I ask you whether you agree with the statement that "That factor is a key to understanding the consequences of major rail consolidation as wherever possible the combining carriers can be expected to reroute traffic interchanged with unaffiliated companies to the new combination."

MR. TOMPKINS: If this is from an exhibit,
Your Honor, could I ask that the witness be shown the
exhibit or this portion of it so he can see it in
context?

MR. MORSE: This is a confidential exhibit.

Is there any objection to showing it to him?

JUDGE HOPKINS: No, let him see it. He is a witress here.

THE WITNESS: I promise not to give away any military secrets. You are on Fage --

MR. MORSE: I don't have my marked up copy with me. I brought one for use by the witness. Let me try to locate the quote.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Gc ahead.

(Pause.)

MR. MORSF: We are talking about Page 000024 of KCS-C-1.

JUDGE HOPKINS: He is ready.

THE WITNESS: Your question was whether I agree with that statement?

BY MR. MCRSE: (Besuming)

O Yes.

A I agree with the first part of the statement, that this factor is a key to understanding the consequences of major rail consolidations, and I disagree absolutely and categorically with the second part of the statement, that wherever possible the combining carriers can be expected to reroute traffic interchanged with unaffiliated companies to the new

combination. That is suicidal. That is irrational. 2 And that is what competitive pressures will not permit 3 to happen. 4 O Even if, Professor, the combined carrier 5 cannot have a perfect price squeeze? 6 A Even if it cannot have a perfect price squeeze 7 or any price squeeze at all. 8 O Have you seen a copy of KCS-C-1 before today?

A No.

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Q Have you been made aware of a confidential memorandum that was submitted to the board of directors of the Santa Fe?

A No.

Q Is it your conclusion, Professor, that railroads crerate in a contestable market?

A That -- it is my conclusion that railroads operate in many markets which are highly contestable, because they operate in competition with trucks and barges.

Q If there are markets that exist in which such competition is not substantial, would that market be characterized by you as contestable?

A If such competition is possible, even if it does not occur now, then it is still effectively contestable. The major point in contestability is the

A That's right. That is that they must be able to utilize the same technological options. It doesn't mear they have to use them, but that they can.

Q Well, does not your conclusion that railreads compete in a contestable market require that trucks and motor carriers operate at similar cost levels and service attributes as railroads?

A No. sir.

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Q \ I thought you said a moment ago --

A It requires them to have the option. I did not say it requires them to have the same costs. That is a world of difference.

Q I take it then that if it were shown to you that trucks for some commodities have a very severe cost disadvantage from railroads carrying that commodity, that that would have no effect on your theory of contestable markets for that commodity?

A No, I didn't say that. That could certainly have a consequence, and it could imply that for that commodity, the market is not contestable. I am conceding what you want me to concede, in brief.

O Thank you.

Professor, would you agree with the following definition of the relevant market for evaluation of rail mergers, and to avoid an objection that will interrupt the answer. I am telling you that I am reading from the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the UP merger, which is at 36% TCC, Page 504, at the margin:

"Motor carriers are unlikely to be direct substitutes for rail transportation in the markets affected by the proposed transactions. In such circumstances, a rise in rail rates would not necessarily result in a significant amount of traffic shifting between modes, and the railroad could effectively increase its profits by raising its rates absent other competitive factors."

MR. TOMPKINS: Your Honor, may I ask counsel to show that to the witness so the witness can look at

it?

JUDGE HOPKINS: Would you, please?

MR. MORSE: I'd he happy to.

THE WITNESS: May I comment?

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

Q Well, I would like to have an answer to the question, unless you think my question is confusing.

A I think your question is misleading, if you will excuse me for saying so.

Q Well, read as much of that opinion as you like, but the question is, I would like to know whether you agree with the statement that I gucted.

MR. TOMPKINS: Counsel, am I correct that the statement that you read began in the middle of a sentence?

MR. MORSE: Yes. I understand that.

MR. TOMPKINS: You didn't read the first part of the sentence. Is that correct?

MR. MORSE: Well, the witness has the whole thing in there. He can read it all.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Well, if he reads it all, he is going to have to say, after reading the whole sentence, he says such and such.

MR. MORSE: Well, I am making a statement,
Your Honor, and asking whether the witness agrees with

it.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Well, which part of the statement are you going to make, the whole statement, or are you only going to make a part of the statement?

MR. MORSE: I am reading a statement and asking the witness wehther he agreed with it. I am not asking him whether he agreed with the decision or with any part of the opinion. I am making a statement.

JUIGH HOPKINS: Well, if you can indicate whether you agree or disagree with what he said, go ahead. Then if you want to, you can explain.

THE WITNESS: All right. I don't agree, A, with what you have said, because this is not part of the decision. What it says here is that most other parties argue that, and then it goes on to the material you quoted, which is very different from the ICC having said that.

Besides, this is not to me a market definition. It is a statement of alleged fact, and that is something to be tested case by case.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Thank you.

BY MR. MCRSE: (Resuming)

Q Well, isn't it a fact, though, Professor, that the ICC excluded truck competition in defining the relevant market for the UP merger? You testified in

that merger.

A I don't know that. If you tell me so, I will accept that as an assertion. I do not know that for myself.

Q Well, let's assume it for the moment. Do you agree with that decision by the ICC?

MR. TOMPKINS: Do you agree with what, counsel?

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

Q Exclusion of truck competition.

JUDGE HOPKINS: If they did.

BY MR. MORSE: (Pesuming)

Q The exclusion of truck competition in evaluating a rail merger.

A No, I do not agree, if that is what they said. I believe that truck competition in many cases effectively constrains railroad pricing, in other cases, it does not, and that this is something which cannot be handled in one blanket judgment.

Q Are you aware of the ICC decision about a month agc in the Milwaukee case?

A No.

Q In that case, the ICC, and I quote, held as follows, and this is not a repetition of what was argued, although it is a repetition --

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JUDGE HOPKINS: Will you give us the reference so that we have the page, et cetera, et cetera?

MR. MORSE: Yes, Your Honor. This is Firance Docket -- I don't have an ICC cite. It is only a month ago.

JUDGE HOPKINS: I understand.

MR. MORSE: It is Finance Docket Number 28-640, Sub Number 9, et al., and I am quoting from Page 59 of the opinion.

JUDGE HOFKINS: Thank you.

BY MR. MCRSF: (Resuming)

Q After saying what was argued in the case, the Commission found, "We are also limiting the relevant product market for consideration to rail freight transportation," and they go on to say that for the purposes of this proceeding, we agree with DOJ," meaning the Department of Justice, "as well as for GTC and Sco that the relevant product market is rail freight transportation."

MR. TCMPKINS: Your Fonor, again I must insist that counsel show the witness what he is reading from.

JUDGE HOPKINS: He is coming up.

THE WITNESS: Tnank you.

JUDGE HOPKINS: He is ready.

THE WITNESS: Once again, I think that the

context must be made clear. The context is not a general conclusion. There is a rather elaborate paragraph preceding it which I think on any fair reading will make it clear that this is a judgment given for a particular set of circumstances in this hearing.

I am in no position to agree or disagree with the judgment in those circumstances, but I certainly disagree with your inference that the rail market should exclude all but other rail competition in deneral, because that would be a distortion of the relevant logic, which is an examination of the constraining influences that inhibit the railroad's power to raise its prices to uncompetitive levels and keep them there.

BY MR. MCRSE: (Resuming) .

Q Well, Professor, I was hoping that presenting two points on this graph, I could let you draw a straight line, but I can see that that is not going to harren.

A When the path is crooked, it is not easy to draw a straight line.

O Do you think the ICC in this proceeding should consider whether the proposed Santa Fe-Southern Pacific merger would have an adverse effect on competition among rail carriers in the affected region?

A If I heard you correctly, yes, I agree that it should consider the competitive effects.

- 2 And that it should consider whether this particular merger would have an adverse effect on competition among rail carriers in the affected region?
- A Not necessarily, because if the markets remain competitive, it doesn't matter.
- O Sc what you are saying is that in this merger the ICC should not consider any adverse effect on competition among rail carriers in the affected region.

A I said not necessarily. By intentions I think are perfectly clear. The ICC should not prejudge the issue by examining the effects on competitiveness exclusively in one way or another. It should examine whether the bottom line -- whether the final consequence of the merger will be to open the consumer to the exercise of market power.

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And if that is constrained by other railroads, fine. If that is constrained by other types of carrier, fine. If it becomes unconstrained, not fine.

Q In this merger, should the ICC consider an adverse effect on competition among rail carriers in the affected regions?

MR. TOMPKINS: He's already answered that,

JUDGE HOPKINS: Gc ahead and answer it specifically. If he wants it that way, go ahead.

THE WITNESS: It should consider that. But that to me is not a determining issue. The issue is the bottom line effect on the ability of the merging railroads to evercise market power.

BY MR. MCRSF: (Resuming)

Q Well, is it therefore your opinion that there are certain commodities and certain kinds of movements which are present in the merger before us for which it

is appropriate to consider truck competition and other commodities and movements for which it is not?

A It is appropriate to consider it for all commodities. The facts may show that it is not highly

commodities. The facts may show that it is not highly relevant in some cases, but what neither you nor I want is to prejudge the facts.

Q Do you believe that in looking at the effect of truck competition that you should also look on the distance the commodity has moved?

A Certainly.

Q That is a substantial factor, is it not, in considering competition from trucks?

A Certainly.

MR. MORSE: I'd like to mark for identification at this time an article from the Economic -- the American Economic Review dated March 1982. It's entitled "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," by William J. Baumol.

THE WITNESS: Fine art.

MR. MORSE: Your modesty s as extensive as your misspellings.

JUDGE HOFKINS: That will be marked for identification as counsel's Exhibit MKT-C-56.

(The document referred to

was marked Exhibit No.

MKT-C-56 for

identification.)

MR. TOMPKINS: May I ask, is counsel finished with KCS-C-1?

MR. MORSE: Yes. I don't want it lieing around.

BY MR. MCRSE: (Resuming)

- O New, Professor, this is indeed your article, is it rol?
 - A Yes, I confess.
 - O You take full blame?
 - A Yes.

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O I'd like to direct your attention to a sentence on page 4, but I want to make sure you have an opportunity to refresh your recollection of what you wrote either before or after, to put that sentence in context. Take a moment, please.

A I hope I have page 4. Please give me the sentence. There are some blank pages here.

Q Well, the pages are marked. Let me come up and see if I can help you with it. The sentence begins "In short." The sentence says: "In short, it is a requirement of contestability that there be no cost discrimination against entrants." You see that

1 sentence, Professor? 2 Yes. 3 You wrote that sentence? 4 A Yes. 5 Do you still agree with that sentence? 6 A Yes. Thank you. Let me change tracks again. 7 8 MR. TOMPKINS: Are you finished with this 9 exhibit, counsel? 10 MR. MORSE: Yes, I an. 11 BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming) 12 On page 15 of your testimony, could I ditect your attention to page 15 of your testimony. And just 13 14 so that you can have the full context of the questicr, at pages 37 and 38 of your testimony you pick up on the 15 16 same theme again. You say in essence that the amount of 17 capital needed to embark on a trucking or barge 18 operation is negligible. On page 14 of your testimony, you agree that 19 20 the ease of entry into railroading is substantial. 21 A I'm sorry? Can you repeat what you just 22 said? I think you misspoke. Q Well, I certainly didn't mean to do that. I 23

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said that on page 14 of your testimony you agree that

the ease of entry into railroading is substantial.

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JUDGE HOPKINS: That doesn't sound right. 1 THE WITNESS: I think the difficulty of entry 2 3 into railroading. BY MR . MORSE: (Resuming) 4 Well, that's right, the barriers to entry are 5 6 high. 7 You said the opposite. MR. TOMPKINS: Well, ease isn't substantial. 8 MR. MORSE: You're right. 9 BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming) 10 The difficulty of entry into railroading is 11 substantial, do you agree? 12 May I try and helr you? 13 JUDGE HOPKINS: Gc right ahead. 14 BY MR. LFARY: (Resuming) 15 No, you may not, but I do appreciate your 16 17 offer. I do want you to take a look at page 14. 18 19 Yes. And isn't the thrust of your testimony there 20 that he barriers to entry into railroading are 21 substantially high? 22 A It is difficult to enter railroading, yes. 23 Q Apu on pages 15 through 16 of your testinory, 24 and then again more specifically at pages 37 through 38

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1	of your test	timony, you describe about the mobility of
2	trucks and y	you describe a hit and run capability. Is
3	that a fair	characterization of your testimony?
4	A Ye	es.
5	Q Ha	ave you made any studies with regard to the
6	amount of su	onk costs any existing railroad, such as the
7	Santa Fe or	Southern Pacific, may have?
8	A I	have at times examined the cost structure of
9	railroads, r	not recently. And yes, I did find very
10	substantial	sunk costs.
11	O Wo	ould you agree with us that the Santa Fe and
12	Southern Pac	cific have substantial sunk costs?
13	A I	'm quite sure cf it, without having made a
14	specific	
15	Q Is	en't it also true with regard to almost every
16	major railro	ad?
17	A Th	nat's right.
18	Q Ar	nd every regional railroad?
19	A I	m glad you agree with me.
20	O I.	m glad you agree with me.
21	Jt	DGE HORKINS: We love each other here, don't
21 22	we.	DGE HOFKINS: We love each other here, don't
	₩ € *	DGE HORKINS: We love each other here, don't aughter.)
22	we.	

sunk costs on a per mile basis or on any other basis which it would take for a railroad to open a new line?

A No.

Q You've done no such studies?

A Nc.

Q Are you aware of any statements or data submitted by any party to these proceedings that discuss the amount of sunk costs present in the railroad industry or in any particular railroad?

A Nc, I'm not aware of any.

Q Isn't it your understanding that the sunk costs of the railroad industry is overwhelmingly greater than the sunk costs of barges or trucks?

A Certainly. I never implied anything else.

That was exactly the point in that statement that we got straightened out about page 14.

Q Well, now I'm puzzled. Isn't it a fact that if trucks do the same job at the same cost, without requiring the investor to sink costs over 40 years, that no one would invest in the rail industry and give up the hit and run feature of trucks?

A I am totally confused by the logic of that question. Why should no one invest in the railroad industry on that account? They would be out of their minds, probably, to invest in a railroad industry which

is confined to the nort of profits we're talking about and which, if this merger is denied, may really drive them to the wall.

But that has nothing to do with the need to sink costs. You may have very substantial need to sink costs in the electronic computer industry and you can produce in competition with them an abacus with virtually no sunk costs at all, and yet I would think that the computer industry is the more attractive investment.

The sunk costs feature is neither the precluding nor the deciding feature in checking whether to invest or not.

Q I am amused a little bit by your analogy,
Professor. Are you saying that the competition provided
by abacuses to computers is similar to the competition
provided by trucks to railroads?

A Hardly. Of course not. That's exactly the reason I would not invest in alacuses and I might very well invest in trucking, because one is a viable alternative and the other is not. But that's quite different from the point in your question, which was about the sunk costs.

O Exactly. We're talking about not investing in either abacuses versus trucks; we're talking about

investing in railroads versus computers.

- A In railroads versus trucks, please.
- O I'm taking your analogy.

Let's try to unscramble this egg. Is there any region in the country, anywhere in the country, where trucks cannot go?

- A Not that I know of.
- Q Isn't it a fact that it is therefore your position that every railroad market in this country is contestable?
- A No, sir. If we read your questions and follow them through, they will tell you precisely why I do not agree. Where there are commodities which cannot be carried by truck, such as particularly wide loads, where there are commodities in which trucks have a marked cost disadvantage, those commodities may be in markets which are conceivably not contestable.

I'm not saying they aren't. I'm saying I would have to investigate the facts of the case, and I could rct conclude from the fact that trucks can drive up and down those roads that their mere presence produces contestability.

O Thank you.

Are there markets where the rail industry has advantages over trucks that offset the disadvantages of

having to sink costs?

A I am sure that they have advantages over trucks to the degree that in many cases it pays to share the activity. That is exactly why the railroads' rates are in many cases competitive.

- Q Would you identify those markets for us?
 - A I'm not prepared to do that.
- O But they do exist, do they not?
- A They exist. There are lots of markets in which both trucks and rail operate and operate more or less successfully.
- Q Do you have a feel for, if you can't identify specific markets, what percentage of total volume of the rail industry these markets comprise?
- A No, but I think that it's a very substantial percentage.
- Q Isn't it a fact, Profeshor, that you have concluded that in situations of market dominance regulation should be continued in the rail industry?
 - A Yes.
- O Isn't it a fact that the airline industry is the best case of a contestable market that you can think of?
- A I may have said that once. I've thought of others since then.

Q Well, are there any industries more contestable than the airline industry?

A I would think the barge line industry, ter one. I can give you my reasons if you're interested, but I'm prepared, for Previty, not to.

Q I'm glad to hear that. I'm also glad to draw the correlation between finding contestable markets and consulting assignments.

A Yes. I hope to learn from them.

Q Well, despite the fact that the airline industry is one of the best examples of contestability anyone seems to be able to come up with, isn't it true that the contestability benchmark has not fully held sway in the first years after deregulation in that industry?

A You are of course referring to an article by Boy Parzar and Bailey, or was it Bailey and Panzar?

I've forgotten.

Q Well, if you speil Panzar -- I know you misspelled it before, but if you spell it P-a-u-m-c-l, you'd be right.

A Well, all right, but that's based on an article by them.

Q By you?

A No. I'm basing by statement in that article

on the statement by the others I cited. But --

O Well, why don't we get the question, though. Do you agree that, even though the airline industry is one of the best examples of a contestable market, that in the years -- in the first years after deregulation, that the berchmarks of contestability don't seem to be applying?

and I have used the analogy -- that even though farming is highly competitive, during years when there is a great disturbance, a change in crop conditions, a depression, whatever, that prices do not conform to the perfectly competitive ideal. Farmers lose money, even though competitive equilibrium prices are supposed to cover the cost of capital, et cetera.

That is exactly the point I'm making, that neither perfect competition produces perfectly competitive prices in a disequilibrium circumstance, nor does a viation contestability yield perfectly contestable prices in a period of disequilibrium.

Well, if that statement is true with regard to the highly concestable mirline industry, isn't it certainly true in the railcoad industry?

A It's true anywhere.

All right. Have you found -- I re lize that

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1 you may not, and certainly have not been asked to 2 testify on this side of the issue. But have you found 3 any industry not to be contestable? 4 A I would think there are lots of industries 5 which are not. 6 O I would, tcc. Name cne. 7 A I would imagine -- and I say this without 8 study -- that automobile production and airrlane 9 manufacturing are not contestable. 10 O Have you found any service industries not to 11 be contestable? 12 MR. TOMPKINS: Is the question whether the 13 witness has done a study on this to see whether these industries are not contestable? 15 MR. MORSE: Is that an objection? 16 JUDGE HOPKINS: Could you answer that 17 question, though? 18

MR. MORSE: I didn't hear the question. I'm sorry.

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MR. TOMPKINS: It's just a clarification. Are you asking if the witness has done a study of these industries or are you asking based on his general knowledge?

MR. MORSE: What I'm trying to do is test the metes and bounds of this contestability theory that is

being proffered to the Commission in this case through the test_mony of Professor Baumol. 3 JUDGE HOFKINS: You're talking about his general knowledge, though? MR. MORSE: I'm talking about his general knowledge or, if he has specific support, let him point out out. JUDGE HOPKINS: Go shead. THE WITNESS: I've made no specific studies, but I would think of -- that there are lots of service industries which don't, lawyering and college professoring being two prime examples. BY MR. MCFSE: (Fesuring) O Those are not contestable?

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I would think not. I think there's a lot of sunk costs involved with them and a lot of restriction on entry.

JUDGE HOFKINS: What about the medical profession?

THE WITNESS: Medical is even clearer.

BY MR. MOPSE: (Resuming)

O Any other service industries which you believe not to be contestable?

A I'm shooting from the hip. I have not done a survey of industries from that point of view, but I have

said repeatedly --

Q I wouldn't have thought that that was putting you at a disadvantage, Frofessor.

A Well, probably so. But again, let me help you. I have said again and again, I do not believe the world is perfectly contestable. There is a range of industries and a range of circumstances, and one cannot work on the Panglossian premise that everything is all for the best because it is all perfectly contestable.

Q Have you reached the conclusion that the railroad industry is not perfectly contestable?

A No industry is perfectly contestable, just as no industry is perfectly competitive. Those are ideals, those are limiting cases. But to answer substantively, I think that much of railroading is subject to the pressures of contestability.

Q Much subject?

A That's right. That's a guarded statement and that's all I can give you.

Q Well, I appreciate your candor on that.

have made, the book you have written on contestable markets, is highly theoretical and describes perfect contestability. Yet in this case, in which we have much of that subject, of that theory, applying to this

merger, I have to ask this question: In your theory of contestability, have you made a determination of how far off you can be from perfect cortestability and still have your underlying analytical assumptions apply?

A The answer is, I have made no such explicit determination and no one has made such a determination anywhere for competitiveness, either, for perfect competitiveness. The situation is perfectly analogous. The inferences are that it is a matter of degree, that the further off you go the less the assurance you have.

And let me say that, lest it be thought that this is a peculiar doctrine which only a few of us hold, that this is basically an old idea for which I have given full credit, an old idea which we find, for example, reflected as recently as the Department of Justice merger guidelines, which refer to the restraining influence of potential competition, of ease of entry, et cetera.

It is precisely those features of contestability analysis and not the escterica of the multi-product vector analyses that are at stake in this proceeding. Would you have anyone believe that ease of entry of competitors who can price effectively against you are not a constraining influence on monopoly power? Because it is that which you will have to deny if you

are to deny the relevance of contestability and its logic to the issues in this merger.

Well, Professor, it's not important what I think. I'm only a poor dumb lawyer. But the ICC does think that it's irrelevant and they did so in the UP case and they did so in the Milwaukee case.

But getting back to my question, I take it from your answer that, with regard to this theory of contestability, you have no idea how precipitously your model falls off from your -- your analytical model falls off as you move away from perfect contestability; is that correct?

- A That is correct.
 - O Thank you.

Do you agree with the following statement -excuse me. Let me mark an exhibit and let me let you
read it. Let me point out the sentences that I'm going
to ask you whether you agree to.

JUDGE HOFKINS: Thank you.

MR. MORSE: I learn slowly, Your Honor, but I do learn.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: You can see why I'm wary of poor dumb lawyers.

MR. MORSI: I'd like to mark two exhibits at

this time, to save some time. The first is an argument -- excuse me, an article; it may be an argument -- published in the Yale Journal on Regulation. The authors are Elizabeth E. Bailey, an outstanding-plus economist, and William J. Fauncl, whom history will judge.

The article is entitled "Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets."

JUDGE HOPKINS: That will be marked for identification as MKT-C-57.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit Nc.

MKT-C-57 for identification.)

MR. MCRSF: And the second article that I would like to mark is an article by Elizabeth E. Bailey, an cutstanding-plus economist, which is entitled "Contestability and the Desig: of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy."

JUDGE HOPKINS: That will be marked for identification as MKT-C-58.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit Nc.

MKT-C-58 fcr
identification.)

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

O P. ofessor Baumol, let's start with MKT-C-58, which is the article by Elizabeth Bailey. And let me direct your attention to page 79. Can you locate page 79? It's in the upper right-hand corner.

- It's 179.
- 179.

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- A I've got it.
- The first full sentence in the first column begins "Fotential." Do you see that?
 - Yes.
- Q Down to the end of the paragraph. I'd like to consider whether you agree with the following statement. Do you want to read it first? I'll read it out loud:

"Potential competition becomes an ever more effective force as the extent of large irretrievable entry costs declines. milarly, incumbent firms, even those who have torne the burden of acquiring the sunk cost facility, are a problem for public policy only to the extent that they have permanent or exclusive access to that facility. Consequently, the single most important element in the design of public policy for monopoly should be the design of arrangements which render benign the exercise of power associated with

operating sunk facilities."

Do you agree with those statements?

- A In general. I don't know whether it's the single most important consideration, but it is certainly important.
 - Q But it is important?
 - A Yes.

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- Q Certainly policymakers should be considering those very factors; is that correct?
 - A For monopoly.
 - Q For mono, cly.
 - A That's right.
 - Q And dealing with monopoly.
 - A That's right.
- And any agency that has as part of its mandate dealing with monopoly should consider those factors, is that not correct?
 - A Certainly.
- O Jump one full paragraph to the paragraph that begins "The theory tells us." You can, of course, read anything in between to get the context.

Do you agree with that paragraph, the one that begins, "The theory tells us that when sunk costs are borne exclusively by a serving natural monopoly, as are railroad tracks in this country and as are local

of Covernment intervention to assure society that no excessive monopoly rents are earned from those facilities. By detaching sunk costs from the service firm, much of the need for traditional economic regulation of the service industry disappears, even if the industry is still a natural monopoly. Instead, Government intervention can often be limited to ensuring fairness of access to the sunk facility."

Do you agree with that?

A I agree with it in substance. I don't necessarily agree that a railroad is a natural moropoly, but that's another story. In fact, in general it is not.

- Q It may be an unratural monopoly?
- A Unnatural it may be, but not a monopoly.
- 0 Well, leaving that point aside, do you generally agree with the conclusions of the paragraph I just read to you?
 - A Certainly.

- O New I'd like you to skir ahead to the very end of the article, but of course skim over the intervening materials.
 - A I've done that.
 - O You have. I admire your preparedness.

Let's take a look at page 182, the first column, the second full paragraph that begins "A fourth rule." You may want to refresh on rules one through three, but I want to see whether you agree with rule number four:

"A fourth rule for the enhancement of contestability is that entry and exit should be made as easy as possible. Expedited procedures based on written pleadings, rather than an oral process, can enhance this process. Another idea is to shift the burden of proof -- to shift the burden of proof -- of showing that entry is in the public interest" -- I'm sorry.

"Another idea is to shift the burden of proof so that new entrants do not have the burden of showing that entry is in the public interest, but rather incumbents must argue that it is not. Both of these policy ideas have played important roles in the reform of aviation and transportation policy."

Do you agree with those conclusions?

- A Let's leave cut the last sentence.
- Q Let's leave out the last sentence.
- A Where I don't disagree and --
- Q I understand.
- A I agree.

Q You agree that the burden should properly be

placed on the incumbent rather than the new entrant to show that access is --

A Oh, I would certainly say -- I mean, I'm not arguing -- let me make clear, I'm not arguing as a lawyer here the terms "butten of proof."

Q Yes, I understand that.

- A I'm talking substance, not legal arrangements. And I think that where you're going to exclude entrants you have a heavy social responsibility.
- Q Sc someone who is before an agency, and which that agency has as one of its mandates to look into the monopoly of the situation, the sunk costs of the situation, the incumbents' possession of exclusive facilities, that that agency should properly put the burden of proof on the incumbent who is trying to exclude the new entry; is that correct?
- A Nc, wait one second. You're talking about trackage rights. We know that you're talking about trackage rights. You're heading there.
 - O You're so clever.
 - A Let's get right down to the point.
- O I feel unfrocked. But let me ask you, sir, not to give me a speech on trackage rights. I have carefully prepared questions. Even a roor dumb lawyer

like me spends lots of time working on questions. I'd

like to have my questions asked and answered. If you

need to give a speech in the context of one of those, I

may not be able to stop you, but at least I have a

question on the record.

A Sir, I have no speech in mind. Your question was longer than my intended answer. I merely meant to say that freedom of entry is a different matter from requiring an incumbent to give up a valuable asset. It is not equivalent to saying that entry should be free and saying that potential entrants should have free access to an incumbent's home property and marital partner.

Q You were wrong. I think they were about equalength.

JUDGE HOPKINS: That's adding to the record, too. Let's go on.

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

Without getting into specifics, you are aware are you not, that several regional railroads, including my client the MKT Failroad, have applied for trackage rights should the Santa Fe-Southern Pacific merger be approved?

A I understand that.

you do. Speaking as an economist and not as

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an advocate, you agree, do you not, with Elizabeth

Bailey that the burden of proof should be on the Santa

Fe-Southern Pacific to show why any of these

applications for trackage rights should be denied?

MR. TOMPKINS: Your Honor, I have to object at this point as to further questions about trackage rights. This witness in his testimony did not address trackage lights. It's my understanding that trackage rights are an issue that is going to be addressed by both sides in this case later on in the proceeding. This is not something the witness has gotten to in his testimony here.

MR. MORSE: Your Honor, my response is that the witness didn't address very much in his statement except his theory of contestable markets. I am using as an example to test that theory --

JUDGE HOFKINS: I'm going to allow it. Go ahead.

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

- Q Would you like me to repeat the question?
- A Yes, please.
- O Speaking as an economist and not as an advccate, you would agree, wouldn't you, with Elizabeth Bailey that the burden of proof should be on the Santa Fe-Southern Facific to show why any of these

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applications for trackage rights should be denied?

A I would agree with Elizabeth Bailey that she would not agree to that statement. I'm not talking as an advocate. I'm trying to make very clear that there is a distinction between absence of impediments to entry and the req irement that an incumbent give away a piece of his property.

O Professor, I have read your articles well enough to know that you are apparently hung up on the price of trackage rights. I want you to understand that my questions are not geared to the price of trackage rights. Otherwise, counsel's objection might be proper.

I am simply trying to test the metes and bounds of your contestable theory market -- your contestable market theory. And I'm asking you whether or not, leaving cut how much should be paid for those trackage rights, whether or not the burden of proof should be on the Santa Fe-Scuthern Pacific to show why these applications for trackage rights should be denied.

A Without price, that question has no meaning. I confess I am hung up on price, because the question has no meaning without price being specified.

Q let's assume a fair price, whatever that may

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he. Let's assume a fair price. Now can you answer my question, if the Santa Fe-Scuthern Pacific should nevertheless oppose these applications for trackage rights at a fair price?

A At a fair price, the Santa Fe would not oppose the applications for trackage rights.

- Q Any of the applications?
- A That's right.

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ahead.

- Q And neither would the Southern Pacific?
- A That's right.
- You have talked to their management?
- A Nc. I'm tal ing about what it would pay them to do.
 - O That would be your strong recommendation?
 - A That's right.
- And should they not follow your recommendation, shouldn't they have the burden of proof here to show why those applications should be turned down, despite the excellent advice of Professor Baumol?

MR. TOMPKINS: That sounds like a legal question to me.

MR. MORSE: I don't think so.

JUDGE HOPKINS: I'll let him proceed. Gc

MP. TOMPKINS: Burden of proof, I mean,

assuming it's from an economist's point of view.

BY MR. MCRSE: (Resuming)

Q Who has to make the argument?

JUDGE HOPKINS: The Commission's going to make the final decision on that, anyway. Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: I would say that if the price that was offered was fair on the market criteria which I have proposed in other testimony, that it would be -- that refusal would be difficult to explain. What procedure should then be used is up to the Commission.

BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming)

Q Isn't it a fact that if the Santa Fe-Scuthern
Pacific thought it could cain a competitive advantage by
denying trackage rights to MKT and thus entry into a
particular market by MKT, would this be inconsistent
with your assumption that railroads participate in a
contestable market?

A If it were rational for these railroads to deny an application for trackage rights at what I consider to be a fair price, that would indeed mean that they could in fact clear the market by predatory behavior and the market would indeed not be contestable.

But I would first like to see an offer of a price I would consider fair.

Q Isn't it a fact, though, that if a railroad market is truly contestable there's absolutely no reason why eliminating a legal barrier to entry, such as granting trackage rights, would lessen the contestability of a railroad market?

A Oh, it could very easily if, as usually happens, trackage rights are granted at uncompetitive prices.

We are assuming a fair price of the trackage rights. I'm trying to take you out of your price considerations and trying to use the trackage rights to test the metes and bounds of your contestability theory.

A Can you repeat the question?

Q Yes. Isn't it a fact that if the railroad market is truly contestable there is absolutely no reason why eliminating a legal barrier to entry, such as by granting trackage rights, would lessen the contestability of the railroad market?

A Granting of trackage rights at a fair and compensatory price would not lessen the contestability of the market.

Q In fact, under your theory it might very well improve it?

A Certainly.

JUDGE HOPKINS: I think this might be a gccd time for a 15-minute recess.

(Becess.)

JUDGE HOPKINS: Let's get back on the record.

Mr. Morse.

MR. MORSE: Thank you, Your Honor.

BY MR. MCFSE: (Resuming)

Professor, isn't it a fact that you and other economists who support the theory of contestable markets have argued strongly for overcoming harriers to entry, in particular by giving equal access to scarce facilities for all competitors as a means of achieving contestability in a particular market?

A Very much so. But we have also argued against cost subsidy, and it is my experience that in the past when people have applied for trackage rights what they've been applying for is not equal access, but for a cost subsidy. That's why I keep emphasizing the issue of full, fair and compensatory pricing.

Q Yes, you can assume that. But I wasn't talking about trackage rights here. We were talking about overcoming barriers to entry.

let me ask the question again, because I think you may have felt we were still back on trackage rights. Isn't it a fact that you and other economists

who support your theory of contestability have argued strongly for overcoming barriers to entry, in particular by giving equal access to scarce facilities for all competitors as a means of achieving contestability in a particular market?

A Certainly.

O Don't you in fact take the position that regulators and policymakers should seek policies that promote contestability?

A That's right.

Q Can I direct your attention now to MKT-C-57, which is the article by you and outstanding-plus Elizabeth Bailey. It's printed in the Yale Journal on Regulation. Do you have that in front of you, sir?

A Yes. But may I put in the record that the "plus" is yours. I've very glad you have granted it.

Well, I take that as a compliment. I will put a "rlus" next to my name henceforth. That shows how you can misinterpret almost any answer, Professor.

Can I direct your attention to what is marked page 115. And I have to confess that the copies we had did not hear page numbers, so they were handwritter on so that we could refer to them together. And I'm going to ask you whether you agree with certain statements that you and Dean Bailey wrote.

Under Roman II, "The implications of 2 contestability theory for regulatory policy," dc ycu see 3 that? 4 Which page are we on? 115. 5 0 6 This is in the Yale Journal? 7 Hold on. locks like my cory got numbered 8 differently. 9 A Sorry to be an uncooperative witness. JUDGE HOPKINS: We're all having that 10 11 trouble. 12 BY MR. MORSE: (Resuming) 13 I apclogize. We're talking about page 123. 14 I'd like you to go down three sentences under Roman II 15 with the sentence that begins "Regulators should seek." Do you agree with the statement that "Regulators should 16 17 seek policies that promote contestability"? 18 MR. TOMPKINS: That's been asked and 19 answered. 20 BY MR. MCRSE: (Resuming) 21 O "If an industry behaves as if it is contestable, most of the benefits of perfect competition 23 can be obtained without Government intervention." Do 24 you still agree with that statement?

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A That's right.

Q Going down to the next full paragraph,
beginning with the sentence "Short of doing everything
possible," do you agree with the following statement:

"Short of doing everything possible to foster contestability, regulators should certainly cease doing those things that work against it. Direct regulatory attempts to impede entry or exit or to interfere with the timing or manner of entry must, at the very least, be questioned severely. Moreover, regulators should keep their eyes open for entry barriers erected by firms and should take steps to discourage the maintenance of those barriers."

Do you agree with that?

- A Certainly, enthusiastically.
- Q Overwhelmingly?
- A If you like.
- O Enthusia stically is enough.

I direct your attention to page 124, the first full paragraph on page 124. Do you agree with the following statement:

"In these cases, regulators are just beginning to experiment with new methods to ensure that no excessive profits are earned from sunk cost facilities. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional rate and entry regulation, they have turned to two rather noble

approaches.

The first of these entails Government intervention to ensure equal access to the sunk facility. If the facility is privately owned, the Government requires that all firms seeking to use the facility be given access to it, that the access price be reasonable, and that all users be charged the same price. If the sunk facility is in the hands of a local public authority, then that authority is encouraged not to discriminate among private users in its access policies."

Do you agree with that still today?

A Absolutely, and I emphasize again the phrase that the price be reasonable, which of course cuts toth ways. It precludes prices which are excessive and it

precludes prices which are uncompensatory and therefore entail a cross-subsidy.

Q I'd like to direct your attention, before we are finished, to your testimony at the bottom of page 6. I have read that argument with certain amusement. I note your argument that if a merger is likely to enhance market power, competitors will usually have little to lose and perhaps even a great deal to gain, and therefore you would expect them to remain relatively silent and not oppose the merger. But if the merger is

likely to yield efficiency gains, this would make it harder for competitors and they could be relied upon to object vociferously to the proposed merger.

Is that a fair representation of your argument?

- A I think it's a guctation and therefore fair.
- Q Isn't it the fact that the same argument could be made with regard to trackage rights applications in this case?
- The same argument? Not necessarily, no, because if a trackage rights proposal is in effect, as it has been historically, an attempt to get a cross-subsidy at the expense of the landlord railroad, then that is not at all analogous to the argument on page 6.
- Well, isn't it a fact -- we're assuming a fair price for the trackage rights.
- A Ah, but that's not what is the relevant assumption here.
- You're an expert and I'd like to have you consider that assumption, relevant or not, and answer the questions.

 It's the only way that I can get to apply your arguments in one context, to test them in another context.

A All right.

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Q Isn't it a fact that if the acquisition of trackage rights by, let's say, the MKT would result in an enhancement of market power to the MKT, the Santa Fe-Southern Pacific would have little to lose and would expect rot to protest?

MR. TOMPKINS: We're back on trackage rights again, and this time it has nothing to do with contestability, the witness' theory of contestability.

MR. MORSE: Again, Your Honor, that is correct. I'm using the trackage rights example to test the metes and bounds of a statement made by this witness at the lottom of page 6.

JUDGE HOPKINS: I'm allowing it.

THE WITNESS: It depends on whether the relationships between the two railroads in this case are horizontal or vertical. But it's probably true that if the price were fair and compensatory and the incumbent railroad then -- that is, the potential landlord railroad -- then protested, it would certainly suggest that there are problems of monopoly, of market power.

BY MR. MCRSE: (Resuming)

O New furthermore, if the acquisition of these trackage rights by, let's say, the MKT would result in efficiency gains to the KKT, wouldn't it also follow that the Santa Fe-Southern Facific would surely object

to the acquisitions of those trackage rights?

A Not at all, not if the price were fully compensatory, because in that case it would be more profitable in a competitive market for the landlord railroad to share in those efficiency gains from the revenues it got from the trackage rights than to use its perhaps inferior efficiency to get what it could out of that space on its tracks.

I can go into much more detail in that and perhaps on a future occasion I will, but that is the essence of the matter. It is only when the trackage rights payments is not fully compensatory that the problem you suggest arises.

O By the way, Professor, isn't it a fact that the Santa Fe and Scuthern Pacific objected very strongly to the merger between the Union Pacific and the MF railroads?

A It may very well be true. I don't remember. I take your word for it.

Does that indicate to you that the Scuttern Pacific cr the Santa Fe felt that the merger between the UP and the MP would result in little or no market rower enhancement?

A I suspect that they feared the efficiency

pairs it would produce. Look, lawyers and professors also object when the competition gets tougher. It's a perfectly understandable and natural reaction. It's a human frailty and I am not surprised if that happened in this case.

O In which case?

- A In the case you cited.
- Q Well, does it indicate to you that the Santa

 Fe and the Southern Pacific felt that the merger between

 the UP and the MP would result in great efficiencies?
- A I suggest that that's what they feared, at least subconsciously.

MR. MCRSE: We have no further questions of this witness.

JUDGE HOFKINS: Who's next? Mr. Leary.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. LEARY:

Professor, my name is Tom Leary. I'm with the firm of Hogan and Hartson, representing the Rio Grande Railroad in this proceeding. And my colleague Susan DeSanti from that same firm is here with me.

If memory serves me right, I may have taken some economics from you at Princeton a number of years ago.

A You look familiar, and if so I'm delighted to

meet you again.

JUDGE HOFKINS: Did you give him an A?

THE WITNESS: If not, I may live to regret
it.

BY MR. LEARY: (Resuming)

- Q If I display a lamentable weakness in my knowledge here this morning, you can draw your own conclusions.
 - A I see I can't win.
- Q Anyway, on page 23 of your statement you said that: "Based on economic analysis, there are strong grounds for the expectation that this merger will indeed enhance efficiency significantly." Is that correct?
- A Will enhance efficiency -- will enhance efficiency, I would say substantially.
 - Q "Substantially" is all right.
 - A Yes.
- Q And you also state, don't you, that there are likely to be efficiencies related to both end-to-end and horizontal aspects of the merger, do you not?
- A I state that, partly on the basis of general inference, partly in the evidence of witnesses cited.
- Q Have you examined any maps that show the routes of the Southern Facific and the Santa Fe?
- A I've seen some of the maps, but I would not be

prepared to reconstruct them.

- Q I'm not going to question you in any detail.

 You are aware of the fact in a general way, are you not,
 that there are some areas where the Santa Fe and the
 Southern Pacific serve identical points at both ends?
 - A That's right.
- Q And there are other areas, are there not, where one carrier serves a particular origin and another carrier may serve a particular destination? Are you generally familiar with that?
 - A That's right.
- And one example, I suggest to you, though you may not be familiar with it, is the Southern Pacific serves northern California and Oregon and the Santa Fe does not, whereas on the other end the Santa Fe serves Chicago directly and the Southern Pacific does not. Are you aware of that?
- A I seem to remember that and I am confident that you are describing it with extreme accuracy.
- O I believe you testified earlier that you have not made any study of the extent to which the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific interline traffic today, is that right?
 - A That's correct.
 - O Have you made any study to determine whether

right now these carriers might be able to achieve at least some end-to-end efficiencies by interline arrangements that fall short of a merger?

A No, I have made no such studies. However, my analysis leads me to conclude that, while there may be such opportunities, there is more to be gained by merger. And I think in this case I must expand my answer a little bit, if you will bear with me.

Q Fine.

A The point is this. If my locic and the evidence of the witnesses on whom I rely are valid, so that there is no gain in market power of any substantial degree to be expected from the merger -- let's just assume this as a hypothesis -- then the only reason such a merger should be desired by the railroads is that it offers them gains on efficiency which they could not achieve by other means.

That is to say, the very fact that they are in here going through this procedure only makes sense. unless if they are making a terrible mistake, on the assumption that their analysis of the situation, their evaluation of the situation, leads them to believe, A, that they can gain in efficiency, and B, they can gain more than they could without -- without a merger, but simply by contracts and other forms of negotiation.

Of course, firms do make mistakes in their mergers, but then who can second guess the firms themselves? Surely that is the nature of our faith in the general workability of the market process.

O In all seriousness, there was no implication in my question that there may or may not be additional efficiencies to be gained by a merger. I really wasn't challenging that. And what I was asking you was whether or not you made any kind of an inquiry as to whether or not there might be some efficiencies that they could achieve right now by arrangements that fall short of a merger.

A The answer is I have made no inquiry, but I would be amazed if there weren't some.

Q Are you aware of the fact that there is relatively very little exchange of traffic between the Scuthern Pacific and the Santa Fe right now, notwithstanding the fact that there are some substantial end to end connections, as you recognize?

A No, I was not aware of that.

On page 28 through 33 of your statement, you present, do you not, a hypothetical example of the benefits to be gained by coordinated pricing of carriers that are joined end to end?

A Benefits that can be gained, that might be

gained.

Q Benefits that might be gained. Incidentally, is that an example that is taken from -- is there an assumption of contestability in that example?

A There's an assumption of imperfect contestability. If it were perfectly contestable, the example would not apply, because the market pressures would force those benefits to be achieved without the merger.

O In your cpinion, is a merger the only way by which parties could accomplish the coordinated pricing to which you refer in that hypothetical example?

A In general, it need not be. It depends on how complex the price structure is, how much conversation, how complex the contracting that is recuired, et cetera. So there can be cases in which merger is not required and other cases in which it is.

O In terms of your hypothetical, sir, couldn't they get together right now and say: Look, everyone will be better off if we just set a joint rate of \$20 and split it evenly?

A Assuming that they were permitted to do so, it may very well be that that would suffice, depending, as I say, on the complexity of the rate calculations that would be involved.

Q Right. From an economist's point of view, would this possibility hold true even if carriers A and B were bitter competitors in other areas?

A Oh, certainly.

Do you believe that there are natural suspicions which competitors may have of one another that could carry over and make it more difficult to negctiate with one another, even in situations where it might be legal and mutually profitable to do so?

A Of course.

O In economic terms, would you say that the fact of competition would impose perhaps a higher transaction cost on that kind of a negotiation?

A That's a legitimate way of interpreting it.

The fact of the natural suspicion that competitors may feel for one another?

A Certainly.

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A I'm not prepared to speak for the railroad people.

O You're not familiar with those terms.

A T've heard the terms, but I do know that railroad people have mentioned precisely the point you're making now, and I believe them.

problem which you, as an economist, recognize may account in part for a railroad's preference for its own long line service over an interline connection, even when that interline connection would be otherwise efficient?

Indeed possible, and that imperfections of the sort you cite, bitter rivalries inability to stand one another's management, et cetera, may lead people to do things which are expensive to themselves and their stockholders.

MR. TOMPKINS: 7°m not sure the witness had finished his answer. I think the vitness was continuing his answer.

BY MR. LEARY: (Resuming)

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- 2 I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you.
- A And can conceivably lead merged firms to favor their own over rivals' facilities. I would think, however, that the scope for that would be limited in an industry which is subject to competitive tressures and which is having difficulties earning adequate revenues and covering its cost of carital.
- Q Would this problem of suspicion that carries over into negotiations, which you recognize as an economist, also account for a railroad's concern when it has to rely upon a competitor for access to a market?
 - A Oh, it could very well.
- On page 15 of your statement, Professor, you state at the top that although railroading may be an extreme example of an industry in which entry and exit are not easy, the opposite is clearly true of at least barge and truck transportation.

Is that correct?

- A That's correct.
- Q And then you go on to say that the record of actual entry into and exit from the truck and barge industries confirms the ease with which they can be carried out; is that correct?
 - A Yes.
 - Q Before we go on, have you made any study of

the potential for barge transportation over the western mountains and deserts?

A Nc, I haven't.

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- O What sources did you consult to refer to the "actual entry into and exit from trucking operations in 1983?"
- A I have not examined the data from 1983.
- Well, have you examined any data with respect to actual entrance into and exit from operations?
- A I have seen some data over the years. I do not recall exactly what they were.
- O You don't claim, do you, that a record of frequent entry and exit necessarily demonstrates that people are engaged in hit and run forays into contestable markets, do you?
- A Nc, sir. Nor are hit and run forays necessary for contestability. It is merely the possibility that is needed.
 - 0 I understand.

In other words, if the records show no entry and exit, that might also reflect a fact of contestability because there are no opportunities. Is that correct?

A Sure. But the existence of exit and entry is a stfficient but not a necessary condition for a showing

of contestability.

Q Well, then maybe I misunderstood your answer.

Are you saying that a record which shows simply

statistics as to entry into cr exit from a particular

industry is evidence, by itself, of contestability?

A Ch, I would need, in addition, evidence on the amount of sunk costs that are involved. Remember, in the -- at one point I said, I think in something that was cited today, that contestability requires entry to be quick, cheap, and easy.

Of course, by cheap I don't mean that it requires a small investment. It merely requires a small sunk investment.

Q I heard that, and I don't need that now. My only question is whether or not statistics as to entry and exits themselves demonstrate contestability. And I believe your answer was no.

A That's right. They establish a presumption, but no more.

- Q Establish a presumption?
- A Yeah.
- Q All right. Fave you made any studies to determine whether there are specific examples in the railroad industry where trucks have seen a profit opportunity entered, skimmed off a substantial amount of

business, and then got out again before railroads could react by lowering rates?

- A No. I have made no such study.
- Q Are you familiar with any other studies of this phenomenon, if it exists?
 - A I know of none.

Q Can you give us one example of the kind of hit and run entry by trucks that you say exerts a pervasive discipline on rail prices in the vast areas affected by this merger?

A No, but you yourself pointed out that all that is necessary for the purpose is the possibility. I would, in fact, expect very little of that as long as the railroad industry is not earning excess profits.

It is precisely the excess profits that act as the lure for that scrt of entry and exit. Remember, the name of the game here is the prevention of monopolistic behavior by the railroads.

One way to prevent that sort of runishmert is not to engage in the monopoly pricing in the first place.

Q Will you turn to page 3 of your statement, please? You state there, there are two ways a merger can enhance profits. Isn't that correct?

A Yes.

Q It can introduce or enhance market power, or it can enhance profit by contributing to efficiencies. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q And it's possible, isn't it, that a merger could add to profits, both by contributing efficiercy and by contributing market power?

A Certainly.

On page 4 of your statement, you have stated, have you not, that "showing that a merger will lead to no enhancement of market power is sufficient grounds for the removal of any public sector impediment to its consummation."

Is that correct?

A That's certainly my view.

Q And then you go on to say -- and this is on page 20 -- and I'm going to telescope a little bit here, and I don't want to do it unfairly -- that it's simply not possible for this merger to serve as a source of market power if the factual evidence presented by Temple, Farker & Sloane and by Reebie Associates is accurate.

Is that right?

A I believe that's --

Q If I'm doing it --

A Nc, I think that is not unfair. I think without some of the preceding points that it comes out a little more extreme than that.

Q In other words, what you're saying is you don't rely exclusively on Reebie or TBS, but primarily as support for your statement.

A I do, and I certainly can imagine that in a very limited number of routes or for a limited set of commodities, that there would be some need for regulatory attention.

O I see.

These witnesses break down the product categories which they study into the various aggregates for study, don't they?

A That's correct.

And to refresh your recollection, I believe that the TBS people used two-digit SIC codes and the Reelie people used four broad commodity groupings. And I guess, whether that's correct or not, the question is have you made any independent inquiries to determine whether the groupings used by these witnesses are appropriate, or have you just relied upon their opinion.

A The answer is that I have not made an independent study. I have gone over the logic of their

classification and, for example, the second study which
you cite -- and it's four independent categories -essentially uses what to me is the right criterion,
which is substitutability in transportation of different
commodities.

That is, if you can take a trailer and put it on a railroad car, it doesn't matter which commodity is inside that trailer as far as competitiveness is concerned.

Sc that I have at least considered the logic of their procedure, though I have not made an independent study.

- O Is it your testimony that, as a general proposition, that substitutability to which you refer, occurs within the full span of a two-digit SIC category?
 - A Not necessarily; no.
- Q Did you make any independent test to verify the appropriateness of the geographical groupings contained in the Reebie study?
 - A No. I did not.

- Q I take it, then, that you would not be gregaed to say that a different geographical grouping is wrong?
 - A No, I'm not prepared to say that.
 - Q You state on page 8 cf your statement: "Two

firms are in the same market if the presence of either constrains the price setting options of the other. But that constraint is always a matter of degree."

Is that correct?

A That's correct.

O And then you go on to say: "In reality, there is never a clear boundary with all firms within that boundary limiting one another's price setting powers equally, and all firms outside the boundary doing so only minimally, if at all."

Correct?

- A Correct.
- Q In deciding this case, the Commission has to draw some kind of boundary, doesn't it?
- A No, sir. In deciding any case, the Commission does not have to use distortions of reality which rely on the invention of bright lines and imaginary boundaries.

The realities of the world are complicated, but incorrect decisions are made when those complications are assumed away. The reality of the world is exactly as I describe it here, and it is that which the Commission should take into account.

Q Is there not a boundary implicit in the tabulations of, say, Reebie Associates on which you

rely?

A There is a boundary, and it is very explicitly drawn to be incorrect because inadequate. If they have done what they claim to do -- and I cannot take responsibilty for them -- what they have done is to include only competitors which, on their criteria, are very strong and clear-cut competitors of the railroads in question and have left out other, weaker constraining forces.

In other words, they have adopted deliberately two narrow a definition of the market on the grounds that if they could demonstrate that even within those narrow markets, there is plenty of competition, then in a market properly envisaged, there would certainly be adequate commetition.

But that's quite different from saying that that is the "true boundary" of a market.

- Q I suppose if you had direct evidence as to elasticities, you could dispense with all this market stuff, couldn't you?
 - A Well, it certainly would help.
- Q . Have you ever suggested that it might be more appropriate for a tribunal like the Commission to lock at elasticities directly, rather than getting into this market analysis?

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A I have certainly suggested that where such data can be obtained reliarly and without too much cost, that it would be an appropriate procedure. But sometimes the cost is not worth the gain in accuracy, and then you engage in what Frank Knight once described as an irrational passion for dispassionate rationality.

- Q Did you make any studies of demand elasticities in connection with this case?
 - A No. sir.

- Q Did you familiarize yourself with any of the literature on that subject in connection with this case?
 - A No, sir.
- On page 36 of your testimony, you state that in contestable markets, the sort of traffic diversion projected for the -- I am again paraphrasing, and I don't want to do it unfairly -- the sort of traffic diversion projected for the merged carrier will occur only in response to an increase in the relative efficiency of the merged railroad.

Do you see those statements?

- A Yes, I recall them. This is on page 36?
- O That's on page 36.
- A Ckay. I see it.
- Q I notice the starts, "In contestable

markets." Would it make a difference if the market were not contestable?

,

A Ch, certainly.

O So your statement that diversions necessarily reflect efficiencies is a y to your opinion about contestability. Is that correct?

A That's right.

Q Would you turn to page 12 of your statement for a moment? You state there, do you not, that a reduction in the number of competitors in the market will not contribute to market power if there is a large number of competitors.

Is that right?

A That's one sufficient condition.

Q And isn't the converse also true, that there are greater grounds for concern as the number of competitors grows smaller?

A That's carefully and well-stated, but it is not the converse, because while there are greater grounds for concern, it does not follow that there will necessarily be a problem as the number of firms decreases.

I said it was carefully and well-stated and I meant it.

O So was your answer, sir.

In fact, the Department of Justice merger guidelines even indicate there is concern if, szy, ten 3 roughly equal sized competitors are reduced to nine, don't they? A In a market that is not contestable, that may well be grounds for concern. O And under the Department of Justice

guidelines, a market with five roughly equal sized competitors is described as highly concentrated, isn't it?

A But the same guidelines also tell you that ease of entry can change things.

Q I understand. Have you made any studies to determine the extent to which truck market shares would vary in any of the commodities or any of the geographic groupings, assuming the hyrothetical 5 percent price increase that the guidelines talk about?

A Nc, I have not.

Q Let me direct your attention now to the last page of your testimony. You talk there about the formation of a body of "mega-systems."

Do you see that, four lines down?

Yes.

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What railroads do you define as mega-systems?

Well, I'm not prepared to give a list of

Q Is it clear to you that neither the Santa Fe nor the Southern Pacific, as they exist today, are mega-systems?

A That's a term of art. I cannot offer you a borderline between "mega" and "mini" systems.

O Do you have any evidence which suggests that these mega-systems, however, defined, are more efficient than other railroads?

A In cases where the -- there was no evidence that the systems offered any significant increase in market power, it is clear to me that management must have expected improvements in efficiency, and I am prepared to accept them as the rest judges of the matter, as we cenerally do.

Q Do you know of any evidence that would demonstrate that efficiency is correlated with an increase in the size of a railroad?

A Not always. Naturally not. In many cases, one might have inefficiencies grow from size. That's exactly why I believe that where there is no issue of market power, one should let the market judge for

itself.

I am not in a position, nor are you, even though you took my course, I gather, to judge case by case, in advance, better than management whether it is more efficient for that particular circumstance to grow larger or to grow smaller, to combine or to divorce.

O Are you suggesting that managers sometimes know the potential possibilities of their own husiness better than we do?

A I am suggesting that in general they do, even though they make mistakes.

Q And are you suggesting that scmetimes managers may have a better idea of whether they can achieve scme market power as a result of a course of action than we do?

A I am sure they do.

MR. LEARY: I think that's it, Your Honor.

JUDGE HOFKINS: Thank you.

Who's next?

MR. BLEAKNEY: I think I'm next, Your Honor.

Professor Raumol, Robert Bleakney. I'm with Sullivan & Boicester, and I'm counsel for the Kansas City Southern Railway.

Your Honor, I distributed earlier today four sheets as counsel exhibits. I trust Professor Baumol

has a set. I did give them to counsel.

MR. TOMPKINS: We did get these this morring. But I will say Professor Baumol hasn't had a chance to study these.

MR. BLEAKNEY: Do you prefer that we proceed after lunch with our examination? If you do, that's fine.

MR. TOMPKINS: I'm not sure what you are going to ask him on hypotheticals, but they do seem to be fairly complex. It might be better and more efficient if Professor Baumol has a chance to look at them.

JUDGE HOPKING: He hasn't had a chance to look at them?

MR. BLEAKNEY: That's fine. Why don't I defer my cross-examination until after lunch. Your Heaor.

May I have them warked now, or should we just defer them until after lunch?

JUDGE HOPKINS: Why don't we have them marked anyway? Have you got the next number? I don't have

With a caveat, that the last MCS number was 13. That would make the next one 14. Tomeone else might have better information, but that's the best information I have.

1 JUDGE HOPKINS: I left my others upstairs. 2 Which one are you starting with? Case No. 1? 3 MR. BLEAKNEY: Case No. 1 will be 14 on that 4 basis. 5 JUDGE HOFKINS: That would be KCS-C-14 marked 6 for identification. 7 Case 2 would be KCS-C-15 for identification. Case 3 will be KCS-C-16 for identification. 8 9 Case 4 will be KCS-C-17 for identification. 10 (The documents referred to 11 were marked Exhibits 12 KCS-C-14 through 17 for 13 identification.) 14 MR. BLEAKNEY: It makes sense for me to defer, 15 ther, all my cross-examination. 16 JUDGE HOPKINS: Is there anytody else that's 17 ready for a short cross-examination? We can come tack 18 to yours after lunch. 19 Anybody else ready? 20 MR. LIVINGSTON: Your Honor, i'd prefer to go 21 after lunch. JUDGE HOFKINS: Well, I'd like to get -- what 22 23 about Mr. White? I was counting on going until 12:30 sc 24 we could get something --

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MR. LIVINGSTEN: I'm a little concerned that I

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would be split up if I were to start now.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. WHITE:

Q Gccd afternoon, Professor Baumol. My name is Charles White. I represent Texas Mexican in this proceeding.

First of all, sir, dc you know what Texas Mexican Railway is?

- A Nc. I don't.
 - Q Have you heard it before?
- A I've heard of it, but I would love to be illuminated.
- O Well, it's a line that connects Corpus Christi for port to Laredo, which a rather important international gateway linking the Mexican railways with the U.S. rail system.
 - A Thank you.
- O Sir, I had the privilege of working with you on the CSX case on the barge side of the equation, and I recall that the most important lesson that you taught us as counsel was that your contestability market theory dependended on ease of entry and mobility of assets within the market.

Am I correct in that recollection?

A That's certainly right.

I also recall that the contestability theory
depended on effective competition being presented by
barge lines and truck lines to the rail system involved.
Is my recollection correct?

- A Either competition or potential competition.
- O Yes.

Sir, on page 14 of your testimony, you indicate that where a transportation market is served only by railroads, even if it includes a substantial number of such carriers, it is not to be expected that the market will be contestable.

Sir, did counsel advise you that Mr.

Fitzgerald of Santa Fe testified here that trucking does
not provide a competitive force for rail traffic moving
to Mexico?

MR. TOMPKINS: Does counsel have a reference to the transcript where Mr. Fitzgerald said that?

MR. WHITE: I don't have a transcript page.
But I'm just asking if counsel advised you that Mr.
Fitzgerald, on cross-examination, testified to that
effect.

A No, I was not advised of that. Eut, of course, it needn't be truck transportation. I admit my ignorance on the subject.

Q Have you studied at all, sir, the

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characteristics of international traffic moving between the United States and Mexicc in this assignment?

A No, sir.

Are you aware, sir, that the Reebie study specifically -- we were talking about boundaries with Mr. Leary -- but are you aware that the Reebie study specifically declined to study traffic crossing the international boundary into and out of Mexico?

A No, I'm not aware of that.

O Do you have a feel, sir, or do you have any knowledge of what the commerce flows are by rail into and out of Mexico?

A I haven't any idea.

Q Would you agree, sir, that the international traffic aspect of this case is a legitimate, identifiable market to study?

A It's certainly a legitimate subject for study. I don't want to get into market definition.

Q I believe Mr. Leary also asked you, sir, if you were familiar with the maps of the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe systems.

Are you familiar with your own recollection to the degree that they serve the boundries into and out of Mexico?

A No, I'm not.

Q If I posed a question, sir, to the effect that as a result of the merger, Santa Fe Scuthern Pacific, as a consolidated entity, would control by direct access all of the Mexican border crossings with the exception of one, would you view that as a concentration of market power with respect to international traffic? MR. TOMPKINS: I take it that's a hypothetical question? MR. WHITE: I began it with an "if."

THE WITNESS: I would say it certainly would require looking -- justify looking into. It would depend on whether, for example, other modes were evailable and could effectively carry much of the traffic.

BY MR. WHITE: (Resuming)

Q But I take it, sir, in the course of your assignment, you didn't focus on international traffic at all?

A No, sir. That is, I agree with you.

MR. WHITE: Well, that's all I have. Thank
you, sir.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Are there any other short ones that we could get in before 12:30?

Who else is going to cross-examine?

Department of Justice? You will be some length?

MR. RATNER: We'll be longer than 15 minutes.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Were there any others?

Well, then, we'll be in recess now until -let's make it 1:15.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. o'clock the hearing in the above-entitled matter recessed, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m. o'clock, this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:15 p.m.)

Whereuron,

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the witness on the stand at the time of the recess, resumed the stand and, having been previously duly sworn by the Administrative law Judge, was further examined and testified as follows:

JUDGE HOPKINS: Let's get back on the record.

Mr. Bleakney, are you ready?

MR. BIEAKNEY: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Are you ready, Dr. Baumol?

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. BLEAKNEY:

Hello again, Dr. Faumol. How are you?

I'd like to address to you a few questions

concerring the KCS exhibits which I assume you looked at over noon.

A I don't have them in front of me, but I guess the ritual is that you have to hand them to me.

Q Just so we don't have any misunderstandings, I want you to understand at the cutset, that in any cf these questions I'm not asking you to reach any specific conclusions about this specific case or do anything other than deal with these as hypotheticals.

First, would you look at Exhibit KCS-C-14, and I think you will note on it the various assumptions built into that exibit as to geography, competitive options, cost, demand, and price.

Would you agree that the conclusions shown on that exhibit, based on the assumptions shown of a \$4 per ton price, is a correct conclusion?

A That's correct.

Now, let us move on to the next exhibit,

KCS-C-15 and I think you will recognize we've now added

trucking competition to the hypothetical. Is that your

understanding?

A That's right.

And again, on the other assumptions shown, could you give your estimate of what the price would be that Railroad A would charge under these circumstances?

A Certainly under the assumption that there is no other constraining competition, I would expect it to charge \$3.50 or \$3.49 a ton.

O Yes. \$3.50 or a shade below.

A Exactly.

Q And that would be to either meet or get slightly below the long run marginal cost of the motor carrier competition; is that correct?

A That's right.

Q Sc much for that exhibit. We're moving quickly.

Now let us turn to Exhibit KCS-C-16 and here again I am sure you recognize that besides the motor carrier, we've introduced another railroad operating between the two points X and Z.

You recognize that, do you rot?

- A That's correct.
- Q And based upon the other assumptions to the hypothetical on that page, what would be your estimate of the rrice that would be charged by Failroad A?
- The answer is that it might very well end up charging \$2 a ton, and that Bailroad A might very well go broke in the process because, assuming there are fixed costs and assuming, just for simplicity, that there is only one product carried, so there is no ambiguities about what is meant by total and average cost, I would expect that the \$2 a ton cost, long run marginal cost, would be below the long run average cost, so that a price, the equilibrium price of \$2 or short run equilibrium price of \$2 a ton would be destructive to loth railroads.
- O So on that basis, would you not expect both railroads to price somewhat above \$2 per ton?

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A Well, it depends. What would happen under those circumstances is not clear, but they might very well, depending on the magnitude of the fixed cost, end up pricing at \$3.50 I don't know.

Q Can we then agree that the price would be perhaps -- strike perhaps -- would be somewhere between \$2 and \$3.50?

A That's right. It couldn't be above \$3.50, nor could it be below \$2.

Q Yes. And if A and B did, in fact, as railroads engage in intense competition, it would not doubt be closer to the \$2 than the £3.50?

A That's right. And you might end up with exactly the sort of situation you have now where neither of them is able to pay its cost of capital.

And if one of ther went out of business, we'd be back to hypothe 'cal No. 2, would we not?

A That's right, and that might very well restore a healthy arrangement. I'm not saying it would. I am saying it is perfectly consistent with a situation in case 3 in which the railroads are destroying one another, and their capital stock is deteriorating, whereas after a merger where price is permitted to go closer to \$3.50, one might end up with a viable railroad in which both trucks and railroads were able to serve

the public.

So the conclusion is not clear.

Q Yes. But on the hypothetical, assuming both railroads priced to meet their long run marginal costs, we don't necessarily need to conclude that pricing with that in mind would put either one out of business, do we?

A Oh, no, sir. We have to conclude precisely that, because as long as there are fixed costs -- and surely in railroading there are fixed costs -- then pricing at long run marginal cost will inevitably produce rates of return less than the cost of capital -- not sometimes, but certainly and always.

O New, will you, however, on the premise that both of these railroads price sufficiently high to keep themselves at least in business, on Exhibit 16 the railroad prices would be lower than the \$3.50 per ton we talked of with only the truck competition?

A Sc. sir. I can no longer conclude that. All I can agree is it won't be any higher.

Q I see.

Now, if Railroads A and B merged, on hypothetical case 3, is it not true that whatever influence the existence of the two railroads had on keeping the price below 93.50, if there were any such

influence, it would evaporate?

A That is correct. And that might, for the first time, permit a viable, healthy railroad operation there maybe. I'm just trying to emphasize that neither of us has a clear-cut conclusion about the benefits or costs of that.

- Q I'm not trying to suggest to the contrary.
- A Ch, of course.
- Q I am suggesting that perhaps capital costs would add \$1.50 a ton over long run marginal of only \$2 is as hypothetical as any other hypothesis. Isn't that correct?
 - A Certainly.
- Q Now, let's look to case 4, if you will, and here we've added or changed case 3 so that the competing railroad operation previously performed by Railroad B is now performed jointly by Railroads B and C.

Do you see that?

- A That's correct.
- Q And let's assume -- again you made qualifications on this -- let's assume for the moment that Railroad A in this market is transporting some of the traffic at \$2.50 a ton. Do you have that assumption in sind?

A All right.

10/25/84 -PAGES- 3725-3784 F. D. 30400And would you also assume that the remainder
of the traffic moves over the combined operation of B
and C at the same rate, so we're talking a single line
rate for Railroad A of \$2.50 and a joint line rate of

Railroads B and C of \$2.50.

Do you have those facts in mind -- assumed facts, if you will?

A Yes.

Q Would you also please assume that Railroads B and C equally divide the rate. The division is \$1.25 apiece for simplicity. Thank you.

Now, with those assumptions in mind, would you consider a merger between Railroad A and Railroad B? In other words, a single line railroad and one of the joint line railroads.

In your opinion, would the merged carrier have an incentive to divert traffic from the former B-C joint line route to its own single line route?

A On the assumption that each was just overing its cost of capital?

O Coly on the assumptions I've given you here, and I've given you no assumptions on that point. Can you reach a conclusion on the assumptions on this exhibit?

A I cannot reach a conclusion on that.

Q New, let's add your assumption that each of these railroads is just meeting its cost of capital and let's proceed to your assumption.

A In that case, the answer is it would have no incentive to divert traffic from B-C to A.

Q Let's assume, notwithstanding either your assumption or on the possibility that assumption does not prove out in real life, that there were such diversion. And let's assume then that all of the traffic was diverted to the single line service.

Would that not mean that Railroad C would then lose \$1.25 a ton it previously had been receiving?

MR. TOMPKINS: I'm not sure what the assumptions are now about -- does the witness understand?

THE WITNESS: I may have gotten a little lost in the very last go-arcund. May I just ask a clarifying question?

BY MR. BIEAKNEY: (Pesuming)

Q Surely.

A I take it we are still dealing with the case where C -- where both railroads or ail three railroads were earning only the cost of capital?

O Well, right now, I'm not even dealing with that. I'm just going to my assumptions as to long run

marginal ccst.

Can you answer any question about this exhibit on that basis?

A The answer is that in the long run, the marginal cost is not enough to give you a basis for that judgment. I have to know something about the return on capital. If the return on capital is exactly equal to the cost of capital, then as far as Railroad C is concerned, it's a wash.

let's assume that in earning the difference between its division and its long run marginal cost, which on this hypothesis is 25 cents a ton -- do you have that in mind? This is Railroad C, \$1.25 versus \$1.

A Yeah.

O That Railroad C is earning over its cost of capital. Do you have that assumption?

A Yep.

And assume also that the merger did cause diversion from Railroad C. Would you agree that Railroad C was justified in opposing the merger of Railroads A and B?

A From the social point of view, on the contrary. The fact that it was earning more than the cost of capital is indefensible, and I would say no, it

was hardly justified at all.

It would be confessing its guilt.

- Q Now, let's assume it were earning precisely its cost of capital. Is it them justified to protest the merger?
- A No, because it's a wash as far as it is concerned.
- Q Let's assume it's not a wash in terms of the savings it would achieve versus the revenues it would lose more revenues than the savings it would achieve.
- A New I'm puzzled how that comes about. See, if we're dealing with a competitive case in which you're confined to your cost of capital, then I have problems accepting that assumption.
- Q Well, it's assume its capital costs are sunk in that line that C operates.
- A You brought in the long run, and in the long run costs are not sunk. You see, in the short run, all that is possible, but you rightly brought in the long run because that's the relevant issue.

I agreed with the problem as you stated it as the relevent problem.

- Q Yes.
- A And as soon as we get to the long run, there

is no sunk cost. Sunk cost, by the definition of the long run, is that period of time in which sunk commitments come to an end.

Q So you are saying that under no circumstances here should -- that you can think of -- could Railroad C oppose the merger of A and E?

A I would never go that far. I keep citing an important exception, and that is when there is a predatory possibility, a case where the railroad by forming a merger, either horizontal or vertical, can clear some portion of its markets of competitors and then earn the fruits of predation, then of course the undertaking is not harmless.

Certainly, you can damage a viable enterprise. Certainly, there is room enough for complaint. And I have never deried -- on the contrary, I will emphasize that there are cases in which there is room for complaint. But you have to put in more than what you have here.

Then you have to show its relevance for a particular case.

And I take it, or do I take it correctly, that it is your view that long run marginal cost is not an adequate standard for the pricing of railroad services?

A I have many times testified that -- that's

why, for example, I have testified many times about the relevance of Ramsey pricing -- Ramsey pricing is long run marginal cost pricing -- when those prices cover total costs. When they do not, then you must depart from marginal cost prices, and must do it in such a way that it is consistent with efficiency and social welfare, and that's what Ramsey pricing is all about.

- Now, going back to my case 4, let's assume that the long run marginal costs were, in fact, more than the long run average cost, which I believe is your --
 - A Diseconomies of scale.

- O In the case of this particular railroad, under that hypothesis, would you not agree that Railroad C is quite understandably opposed to the merger of Railroads A and B?
- A Quite understandably, and it would be earning more than the cost of capital. We're back at your previous case.

ME. BIEAKNEY: I have no further questions. Thank you.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Mr. Livingston.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. LIVINSTON:

O Mr. Raumol, my name is Bill Livingston. I

represent the Union Pacific Bailroad. I have only a few guestions.

In markets where the Applicant railroads today compete, in order for those markets to be contestable by trucks, is it necessary in your theory for the trucks to have costs comparable to those of the railroads for serving the market?

A I'd certainly expect that they'd have to be closely comparable if that were the only source of contestability.

O Well, for the trucks to make the market contestable, their costs must be comparable to rail?

A Yes, certainly

Q And it seems to me, then, that if in fact in a particular market the truck costs are appreciably higher than the railroads, then in that situation the trucks cannot make the market contestable or competitive.

A Certainly.

And I think you may have said this before.

But just to be clear in my cwn mind, it is not sufficient for contestability, is it, that the trucks represent a logistically feasible option for the shipper if it is an appreciably higher cost option?

A I agree. Or to put it in other words, it must be an economically feasible option.

Q In looking at the definition of markets in this case, as I understand it, you have not sought to define markets.

A Oh, on the contrary, I have sought to indicate what the correct definition of a market is, and unfortunately it says reality is vague and has no clear borderlines.

Q Well, let me ask a few questions to clarify things.

It is not your view that these two railroads compete only in one market, is it?

A No. I'm not even sure precisely what that means, but probably correct.

Q Well, would you recognize that transportation service between Houston and Ios Angeles, to take an example, would involve things that are in a different market from service between Kansas City and Texas?

A Not necessarily. They may very well be. I'm not arguing they are, but it may well be that there are plants deriving products from both those routes and that the two plants for finished products are in close competition, and that forces rates on the two routes to be comparable.

Q Well, if, therefore, there are products moving between California and Yexas subject to source

competition from the Midwest, then I take it you would ray the Midwestern traffic and the California traffic is in the same market.

A Ic a degree. Remember, this is all subject to understanding that the degree of competition shades off.

Q But you would recognize that there is likely traffic between California and Texas not subject to such scurce competition, which by itself would constitute a relevant market?

A Which by itself would not be in the same market as the other. Whether it constitutes a relevant market is another story.

Q And it seems to me from what you have said that different commodities could represent different markets for analysis.

A They could, certainly.

And that, therefore, these railroads compete against each other in numerous different markets.

A They may well be.

Q And you have not attempted to define those.

A That's right.

Q Is it your belief or view on the basis of the information set forth in the Anderson and Reebie studies that there are no markets where this merger will result

in an increase in market power on the part of the merged railroad?

A It is my impression by looking -- from looking at these studies -- that there are a few markets, how important I cannot judge, though what I have seen suggests they are unimportant, in which that possibility has not been ruled out by their data.

What their data, if correct, and correctly analyzed, show is that the vast preponderance of the markets are highly competitive.

- Q Did the data show you that the vast proponderance of the markets are contestable by trucks?
- A They certainly suggest that they are contestable by something, not necessarily --
- Q I understand that. I'm just focusing now on trucks, noter carriers.
- A I don't remember whether trucks in particular are available in most of the markets or in the vast preponderance of the markets. They are certainly available in a very substantial proportion of the markets, but I can't define precisely what that means.
- O In to many of these markets where the Applicants compete, that are in fact contestable, I take it it is your view that the elimination of competition between these two railroads will have no adverse

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competitive harm to the shippers in those markets.

- A I had trouble hearing the first part of the question. I'm sorry.
- In those markets where the Applicants compete and where the market is contestable by other modes or sources, I take it it is your view that elimination of the competition between Santa Fe and Southern Pacific would have no adverse competitive effect on the shippers in the market.
 - A That's right.

- And am I correct then that if, for instance, in those markets tomorrow, Southern Facific were to announce that it was closing its doors and rippin up its tracks, that, too, would cause no competitive harm to the shippers in those markets?
 - A That's correct.
- Applicants compete, if both Santa Fe and the Southern
 Pacific were to cease doing business, that would have no
 advers competitive effect on the shippers in that
 market?
 - A If the markets are sufficiently contestable.
- Q And if -- and the shippers in those markets, therefore, should be indifferent in terms of their own economic self-interest as to whether the merger occurs

or not, except that they may favor it if they accept the benefit side of the case.

A That's the important proviso, but there's a second proviso. I mean, clearly, if there are substantial benefits and those result in better service or lower costs, and the market is contestable, then a good part of those benefits will be passed on to consumers.

Furthermore, a market may be highly contestable. The railroads may offer service which is either marginally better or marginally cheaper or better for some customers and works for others, and the availability of the combination of the railroad and the trucks, assuming it's the trucks that make it contestable for the sake of simplicity, may be better for customers taken customer-by-customer than is the market in which there are only trucks.

That is to say, customers are not perfectly homogeneous. Their requirements are not perfectly identical, and there may be efficiency advantages for some to have a railroad available and for others to have a truck available, and yet both may be forced to charge prices that earn them no excessive returns.

O I'm assuming now that the merger ir going through, that the railroad remains in the market;

they're not closing their dcors.

A Yes.

- And in that circumstance again, all of the markets where the Applicants compete, where there is contestability, in your view it would not be in the shipper's economic interest to oppose the merger.
- A That's right. And it might be in their interest to advocate the merger if my inference and the evidence provided by a number of witnesses is right, that that will provide some economies and some improvements in service.
- And for those shippers in these contestable markets where Santa Fe and Southern Pacific compete, assuming the merger went through, those shippers would receive no competitive benefits, would they, if any trackage right applications were granted?
- A Once again, I'm terribly sorry. I'm having difficulty hearing you.
 - O Okay, let me try again.

Assuming that the merger goes through and looking at these shippers who are in the contestable markets where Santa Fe and Southern Facific now compete, in your theory those shippers would receive no competitive benefits from the grant of trackage rights applications.

Isn't that correct?

A They would receive no competitive advantage unless some efficiency improvement resulted, provided that the price were fully compensatory.

On the other hand, if the price, as so often happens in these cases, were not compensatory, then the shippers would benefit through a cross-subsidy because the tenant railroad would now be able to traverse the tracks at a less-than-adequate compensation for its inputs.

And, of course, that would mean the shippers would benefit at the expense of the rest of society because there is a cross-subsidy at the heart of the arrangement.

O Assuming that the trackage rights compensation will be full and fair, then in your theory, the shippers in these contestable markets receive no competitive benefit simply by virtue of having access to a second railroad.

A Only if the choice leads to increased efficiencies, either in the form of cost savings or increased options in terms of convenience of service. Then, indeed, they would receive some benefits.

It's the same as the answer for the merger.

Q I believe you indicated that there may be some

markets where the Applicants compete that are not contestable, where the Applicants will be able to exercise a degree of market power.

- A There may be some such markets. I didn't say that there are such markets or that it will be able to.
- Q Okay. And you have not attempted either to identify them or to determine the importance of any such market?
- A That's right. I only know that if the testimony that is cited in my statement is correct, then those markets will be relatively a small proportion of the total and will be relatively among the smaller of the markets in terms of volume of traffic.
- Now, if I were to ask you whether the problems are concentrated in the southern corridor or the Phornix area or some such, a specific example, you would be unable to respond.
- A I would have to confess ignorance.

 MF. LIVINGSTON: That's all I have. Thank
 you, Your Honor.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Mr. Patner.

MR. RAINER: Your Honor, I would like to know if I could have one or two minutes to review what I've got and see what's already been asked and what hasn't.

(Pause.)

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. RATNER:

Q Professor Baumol, my name is James Rather.

I'm from the United States Department of Justice.

As we've reen going along here, I've been trying to eliminate things that have already been asked of you. But if I ask you something that you've already gone over, I ask your indulgence.

A Of course. I understand and I appreciate that.

Q To start with some definitions on page 8 where you define market power, you define it as the ability to raise the price above the competitive level and to retain those high prices for some substantial period.

I don't know if you're familiar with it or not, but the institutional term the Department of Justice has chosen is "significant" rather than "substantial."

Do you see any difference between those two terms?

A I see no significant difference between them.

I interchange them with I get hored with either of them.

Q I always use "non-trivial." I assume that's the same point.

A Yes.

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Q And you also referred in the last part of that sentence to the price level that would prevail without commensurate losses in sales volume.

Out of an abundance of caution here, I assume you are referring to losses additional to losses in sales volume that would occur anytime somebody prices above the competitive level.

A Of course.

On page 18, down where you refer to the competitive cap on rail pricing, you say it's important to consider whether the merger will permit the combined railroad to charge more for some or all of its services than its constituent firms can formally charge.

And then at the letter you say, if no such rise is price is possible by the merger, it can entail no market rower.

When you are referring to a price rise, is it fair to say implicit in that is an assumption about the service levels and service quality?

A Certainly. This is an "all other things being equal" proposition. And it's implicit.

Q I think on pages 36 and 37 in the footnote, you indicate that point regarding benefits.

A Yes.

increase market power -- the decisionmaker obviously must first consider whether the two firms actually compete. Is that correct?

- A Certainly.
- And if the two firms do compete with each other, then an issue that the decisionmaker needs to evaluate is whether trucks will be effective constraints on the ability of the merged firm to exercise market power.
 - A Certainly. That's one of the considerations.
- Q I think you may have been asked this, but have you done, either in the process of pregaring your testimony here or at any time at all, have you done any econometric analysis of the substitutability of rail and truck at either competitive or at prevailing prices?
 - A Nc, sir. And I have been asked that before.
- Q Is it fair to say that econometric analysis of modal substitutability in surface freight transportation industries is not your particular field of emphasis?
 - A That's correct.
- Q I think you've been asked this, tcc. Did you review in any way the economic literature on modal substitutability as part of your preparation for your restimony?
- A No. I did not.

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Q Is it correct to say that unless it can be demonstrated that a motor carrier is an effective constraint to the merged firm on routes where the merged firm is operating, that contestability of the trucking industry is not a particularly relevant issue, going toward the question of whether the merged firm will have increased market power?

A If the market is one in which firms -- trucks neither compete nor have the economic likelihood of competing, then you are right. Their contestability will neither make nor break the contestability of the railroad's market.

O Sc unless it can be shown, then, that the motor carrier will enfectively constrain the merged firms, then contestability is not something that comes into play for the most part, contestability of the trucking industry?

A That's right. But the contestability of large or crean transport might.

O Sure.

Is it correct to say that on routes where a motor carrier can properly be considered to be an effect constraint on the merged firms' ability to exercise market power, but that the current number or the share of the trucking firm is either small or zero, it is at

that point that the ability of trucks as contesters to constrain the merged firm becomes an issue for the decisonmaker to decide?

- A That's right.
- On page 12 of your testimony, you talk about collusion. The second line from the top.
 - A Yes.

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- Q Collusion, as you use it, need not involve an explicit or illegal agreement, does it?
- A I'm no expert on the legality, but it may not involve an explicit agreement.
- Q If a merger makes it more likely that there will be successful explicit coordination or collusion, that may be of concern to society. Is that correct?
- A Certainly.
- O And collusion, as you use the term, also may just apply to firms recognizing their interdependence and independently coordinating their price and service levels. Is that correct?
- A If the merger makes that more possible and action on it more relective, yes. I'm just expanding on that and trying to make clear on what I think we agree.
 - Q I appreciate that.
- Does conventional industrial organization literature conclude that collusion would be unlikely in

a market with three firms where those firms have similar cost structures and have had a history of rate and service collusion?

A I would say that, subject to some caveats, that by and large the conventional industrial organization literature says that where there is a history of collesion, where there are three firms where the products are homogeneous, where there is little product innovation, you get a whole list of these conventional criteria, then you do have a source of concern for collusion.

And I would agree with it.

Description of the closest substitute to the merged firm, then the merged firm may be able to raise prices or dilute quantity considerably?

A If the difference is considerable, they may be able to raise prices considerably. So it's a statement about the best available substitute, the tightness of the cap on the merged firms' prices, which is precisely what I have talked about before.

O And it follows from that that it's important for the decisionmaker to compare the price and service

levels of various substitutes with those price and service levels that are offered with the merged firm?

A It's certainly important to take that into account. I mean scmetimes the evidence may be so clear that the case is open and shut. Other times, very careful calculation and investigation of the data is necessary.

Q Do you think that a market that is defined to include only the merged firms and all other firms that fully constrain the ability of the merged firm to exercise market power is a helpful tool for evaluating whether the merger will increase market power?

A Yes, it is, if you consume it knowing that it may be dangerous to your health. That is, the point is such a definition definitely, by your description, a very legitimate description, excludes things which are imperfect substitutes.

Suppose that we don't know whether those imperfect substitutes are very close or very distant. That means that, at worst, if the overly tight market definition exonerates the merger from any cdcr of monopoly power, then it is a convincing case by itself because all that can happen is when one extends the market that one considers, that one takes into account, that case will be strengthened.

On the other hand, if one considers such a limited market definition and one finds that there is in adequate constraint within those boundaries upon the merging firms, that is not conclusive.

It certainly doesn't excherate that firm or the merger, but it means further study is needed.

O Is it fair to say that the other side or part of what you are describing is also correct, which is, that in trying to draw lines to define a market you include firms which cannot effectively constrain the merged firm as being in the market, then you might come to the conclusion that there was effective constraint and effective competition when in fact there was not?

A Oh, certainly.

On page 19 of your testimony, you discuss various possible constraints that the merged firm might face. And one of them that you mention is the services of another railroad in the third line there.

A Yes.

O You don't mean to be suggesting by this that the presence of one additional railroad by itself would be adequate to eliminate increases in market power coming from a merger, do you?

A It might be. I'm not suggesting it generally is. I am saying that I can think of circumstances, as

in the hypothetical illustrations we had just a few minutes before you started to cross examine me, in which the availability of one additional railroad was enough to eliminate all market power.

So I can construct cases in which that is true. I am saying the availability of another railroad must be taken into account in judging the contestability of the market, not that that settles the issue.

Q Also on page 19 of your testimony, you refer to source and product competition as a possible constraint on the merged firm. Is that right?

A Yes.

Is it correct that in order to be effective constraint, the alternative source of product must be closely substitutable to the source or the product that is currently being transported by the merging firms?

A That's right. Some sort of substitutability, albeit very indirect and not obvious sometimes, but nevertheless close.

Q It must be close is the point I was getting at.

A Yes. But close -- I'm again not disagreeing, just hering to clarify. Close is not a synonym for obvious.

O I understand that close and obvious are

different things.

Is it also correct that the alternative source or product, to be an effective constraint, has to be capable of expanding its quantity to meet all of the quantity currently being moved by the merging firms?

A I'm not sure that's right. I think that it could expand sufficiently just to cause a lot of damage to the incumbent.

Q Well, then it would only be a constraint for the portion of the quantity that could expand. Isn't that correct?

A No. But the prices are affected by marginal conditions. I mean let's assume you have available a substitute that could take away half your business, but only half, but you would go broke if you lost that half.

And suppose you did not have the opportunity to discriminate in price. You know and I know that in that case, the competitive price will emerge. So, no. I'm sorry. This is the first time I'm forced to disagree with you.

0 Well, it's perfectly acceptable for you to disagree with me if you're so inclined.

A Ch, no. It's just that I like agreeing with you.

Is it fair to say that the conditions of

determining the price for the merged firm may affect how much quantity the alternative will have to produce before it becomes a constraint on the merged firm?

A Certainly. What is adequate quantity in one set of circumstances is not adequate for another.

Q Is it correct to say that in order to be an effective constraint, the alternative source or product must be capable of being transported to the shipper by a method other than that which uses one of the merging firms?

A Not necessarily, no. It may be that one of the merging firms -- let me give you an illustration. If the merging firm has some sort of service which is highly regulated and which is -- remains effectively available for substitute products, that may serve as an adequate constraint.

Q Assuming there is no constraint on the merged firm other than market forces, is my statement correct?

A I suppose so. I would like to hear it again.

All right. Is it correct that in order to be an effective constraint, the alternative source or product must be capable of being transported by the shipper using a method other than that of the merged firms?

A If there are no constrains, whether by market or regulation or anything else, of the merged firm, that is correct, but it then becomes an empty statement, because the point is, if there exists some other

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substitute commodity in which there is competition, and in which the merged firm must adhere to a competitive price because of the pressures of the market, then that is plenty of competitive pressure, or can be, and of course we can rule that out, but then we can say we can rule out all sorts of possibilities.

Q Well, that would mean, then, the answer to my question is, if there is a method other than using the merged firm to transport the product to the shipper, then that method may constrain the merged firm. Is that correct?

A It is not the product. It is some other product.

Q The alternative product.

A There has got to be some constraint somewhere. No constraint is no constraint. Look, we are not differing that much.

Q I agree with that. I would like to go over my question again and have you listen to it, and I don't think we disagree on this at all.

In order to be an effective constraint, is it correct that the alternative source or product must be capable of being transported by the shipper using a method other than that of the merging firm?

A Yes, unless the merging firm itself has some

other constraints on other of its services.

Q Given that you regard source or geographic competition as a possible constraint, isn't it correct that what you have described in your testimony as erd to end mergers can in some ways enhance market power by reducing that competition?

A I don't see how it per se would reduce that competition unless there were an opportunity for real predation.

Q Well, let me give you an example. Surpose that a merger enables the merged firm to control 100 percent of the originations of all of the borax in the United States such that no borax shipper could transport its product without using the merged firm. Could that have an anticompetitive result?

A How could the merged firm control 100 percent of the borax shipments after the merger and yet not one component of it control them beforehand?

O Speaking purely hypothetically, assume 50 percent of them right now originate on Southern Pacific, and the other 50 percent right now originate on Santa Fe.

A And there is no other alternative, there is no alternative source? Then of course your conclusion follows.

O Sc is it correct, then, that end to end mergers can foreclose source competition and thus may pose a problem which could result in an increase of market power to the merger firm?

A It is not the source competition there, I think, that has been fcreclosed. What has been foreclosed -- well, I guess you are right. In that case it is source competition. Scrry.

O So is the answer to my question yes -- that the merger forecloses source competition and source competition is a constraint of some kind on the merged firm's activities? Then an end to-end merger could pose an anticompetitive problem?

A That's right, if it either permits collusion among all of the sources or it effectively monopolizes all of the sources.

Q The standard reasons for why we wouldn't be concerned about a merger? Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Sc is it fair to say that on Fage 10 of your testimony where you indicate that end to end mergers are not usually considered a source of enhanced market power, and also on Page 32, where you say that end to end elements constitute no possible threat of price raising through the exercise of market power, that those

statements should be amended to reflect an assumption that there is no significant foreclosure of important source of geographic competition?

A No, because those statements -- first of all,

I think at least one of them is guarded, and I hope both

of them are. They don't say there never is any concern

about end to end mergers. Second -- and I had precisely

in mind, for example, the list of exceptions I recited

this morning.

So, I am happy to include yours as well.

Q Well, that's all I was looking for is, you would include that as another possible exception?

A Sure.

peen asked this. In determining whether trucks or other modes in reality as distinct from in theory effectively constrain the merged firms from exercising market power, my understanding is that you have made no factual analysis for the most part other than reading the application. Is that correct?

A Reading the application and reading the testimony -- other pieces of testimony that have been submitted.

Q Is it fair to say, then, that for the most part you relied on, among other things, the TBS studies

considering shares and things like that?

A That's right, and my general knowledge of the railroad industry, as I have indicated before.

Q Based on your general knowledge of the railroad industry, are you satisfied with the accuracy and the methodology that was used by TBS?

A My judgment, not having studied the methods in detail, is that they seem reasonable, but I am --t prepared to give a good housekeeping seal of approval without having done careful study of the methods.

O If you could describe it for me very briefly, if you were going to undertake that project, how would you have designed the analysis that TBS did?

A I haven't thought about it, but let me try. I would certainly attempt -- one way to go about it would be simply to investigate costs of substitutes for railroading, the availability of alternative modes, that is, the extent of their coexistence, both geographically and in terms of commodities carried.

I would examine whether the cases of coexistence precluded the entry of still other carriers of the same sorts, and if sc, in what way, and whether those impediments to entry could be overcome at high cost or low cost.

I would examine in cases where there were no

- Q A guick question on that. You indicated -- I think the first thing you indicated that you would like to look at is the cost of substitutes for railroads. Do you mean the cost to the shipper or the cost structure?
 - A The cost structure.

or to price excessively.

- Q Would you want to look at the cost to the shipper?
- A Well, first of all, in many of these cases, you have methods of observation from which you can deduce costs. That is, if these -- if several modes are operating simultaneously, providing the same service, carrying along the same routes the same commodities, and neither of them manifests any excessive profits, I could from that deduce something about the costs.

In fact, I would deduce from it that the costs are probably comparable.

I think you have answered my question, but I asked you if you would want to look at the cost to the shippers, and you said, well, in many ways you could deduce it.

I take it that it is important to consider the

cost to the shippers of the various modes?

A Oh, certainly. In other words, the pricing, which of course is the heart of the issue.

Q If you had been doing your own analysis, do you think you would have wanted to take a slightly more disaggregated approach than the approach used by TBS?

A It depends. It is always a matter of weighing costs and benefits, availability of data, time. You have done studies, I am sure, and one always makes compromises.

Are you fully satisfied that TBS thoroughly and completely evaluated the price of service levels that the various modes they looked at can offer, and that they compared them adequately to the offerings of the merging firms?

A am not in the position to answer that question.

On Page 20 of your testimony, the third sentence of the second paragraph, it says, as is shown by studies prepared by TBS, there is only a small portion -- small proportion of the expected traffic of the combined railroad which will not continue to be subject to substantial intramodal rail competition.

A Yes.

Q Do you see that?

A Yes. I think that should be read -MR. TOMPKINS: I am not sure there is a

question pending.

THE WITNESS: Do I see it? The answer is yes.

JUDGE HOPKINS: He is trying to correct it if there is a correction.

BY MR. RAINER: (Fesuming)

Q I have no problem if there is something you have to offer on this point before I ask my question. Please so ahead.

A Well, the question is read, do I see that?

The answer is, yes, I do see it, and I would say for the purpose of clarity that it should be read along with the following sentence, that is, were I writing it over again, I would not put the weight on rail competition exclusively.

Q All right. That was the main focus of my question. That is, it is correct to say, then, it should not be concluded that, from the rail TPS analysis by itself, that there would be adequate intramodal competition?

A That's right. I would certainly not suggest that. Mea culpa.

O On Page 21, and I think on through Page 22 of

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A That's correct.

- Q The same stimulation effect occurs any time there is an efficiency enhancement in a market, and not just when it is done through a merger. Is that correct?
- A Absolutely. Any form of efficiency enhancement is procompetitive, including those which emerge from a merger if in fact there is reason to expect it from a merger.
- Q It is correct, isn't it, that assuming that a firm is profit maximizing, all participants and all firms are under constant pressure to earn more money by engaging in efficiency enhancements where possible?
- A Oh, absolutely, but they may not be able to achieve them without obtaining the opportunities for economies of scale, scope, and integration that merger permits, maybe. I am not saying that is generally sc. But it may be so.
- Q On Page 5 of your testimony, I think you are making basically the same point in the second paragraph. You say, "For increased efficiency of any

one firm, an industry forces its rivals to try harder."

Isn't it true that that is only correct to the extent

that the merged firm responds to efficiency improvements

by expanding its capacity or its output?

A Oh, I think that assuming rationality, some degree of rationality in this operation, that if a merged firm does achieve economies, it will try to keep some or other types of efficiency.

It will obviously try to keep some for itself, but it will generally try to pass some of them on, not out of a sense of justice and virtue and Boy Scout honor, but because in that way it can increase profits.

Even the most protected of monopolists, if its costs gc down, will pass on some of those savings, not because it loves the consumer, but because in that way it can expand its volumes and make profit higher than was previously possible.

Q Professor Baumol, it is not that I disagree with you. I think you can assume that even attorneys from the Department of Justice understand why a firm may sometimes want to decrease their prices to make more profits.

The point I was getting at is, again, if a firm or merged firms obtain efficiencies from that merger, and choose to not increase their output or

increase their capacity, and instead sclely take the gain in terms of producer surplus, will there be pressure on the other firms to improve their efficiencies as a result of that merger?

A First, let me protest that I have the highest respect for attorneys from the Department of Justice, with whom I have worked in the rast. And I am merely concerned that something I said which is obvious to you will be misunderstood on the record.

- Q That is fair enough.
- A So that is why my reservation, and the arswer is, yes, you are right, but I would normally not expect that to happen.
- On Page 26 of your testimony, you refer to transactions costs associated with having two firms improve efficiencies through contract. Is that correct?
 - A That's right.
- Q And is it correct to say, ther, that the primary benefit of an end to end merger in terms of efficiencies would be the reduced transactions cost that would occur because you don't have to enter those transaction costs through contracts?

Is that correct?

A Well, the elimination of those transactions

costs may in fact be multiplied through the rearrangements that then become possible.

"The economies and efficiencies to be gained from a vertical consolidation are inherently less likely to produce huge savings than a horizontal consolidation, where, for example, a parallel rail line or a duplicate terminal may make it end to end, the amount of efficiency gains resulting from a vertical consolidation depends on the magnitude of the transactions costs which would have to be incurred in order for independent entities to achieve economies in question without recourse to a consolidation.

"Where those transactions costs are small the vertical elements of the merger cannot be expected to provide substantial efficiencies. Wehre those transactions costs are significant, the operating efficiency rayoff of the consolidation is apt to be correspondingly greater."

In case you are not familiar with that, that is a verbatim quote from your CSX barge line testimony.

MR. TOMPKINS: Would the witness like to look at that?

THE WITNESS: I suppose sc. It is nice to

1 meet an old friend. But I was going to agree with it. 2 BY MR. RATNER: (Resuming) 3 0 Would you like to look at it for a moment? 4 A Certainly. 5 (Pause.) 6 A Yes, I still agree. 7 Q You still agree? 8 Yes. 9 Q Thank you. Are you aware that there is any 10 place in the application which analyzes the transactions 11 costs savings that will occur due to the merger of the 12 Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific? A No, I am not, but I consider that to be 13 14 unnecessary if the evidence that there are no impediments to efficiency stands up, because in that 15 16 case it must be true that in management's judgment there 17 are sufficient transactions economies to make the merger worthwhile. 18 19 As I have said before, they could be wrong, 20 but who are you and I to second guess them? 21 Q I understand, but your statement that you just 22 made to me is predicated on the if, that there is no anticompetitive harm that will occur from the mergers. 23

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A I agree, but I am saying that if one, as I

hope you will, goes through a careful cross examination

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of the witnesses who have provided that evidence, and if they convince you that that evidence has stood up, my point I am making is that that should be the end of the story, and I think the merger guidelines in fact indicate that it should be the end of the story.

- I understand that. So, to clarify, though, are you saying anything other than the fact that if there is nothing harmful from a merger and there is a possibility that there is something good, we should allow the merger?
 - A Fine. That's a good way of putting it.
- Q Is it fair to say that the transactions costs of implementing a significant rail merger may not be trivial?
- A Certainly, but once again, the logic I indicated before, the decision of management to undertake it denies that possibility, I mean, denies the possibility that those substantial costs will be greater than the savings that emerge on the other side.
- Q Is it fair to assume that you did not compare the transactions costs associated with merging with the transactions costs of achieving efficiencies through contract?
 - A More than fair. It is correct.
 - O On Page 27 of your testimony, you refer to end

to end marketing efficiencies.

A Yes.

O I don't want to overly simplistically sum up this portion of the testimony, but am I correct in saying that the primary benefit occurs because one person or one firm will do all the promoting instead of two separate ones?

A That is certainly a prime source of efficiency.

Q Is there any significant source of efficiency associated with some aspect other than what I have just described?

A It may, for example, save advertising costs, and I also cite the possibility of improved pricing.

On Page 33 of your testimony, you talk about horizontal efficiencies. Is it correct that you have not evaluated which facilities and which physical plant used by Southern Pacific and Santa Fe are not currently being utilized efficiently?

A That is correct.

Are you aware of any significant literature that suggests that Southern Pacific and Santa Fe are operating fairly close to the level to where the long run cost curve is flat?

I am sorry? The answer was no?

A The answer was no.

Q On Page 6 and 7 of your testimony, you discuss the fact that what parties oppose and what parties support a merger might be a telling sign indicating whether a merger is likely to increase market power and increase efficiency?

A That's correct.

Q How many truck firms are you aware of that are opposing this merger?

A I don't know of any, but truck firms are not the ones who are -- they are already engaged in such competitive operations that for them it is not likely to make much obvious difference.

Q Aren't you making a prediction in your testimony that if the merger is efficient and a firm competes with that merged firm, that they might be the ones that are likely to oppose the merger, because the merger will make it harder for them to compete?

A Sure. But just as individual trucking firms don't advertise because each is such a small proportion of the market that it really cannot achieve much effect, but oligopolies do advertise, I would expect that the bulk of the opposition will come from the big firms, just as that is what we find, for example, in cases like the proposed Toyota-General Motors joint venture.

There, there are hig firms who stand to lose, and there you do get the predictable response. Small firms generally don't engage in that sort of thing.

There are exceptions.

Q Is it your opinion that trucking firms do not oppose particular measures at the ICC?

A No. But it is a very different sort of situation. Look. What I am saying and what your experience will surely confirm is that just as in lobbying operations, the first to arrive at the big or medium-sized firms, and in the protests I would expect the medium or large firms involved to be the first to object.

Q Well, the last sentence of the paragraph on Page 7 says, "If the proposal is greeted with silent acquiescence by competitors, that may be indeed the time for government agencies to grow concerned."

Given the Department of Justice is a government agency, and the fact that this merger has been greeted so far by silent acquiescence by what the application describes as one of the major competitive forces, trucks, isn't this the time for the Department of Justice as a government agency to grow concerned?

A Oh, come now. Now we are playing games, because, lock, if you have a market which is so

obviously competitive as trucking, say if you were dealing with farmers, and you found that they were not behaving -- they were not objecting to a merger that was related to farming, you would not propose that the Department of Justice allocate a large portion of its budget to breaking up the farm monopoly.

What is relevant here -- come on, let's take a view of the matter with a sense of proportion. First of all, I did not say that the department -- that was a very measured statement, and I am glad you read it as it stands, but what I am suggesting is that where there are no other circumstances that assure you that the market is operating competitively and appropriately, then that is -- the lack of response is a worrisome sign.

But there I am not suggesting that each and every participant in the market should respond. I never suggested that.

So is it fair to say, then, that the responses of various firms in terms of who supports and who opposes is strongly secondary to an analysis of the indicia in the market as to whether it is competitive or not?

A I was very careful not to suggest this as a conclusive test.

O So the answer to my question is that it is

Q I just asked whether it is fair to say that any reaction by particular parties as to whether they oppose or support a merger in considering that as information about whether the government should be concerned should be considered strongly secondarily to information about the competitive nature of the markets that are affected by the merger?

A It should be considered along with it. I have not given you a ranking. In some cases it would worry me a great deal. In others, it might not.

MR. RATNER: One moment, Your Honor. (Fause.)

BY MR. RAINER: (Resuming)

Q It is correct that certain conditions must be met in order to accept that a market is perfectly contestable and then perform efficiently because of that. Is that correct?

A That's correct. In fact, I'd go further. I'd say I don't know of any market that is perfectly contestable.

Q I agree with that. Is one of those conditions for contestability the condition that entry and exit must be unrestricted?

A Must be relatively unrestricted. O Urrestricted relative to what? A Well, sunk costs, for example, must be a small proportion of total investment costs. There must be some sort of either inhibition of retaliatory responsiveness by other -- by incumbents, or it must be 6 7 possible to have contracts. There are a whole variety. O Well, is it a condition then that entry and exit must be associated with zero sunk costs and, as well, must not be otherwise restricted? A I just said small sunk costs, because I started off confessing that there is no perfectly contestable market. Q Ckay. A I am sorry. We have already moved off of 15 perfectly contestable. 16 17 O I think you have answered this, but is it fair to say that it is unlikely that an entry and exit can 18 occur without some sunk costs? 19 A That is virtually certain. The question is 20 whether they are de minimis or whether they are huge. 21 And that will vary from industry to industry. 22 Q I think you have also said this earlier, and I 23 am sorry to go over it, but just to make it clear, is it 24

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correct that you testified this morning that it hasn't

been proven, and so we are not sure whether the further we get away from zero sunk costs, whether that will act as a continuous constraint, or whether the entire process of contestability will fall apart and the incumbents will be unrestrained entirely?

A That is right, but I remind you of my answer of this morning, which is that all the wisdom, received wisdom in the area, including the Department of Merger guidelines -- the Department of Justice guidelines --

O Sometimes we are the Department of Mergers.

A It is getting to be a long time. Forgive me. The Dapartment of Justice merger guidelines indicate clearly that ease of ertry and exit are an important consideration restricting the ability of a firm to acquire market power even when numbers are small.

And that is all we are saying. That is, while it is conceivable that small deviations from perfect competition will lead to highly deviant belavior, and it is conceivable that small deviations from perfect contestability will lead to highly deviant behavior, all the received wisdom in the area, all the evidence I have seen suggests that the department's guidelines and the other discussions that I see in most of the precontestability literature is right on that score, and agrees with the conclusions that emerge on this score

alone from the contestability literature.

Q Do you think it has been empirically demonstrated that try factors dictate the performance of a market as conclusively as has been demonstrated in the internal conditions that affect market performance?

A I don't think it has been demonstrated conclusively, no.

Q Is it a correct statement that if there is any amount of nontrivial sunk costs associated with entry that would be incurred by the entrant, and the incumbent can respond very quickly to the entrant's prices, that the incumbent may be virtually unconstrained by the entry?

A If there is any amount of sunk costs?

Q If there is any nontrivial amount of sunk costs associated with entry, and incumbents can implement countermeasures very quickly.

A Nc. It is not necessarily true. In particular, it is not true when contracts can be rade by entrants and customers. Then the speed of response becomes irrelevant. Let me explain that point.

Q I think I understand. Isn't it correct that that is only true of the contract as a requirements contract?

A No.

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2 If it is not a requirements contract, what keeps the incumbent from simply responding with a lower price?

A If the customers know that that lower price is a temporary matter which will be rescinded the moment the entrant leaves and have been taught that by past history, then it will pay customers to deal with the entrant because -- and take the lower prices that the contract offers them.

O I am not disputing that that is a possibility, but isn't it correct that what you have just described is just one of many possible scenarios that may occur when an entrant attempts to contract with a shipper in advance and the incumbent is available to institute countermeasures quickly?

A It -- certainly as an alternative scenario is conceivable, but your question, as I recall, asked whether all things fall apart when there is not a requirements contract, and I denied that. And I still do.

Q In other words, when there is not a requirements contract, we don't know whether the entrant will be an effective constraint on the incumbent or not.

A The entrant is giving a powerful weapon that

inhibits the incumbent. The incumbent has to fear already that he won't be able to get away with murder.

O Do you agree with the proposition made by Professor Shepherd that if the railroad incumbent pursues a strategy of announcing that it will meet all credible offers by entrants, that such a strategy could render all entrants' offers not credible and therefore weightless, and that would then negate the contract strategy of entry?

A In a word, no. And I just explained why.

Q Again, I think you have been asked this. Is it correct that for an entrant to constrain an incumbert, the entrant must be able to enter at a scale which enables the entrant to completely match the incumbent's output?

A The answer is no.

Q If the entrant is unable to enter at the same scale, and that results in the entrant facing a higher per unit fixed cost than the incumbent, doesn't that mean that there is an entry barrier associated with entry?

A No. That is not an entry barrier in itself.

That is a confusion of the rasic difference between

fixed and sunk costs. I mean, there may be an entry

barrier there if, say, the entrant is, say, threatened

if he matches the incumbent's cutrut, but the mere existence of economies of scale is not an entry barrier in the sense of protecting the incumbent.

Q Is it incorrect that if the entrant has a higher per unit fixed cost, that it will not be able to -- that the incumbent will always maintain an advantage over that entrant?

A What you are saying is, an efficient firm is always a worse competitor than an inefficient firm, and so be it.

Q I am not trying to trap you or trick you or anything. I am puzzled by what you said a little earlier this morning, and I think what you said was that an entrant must have or must be able to enter under the same cost structure as the incombent. Is that a mischaracterization of what you said this morning?

A No, that's nct.

Q Very briefly, could you describe for me the difference between this statement which you agree is correct and what I was just describing to you about an entrant having higher per unit --

A A higher fixed cost?

Q That's ccrrect.

A Oh, that's a special case of what I stated. I didn't disagree with your statement about fixed costs.

Q Is it a fair statement that during the short run period where incumbents have not responded to an entrance price that sunk costs are likely to be higher than during a period that is longer when the incumbents would have time to respond to entry prices?

A Oh, almost by definition, the longer the period, the less the proportion of costs that is sunk. That is how we define the long run and the short run.

Q Is it correct to say that one key to contestability is that entrants must be able to perceive that they will be able to earn something positive by entering?

A Certainly. I am sorry. Let me hear the question again.

Q The question was, is it correct to say that one key to contestability is that entrants must be able to perceive that they will be able to earn something positive by entering?

A I think I don't disagree, but let me make clear, because there is an ambiguity in my mind. I am sorry. It is important that if there is a profit opportunity, entrants should be able to see it, but it is not important that there be a profit opportunity. That is, if the incumbent chooses to behave in an exemplary manner, there will be no profit opportunity

for entry. That is exactly what the virtue of contestability is, and therefore, though there is contestability, the potential entrant will see no profit opportunity because there isn't any.

- Q All right, then. The key is that if there is a profit opportunity they will be able to perceive it?
 - A That's right.
- Q Is it correct, then, to say that what is important is the entrant's perception about the post-entry conditions of the market?
- A That is correct. That can be assured, for example, by contracts.

MR. RATNER: Could I have one more moment, Your Honor?

JUDGE HOPKINS: Sure.

(Pause.)

EY MR. RAINEF: (Fesuming)

- You may already have been asked this. Have you done any analysis of what is necessary for trucks to enter on routes served by Scuthern Pacific and Santa Fe, and how much of what is required to enter would be a sunk cost?
- A No, I have not.

MR. RATNIR: Thank you very much, Professor Baumol.

I have no further questions, Your Honor. JUDGE HOPKINS: Thank you. 2 3 Any redirect? 4 MR. TOMPKINS: Your Honor, we have no 5 redirect. 6 I would move Professor Baumol's statement into 7 evidence. JUDGE HOPKINS: Any objection? 8 9 (No response.) JUDGE HOPKINS: It will be received in 11 evidence. And the other? 12 MR. BLEAKNEY: KCS-14 through 17. 13 JUDGE HOPKINS: Any objection? 14 (No response.) 15 JUDGE HOPKINS: They will be received in 16 evidence. 17 (The documents referred to, 18 previously marked for 19 identification as Exhibits 20 Number KCS-C-14 through 17, 21 were received in evidence.) 22 MR. MORSE: Your Honor, I would like to move into evidence MXT-C-54, 55, 56, and 57. 23 JUDGE HOPKINS: Any objection? 25 (No response.)

JUDGE HOFKINS: They will be received in evidence.

(The documents referred to, previously marked for identification as Exhibits Number MKT-C-54 through 57, were received in evidence.)

JUDGE HOPKINS: We will be in recess for 15 minutes. Is somenody scheduled? Have you got the witnesses available? Thank you.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

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JUDGE HOPKINS: let's get back on the record.

MR. LEARY: Your Honor, before we begin with the additional witnesses, could I raise a very minor procedural point which I would like to have on the record?

JUDGE HOPKINS: Sure.

MR. LEARY: On September 17, the Fio Grande filed a motion for leave one week late to file six shipper statements, additional shipper statements. The motion has been greeted with a thundering silence all the way arcund, and I am just wondering if a motion might be granted in view of the lack of opposition thereto?

MR. STEPHENSON: We oppose it, Your Honor.

(General lauchter.)

JUDGE HOPKINS: You have received nothing from the Commission on it? Since they haven't, I grant you the motion.

MR. LEARY: Thank you, sir.

JUDGE HOPKINS: There's one in every crowd, as I said yesterday.

Would you call your next witness?

MF. LANE: Your Honor, I have not had the opportunity to appear before in this case.

My name is Ronald lane, appearing for the

Applicants. We call Messrs. Frestel and Peifer at this time.

Whereupon,

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JOHN F. FRESTEL, JR.

and

KENNETH R. PEIFER

were called as witnesses by counsel for Applicant and, having been duly swcrn by the Administrative Law Judge, were examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. LANE:

- Q Would each of you please state your name, address and present occupation for the record?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) My name is John Frestel. I am Vice President of Personnel and Labor Relations for the Atchison, Topoka & Santa Fe Railway, 80 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago.
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) My name is Kenneth Peifer.

 I am Assistant Vice President, Labor Relations, for the Southern Pacific Transportation Company, One Market Plaza, San Francisco.
- Q Have you had an opportunity to prepare and submit a verified statement in connection with this case?
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I have.

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Q And except for the errata which has already been submitted to the Commission, do you have any other changes that need to be made in that verified statement?

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A (WITNESS FRESTEL) There is one change, counsel.

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I refer your attention to page 7 of the verified statement.

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Q Would you identify the correction?

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A (WITNESS FRESTEL) In the second full

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paragraph on that page, the second line, and I'll read

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from the outset, "We estimate total relocation costs at

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approximately," it states, "\$42,863,000." That should

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be changed to "\$37,912,000," and continuing with that

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sentence, "which constitutes," instead of "53.4

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percent," it should read "51.6 percent," and this was an

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oversight, and those figures reflect the total on page 2

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after the errata was submitted.

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For example, the total cost of relocation as appears on page 6 of the verified statement, Table 2, is

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\$37,912,000.

Q And with that correction, is your verified

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statement, as corrected in the errata, true and correct

25 to the best of your knowledge?

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A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes, it is. A (WITNESS PEIFER) Yes, it is. 3 MR. LANE: Your Honor, we tender the witnesses 4 for cross examination. JUDGE HOPKINS: Thank you. 5 Who is going to start? 7 MR. BIRNEY: I think we are going to start, 8 Your Honor. 9 Just as a matter of clarification, Your Horor, 10 with regard to the correction on page 6, Table 2, I did 11 not get the correction. 12 WITNESS FRESTEL: Forgive me, Counsel, there was no correction on page 6 at this time. When the 13 14 errata was submitted, there were some changes, and you should have a corrected copy in your possession. But at 15 16 that time we neglected to make a change on page 7 as 17 indicated which would make it consistent with the 18 charges which appear at page 6, Table 2. 19 MR. BIRNEY: I understand. Thank you very 20 much. 21 22

Your Honor, my name is Bill Birney. I am from the lawfirm of Highsaw & Mahoney, and that firm represents the Railway Iabor Executives' Association in this proceeding. Also present today from the firm is Kimferley Madigan.

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As a preliminary matter, Your Honor, I would like to inform the Court that we were advised yesterday of a change in schedule which advanced the cross examination of these witnesses until this afternoor. Because of that sudden change, we have asked the Applicant carriers if Ms. Madigan and I could split the cross examination of these gentlemen, and it is my understanding that they agreed to that procedure, if that is agreeable with the Court.

Mr. Peifer.

JUDGE HOPKINS: It is agreeable to me, too.

MR. BIRNEY: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

Your Honor, my cross examination of these

witnesses will be directed principally to the nature and
extent of the employee impact due to consolidation and
merger, and that constitutes approximately the first
five pages of the verified statements of Mr. Frestel and

For the information of the witnesses, that examination will be based largely on your verified statement.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. BIRNEY.

Q Before I begin, I would like to ask you however if you both have copies of the statement.

A (WITNESS FEIFER) Yes, we do.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes.

- Do you have copies of both the original statement as submitted on March 15, 1984, as well as the corrected copies which were submitted or September 20, 1984?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) I have only a corrected copy. I don't have the original.
 - Q You do not have the criginal?
 - A (WITNESS PEIFER) I do not.
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I have a copy of the corrected copy with, I believe, one of the pages which was from the original, but I don't know if that was the only change.

MR. BIRNEY: Your Honor, I think we can proceed with the corrected copy. In the event it becomes necessary, we may need to supplement the materials that the witnesses have.

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

O In addition, gentlemen, I have also provided to counsel in this matter an exhibit which has been previously admitted into evidence which is entitled MKT-C-21. We have provided counsel with enough copies for you as well.

Have you gotten those copies?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Just now.

- A (WITNESS PEIFER) Just now.
- O Just now?

It will not be necessary for you to look at those right away. That part of my examination won't come until the end.

you propose to proceed in this cross examination. I have never had the opportunity to examine two witnesses at the same time. Since my cross examination is going to be limited to the nature and extent of employee impact, is it possible to designate one of you two gentlemen as the first witness to respond and then the second witness respond only if it is necessary?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I think my preference is that either one of us answer a particular question as we think either is the more qualified.

JUDGE HOPKINS: They can look at each other and make the decision after you ask the questions, I'm sure. It's worked before.

Just go -head and ask the question, and then one of them will take it.

WITNESS FRESTEL: Hopefully.

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

Q Mr. Frestel, I note in your verified statement that you state you are the Acting Vice President for

1 Personnel and labor Relations. A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes. 2 3 O This afternoon you testified that you were the 4 Vice President. Have you now been -- taken that position 5 6 permanently? 7 A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes, as of May 1 of this 8 year. Q When was the final version of this verified 9 statement completed prior to filing in May of 1984? 10 11 A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I would say shortly before 12 it was dated. Q Approximately how many times was the statement 13 14 revised before it was finally submitted in March? A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I don't know that it was 15 revised seriatim. I think that as we went over it we 16 17 made a number, a myriad of minor changes. So I don't think that there were a set number of revisions. That's 18 19 my recollection. 20 O When did you begin the task of preparing the 21 statement? A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I don't recall 22 23 specifically, Counsel. Was it more than a month before it was filed? 24

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(WITNESS FRESTEL) Probably.

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1	A (WITNESS PEIFFR) Yes.
2	Q More than two months?
3	A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I just don't recall.
4	Q Was there more than one draft prepared by you
5	before this final submission was filed with the
6	Commission?
7	A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I think that's fair to say,
8	yes.
9	Q Approximately how many drafts were prepared?
10	A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I'd say two or three.
11	A (WITNESS PRIFER) I would agree with that.
12	Q To whom were those drafts submitted?
13	A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I think it's best to say
14	that the verified statement was a cumulative effort on
15	the part of Mr. Peifer and myself, consultation with
16	members of our staff, consultation with our lawyers.
17	Q What prompted revisions, if any, to be made in
18	those drafts!
19	A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Oh, advice, opinions,
20	second thoughts. Many of the changes were style in
21	nature.
22	Q Advice from whom?
23	A (WITNESS FRESTEL) We sought clarity
24	Q Advice from whom?
25	A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Any one of the individuals

I mentioned. It was truly a collaborative effort.

Q Which would be an effort of your staff as well as your counsel?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes.

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Q Was there anyone else who assisted you in the preparation of the statement?

A (WITNESS FRESTEI) I have covered a number of people.

Q Are you satisfied with the statement as it now stands with the corrections you have made as of September and the additional correction you made today?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes, I am.

A (WITNESS PEIFER) Yes.

Q Is it correct in each and every respect?

A (WITHESS FRESTEL) I believe so.

A (WITNESS PEIFER) As far as we know, it is.

O Do you wish to make any further changes?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) Not at this time.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) No. sir.

Q If you would, I would like you to turn first to page 2 of your verified statement.

At that page, in the first full paragraph, you state as follows: you ascertained the number of employees who will be affected by the consolidation.

Each team relied on experience-based estimates of the

manrower required in each craft or classification for projected traffic levels.

Who provided you with the experience-based estimates to which you refer in that sentence?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) The numbers primarily came from two sources. They came from Mr. R. M. Champion, Jr., who provided us with the numbers on the staff department consolidations as well as some of the miscellaneous clerical numbers with respect to the operating department.

They also came to us through Mr. Neil Owen, from Hooz, Allen. Hamilton who was working under the guidance of both Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Lacy in the operating department to develop the operating plan.

- Q Did you see any of the data on which those estimates were based?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) We received information from -- we received the numbers directly from Mr. Cwen as to the impact on operating craft employees by geographical locations. We were also given information from Mr. Champion as to the effect on employees for those areas which he covered in his verified statement.
- Q Do you know how those estimates were reached?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) They were reached as described on page 2 by information that was given by

various teams, teams made up of individuals such as Mr.

Mason and Mr. Lively, mechanical officers for the

respective companies, Mr. Pottorff and Mr. Lynch,

engineering officers for the respective companies,

Messrs. Fitzgerald and Lacy for the operating

department, and there were teams like that.

O When were those teams created?

- A (WITNESS PEIFER) Early on in the planning stage. I don't recall the specific dates.
 - O By early on, do you mean in 1983?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) It would have been sometime late 1983.
- So they had been in existence for some time before you prepared your report and the data had been submitted to you?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) When you said they were in existence, what do you mean?
- Q I'm talking about the teams to which you refer?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) There were certain individuals assigned to the merger case, and they knew who they were, and they were in existence before we prepared the labor impact study, that's correct.
- Q Do you know by whom those teams were selected

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most of the information, with the exception of that

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which came directly to us from Mr. Owen.

- Q Giat was the composition of these teams?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) Excuse me?
- Q What was the composition of these teams, what kind of people, and what were their backgrounds who were selected to be a member of the team?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) I can't state specifically what their backgrounds were. The composition usually involved one Santa Fe person and one Southern Pacific person in the specific area involved, whether it was mechanical engineering or operating. We were designated representatives from each of the companies for those areas.
- Q Then in each area that was to be investigated there were two members, one from each carrier?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) Generally that's true, but again you ought to ask Mr. Champion that question.
- Q To the best of your knowledge, were there teams that existed of more than two people?
- A (WITNESS FEIFER) To my knowledge, there was at least one that was involved in the operating plan. There were a number of individuals involved in the operating plan although insofar as our involvement with the operating people was concerned, the information came primarily from Mr. Owen.

1	Q Was there any method established for verifying
2	the estimates you were given by the teams?
3	A (WITNESS FEIFER) Do you mean insofar as
4	looking at the numbers?
5	Q Yes.
6	A (WITNESS PEIFER) No.
7	Q So the statement that you have submitted is
8	prepared based on the estimates you received, and you
9	have not done anything to verify the accuracy of those
10	estimates?
11	A (WITNESS PEIFER) It is strictly a compilation
12	of the numbers that were given to us from the two
13	sources I have described.
14	Q Do you know whether or not those estimates
15	were independently verified by anyone else?
16	A (WITNESS PEIFER) I do not.
17	Q Mr. Frestel?
18	A (WITHESS FRESTEL) I dc nct.
19	Q If the estimates that you received are
20	incorrect, then in fact the statement you have submitted
21	may well be incorrect also?
22	A (WITNESS PEIFER) If the numbers were
23	incorrect, the statement is incorrect, that's correct.
24	Q Referring again to the first sentence on page
25	2, you say that the experience-based estimates of

manpower required in each craft or classification were provided for projected traffic levels.

With regard to the projected traffic levels referred to in that sentence, can you tell us how those levels were arrived at?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) I can tell you to the best of my understanding that the traffic study that was done influenced to a certain extent the operating plan.

Beyond that, I can't give you my specifics.

Q I'm not really sure that was responsive to my question.

What I meant to say was do you know how the projected levels were arrived at, and by whom, if you know?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) Specifically, no. I know there are a number of people involved in the traffic study. Who those people were, I can't name them all for you.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I do not know.

O So again, as with the estimates you received from the teams who were -- which were prepared, or which were gathered to prepare the estimates of manpower, the information you received with regard to projected levels also came from individuals, and you are not even going to testify about how that information was obtained?

A (WITNESS FEIFER) Again, I have already told you that our information came primarily from the two sources, the sources of Owen and the sources of Champion.

And you don't know where they got the infermation?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I think we indicate that they received information as a result of the traffic diversion studies. If you are asking if I have specific information who worked on it, I do not. I do know they incorporated the results of the traffic diversion studies with those of the operating plan.

O I understand, and all I'm trying to do is establish whether or not you independently verified the estimates and the projected levels that you received.

As I understand your testimony, you did not do so.

A (WITNESS PEIFER) You've asked the question once, and we have already answered it. We did not.

Q I am clarifying my question for Mr. Frestel, and I believe in the clarification he has responded positively, that there was no independent verification, is that correct?

A (WIINESS PEIFER) That's correct.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) There was no independent

verification.

The second sentence of that paragraph states that the impact on operating employees was determined primarily by the results of the operating plan, which is Exhibit 13 to the application, and traffic diversion studies, Exhibit 12 to the application, which accompanies the testimony in volume SFS-14. I believe you have already referred to that.

Have there been any further changes in those dccumerts which would cause you to revise your manpower requirements in light of those changes, if any?

- A (WI'NESS FRESTEL) Not to my knowledge.
- O Mr. Peifer.
 - A (WITNESS PEIFER) To my knowledge there were some minor adjustments made in the numbers of individuals at certain locations. There is at least one location that comes to my mind.
 - O Which location is that?
 - A (WITNESS PEIFER) Tracy, California, where the labor impact exhibit had shown there would be a number of positions added at that point. I have not seen the errata that was filed by the operating department, so I don't know whether or not that errata includes the changes. I assume that it does, and if so, it would show that those jobs which were shown initially on our

labor impact exhibit to be established at Tracy, California were in fact established at Fresno, California.

Q Would that result in the creation or abolition of any jcbs?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) I think it was just a transference of numbers from one location to another location.

Q Would tha fall under the category of jobs transferred?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) No. It would fall under the category of jobs to be established.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) If I may clarify, counsel, it is my understanding the errata did pick up that change specifically involving Tracy and Fresno.

Q But that change doesn't cause any change in the conclusions you have reached here.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) No, because our conclusions incorporate the errata.

Q In the last paragraph of that sentence you state with respect to nonoperating and staff departments the total amount of work projected for the combined enterprise was compared to the number of existing employees of the respective railroads.

How did you arrive at the amount of work

A (WITNESS PEIFER) Those were done by the various teams who reported to Mr. Champion.

- Q You don't know how that was arrived at?
- A (WITNESS PETER) They were done individually by those teams, and Mr. Champion provided the information for us as to the number of positions to be affected.
- Q Well, I understand the source of the information. My question to you is are you aware of the method that was used to arrive at the work projected for the combined system?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) In no case were we involved in the actual methodology with any of the teams or with Mr. Champion.
- Version of your statement, as the first full paragraph on that page indicates, the table on that rage constitutes a summary of the employee impact which summarizes studies set forth in the labor impact exhibit.
- Now, I have gone through the summary of employment impact and drawn from that summary a number of figures which would serve as the basis of a

comparison.

Have you done that task as well?

Are you able to tell me with regard, for instance, to agreement positions in the operating crafts which appears in the leginning of your summary as the total amount of jobs abolished at the end of the three-year period?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) We are aware of the fact that there are no operating craft positions, agreement positions, that are projected to be abclished.

Q With respect to jobs created, can you tell me the total number of jobs that would be created over the three year period?

A (WITNESS FEIFER) The jobs to be created should be the total of these three columns, 1, 2, and 3.

Q New, what I am trying to do is to explain to you that according to my calculations, that is a total of 1,029 jobs.

A (WITNESS PEIFER) That's correct.

O Havel you arrived at similar calculations?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) Have we gone through and verified the 1,029?

O Yes.

A (WITNESS PEIFER) I don't remember that we matched up specifically, but I think generally we did.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I 'on't know if T

Are you asking if we did the mathematical calculation of adding the jobs created for operating crafts for years one, two and three?

Q Yes, that's what I'm asking you because during the course of this examination it may be necessary for

I can tell you that I have made those calculations and will refer to them. I am asking you whether or not you have any similar calculations which would, for instance, total the columns of year one, year two, and year three for agreement positions, operating crafts, and jobs created. You do not have that information readily available at this moment as I understand it.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) If you mean whether or not we have done the mathematical computation of adding columns in our Table 1, we have not.

Q You have not.

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Very well.

I have done it. If you will accept for the purposes of this examination the numbers I give you,

subject to verification by your counsel, I think we can proceed with the next line of cross examination.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) That would be fine.

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Q With regard to these figures and not the calculations that I have just referred to, have you yourself performed an independent verification of the figures set forth in this summary?

- A (WITNESS FRESTEL): No.
- A (WITNESS PEIFER): No.
- Q Has anyone performed such a verification?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL): Again, I'm going to ask
 you to clarify that, counsel. Do you mean a
 verification of the numbers which were supplied to us
 regarding positions as to whether we independently
 verified that they were accurate, or do you mean
 mathematical verification of the numbers you see in the
 summary here?
- Q Nc. no. You were exactly correct in the first portion of your question. Have you verified the numbers that appear in the summary?
- A (WITNESS FRESTFL): I submit to you your question is ambiguous. We did not independently verify the numbers of positions which were surplied to us by these various teams and which we refer to.

If you mean whether cr not we have verified these numbers, whether these numbers accurately reflect the numbers which are reflected by the labor impact exhibit, the answer is yes.

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Now, when you submitted your statement on March 15, 1984, that statement included an identical summary. But when you submitted your revised statement on September 20, 1984, there were numerous changes in

And if I may give you an example, under the toric "agreement positions, operating crafts, jobs created in year one," you state that will be 628 jobs created. That is derived from the corrected statement submitted to the ICC on Sertember 20.

In the statement submitted to the ICC on March 15th, you stated that there would be 702 jobs created. According to my calculations, that represents a difference of some 74 jobs.

Are you able to explain to me why it was necessaary to revise your summary?

A (WITNESS PEIFFR): I don't specifically remember why it was.

- A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I don't either.
- O That's a fairly substantial chance, isn't it?
- (WITNESS FRESTEL): I think the numbers speak A for themselves.
 - Q Well, 10 percent of the affected jobs created,

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wouldn't you agree that that's fairly substantial?

A (W:INESS FRESTEL): I agree it's 10 percent.

The same is true of the category "jobs transferred" under operating crafts. In your March 15th statement, you submitted that there would be 544 jobs transferred, whereas you stated there would be 470 jobs transferred, again a difference of 74 positions.

Are you able to explain why there is a difference?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): let me try. If I understand it correctly, the original summary of data, when it was prepared, they looked at each location for each craft, for each of the three years following the merger.

In doing so, they considered, for example, a yardman as in a different craft than a trainman, and then it considered a locomotive, a yard locomotive engineer, as in a different craft than a road locomotive engineer, and the same with the fireman.

The same is true with respect to a yardman versus an engine foreman. These are all titles of employees in the operating crafts on each of our railroads.

When they saw that a position -- let me give you an example -- of yardman was abolished, and they

looked to where that individual could go, they transferred them or counted that as a transfer to the road.

What they did not understand or mistock was that on both of our railroads, those employees have what we refer to as dual seniority. So in the ordinary exercise of seniority, wholly independent and preexisting to the merger, such individuals were free to exercise seniority and go from yard to road and vice versa.

Sc, in reality, the number of jobs transferred would be the number indicated, less than we originally indicated.

Consequently, the relocation costs would be similarly reduced.

Q That explains the reduction in the amount of jobs transferred.

Do you have any recollection at all as to why there was a change in the arcunt of jobs to be created?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I don't. Maybe Mr. Peifer does. I do recall that here and there, there were just mathematical mistakes or what have you, but I don't think they added up to that number, and I just don't recall.

Q I can pursue this with each and every one of

the figures because there are differences, regardless of whether you call them substantial or not, in all but just a handful of these figures.

If I understand your testimony, you're not going to be able to explain why in the six months between March 1984 and September 1984 these exchanges occurred?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I guess I'm going to just disagree with you some. As I look at the original version in the errata, for example, non-agreement positions, I see there was a change in jobs abolished from 286 to 285.

I'm sure you wouldn't call that substantial.

And jobs created and job transferred have remained, respectively, 245 and 237. Sc there were not changes throughout the exhibit.

My understanding was most of the changes referred to jobs transferred. Again, more specifically, most of those would refer to changes in the operating crafts. There were some changes with clerical positions for similar reasons.

Q Well, with regard to the agreement positions in particular, I think you will note that there are changes in each and every category, for each and every year, for all except the jobs abolished in years one,

two, and three, and operating crafts and under non-operating crafts, jobs created in year three.

So there were changes in that six-month period in each and every figure submitted to the ICC except those three.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I'm sorry, I can't agree with you, counsel. As I just visually scan the two tables, I see a number of entries which are identical.

I'll be specific. Jobs created in year 3 for non-operating crafts. As I read it, it's 63 in each of the tables.

And I've already alluded to the fact that in the non-agreement positions, jchs created and transferred, year one, are respectively 245 and 237 in each table, and I'll run out those entries. In years two and three, the numbers are identical, as I read them.

Now, maybe you're looking at something else.

Q I may be because, as I said, they are identical with regard to jobs abolished in operating crafts for all three years. The only other identity I see is, as I stated, jobs created in non-operating crafts for year 3.

Now, can you point again to me to where you find them identical?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I'd be glad to. Let's look at non-agreement positions, which is the last category.

Q Now, I prefaced my question to you by pointing to the agreement positions. I asked you in the agreement positions, I see there have been changes in each and every category except for four.

Whether you call the changes substantial cr nct, I rcinted out that there have been changes in each and every one.

My question to you is, if you can answer the question as to why these changes were made, I'll pursue this line of cross-examination. If you can't, I'll drop it.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I have answered the question insofar as the changes regarding jobs transferred, and that applies to whether they are agreement positions or non-agreement, operating or non-operating crafts.

You will notice there are a number of changes where there is a change in one number. For example, jobs abolished, non-operating crafts, year 3, went from 378 to 379. As I indicated, there were a number of situations where at different locations, there were changes of one or two as a result of mathematical

errors, or whatever.

As a result of math? Do you know whether or not that change is mathematical there?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I do not.

Q Sc I take it, the fact remains that you are not able to explain the reasons for the changes except in the one isolated instance?

A (WITNESS FRESTEI): It is not one isolated instance. I've explained the changes with respect to jobs transferred, and that applies to any of the three categories: agreement operating, agreement non-operating, or non-agreement.

Q Are you able to explain the differences in the jobs created or jobs abolished categories for either the operating crafts or non-operating crafts for the premium positions?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): Cther than my general statement that there were a number of mathematical errors which made very slight changes in a number of entries.

Well, let me invite your attention, if you would, to non-operating crafts under jobs created. In year one, in your initial statement, in March of 1984, you state there's 357 jobs created. That is reduced in your September 20, 1984 statement to 315, which is,

according to my calculations, a difference of 42 2 positions. 3 Is that a mathematical or inconsequential 4 change? 5 A (WITNESS FRESTEI): I don't know the answer to 6 that. 7 Q With regard to the last sentence at the bottom 8 of rage 3, moving onto page 4, you state that the 9 results from the operating plan projection of increased 10 traffic -- this results from the operating plan projection of increased traffic, which more than offsets 12 reduction in crews resulting from planned consolidations 13 in yard and local service. 14

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Can you identify that increased traffic on which these estimates are based?

- A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I cannot.
 - A (WITNESS PEIFFR): Nc, I can't.
- O Where did that information come from? Mr. Champion?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER): No, it would have come from Mr. Owen.
- Also on page 3, just below the table, in the second sentence, you state among agreement employees, operating craft employment is expected to increase overall.

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Why is there such an increase in the number of employees in the operating crafts when there is such a decrease in the number of employees in non-cperating crafts?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I think that's because of the expected increase in traffic levels following the merger.

Does any of the increase which you project in operating crafts arise out of temporary positions that you perceive, for instance, in construction that might not be considered pemanent?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): You're referring to operating crafts?

Q Yes, I am.

A (WITNESS FRESTEI): No, I do not.

A (WITNESS PEIFER): Let me understand the question. Are you talking about work train service or things of that nature that would be temporary as orrosed to permanent positions, operating positions?

O Anything that might be identified as part of the operating crafts which, although would result in the creation of a position, would be considered temporary as opposed to permanent.

A (WITNESS PEIFER): None of the numbers that were furnished by Mr. Owen were couched in terms of

temporary positions. We assumed that they were all going to be permanent positions, as permanent as any position is in the railroad industry.

Q I'm scrry?

A (WITNESS PEIFER): As permanent as any position is in the railroad industry.

Q I understood and gave as an example the possibility that a merger might result in some construction, and I wanted to verify that in fact these figures don't include positions that might be necessary to complete that construction if the employees were actually employed directly by the railroad as opposed to by an independent contractor.

And as I understand what you've told me, it is to the best of your knowledge, there is no temporary positions included in these figures.

A (WITNESS PEIFER): There are no temporary positions included within the labor impact exhibit.

O Thank you.

On page 4, if you would turn the page to the first full sentence, you state: "In non-operating crafts employment will decrease over the three-year period."

Do you expect any further decrease at the end of the three-year period?

A (WITNESS PEIFER): We didn't do any studies
beyond the three years, so there's no way we can answer
that question.

Q When you say "we," do you mean you and Mr.
Frestel, or the railroad?

A (WITNESS FEIFER): I'm talking specifically
about Mr. Frestel and myself and the people in our
respective departments.

Q Do you have any opinion as to whether or not
there is going to be a decrease beyond the three-year
period?

A (WITNESS FEIFER): I do not.

A (WITNESS FEIFER): Nor do I.

Q Why is that?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I just don't. I haven't thought about it.

You haven't given any thought to the fact that beyond this three-year period, there could be additional reductions in the labor force that could result in increased labor costs, increased labor protection costs, but perhaps increase the labor costs of the work force?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): We were asked to compare this and compile the data which we received for the three-year period and ascribe costs to it, and that's what we did.

We did not receive data beyond the three-year period.

- Q And your inability to give orinion as to whether there would be a further decrease is based on the fact that you don't have data?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL): It's further complicated by the fact that the farther you get in time, the more difficult it is to make forecasts.
- O Well, I coderstand that. But as we went over this summary, it seems to me that you've testified in some specificity with regard to what the reduction is going to be.

Are you telling us there's been no thought given to whether or not there is going to be further decreases after the end of this three-year period?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL): I think what we're telling you is we reported the numbers as given to us by the two sources. Beyond that, we haven't done anything else for the purposes of the labor impact exhibit.

Anybody could give you an opinion about something, and I don't think the opinion would be very valid, for the reasons that Mr. Frestel described and other reasons, any number of reasons.

And you're not capable of giving us any
opinion?

A (WITNESS PEIFER): I think anybody could give you an crinicn. If you want an opinion, we can give you an opinion. I don't think the validity of the opinion is going to be --

O To give you an example, I can't give you an opinion because I'm not qualified. That's why you're here, the Vice President in Charge of labor Relations on these carriers.

I'm asking you in your position as Vice

President of the carriers in Charge of Labor Relations,

whether or not, based on what you now know, you can give

us an opinion as to whether there is going to be further

decreases beyond this three-year period.

A (WITNESS PEIFER): Well, first let me correct that. That's not why we're here. Why we're here is to stand cross-examination on the labor impact exhibit which portrays the effect on positions over a specific three-year period. That's why we're here.

Q Well, it's been my understanding in sitting through this cross-examination, that the Court has allowed cross-examination beyond the scope of the very limited verified statements.

JUDGE HOFKINS: Well, can you give an opinion for what it's worth?

WITNESS PEIFER: It would be very difficult.

I could give two opinions. One would be that there would be more employees required. The other would be there would be less employees required. It's going to depend on the level of business at that given time.

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

Q This whole merger is based on the fact that you project an increase in traffic levels, as I understand it. And I assume that you expect this increase in traffic levels to continue beyond this three-year period.

Is it safe to assume that that increased traffic level is going to continue beyond this three-year period?

MR. NELSCN: I would like to interpose ar objection. I think counsel has mischaracterized what the merger is all about. I also think that this line of questioning is becoming very argumentative, and the Commission's regulations call for a three-year planning period for the labor impact exhibit. It doesn't call for opinions beyond that.

And I think the gentlemen have explained why it is difficult to go any further.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Well, it appears these men have stated that they have no opinion past the three-year period, Mr. Birney.

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

Moving on to the next sentence, you state:
"However, we examined the number of employees expected
to be furloughed each year, and in every instance the
number is smaller than the annual attrition for that
craft on constituent railroads."

How much smaller?

A (WITNESS PEIFER): What we did was examine attrition, the number of people who actually left service, based on EOC reporting, which broke down the reports on employees into nine separate categories.

We did that for years 1980, 1981, and 1982 and we came up with percentages of employees who actually left service that varied anywhere from over 8 percent to below 19 percent, depending on the particular craft involved.

Q So with regard to each craft or class involved, the amount of attrition varies anywhere from 8 to 19 percent?

A (WITNESS PEIFER): If you look at the full spectrum of all the classifications involved, that's correct.

Q Based on that, are you able to give us any indication of how much smaller the annual -- or how much smaller the furloughed employees would be in those

categories?

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A (WITNESS PFIFER): I guess we'd have to do it specifically by class, but we did observe one thing, and that was pretty much what is stated here; that in every case, based on what we had seen, the number of people who would become surplus was significantly less than who the true attrition had been for any given craft.

Q What do you mean by "significantly"? More than five?

A (WITNESS PEIFER): Let's say 2 percent compared to 17 percent; 3 percent compared to 16 percent. I think that's a significant difference.

Q Have you further examined those figures in light cf your recent revisions to ensure that the annual attrition in each one cf those craft and classes is going to be less than anticipated furloughs?

A (WITNESS PEIFER): Specifically, no; but it would take an awful lot to have an impact on the percentages involved. You'd have to decrease a hell of a lot of employees because you got into that percentage.

There would have to be a significant change in the number of employees that you added or absolished that would have an impact on the comparison of percentage of people that are actually going to be

surplus by this transaction as compared to the tecrle who actually leave service. 3 Did you understand that? 4 Q I think I do. 5 (WITNESS PEIFER): Okay. 6 Q Moving on, you state that: "We expect all 7 furloughed and displaced employees to be reabscribed into 8 the combined work force within the first year after they 9 are first affected. 10 Do you expect your recent revisions to affect 11 these figures at all? 12 A (WITNESS PEIFER): Nc, I don't. 13 Q What do you mean by "reabsorb"? 14 A (WITNESS PEIFER): It means they will be able 15 to come back to work for the company. They will be 16 recalled to service. 17 Q How many employees do you expect to be 18 furlcughed? 19 20 21 22 23

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- A (WITNESS PEIFER) I don't have the exact number.
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Nor do I.

- Q Do you know where that figure can be derived?
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) You would have to go back through the work papers, all of the work papers involved.
- Q So you can't tell me today categorically how many employees are going to be furloughed, displaced, or transferred by craft or class?
- A (WITNESS PEIFFR) We can tell you what the assumptions were for protection based on people being dismissed, people opting for separation allowances, people subsequently being recalled, people electing not to take any protection.
- The reason I am asking the question obviously is, you come to the conclusion here that all these people who have been furloughed and displaced are going to be reabsorbed, and my question to you is, can you provide me with the figures showing how many of these people will in fact be furloughed, displaced, or transferred by craft or class, and as I understand your answer, you are telling me those figures can be obtained from the work papers, and I will be guite candid with you, I am not familiar with the work papers.

Is there any way, just to make my question clearer, that I can obtain that information if it is not available right now?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) It would be very difficult for you. As I understand it, the work papers have been available in the depository, both the work papers of Mr. Frestel and myself, as well as other people's.

Q I am not disputing that. I am just telling you for the purposes of the questioning right new that I am not familiar with them, and I don't have them here.

And my question to you was simply, could you assist me in telling me where I can find them? And I think your answer is that I can find them in a dercsitory, and they are available.

- A (WITNESS PEIFER) That is correct.
- Q And the information I sought in my question can be obtained from those papers?
 - A (WITNESS PEIFER) I think it could, yes.
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I believe so, yes.
- Q If you could turn to Page Number 5, the first full paragraph, you state, "Substantial reductions in employment are anticipated along non-agreement employees."

Do you know what the extent of those reductions are?

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A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I believe they are set forth in the table.

Now, going back to my calculations, based on the revised statement you provided in September of 1984, there would be a reduction in non-agreement positions of 215. As I calculate it, the number of jobs abolished over that three-year period would be a total of 470. The number of jobs created would be 275. The difference I come to is a figure of 215, which of course doesn't take into account the number of jobs transferred.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) That's correct.

O Assuming that's correct, would you agree that there was also a substantial number of non-operating craft positions abolished in this merger?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) What do you mean by substantial? In the context, I think I have to disagree with you.

Q Well, I suppose that if you used the word "substantial" to mean 215, and the figures from the summary at Page 3 indicate that 573 non-operating crafts are going to be abclished as you use that term, that would be a substantial number.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Counsel, numbers are relative. Two hundred and fifteen may be a larger and in fact is a larger percentage of the approximately

eighty-two or three hundred non-agreement employees than 573 is of the approximately 35,000 non-operating employees.

- O So those 573 --
- A (WITNESS FRESTEI) My rough calculation is, that is about 1.5 percent spread over a three-year period.
- O So in your view, the positions that have been abolished for non-operating crafts are therefore insubstantial?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) No, I said it is not a substantial number taken in context.
 - O They are not substantial?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) It is not a substantial number taken in context of the number of non-operating employees and the fact that it is spread over a three-year period.
- Q Well, both are spread over a three-year period. Is that not correct?
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes.
- Q Sc that factor doesn't have anything to do with the comparison.
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) It has to do when you compare the two numbers, 573 and 35,000.
 - Q But it doesn't have anything to do with the

comparison of 215 and 537.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) They would both be spread over a three-year period. That is correct. Which would, of course, ameliorate the impact.

- Q With regard to each of the two?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes, exactly.
- Q So it doesn't serve as any distinguishing feature between the two, does it?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Counsel, my point was directed to the fact that if you are considering the base from which we are dealing, respective bases of non-operating and non-agreement, and the numbers of employees that would be involved in this context, and the fact that it is spread over a three-year period, I do not regard the numbers as substantial. They are more substantial with respect to the non-agreement employees because it is a smaller base.
- O Moving down the page to the third full paragraph, the first sentence, you state that combined rail systems will handle more traffic but will do so with somewhat smaller and much more efficiency -- excuse me, and much more efficiently deployed work force.
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes.
- Q I may be misreading the summary. That is entirely possible. But it seems to me that based on the

figures you have projected, and I am perfectly willing to accept the correction if I am wrong, that there would in fact be, under the figures you provided, a somewhat larger work force.

According to my analysis of the figures, and as I state, I am perfectly willing to accept contrary information if you are able to provide it, according to your figures on Page 3, the number of operating crafts and agreement position is going to increase by 1,029 jobs, whereas the number of non-operating craft positions is going to decrease by 573.

Even if you add in the number of non-agreement positions, as I see it, it appears to me that the work force that you project based on this merger is not going to be somewhat smaller, but is going to be somewhat larger. But as I say, I may be reading those figures incorrectly.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) That could be, counsel. That's the way I look at it. It could be. Ken?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) I agree.

Q So then the statement that I just read from Page 5 is incorrect?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Substitute the word
"larger" for "smaller," and it would be correct. At
least that is how I read it. There may be another

explanation.

Q Turning now to Page 6, which will be my last question from your verified statement, you state there will be a good deal of transferring employees and some temporary furloughs, and I will stop there, because that is what I am interested in asking you about. Can you tell us how many employees will be transferred?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I think you can arrive at that total by computation from Table 1.

- Q. That would be derived from Table 1 on Page 3?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes, sir.
- Q What do you mean by temporary furloughs?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) We mean temporary because of the fact that we do not expect them to last, I think our assumption was any longer than one year, due to the fact that the attrition rates for all of the crafts and non-agreement employees were greater than the numbers we expected of positions that would be furloughed.
- Q So by temporary you mean no longer than one year?
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes, sir.
- I have no further questions with regard to that portion of the verified statement that I was examining on, which deals with the labor impact exhibit. Do you wish to add anything to your testimony

that relates to the questions that I have asked?

- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I don't.
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) No.

I would like you to turn if you would, then, to the exhibit that I think you have been given by counsel, which is identified as MKT-C-21.

Your Honor, I apologize. I am not sure you have a copy. Do you have a copy?

JUDGE HOPKINS: I haven't got it with me. It is upstairs.

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

- Q I realize that your counsel gave you copies of this document just before you took the stand, and so before you delve down into it, let me just ask you some preliminary questions. I might save you some time. Are you familiar with the exhibit, without referring to any of the contents? It is identified as an exhibit underneath the date on the first page. Have you -- Are you familiar with the exhibit at all as it is constituted and stapled together in this form?
 - A (WITNESS PEIFER) This document?
 - Q Yes.
 - A (WITNESS PEIFER) I am not.
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I am not either.
 - Q What I am principally interested in asking you

about is the last document which appears among these documents which begins on Page 000525.

If you will look to the bottom righthand corner of each of those pages, you will see they are numbered, and the document I am interested in asking you about is, at the bottom righthand corner, begins with 000525, and at the top it says Santa Fe-Southern Pacific Merger Considerations, Operating Department.

Do you find that?

- A (WITNESS PEIFER) Yes.
- A (WITNESS FRESTEI) Yes, I do.
- Of that five-page document, which is Page 5 of the document, there are two paragraphs there I would like to invite your attention to. They are entitled Labor Agreements and Recommendation.

Have you had an opportunity at any time in the past to read those two paragraphs?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I have not had an opportunity to read them. I have been advised that earlier in the testimony, and I believe it was witnesses J.R. Fitzgerald and W. Lacy, the respective operating vice presidents, that this matter came up. That is the extent of my knowledge.

O Very well.

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With the Court's permission, I would like you to read those two paragraphs now, if that is agreeable with the Court.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Individually?

MR. BIRNEY: If they could just have the opportunity to read the two paragraphs.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Sure.

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

(Pause.)

JUDGE HOPKINS: Have you read them?

- Q Have you had a chance to read the paragraphs?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes.
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) Yes.
- O The first question is a very broad one, addressed to each of you, if you would. What does this have to do with this merger?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) I am not even sure when this was written and who wrote it. I read these totally in abstract.

Q Well, given that it has been written, I am asking you, after having read it, what, if anything, do these two paragraphs have to do with this merger?

MR. LANE: Your Honor, I believe the question calls for some speculation on the part of these witnesses, the role of an unknown author at this point

of a document they have been shown -
JUDGE HOPKINS: Go ahead. I am scrry.

MR. LANE: That is okay.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Are you first asking them whether they know anything about this dccument? I think you ought to first ask them that.

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

Q Very well. Have either of you -- I thought I had asked them that, Your Honor.

JUDGE HOPKINS: I mean, about these two paragraphs in particular.

BY MR. PIRNEY: (Resuming)

- Q Have you ever seen these two garagraphs before?
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I have not.
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) I don't recall ever having seen them.
- Q Have you ever heard the substance of these paragraphs ever discussed?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Earlier I mentioned that it was my understanding that questions were asked of the witnesses I mentioned, and I believe it was with reference to this document, and it had to do with restrictive agreements and possible -- call it a buyout or separation allowances or something like that of

necessary emrloyees. That was the description which I received of the nature of the question.

- I would suggest to you that that seems to indicate that this merger could be used as a means of the carriers, and I haven't attributed the authorship to anyone. All I am saying to you is that the paragraph seems to suggest that the merger could be used as a means of eliminating what in the view of someone these agreements are unduly restrictive. Is that the meaning you derive from these two paragraphs?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I don't know what the meaning is, but I suggest to you that the author obviously does not have experience in labor relations in this industry.
- Q So this does not represent the position of the carriers in this application?
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) No, sir, it does not.
- Q In fact, it would be contrary to the intent that you proceeded with this application. Is that correct?
- MR. IANE: Your Honor. I think the question needs to be refined a little more closely. That is an awfully broad question.

WITNESS FRESTEL: What do you mean by intent?

JUDGE LOPKINS: Why don't you be specific?

MR. BIRNEY: I don't know how I can be more specific, Your Honor. It just seems to me that I am asking the two representatives of these carriers who are in charge of labor relations whether or not in their view such a position would violate the intent of the carrier in seeking the merger.

JUDGE HOPKINS: What particular position? Why don't you be specific as to what particular item you are talking about?

MR. BIRNEY: Well, as Mr. Frestel has testified, I believe, Your Honor, that it indicates that there should be a buyout of unneeded personnel, and that is the recommendation.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Are you asking whether they agree with this position, or whether this is the supposed merged carrier's position, or what? What is your question?

MR. BIRNEY: My question was whether or not this position would be contrary to the intent of the carriers in this application.

wITNESS FRESTEL: I don't incw that it is contrary. I can read this as being independent of. Let me be specific. The last sentence of the first paragraph, with reference to labor agreements, makes the statement, "SP has no crew consist agreement." It is my

understanding, and I am sure Mr. Peifer can testify in detail, that they now have such a crew consist agreement. Chviously, it has nothing to do with the merger. Santa Fe has had one for over three years now, as most other major carriers.

So I guess what I am saying is, I see nothing wrong with the statement that we should seek to change labor agreements which we regard as restrictive or unduly so, nor do I see anything wrong with an attempt to huyout or separate employees who are regarded as redundant.

This has been widespread in our industry for the last three years, in fact, earlier than that on merged carriers, but independent of any merger, because of the economic conditions we have all experienced.

What I would submit to you is, none of these statements have been --

BY MR. BIRNEY: (Resuming)

- Q If I may interrupt you for a second, you have come to, I think, propably the heart of my question, and I would like to go forward with it.
 - A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Go right ahead.
- 2 You have just referred essentially to the first sentence of the recommendation, but I would like to point out to you that is says, "Suspend the

appropriate funds required at the onset of the merger to buy out unneeded personnel and get rid of overly restricted labor agreements."

My question to you is, as I understand your answer, such an independent tack should not be part of this merger.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) My earlier statement was that wheever wrote this, and I really don't know who did, does not have experience in labor relations, because when I first read that I took that to mean that perhaps the individual thought that there would be merger-related costs such as employee protection and relocation, and that is quite frankly how I read that first sentence of Paragraph 2.

But I guess what I was trying to say before was, it is my understanding that there is nothing in the operating plan, and there is nothing in the employee impact statement or the numbers generated by the operating plan which contemplates anything which is set forth in any of these paragraphs.

O That would be consistent with the testimory of Bruce Mc/hee, who testified as the treasurer of the SPT and Southern that he knew of no such plan to reduce labor costs in the future by decreasing labor outside of the merger, and what your answer just leads me to

confirm is that you know of no such plan, either. Is
that correct?

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A (WITNESS FFESTEL) I have to be careful there. Let me back up. I know of no such plan coincident or related to the merger to reduce employment levels. From time to time in the past several years, I have considered various avenues of reducing employment on the Santa Fe Railroad. I have chosen not to pursue them. I am talking about buyout or early retirement and that sort of thing.

Sc, when you say that there have been no such plans, we have considered some. There are none presently in existence, but let me perhaps ease your mind. To my knowledge, and I would know if there was such a plan, there is no plan coincident or related to the merger and independent of it to reduce employment.

MR. EIRNEY: Thank you, Your Honor. No further questions.

JUDGE HOPKINS: Thank you.

Ms. Madigan?

MS. MADIGAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MS. MADIGAN:

Q Good afternoon. As Mr. Birney indicated to you earlier, my name is Beverly Madigan.

Gentlemen, are you familiar with the labor impact exhibit which details by location and by job classification where the employees will be relocated or where jobs will be abolished?

A (WITNESS PEIFFR) We are, but it doesn't say where they will be relocated to. It gives the detail on positions that will be established or abolished or transferred.

Q Is this labor impact exhibit representative of what will actually occur following the merger, or is it merely a projection?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) It is our best estimate, as I understand it. I don't know what you mean by, is it an estimate or is it an estimate. It is an estimate.

Q Well, is this actually what you are going to implement?

A (WITNESS FRESTEI) I can't say that.

Q You can't say that?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) No.

Q When will you be able to say what you will actually --

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) My point is this, counsel. Between now and the time of the merger, we may be into, God forbid, another recession the likes of which we are not quite out of, so it is very difficult to tell what

we will be doing then. It could be totally different economic conditions.

- Q What factors or what circumstances would account for the changes?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I just named economic conditions.
- 0 Well, what else?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Technological changes. Our industry is constantly in a state of flux in terms of employment.
- Q So you are not committed to put this into effect when you consummate the merger?
- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) This is the best estimate of the employee impact as a result of the operating plan.
- Q Do either one of you gentlemen know how many employees attrite per year on your individual carriers?
 - A (WITNESS PEIFER) You mean the actual number?
 - Q The actual number, or your best estimate.
- A (WITNESS PEIFER) We have done it on a percentage basis, and I have already explained that. We did it for the years 1980, '81, and '82, so we could answer that question on a percentage basis, if we had an opportunity to look at our work papers.
 - O But you have no idea how that would relate to

numbers of employees?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) Number of employees that have actually left service? No, but it is something that could be calculated.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) We do have those numbers available. They are available in our work study. I raised that point because we extrapolated from them the various attrition levels for the different crafts. So those totals are available.

Q If I went to the document depository and reviewed your work papers, would I be able to ascertain that figure?

- A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Yes, I believe so.
- And your documents are included in the document depository?
 - A (WITNESS PEIFFR) That is our understanding.
- Could you turn to Page 4 of your verified statement, please?

In the first full paragraph, approximately one-third of the way down, the sentence begins, "If they are unable to secure such a position, these employees would be then expected to exercise the seniority to obtain the highest rated position available requiring relocation for which relocation costs would be paid by the merged railroad."

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Can you tell us what you mean by highest rated position?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) The position that pays the most.

Q In comparison to that employee?

A (WITNESS FRESTEI) Yes, positions are paid rates, those that are subject to cooperative agreements as opposed to salaries or wages, if you will.

Now, in the sentence, are you referring to transfer to anywhere on the system?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) Well, you really have to go back and read the paragraph. The first part of the paragraph says that they would be obligated to take a position producing the highest rate of pay at that location, or if necessary, move, in which case they would be paid relocation expenses.

Q What if these individuals hold point seniority? Would they still be required to relocate anywhere on the merged system?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) We have assumed that if there is a position available for an employee in the merged company, that the employee would be obligated to go to that position, and if required to move, he would be entitled to relocation expenses.

Q That is what your study and that is what your

figures are predicated on, that understanding of your obligation?

A (WITNESS PEIFER) That assumption, that was the assumption that was made.

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) That statement is directly made in the sentence following the one which you are referring to, counsel.

O I was going to ask you what the sentence following means. I can read it for the record. Why don't I do that? The following sentence is, "Those unable to obtain such positions will be offered transfers to other jobs elsewhere in the combined system for which relocation costs also will be paid."

What exactly does that mean?

unable to find a position in the exercise of seniority as described in the first sentence without relocation or is unable to find a position described in the second sentence, which is through exercise of seniority with relocation, will be expected to go to a position anywhere or the contined system and receiving, of course, relocation costs.

Now, is this a position that could be outside his or her craft or class?

A (WITNESS FRESTEL) We have not made that

assumption in any of our data, of our figures. That could be, and there is arbitration support for that. We have not made that assumption in our labor exhibit. O Now, you understand, don't you, that your 5 interpretation of the employee's obligations to relocate 6 are different from rail labor's, don't you? A (WITNESS FRESTEL) I wouldn't know. 8 A (WITNESS PEIFER) We don't understand that. 9 A (WITNESS FRESTEL) It might be a fair 10 assumption, but if you are telling me they are 11 different, I will take your word for it. 12 Q Would you agree, though, that this kind of 13 disagreement would be subject to arbitration under the 14 New York dock conditions? 15 A (WITNESS FRESTEL) Which agreement are you 16 referring to? 17 Q let me rephrase the question then. Would you 18 agree that the dispute concerning the employee's 19 obligations to relocate under the New York dock 20 conditions would be subject to arbitration under the New 21 York dock conditions? 22 (WITNESS PEIFER) Not necessarily. No.

Q What reasons do you have for not agreeing with that?

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A (WITHESS PEIFER) I guess you would have to