

b) Hazardous Materials Programs

Conrail's hazardous materials organization is staffed by a Director of Hazardous Materials; four Hazardous Materials Field Service Managers, who have received extensive and comprehensive training; and 50 Hazmat Sentinels. Conrail's hazardous materials program is comprehensive and extensive. It consists of these elements:

- (1) Compliance Quality Inspections identify shipper preparation problems involving the transportation of hazardous materials.
- (2) The Transportation Incident Severity Index (TISI) was developed to identify the severity of every non-accident release of hazardous materials occurring on Conrail. Non-accident releases (NAR) are those caused by something other than a railroad accident (collision or derailment).
- (3) Hazardous Materials Public Education provides hazardous materials incident response education and training to fire, police, emergency medical services, and office of emergency management personnel in the areas served by CR.
- (4) CR's Hazardous Materials Response Team members, stationed at various locations throughout the CR system, are immediately dispatched to every on-line hazardous materials emergency situation to provide on-site expertise in handling incidents.
- (5) The Hazmat Sentinel Training Program provides ongoing training for a select group of non-agreement employees. Their advanced level of emergency management knowledge maximizes safety, coordination, and cooperation at hazardous materials incident sites.
- (6) CR's Customer Contact program involves formal contact with chemical shippers. These contacts include inspections of the preparation for car loading and the loading itself, follow-up on chemical releases to ensure proper determination of cause and to prevent recurrence, and conducting education and training of the shippers' employees, often on the premises of the company or plant.
- (7) CR's Hazardous Materials Training Partnership is an ongoing effort between the Association of American Railroads (AAR), Conrail, the New Jersey State Police Office of Emergency Management, and the New Jersey Fire Training Academy. Partnership efforts, focused on New Jersey because of its concentration of chemical shippers and receivers, include tank car incident-related training to fire departments and other emergency responders.
- (8) The Responsible CAER® Partnership is an internal advisory team of employees and supervisors at CR's Conway Yard, just outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The team addresses regulatory and environmental issues at this major classification hub.

This program has effectively reduced recurring hazardous materials problems. Additionally, CR management has expanded the hazardous materials training of their employees, and fostered new partnerships with local communities throughout its system.

c) CSX Organization

The CSX field managers conduct in-house, train-the-trainer, hazardous materials training, and "community" training of local emergency responders, customers' employees, and others. In the past five years, the community training activities alone acounted for 400 classes with more than 14,000 participants. These efforts earned CSX the 1996 Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response (Transcaer) Achievement Award from the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the AAR.

d) The NS Hazardous Materials Program

The NS Hazardous Materials Program is staffed by a manager, three Industrial Hygienists, two hazardous materials specialists (one Principal Hazardous Materials Coordinator and one Transcaer and Training Coordinator), and ten Regional Environmental Operations Engineers. The program addresses four emergency action plans: prevention, preparedness, response, and remediation. The program includes field compliance audits of the entire system conducted by the manager and two hazardous materials specialists.

The hazardous materials team took note that hazardous materials issues were not discussed in the CSX Operating Plan. The NS Operating Plan states that "many" CR employees working in environmental and safety administration areas will be relocated to the NS' Safety and Environmental Department's headquarters in Roanoke, Virginia. FRA is concerned that neither CSX nor NS has made any specific proposal that addresses any commitment to, or specific aspects of, hazardous materials issues. FRA is further concerned that the centralization of former CR hazardous materials employees will result in fewer field observations and audits on the former CR territories. Additional information is needed from CSX and NS to address these issues in order to make a proper safety assessment.

e) CR Department

Commendably, CR has expanded its Hazardous Materials Department in the recent past and appears more active in day-to-day hazardous materials issues than CSX or NS. Indeed CR's program of initial action and aggressive pursuit of non-compliance issues has placed CR "ahead of the curve" in the pursuit of compliance with hazardous materials regulations. FRA is concerned that the CR hazardous materials program will suffer if the proposed acquisition is approved. In order to make its determination, it is vital for CSX and NS to elaborate on their materials safety policies, particularly as regards the adoption of "best practices"safety programs.

f) Computer Systems

When releases of hazardous materials occur, for whatever reason, it is **imperative** that proper information on the specific chemical or chemicals involved is immediately available. This information is vital to ensuring the safety of affected railroad employees, emergency responders, and the general public and to implementing safe and appropriate containment and remediation measures. The source of this information is the documentation that accompanies each railroad shipment.

At one time shipment documentation originated with railroad freight agents. They would transmit the documentation to local freight train crews or to yard clerks. Clerks would prepare waybills for each car, and assemble them together with the manifest for each train. These documents were given to the conductor, who would deliver them to the yard clerk at the end of his run. In this manner, information on the content of each car in the train was immediately available to its crew.

Today, all major railroads in the United States use a computer-driven transportation control and communications system to oversee the movement and tracking of freight. CR and CSX have centralized Customer Service Centers (CSC). NS has part of its customer service function centralized, and is moving to centralize the rest. In addition, CSX's accounting and core computer operating systems differ from those of NS and CR.

At the CSX, the CSC is divided into two groups, Customer Support and Terminal Support. Customer Support is responsible for all contacts with customers. They also frequently have contact with CSX operating personnel pertaining to work orders. The Customer Support personnel perform the work historically performed by freight agents. Customer Support at CSX is divided into teams, or Service Lanes, which are geographical portions of the CSX system.

The CSX Terminal Support group is responsible for all functions and associated paperwork and electronic data related to the actual movement of the freight. These functions are those historically performed by yard personnel, and include yarding of trains, classification, preparation of consists, and video verification of train makeup.

Both groups are located in the CSX Jacksonville, Florida, CSC facility. They were relocated there from the old regional Transportation Service Centers between 1991 and 1993.

NS has within its Operations Department the Agency Operation Center, responsible for all waybilling and demurrage, and a separate National Customer Service Center, responsible for customer service and car tracing. NS' customer service function is organized into the more traditional commodity groups, unlike CSX's Service Lanes. NS' yard office functions are handled at decentralized locations throughout the NS system by the Transportation Department. However, efforts are underway to centralize these functions in Atlanta, Georgia. The NS' Accounting Department is responsible for all other revenue functions related to the movement of freight. NS is currently completing a major rewrite of its computerized operating system. The rewrite includes the implementation, over the next two to three years, of the Thoroughbred Yard Enterprise System (TYES), a train movement reporting and station inventory system that will enable centralization of the yard office functions. NS' Strategic Intermodal Management System (SIMS), the operating system for intermodal freight (trailers or containers on flat cars, TOFC or COFC) has been in operation for about one year. A recent review of SIMS by FRA personnel indicated problems with record availability to train crews concerning shipments of hazardous materials of less than 100 pounds.

CR bases its National Customer Support Center in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At this location, clerical personnel make sure that train crews receive the required hazardous material shipping papers for cars in their trains. In addition, they monitor the trackside AEIs for accuracy of train consists and verification of block make-ups. This includes assuring that hazardous materials cars in trains are located in the positions required by Federal regulations.

FRA is concerned about the lack of specific information in the Operating Plan submitted by CSX pertaining to the integration of its computer-based Customer Support System with CR's. Specifically, information is needed from CSX as to how it will ensure the availability and integrity of vital hazardous materials information to operating personnel during the transition.

FRA is also concerned about the statement in the NS' Operating Plan that it will eliminate CR's computerized Customer Support operating system and migrate those functions into its own. A number of aspects of NS' computer-based program are, themselves, in the early stages of implementation. NS must reveal specifically how intends to implement its computer-based Customer Service programs fully and properly at the same time it is physing out CR's. It also needs to know how NS intends to correct its SIMS problem, and prevent a recurrence of that type of TOFC/COFC problem on the acquired portions of CR.

Finally, NS must ensure the availability and integrity of vital hazardous materials information to operating personnel during the phase-out of CR's computer-based Customer Support system.

The Operating Plans of both CSX and NS propose to close the present CR Customer Support Center in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Of the 547 current clerical positions, 147 will be abolished; 185 relocated to CSX's Jacksonville, Florida, facility during Year One; 15 relocated to NS' Atlanta, Georgia, facility during Year One; and 200 relocated to Atlanta by Year Two. In the past, CR itself eliminated clerical personnel whose duties included making sure train crews received hazardous material shipping papers for cars in their trains. This elimination resulted in a system-wide problem, whereby train crews and clerical personnel could not retrieve the required rail car's paper work containing hazardous materials information. Moreover, I am aware that the present workload at CR's Pittsburgh CSC is such that telephone calls often are greeted with voice mail messages or busy signals, or are just not answered.

In light of the foregoing, FRA is concerned that neither CSX nor NS has given proper thought to Customer Service Center staff levels. FRA is especially concerned that CSX is proposing an immediate reduction in such staff. The NS, while not proposing reductions in CSC forces, has not evidenced that it has carefully considered the present workload at the Pittsburgh Center. Specific information from CSX and NS on the justifications for their proposed staffing levels at their Customer Support Centers is necessary. Additionally, information is needed as to how CSX and NS will ensure timely availability of hazardous materials shipping papers to train crews, and availability of Support Center personnel to hazardous materials customers and others.

g) Inspections

Non-accident releases of hazardous materials (any unintentional release not the result of a railroad accident) are the largest single cause of the escape of hazardous materials from their packaging, and are the reason nearly 90 railroad workers a year are "splashed" with dangerous chemicals. Most often, NARs are caused by improperly secured valves or other closures or by overloading, operations typically beyond the direct control of a railroad. Nevertheless, 25% of the NARs happen on the tracks of the three railroads involved in this analysis. It is vital that the acquiring railroads and the CSAOs have a program in place to prevent train crew injuries; none has yet surfaced.

In addition to NARs, the most common hazardous materials-related defects on the three analyzed railroads include loose closures on tank cars (without demonstrable leaks as of the discovery of the defect), missing or improper placards and other emergency response markings, and erroneous hazardous materials shipping papers.

The best defense against any hazardous materials defect is a comprehensive safety plan, backed up by a sound inspection program. Such a program includes not only field inspections, but reviews of hazardous materials documentation to ensure it exists and is properly completed. Both the CSX and NS project increases in freight traffic volumes as well as the number of runthrough trains and in block-swapping. However, both railroads project decreases in personnel traditionally responsible for the inspection of cars, for police and security protection, and for first-level supervision.

FRA is concerned that the traffic and operating projections of CSX and NS, expressed in their Operating Plans, are in conflict with their manpower projections. In order to make a proper hazardous materials safety assessment, additional information from CSX and NS is needed. This information needs to explain in detail how the carriers will be able to ensure required inspections of cars carrying hazardous materials will be performed. The information should include specifically the following:

- What inspection procedures will be for run-through trains at crew-change points, and at points where blocks of cars are added to and removed from trains.
- Which employees will be assigned to perform which inspection tasks, and an outline of the training they will receive to ensure they can perform their inspection duties thoroughly and knowledgeably.
- How the two railroads will prevent the pressure of keeping trains "on time" or "moving" from taking precedence over thorough and complete inspections.

Information going beyond just hazardous materials inspections is needed because most hazardous materials releases resulting from derailments caused by car defects are from defects in cars not carrying hazardous materials.

6) Dispatch Centers

a) Dispatch Centers Safety

Train dispatching is an essential element of the movement of trains, engines, and rolling equipment in a safe and efficient manner. Train dispatchers are responsible for regulating and controlling these operations in an assigned territory. Train dispatchers execute their tasks from a dispatch center. A railroad may centralize all dispatching operations in one center or designate such centers according to operating divisions. CSX has centralized its dispatching operations at one facility in Jacksonville, Fiorida, whereas Norfolk Southern and Conrail conduct their respective dispatching operations at division headquarters.

Neither NS' operating plan nor CSX's operating plan discusses measures to combat excess service performed by dispatchers or excessive assignments of dispatchers on their designated "off duty" days. FRA is concerned that overworked dispatchers at Conrail and CSX are already experiencing fatigue, which compromises railroad safety. FRA believes that the railroads need to promulgate initiatives reducing maximum dispatching workload capacities and minimizing violations of the Hours of Service laws for excess service performed.

b) Integration of Dispatching Control Systems

Neither the NS nor the CSX operating plans explains which dispatching system will be employed to move trains or engines on former CR territories. Currently, NS, CSX, and CR use computeraided dispatching systems that are unique to their own rail operations. The railroads have not explained whether they intend to integrate CR computer-aided dispatching system with their respective systems or eliminate it altogether. Applicants must indicate which dispatching system or systems the railroads intend to use that will direct traffic on the acquired territories; and also how integration of systems will be accomplished in a programmed manner to minimize disruptions.

7) Highway-Rail Crossings

a) Highway-Rail Crossings - Background

The vast majority of deaths and injuries attributable to rail operations occur as a result of highway-railroad grade crossing collisions and trespass incidents. Although FRA is always concerned with rail line crossing safety, we have particularly concerned related to the potential for an increased number of these incidents.

b) Traffic Flow Changes

The proposed acquisition will change the traffic flow drastically in some areas. The CSX operating plan includes track rehabilitation route upgrades which will increase capacity and traffic on the line between Chicago, Illinois and Cleveland, Ohio, and increase speeds to 80 mph (FRA Class 5). Traffic density is expected to increase more than 100 percent in some areas. Studies indicate that incidents will increase with related traffic and speed. When assessing crossing safety, several issues need to be considered:

- Effect of increased train traffic/speeds/tracks on crossings
- Need to improve crossing and pedestrian warning devices
- Need for increased rail-safety (highway-rail crossing and trespasser) education (Operation Lifesaver)
- Crossing improvements on a corridor basis with emphasis on closures.

Neither carrier, NS or CSX, focuses on highway-rail crossing and trespass safety prevention issues and other such issues involving public safety and emergency response. Since the vast majority of rail operation deaths and injuries are attributable to and occur as a result of highway-rail crossing collisions and trespass incidents, it would seem appropriate that these issues be properly addressed in the operating plans and environmental documents of the two carriers.

The operating plans filed by CSX and NS do not address the grade crossing issue on a comprehensive basis. Of particular concern is the locations of a projected increase in rail traffic along certain segments of the current CR system and even where changes will occur on the current CSX and NS systems. This will have a direct and material impact on public safety in the communities through which the carriers will operate. It will also have a strong impact on the inventories and priority ratings of highway-rail crossing improvements projects at the state level. Obviously, obtaining up-to-date inventory data and correct incident data is very important. The inventory up to date. It is this data that is used to determine the incident prediction and the hazard rankings for all crossings in a state, which is then used for the allocation of federal funds for crossing improvement projects with the goal of reducing incidents and saving lives.

Adequate arrangements should be made to address the issues of community awareness and public education in those locations where an increase in rail traffic will occur. Mechanisms should be in place to insure that adequate communication and coordination between the carriers, the states, the communities and the FRA occurs regarding the impacts of such increases on crossing inventory data and the priority rankings for crossing improvement projects.

Since highway rail crossing and trespasser prevention educational programs are so important to rail safety, NS' and CSX's level of educational service (including support for Operation Lifesaver) should be expanded to reflect the additional traffic resulting from the CR acquisition.

c) Area Specific impacts

The STB has conducted special preliminary highway-rail grade crossing impact assessments in the communities of Wichita, Kansas, and Reno, Nevada, in the aftermath of the merger of the UP/SP, Finance Docket No. 32760. In the UP/SP merger, Wichita train traffic was estimated to increase by a factor of three. In Reno, the increase was estimated to be by a factor of two. Preliminary analyses from the US DOT's Office of Policy projects similar increases in train traffic following acquisition of CR for a number of communities in the states of Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Indiana. In order to make a proper safety assessment of the

proposed acquisition of CR, the CSX and NS both need to provide specific plans for assessing and mitigating the impact of projected significant increases in train movements through specific communities. These safety assessments should address not just the projected increase in train movements, but their time of day, their speed, the number of crossings simultaneously affected by one movement, the available alternatives for emergency vehicles when crossings are blocked by trains, school bus routes, and the normal pedestrian and motor vehicle traffic over each crossing.

Although CSX and NS indicate 20% and 18% decreases, respectively, in number of grade crossing collisions in 1996 as stated in their Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) filings⁴, there are a number of "high profile" locations where, due to substantial increases in train traffic, FRA has major concerns about increased exposure to collisions and degradation of safety as a result of the merged operations. CSX and NS used models to predict grade crossing risk which do not measure the effect of changing the number of trains per day; rather they address the effect of a steady state number of trains, and may understate risk.

There are no plans or analyses provided in the CSX and NS operating plan submissions that identify means to mitigate these community impact concerns via engineering projects with specific assignment of resources.

F) CONCLUSION

FRA's careful review of the impacts of mergers that have taken place in the recent past, has clearly revealed that mergers and acquisitions disrupt existing safety and operating patterns. Since these transactions are generally justified in significant part by cost savings, there is pressure to close redundant facilities and eliminate positions. This can lead to degradation of safety programs unless formal, written, systematic, detailed plans are prepared to assure that safety programs are continued and closely followed. Any less attention to safety can produce catastrophic results, both in terms of economic cost and, more importantly, loss of life.

Operating conditions differ across the very large territories covered by today's largest railroads. These operating conditions produce different needs. Conrail presents an example of the need for different approaches in different territories. Conrail's hazardous materials response team is perceived by the FRA to be larger and better trained than those on the acquiring railroads, not because Conrail has more hazardous materials releases but rather because, in the densely settled territory where Conrail operates, the consequences of a hazardous materials release may affect more people.

A similar situation prevails with regard to rules training and compliance. Many Conrail employees work on rail lines that host high-speed passenger trains and/or frequent commuter traffic. Other railroads are tenants on considerable portions of Conrail, and Conrail trains are

[&]quot;Railroad Control Application, Volume 6A of 8, Finance Docket No.33388, 1997.

tenants on track owned by Amtrak, commuter railroad agencies, and other freight railroads. Conrail's divisional structure (versus centralized) of the rules and training organization was developed in response to a need to qualify train and engine (T&E) employees on many different rulebooks and to provide for compliance under many different sets of circumstances.

In their current configuration neither NS nor CSX meet these special requirements. It would not be acceptable for Conrail's special competence in these areas, built up in response to unique circumstances, to be weakened following the acquisition without providing for similar safety assurance by the acquiring railroads. Well-defined safety plans should be structured (containing detailed action items and schedules) to significantly mitigate the potential for critical loss of safety instructions, training and integration of personnel and information systems in the start-up of new train operations of the combined railroads.

There are lessons to be learned from the difficulties now being experienced by UP/SP and BNSF. Both have reduced their forces by several thousand employees each during the phase-in period of their mergers. It has been identified that the post-merger force reductions at UP/SP (on the order of 1,500 or more personnel) have led to the current service delays and disruptive congestion of lines in Texas, as well as increased exposure to incidents and injuries. The lessons are, in part, that safety considerations must be given at least equal weight with operating efficiency considerations in planning for merger. Railroads must also be cognizant of the potential for conflict among the varying safety cultures of the railroads that are being acquired and merged.

Special planning will be required in order to produce new operating companies that are free of disruption to services and safety hazards. Areas where large traffic increases are projected to occur must be specifically addressed. The concept of the Conrail Shared Assets Operations (CSAO) continues to evoke questions about safety inspection and maintenance commitments, as well as legal responsibility. These questions can be answered and the problems overcome with proper planning and execution.

Finally, FRA believes that merging railroads should carefully examine both the physical and cultural safety environments of the workplace. FRA believes that railroads, in the context of any "mega-merger," should accomplish this examination by developing well defined safety plans that identify allocation of resources and schedules, i. e., Safety Integration Plans (SIP). Of course, these plans must additionally be monitored over the specified period of the merger integration to ensure that the plans are fully executed.

A careful review of the operating plans filed in this case shows the need for much closer review of the safety programs of both Applicants. Such review should at least address those concerns I have identified above. More importantly, however, Applicants must produce and submit Safety Integration Plans that will assure the safe integration of the CR properties to be acquired by Applicants into their own operations, if the transaction is approved by the STB.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) SS.

Verification

Edward R. English, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is "Director of the Office of Safety Assurance & Compliance" at the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), that he is qualified and authorized to submit this Verified statement, and the he has read the foregoing statement, knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true and correct.

Edward R. English

I

10.17.97

Date

Subscribed and sworn to before me by Deboant K. Mc Callun

this ITTH Day of OCTOBER, 1997.

Notary Public

My Commission expires: 16/2000

APPENDIX

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Safety Assurance and Compliance Program Report for CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

PURPOSE FOR REPORT: This report highlights the findings of the Federal Railroad Administration⁵ (FRA) subsequent to a major safety assurance team inspection initiative conducted between July and September 1997 over the CSX Transportation, Incorporated (CSXT) system. It is organized into five chapters which specify FRA findings by functional area: *Signal and Train Control; Hazardous Materials; Operating Practices; Motive Power and Equipment;* and, *Track.*

TEAM REVIEW METHODOLOGY--THE S A C P APPROACH: To review the CSXT safety processes, FRA utilized a multi-discipline team audit strategy based upon the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP) model⁶. With SACP, the focus is on identifying and remedying root causes of safety concerns across an entire railroad system. Emphasis is on a collaborative approach to systemic fixes. The underpinnings of a successful SACP effort are full participation in the process by railroad labor, management, and FRA, in an atmosphere of openness and trust.

⁵ Throughout this report reference to "FRA" includes by inference all FRA state regulatory safety specialists that participated in the project with FRA personnel.

⁶ For a more complete description of SACP see the Report to Congress entitled "ENHANCING RAIL SAFETY NOW AND INTO THE 21st CENTURY" published in October 1996.

CSXT RESPONSE: The information in this report represents FRA findings during the audit period. CSXT and their rail labor leaders did not wait for FRA to issue a final report before they acted on findings. CSXT and their labor representatives, in cooperation with FRA, have initiated over 250 corrective projects addressing FRA concerns. In addition, 16 labor-management-FRA teams are functioning in a collaborative process through SACP to find permanent solutions to safety issues. FRA applauds the proactive response by CSXT managers and labor representatives to all our safety concerns and recommendations. Upon receipt of the final report, CSXT will supplement already ongoing activities to address any issues or concerns requiring additional focus.

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The Need to Do More

BACKGROUND: In October 1995, the FRA initiated a SACP review of CSXT. Working with CSXT management and their rail labor organizations, we identified a number of safety concerns, including improving the quality of train brake inspections, and managing employee safety--especially bridge worker safety. CSXT responded with corrective actions which helped them maintain a good overall record of safety performance since that time.

RECENT INCIDENTS: Despite generally good safety performance since the initial SACP process in 1995, a series of five incidents this summer caused FRA to escalate its ongoing safety oversight of CSXT:

- One fatality and other employee injuries occurred when a CSXT freight train collided with the rear of another CSXT freight train in St. Albans, West Virginia.
- A CSXT freight train derailed 34 cars near Marianna, Florida, including 17 placarded hazardous materials tank cars (13 cars were loaded and 4 contained residue). Five loads leaked product resulting in a four hour evacuation of local citizens around the derailment site.

- A CSXT intermodal freight train with a shifted trailer on a flat car derailed near Rosslyn, Virginia and side-swiped a passing Amtrak passenger train. Fortunately no serious injuries were sustained although damage was extensive.
- A truck trailer loaded with waste paper fell off a CSXT flat car in Baltimore, Maryland, after an undesired emergency application of the air brakes. There were no injuries.
- An eastbound CSXT freight train with a shifted load side-swiped a passing westbound CSXT freight train in Lawrenceville, Illinois. Six cars derailed, including a placarded residue hazardous materials tank car which was punctured in the pile up and caught fire.

To stem this sudden trend, FRA immediately accelerated the magnitude of ongoing CSXT safety oversight. Large, multi-disciplinary teams were dispatched to examine every facet of CSXT's system operations. In all, over 75 FRA safety specialists from across the U.S., and state safety specialists from the States of Virginia, Florida, West Virginia, Illinois, and Ohio, provided comprehensive analysis of CSXT practices. FRA, railroad management, and labor representatives quickly established joint working groups which met initially in early July 1997. Those teams continue to meet today as they work to prioritize and resolve safety issues.

The Role of Safety Culture

RAILROAD SAFETY CULTURE: The ability to eliminate safety hazards and promote prevention of injuries, collisions, and derailments, is dependent upon an atmosphere of mutual trust. respect, and openness. Unfortunately, for decades the railroad industry has been characterized by a culture that engenders an adversarial relationship between management and labor rather than one of cooperation. Getting the job done without admitting a need for help is the standard, leading to reluctance to ever take "bad news to the boss." The significance of this culture as an impediment to maximizing safety performance is readily evident throughout the U.S. rail system. FRA has therefore made it a priority to include the issue of safety culture as part of all SACP efforts.

Based upon FRA observations and employee testimonials, CSXT, like most big railroads, is characterized in some quarters by an adversarial safety culture. Throughout this report, FRA identifies examples of this culture, instances in which line managers made decisions about train operations which compromised safety. Only through a true commitment to *safety first at every level in the organization* can a viable safety culture be developed and sustained.

Summary of Specific FRA Findings by Functional Area

The following section summarizes FRA's key findings during the audit period (more detailed discussion of each issue is provided in the report narrative).

Signals and Train Control

FRA findings revealed that CSXT needs to more effectively manage their signal and train control operations in the following areas:

- ✓ Staffing and Training
- ✓ Pole Line Maintenance
- Insulated Rail Joint Maintenance
- Preview and Visibility of Signals
- ✓ Circuit Plans
- Power and Hand-Operated Switches

FRA found a general lack of consistency in maintaining a comprehensive signal oversight program. According to employees and supervisors that FRA contacted, part of the problem may be associated with the level of staffing and training provided. For example:

 FRA inspectors repeatedly found instances in which supervisors had insufficient time to devote to their main objectives (supporting, coaching, mentoring and training signal employees) due to administrative duties.

- These concerns were substantiated by the high defect ratios FRA encountered during inspections. FRA saw sections of right-of-way with poorly maintained pole line (wires with excessive slack, broken poles and cross arms, broken or loose insulators, wires lying on the ground, and overgrown vegetation interfering with wires).
- FRA also found insulated joints defective in a number of locations due to missing end posts and/or deteriorated insulation.
- A number of wayside signals and grade-crossing lights had poor preview and visibility to approaching trains.
- FRA documented instances where circuit plans were incorrect, incomplete, illegible or missing.
- FRA noted that many power and hand-operated switches were defective with loose and ineffective braces and fasteners, improper anchoring of the rail, and defective head block ties.

Operating Practices

FRA documented inadequacies in administration of operating practices requirements in the follow areas:

- ✓ Efficiency Testing
- ✓ Locomotive Engineer Certification
- ✓ Accident Incident Reporting
- ✓ Alcohol and Drug Testing
- ✓ Dispatching Concerns
- ✔ Crew Management Center

Operational Testing-- CSXT's operational testing program, on paper, appears detailed and well conceived. However, it is the implementation of that program where FRA took exception. Specifically:

 There is little evidence that quality operational tests are conducted as required by Federal regulations and CSXT program parameters.

- CSXT management has generally not taken full advantage of this important tool as a means to identify additional safety opportunities to reduce the potential for human factors incidents.
- Employees do not normally get feedback on their test performance unless they fail the test. Such feedback is normally in the context of a disciplinary hearing. Little value results since the process becomes one promoting adversarial outcomes rather than a positive learning experience.
- Little training was provided to designated testing officers by CSXT to provide them a base upon which to build effective testing scenarios.
- Finally, there has been little quality testing of train dispatchers despite their critical safety role in the operation.

Crew Manar;ement-- problems at CSXT's crew management center were identified early in the process. Specific issues included inefficiencies in crew calling which added to extended duty days and overall fatigue for operating crews. To illustrate the degree of the problem, FRA found an instance in which a computer glitch resulted in some employees being called every 20 minutes by the automated but malfunctioning system, thoroughly interrupting their rest period. In addition, FRA believes that the crew management center staff is regularly overwhelmed given the demands of the job. Service to employees suffers. The number of telephone lines available in the center needs also to be increased to provide more ready access to crew dispatchers.

Records Compliance-- FRA's investigation revealed that CSXT is not efficiently managing all FRA required records. For example, accident/incident records for reportable employee injuries and illnesses, and rail equipment accidents and incidents, were lacking in some areas. FRA discovered in a "snapshot" review of records a total of 25 instances where reportable accidents and incidents had not been reported to FRA as required. The failure to report these incidents caused CSXT's overall safety numbers to be artificially low in that reporting period.

Likewise, CSXT was unable to provide an accurate list of certified engineers as required by the regulations. And, FRA documented instances where CSXT did not comply with all record keeping provisions of the Federal alcohol and drug testing protocol. Specifically, FRA found that CSXT improperly used Federal forms to conduct "for cause" testing under its collective bargaining agreement.

Hazardous Materials

FRA noted deficiencies in the following areas of CSXT's hazardous materials operations:

- ✓ Train Consist Accuracy
- ✓ TOFC/COFC Documentation
- Placard Compliance
- ✓ Training of Personnel

Examples:

-- FRA noted three separate instances in which CSXT personnel knowingly ordered defective or non-compliant tank cars to be moved in violation of Federal regulations (individual civil prosecutive action is pending for involved individuals).

-- Inaccurate train consists were encountered repeatedly by FRA inspectors. In addition, FRA noted a trend in which hazardous materials loads inside trailers-on-flat cars (TOFC) and containers-on-flat cars (COFC) were moved with insufficient or missing documentation.

-- CSXT didn't have a consistent or standard methodology to ensure hazardous materials cars were properly placarded, or that missing, worn, or faded placards were replaced as needed en route.

-- Finally, not all CSXT employees requiring hazardous materials training have been provided sufficient training to inspect and monitor hazardous materials shipments.

Track

A major portion of CSXT track is in good condition and fully compliant with Federal track safety standards. However, FRA found that CSXT lacks a fully consistent, sound track program across all parts of the system. Exceptions were noted by FRA in the following areas:

- ✓ Track Inspections
- Control of Water Saturation on Track Structures
- ✓ Vegetation Control
- ✓ Roadway Worker Protection Compliance
- ✓ Test Car Operation
- ✓ Procedure Manual
- ✓ Defective Rail Detection

FRA determined that some CSXT track inspections and maintenance goals are based solely on the minimum Federal standards rather than more comprehensive CSXT standards.

During inspections FRA found defects on main tracks, including overgrown vegetation, saturated subgrade, and defective rails. In 1996 there were 9 reportable main track derailments caused by defective rails. The Rivanna subdivision, in particular, has had four rail-caused derailments since the beginning of 1996.

FRA determined that while CSXT utilizes a track geometry testing car, the results produced are not always properly verified, interpreted, and corrected in the most effective way.

Finally, FRA believes CSXT's application of the Federal Roadway Worker Protection requirements needs more centralized oversight by engineering managers to minimize risks for employees working on or near the railroad rights of way.

Motive Power & Equipment

CSXT administration of maintenance programs for cars and locomotives is in need of more strict management oversight. Issues FRA encountered included:

- Locomotive Inspections
- ✓ TOFC/COFC Securement

CSXT's practice of inspecting locomotives on a 122-day cycle does not comply with requirements of the Federal regulations which specify that 92-day inspections be conducted. The quality of inspections also needs to be a recurrent subject of supervisory focus.

In terms of TOFC/COFC securement, FRA found CSXT's program lacking direction. Like many railroads, CSXT has contracted out most trailer/container loading to outside contractors. As a result, railroad oversight of quality control processes has diminished to the point where railroad follow up inspections are ineffectual. As a result, trailers are accepted on CSXT lines with little assurance that proper loading or securement steps have been taken.

Summary of General Conclusions

FRA identified several recurring themes during the audit period which CSXT and their employees must continue to address if they are to progress their safety program to the next level. Based upon comprehensive individual findings, FRA has defined several general conclusions about the CSXT safety program:

 SAFETY "FIRST" IS NOT UNIVERSALLY OBSERVED-- FRA found an atmosphere on CSXT in which some CSXT field managers consistently failed to demonstrate full commitment to safety. Some front-line managers emphasize train operations over safety considerations. For example, FRA

witnessed two occasions in which locomotives were dispatched from repair facilities with known intermittent electrical ground faults. In another example, a leading tank car was dispatched from a terminal by a management official to avoid a delay in car transit⁷.

Such management actions have led some employees to doubt senior management claims that safety is first, foremost, and always. In fact, some CSXT employees told FRA inspectors that they believe they must involve FRA in order to ensure corrective action for identified safety hazards.

 HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION ARE EVIDENT-- CSXT has not created a universal atmosphere where safety performance and risk reduction are rewarded. Many employees in various departments and locations reported to FRA inspectors that they feel harassed or intimidated when they raise safety concerns that might interfere with train operations. For example, FRA noted an instance where a locomotive was ordered out of a terminal without allowing a mechanic to finish a required daily inspection. The mechanic was ordered to allow the locomotive to depart by the operating supervisor or face consequences.

Open dialogue and common resolve to address safety hazards is jeopardized by this overriding theme. Many employees simply do not feel ownership in the safety program since being a safety advocate is not valued by some managers.

 LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS FOLLOW THROUGH HURTS SAFETY--CSXT's communications infrastructure is not sufficient to eliminate known safety hazards. For example, on October 9, 1997, near Savannah, Georgia, an Amtrak train collided with a "lowboy" truck trailer that lodged itself on the street crossing. Based on FRA's preliminary review, which is continuing with the National Transportation Safety Board, we learned that a local police officer notified the CSXT dispatching center almost 30 minutes prior to the collision that the truck was stuck. Despite the advance call, no warning was provided

to the crew of the approaching Amtrak train resulting in the collision. The entire Amtrak train derailed with injuries to passengers and crew. Less than

⁷ FRA is processing individual liability cases against individuals engaged in willful violations.

12 hours after the incident, FRA Administrator Molitoris and CSXT President Pete Carpenter signed a comprehensive "Safety Action Agreement" undertaking measures designed to improve communication and eliminate such hazards.

Conclusion

Over the years, CSXT has demonstrated an improving safety record and top level commitment to safety. The findings documented by the FRA teams during the August period serve as an indication that it is imperative that senior CSXT leadership build upon past successes while recognizing the need to move forward to address the shortfalls identified in this report.

Finally, FRA extends appreciation to all who participated with us throughout this safety review, especially the professional craft employees who took time to share with us their perspectives, concerns, and recommendations. In fact, it is clear that the employees who operate and maintain the railroad and equipment are the best group of safety consultants any railroad could have.

Federal Railroad Administration October 16, 1997 Washington, D.C.

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on this day I have caused to be mailed to all Parties of Record in Finance Docket No. 33388 a copy of the foregoing Preliminary Comments of the U.S. Department of Transportation.

Part Somelduit

Paul Samuel Smith

October 21, 1997

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EY HAND DELIVERY

Honorable Vernon A. Williams Secretary Surface Transportation Board 1925 K Street, N.W., Room 700 Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

> Re: Finance Docket No. 33388, CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc., Norfolk Southern Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway Company --Control and Operating Leases/Agreements -- Conrail Inc. and Consolidated Rail Corporation -- Transfer of Railroad Line by Norfolk Southern Railway Company to CSX Transportation, Inc.

Dear Secretary Williams:

Enclosed you will find the following documents:

- The original and 25 copies Volume 1 of the Comments and Request for Conditions of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission (VRE - 8), containing Highly Confidential information and filed under seal;
- 25 redacted copies of Volume I of the aforementioned Comments; and
- the original and 25 copies of Volume II, Comments and Request for Conditions of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission (VRE - 9).

We also have enclosed a 3.5-inch diskette containing the filing in WordPerfect 5.1.

Please stamp the extra copy of each of the foregoing items and return them to our messenger.

Respectfully submitted,

Kevin M. Sheys

Enclosures

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Redacted Version VRE-8

Office of the Secretary

OCT 2 1 1997

Part of Public Record

BEFORE THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Finance Docket No. 33388

CSX CORPORATION AND CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION AND NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY -- CONTROL AND OPERATING LEASES/AGREEMENTS --CONRAIL INC. AND CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub No. 37) - 182885

NORTHERN VIRGINIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND POTOMAC AND RAPPAHANNOCK TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION -- OPERATING RIGHTS --LINES OF CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY AND CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION

COMMENTS AND REQUEST FOR CONDITIONS OF NORTHEP.N VIRGINIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND POTOMAC AND RAPPAHANNOCK TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION ENTERED

VOLUME I

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Thomas J. Litwiler Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly 1020 Nineteenth Street, N.W., Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 293-6300

Counsel for Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission

Dated: October 21, 1997

Finance Docket No. 33388

CSX CORPORATION AND CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION AND NO. FOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY -- CONTROL AND OPERATING LEASES/AGREEMENTS --CONRA!L INC. AND CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 37)

NORTHERN VIRGINIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND POTOMAC AND RAPPAHANNOCK TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION -- OPERATING RIGHTS --LINES OF CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY AND CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION

COMMENTS AND REQUEST FOR CONDITIONS OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND POTOMAC AND RAPPAHANNOCK TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

I. COMMENTS

A. Introduction

Pursuant to Decision Nos. 6 and 12 herein, served on May 30, 1997, and July 23, 1997,

respectively, Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock

Transportation Commission (the "Commissions"), 1 hereby submit their Comments and Requests

for Conditions regarding the proposed control of Conrail, Inc. and Consolidated Rail Corporation

("Conrail") by CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc. (collectively "CSX"), Norfolk

¹ The Commissions are political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Virginia and co-owners of Virginia Railway Express ("VRE").

Southern Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway Company (collectively "NS"), and the division of Conrail's assets.

On August 22, 1997, the Commissions filed a Description of Anticipated Responsive Application indicating their intention to seek operating rights over the following lines: CSX's line of railroad between XR Interlocking in Spotsylvania, Virginia and RO Interlocking in Arlington, Virginia; NS's line of railroad between the South Manassas turnout and NS's connection with CSX at CSX's AF Interlocking in Alexandria, Virginia; and Conrail's line of railroad between RO Interlocking in Arlington, Virginia and the Virginia Avenue Interlocking.

In the interim between the filing of the Description of Anticipated Responsive Application and today's filing, the Commissions have continued to negotiate with the Applicants in the hope that the transaction-related concerns of the Commissions might be resolved. Both NS and CSX have demonstrated a willingness to renegotiate key provisions of the existing VRE access agreements in an effort to address the Commissions' concerns. For example, NS has indicated that it may relax the Commissions' current obligations to consider a purchase of its line from Manassas to Alexandria as a condition of continued access, and CSX has expressed its support for a ten-year extension of the current agreement. Although those discussions continue and the Commissions still hope to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Applicants, no such agreement has been reached as of this date. Therefore, the Commissions are submitting their Comments and Requests for Conditions.

The authority to condition the Primary Application (e.g., by imposing the conditions to be sought by Applicants) is found in 49 U.S.C. § 11324(c). The statutory criteria for regulator, consideration of the proposed transaction are provided in 49 U.S.C. §§ 11323-25. Section

11324(d) states:

(d) In a proceeding under this section which does not involve the merger or control of at least two Class I railroads, as defined by the Board, the Board shall approve such an application unless it finds that -

- as a result of the transaction, there is likely to be substantial lessening of competition, creation of a monopoly or restraint of trade in freight surface transportation in any region of the United States; and
- (2) the anticompetitive effects of the transaction outweigh the public interest in meeting significant transportation needs.

The Board interprets Section 11324(d) to require the imposition of conditions if the consolidation may produce effects harmful to the public interest, that the conditions to be imposed will ameliorate or eliminate the harmful effects, that the conditions will be operationally feasible, and that the conditions will produce public benefits (through reduction or elimination of possible harm) outweighing any reduction to the public benefits produced by the merger. <u>Union Pacific -- Control -- Missouri Pacific; Western Pacific</u>, 366 I.C.C. 462, 562-65 (1982).

In considering the Primary Application, the Board has a statutory obligation to, among other things, consider "the effect of the proposed transaction on the adequacy of transportation to the public." 49 U.S.C. § 11324(b)(1). See, e.g., Decision No. 44, served October 15, 1997, at 4. The Commissions believe that the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application will diminish the adequacy of transportation to the public in Northern Virginia and Washington, D.C. and, absent appropriate conditions to ameliorate these harms, will not be in the public interest. In particular, as is relevant here, the Commissions are concerned about VRE's continued access on reasonable terms to the rail lines over which it currently operates. In Decision No. 33, served September 17, 1997, the Board held that VRE was not required to file a Responsive Application

as a requirement for seeking the conditions described herein. <u>Id.</u> at 2-3. However, because VRE is asking the Board to exercise its conditioning authority to grant VRE operating authority, the Board ordered VRE to submit evidence about the feasibility of its proposed operations and whether they would interfere with freight operations that are conducted over the relevant lines. Id. at 3.

In accordance with the foregoing, what follows is an identification of the Commissions and a history of VRE's operations; a discussion of why VRE's continued viability requires the requested operating authority; a discussion of why the requested operating authority would ameliorate the anticipated harmful effects of the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application; and an explanation of why the requested operating authority would not interfere with freight operations conducted on the relevant lines.

B. Identification Of Commenting Parties

VRE is a commuter railroad which operates 26 passenger trains per weekday between Washington, D.C. and Fredericksburg and Manassas, Virginia over approximately 90 route miles of rail line owned by CSX, NS and Conrail, all Applicants herein. VRE's right to utilize these rail lines is established by Operating Access Agreements entered into by the Commissions and CSX, NS and Conrail, respectively. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") conducts and manages VRE's commuter rail operations pursuant to a Purchase of Services Agreement with the Commissions. VRE has weekday ridership of approximately 7,000 trips and annual ridership of approximately 1.9 million. VRE commenced operations in 1992.

C. VRE History, Operating Statistics, and Public Benefits

1. VRE's History

The Northern Virginia Transportation Commission ("NVTC") and the Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission ("PRTC") are political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Virginia organized pursuant to the Transportation District Act of 1964, § 15.1-1340 <u>et seq.</u>, VA Code Ann. Consistent with their enabling authority, NVTC and PRTC are authorized to provide planning, construction, operations and funding for a wide range of transportation-related purposes. Significant among these is NVTC's and PRTC's joint ownership and operation of the VRE commuter rail service. Verified Statement of Stephen A. MacIsaac and Richard K. Taube ("MacIsaac/Taube VS") (Exhibit A at 1.)

Created in 1964, NVTC is comprised of the counties of Arlington, Fairfax and Loudoun, and the cities of Alexandria, Falls Church and Fairfax. NVTC's territory has a population of 1.3 million and covers approximately 1,000 square miles. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 1.

PRTC was created in 1986 primarily to join NVTC in planning and implementing VRE. PRTC's member jurisdictions include the counties of Prince William and Stafford and the cities of Manassas, Manassas Park and Fredericksburg. PRTC's territory consists of 630 square miles with a total population of 410,000. Twenty-two percent of PRTC's working population commutes, primarily on the I-95 and I-66 corridors, to the employment centers within the Distr' A of Columbia and its immediate environs. PRTC generates a two percent tax on motor vehicle fuels to provide a dedicated revenue source to offset a portion of the PRTC member jurisdictions' share of VRE costs. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 2.

The final and ultimately successful efforts to start VRE service connecting

Fredericksburg, Virginia to Washington, D.C.'s Union Station (55 miles) and Manassas, Virginia to Union Station (35 miles) began in earnest in 1984. Feasibility studies, plans for demonstrations, financial plans and - most importantly - the commitment of RF&P's (later purchased by CSX) and NS's chief executive officers to Virginia's governor were accomplished by 1986. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 3.

The commitment of the railroads to provide VRE access to their lines was obtained only after the railroads' initial refusal and complete opposition was overcome. This came only after NVTC and PR IC agreed to provide the railroads absolute indemnification from all liability for VRE operations. Specific authorizing legislation was adopted by the Virginia General Assembly to satisfy the railroads' demand. Pursuant to the enabling authority, a \$200 million insurance plan was established to indemnify the RF&P (later CSXT), NS, Conrail and Amtrak. MacJsaac/Taube VS at 3.

As a result of an accident involving Amtrak and Conrail at Chase, Maryland in 1987, the railroads were unsatisfied with indemnification based on Virginia legislation alone, and VRE's sponsors were required to obtain an act of Congress to establish liability limits for freight railroads leasing access to their tracks to VRE. This was accomplished in 1990 and currently authorizes full indemnification of freight railroad conduct, including gross negligence, capping the total liability at \$200 million. With this legislation in place, the insurance plan supports VRE's contractual obligation to indemnify the railro⁻ds. Under the plan, VRE is responsible for all damages that occur "but for" the existence of VRE's service, including gross negligence of the freight railroads themselves. While this is not a fair standard for VRE, and far exceeds any

standard required of others using the railroads' lines, the railroads have required it as a condition of using their tracks. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 4.

VRE began operations in the summer of 1992, having spent close to \$150 million on terminals, stations, track improvements, rolling stock and training. Contracts with RF&P, NS, Conrail and Amtrak were in place, the master agreement committing local governments to funding was signed and the Commonwealth of Virginia had agreed to a financial role. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 4.

The railroad agreements troubled VRE's sponsors since, in addition to stringent indemnification provisions, they provided the freight railroads with unilateral powers to cancel or delay VRE trains, to impose schedule changes and restrictions, to compel VRE to make capital improvements to the railroads as a condition of continued operation, and to afford the freight railroads the right to force VRE to discontinue operations on short notice for any reason. These provisions have not been relaxed as the contracts have been renegotiated over the years, and have been exacerbated by the railroads' demand for sharply increased compensation without corresponding requirements for meaningful performance incentives or guarantees. As a result, local government officials and VRE and commission board members have only reluctantly approved significant capital investments required by the freight railroads, since they fear VRE's being expelled from the freight lines in response to growing freight traffic, or indeed for no reason at ail, as permitted under the existing freight railroad contracts with VRE. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 4-5.

The NS and CSX forecasts of substantial increases in freight traffic on the lines on which VRE operates have compounded this concern, and as a result the commissioners have instructed

their staffs to approach NS and CSX to seek negotiated improvements in the access agreements. While these negotiations have been positive, they have been unsuccessful. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 4-5.

2. Operating Statistics

VRE's 26 daily trains (12 on the CSX Fredericksburg Line and 14 on the NS Manassas Line) serve 18 stations. South of Alexandria, Virginia the NS line joins the CSX line, and at the Potomac River both use the Conrail bridge and line to reach Union Station. In addition, VRE customers may use their VRE tickets on several Amtrak trains which to a limited extent expand the hours of service available to VRE customers beyond the restricted periods of operation allowed by the freight railroads. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 5.

VRE ridership grew sharply during the first three years of service and peaked in mid-FY 1996. From about 3,500 average daily passenger trips in the first year to over 8,000 average daily trips in the fall of 1995 and winter of 1996, VRE demonstrated that it could provide a safe, affordable and reliable commuting alternative, carrying the equivalent of a freeway lane of automobile traffic in the heavily congested I-66 and I-95 corridors. Indeed, an analysis by NVTC staff revealed that the \$150 million investment in VRE by the Commonwealth of Virginia and VRE's local governments was less expensive than building instead the equivalent freeway capacity, when both were operated over a 20-year period. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 5-6.

Ridership since mid-FY 1996, however, has declined significantly as a result of several factors, including ill-advised track maintenance procedures by NS in the summer of 1996, which penalized on-time performance on the Manassas line, and various delays caused by CSX freight operations, including most significantly a CSX derailment in July 1997 and subsequent track and

signal repairs and upgrades, which impacted VRE on-time performance severely for more than a month. With frequent late trains, slow trains and annulled trains, VRE's ridership by August 1997 fell to approximately 25 percent below mid-FY 1996 levels. In early October 1997, despite some gains, ridership remained 15 percent below the 1996 levels on the Manassas Line and 20 percent on the Fredericksburg line. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 6.²

3. Public Investment

VRE is a partnership among eight local governments, the Commonwealth and VRE's customers. VRE's Master Agreement requires a fare box recovery of at least 50 percent of its annual operating budget of about \$20 million. VRE's capital budget (including debt service) is over \$10 million annually. Customers have paid about a third, local governments a fifth, the federal government a third, and the Commonwealth the balance of the combined operating and capital budgets. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 6.

VRE's balance sheet lists approximately \$100 million of assets. NVTC and its partner PRTC have issued appropriations-based, tax-free debt of over \$100 million to finance rolling stock and stations. In cooperation with the Virginia Department of Rail and Pubic Transportation ("VDR&PT"), VRE's capital improvement program contains an ambitious set of track, bridge, signal and other improvements to be accomplished over the next several years. The great preponderance of these investments will be made on freight railroad rights-of-way. One example is a new bridge over Quantico Creek, which will add an additional track to replace the track that CSX demolished shortly before VRE began operations. This location is now a

² Freight-related delays to VRE's on-time performance are discussed in greater detail in section D.2 <u>infra</u>, and the Verified Statement of Stephen T. Roberts ("Roberts VS") (Exhibit B).
bottleneck for both CSX and VRE, and VRE's capital program calls for raising over \$20 million to design and install a parallel bridge. VRE's investment will provide CSX the opportunity to install a third freight track as well. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 7.

Approximately a third of VRE's total annual capital budget is devoted specifically to improvements in the Washington, D.C.-Fredericksburg corridor, which is primarily funded by VDR&PT, using federal funds, and is coordinated with the Commonwealth's ongoing highspeed rail program. These include the Woodbridge/Aquia crossovers at \$1,500,000, RO to AF Interlocking and related track work at \$2,650,000, and \$4,000,000 for design of the Quantico Bridge. Addition of the Woodbridge/Aquia crossovers on either side of the Quantico Bridge would double the number of crossovers in the area and help freight and passenger railroads avoid delays. These will also make it possible to use the second Quantico bridge crossing to better advantage. CSX will perform all design, engineering and construction work using VRE funds. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 7.

Track and signal improvements between the Potomac River (RO) and Telegraph Road (AF) are designed to increase train speeds, decrease travel time, and consequently increase VRE ridership. A properly designed system of signals and interlockings constructed to modern codes would increase track operating speeds to 45 miles per hour from 25 miles per hour. VRE's capacity simulation model identified these improvements as the highest priority for improved and expanded VRE operations. VRE is required by its existing access agreement with CSX to install these improvements as a precondition to any increased VRE service. Another part of the project will consolidate and move tracks to provide access to a new Metrorail and VRE station in Potomac Yard. A third mainline is now in place. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 8.

Finally, a second crossing of Quantico Creek with a second parallel mainline (with space for a third mainline) will address delays at this location that occur several times per week and last ten minutes or longer. This is the only segment of single track on the entire Fredericksburg line, with speeds now limited to 45 miles per hour (versus 70 miles per hour elsewhere) over a fourmile segment. VRE's capacity simulation model confirms that removal of this bottleneck will greatly increase operating capacity on CSX south of Woodbridge. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 8.

VRE is committed by its access agreement with CSX to provide a parallel third mainline along its entire route (Potomac River to Fredericksburg) as a precondition to any increased service beyond the current 12 trains on the Fredericksburg line and 14 trains on the Manassas line. To accomplish this will require about \$180 million of improvements, including signals to permit closer spacing of trains, and improving several curves with a curvature of greater than two degrees. Increasing the superelevation (banking) of these curves to five inches will al'ow all trains to travel at higher speeds through these curves. Increasing speeds will also require upgrading to FRA Class 5 track. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 8.

Unfortunately, CSX has been unwilling to agree to specific terms by which the Quantico Bridge (or any of the other "Third Track Improvements" made by VRE in Potomac Yard and elsewhere) would guarantee VRE's ability to operate additional service using the extra capacity that <u>VRE</u> is paying to install. While discussions on the subject are ongoing between VRE and CSX (and NS), the inability to define a contractual partnership to own and operate publicly financed capital improvements on CSX and NS rights-of-way is jeopardizing the ability of VRE to program funds for this purpose. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 9.

4. Public Interest Benefits of VRE

While ridership on VRE has declined substantially from its mid-FY 1996 peak, its future can be bright. First, projections of employment and population in VRE's core markets show steady growth. Automobile ownership and vehicle miles traveled are forecast to outpace new highway capacity. Traffic congestion, which is already the second worst in the United States, will get worse. If VRE can restore its reputation for on-time performance, its ridership should resume a healthy growth trend.

Second, VRE's ridership is sensitive to the frequency of service. The freight railroads have not allowed VRE to expand service as it has wished, citing competition with existing freight traffic. The very substantial growth of freight train traffic predicted by NS and CSX in this proceeding indicates that even greater pressure will be placed on VRE's existing schedules, and any capacity enhancements resulting from VRE's investments in CSX and NS rights-of-way could be eroded <u>before</u> VRE is allowed to operate any new service.³ But if VRE is allowed to expand service frequency, its state-of-the-art ridership forecast model shows a healthy ridership response. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 9.

Third, VRE is well placed to serve the region when special circumstances call for a quick and innovative response. For example, VRE carried 3,800 trips earlier this month to and from a Washington, D.C. rally of the Promise Keepers, using special trains. A pending 10-year reconstruction of the intersection of 1-95/395/495 (Mixing Bowl) at Springfield, Virginia will

³ The pressures this increased traffic will place on VRE operations are discussed further at pages <u>infra</u> and in the Roberts Verified Statement and the Verified Statement of Charles H. Banks ("Banks VS") (Exhibit C).

take a lane of highway capacity out of service. In similar circumstances, commuter rail has provided an effective mitigation of the severe traffic congestion that would otherwise result (e.g., 1-95 between Ft. Lauderdale and Miami). VRE likely will be part of a multi-modal strategy to mitigate traffic congestion during the Mixing Bowl reconstruction, and this will boost VRE ridership. During snow storms, VRE also is used heavily and has been quite reliable. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 9-10.

VRE data compiled for submission to the U.S. Department of Transportation's ("U.S. DOT") National Transit Database reveal that in FY 1997 VRE provided 57,116,170 passenger miles of service at an average cost of only 32 cents per passenger mile. This compares very favorably with costs of operating sin_ble-occupant automobiles. VRE has operated without a passenger fatality or even serious injury since 1992. At VRE's FY 1997 level of ridership (1,758,471 passenger trips) approximately 125,000 annual vehicle miles traveled by singleoccupant automobiles were saved, amounting to approximately 2,879,000 less gallons of gasoline. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 10.

Northern Virginia is designated as a "serious" ozone area by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Accordingly, the region must prepare air quality plans and spend millions of dollars to devise methods to reduce ozone levels to acceptable levels. An emissions analysis performed by NVTC in 1994 shows that for each work day VRE results in 0.06 fewer tons of hydrocarbons, 0.42 fewer tons of carbon monoxide, 0.19 fewer tons of nitrogen oxide and 0.07 fewer tons of volatile organic compounds (the controlling pollutant in smog formation in the Washington, D.C. area). These amounts are net of the extra auto trips by VRE customers to and from VRE stations. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 10.

Commuter rail systems around the United States consistently generate economic activity that yields a substantial return on the investment of public funds. In a September 1997 study for the American Public Transit Association, the Carmen Group, Inc. estimated that commuter rail economic and societal benefits are \$5.2 billion annually.⁴ These benefits include cost savings from avoided congestion; cost savings from the mitigation of traffic accidents, and environmental damage; and tax revenues generated. These benefits are beyond those accruing directly to the 1.2 million daily commuter rail riders, including savings of \$2 to \$6 daily compared to auto commuting, 23 to 81 hours of reduced traffic congestion per year valued at \$247 to \$865 in time and fuel costs. Also, commuter rail capital projects over the last ten years have totaled \$24 billion, creating 420,000 jobs. Another 23,000 individuals are employed in the U.S. commuter rail systems. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 10-11.

A December 1993 report for the U.S. DOT established a baseline for determining the impacts of VRE on highway congestion relief, land use changes and local economic development. Among the significant findings of this initial study were:

- In densely populated areas, VRE's market extends to five miles around each station and 10 miles around stations in less densely populated areas.
- 43 percent of home purchasers surveyed in 1992 indicated that VRE had been either a major or some consideration in their housing location choice.

⁴ <u>Commuter Rail: Serving America's Emerging Suburban/Urban Economy</u>, Carmen Group, Inc. for APTA (Sept. 1997).

A VRE 1996 survey of its customers on-board, asking about demographic characteristics and attitudes, revealed among other findings from the approximately 2,700 responding customers:

- Over 700 (more than 25 percent) respondents indicated a desire for additional VRE stations, including many beyond the current limits of VRE service (e.g., 200 favored Richmond).
- About a guarter of VRE customers transfer to/from Metrorail to complete their trips.
- Almost 60 percent of VRE customers drive alone in their automobiles on days on which they do not use VRE.
- Over 800 respondents reported shorter one-way travel times using VRE compared to their previous method of travel, with savings reported as much as an hour.
- Over a thousand riders reported longer travel times, with most of 30 minutes or less, which suggests that reliability is a stronger inducement to use VRE than speed.
- Most riders (73 percent) use VRE every weekday.
- Almost 30 percent reported that VRE was a "major consideration" in choosing their current home location. Another 20 percent said VRE was of "some consideration." About 84 percent of VRE riders own their own homes.
- While VRE has a solid core of long-term riders (20 percent since the start of service in 1992 and another 20 percent three or more years), fully 25 percent of VRE riders are relatively new (less than a year).
- For those riding VRE less than six months, relocation of job (30 percent) or home (20 percent) were the most significant reasons for starting to use VRE, and another 15 percent relied on recommendations from friends.
- Fully 43 percent of VRE customers work for civilian government agencies and another 10 percent for the military.
- Over 31 percent of VRE riders are 30 to 39 years old, 35 percent are 40 to 49, and 23 percent are 50 to 59; male riders comprise 64 percent of total ridership; and annual household income is \$50-75,000 for 30 percent of VRE riders, \$75-100,000 for 28 percent, and over \$100,000 for 27 percent.

 In grading VRE's on-time performance, 11 percent gave an A grade, 43 percent a B, and 29 percent a C. Other factors receiving strong positive ratings were cleanliness of trains and stations, communication with management, helpfulness of crews, ease of buying a ticket, station parking availability and personal security. Even for VRE's fares, which are admittedly relatively high compared to other commuter rail systems, customers were relatively satisfied with the value of service received, with 83 percent giving a rating on A, B, or C. (Note, however, that this was in May 1996, near the high-water mark of ridership and before the delay incidents and substantial loss of ridership previously noted.)

MacIsaac/Taube VS at 11-12. These findings and the other factors discussed above clearly demonstrate the significant benefits VRE provides to the public and the importance of the Board's protecting this service.

D. <u>VRE's Continued Viability Requires Changes In Several Provisions Of Its</u> Current Access Agreements

1. VRE Lines Will Carry Substantial Passenger And Freight Traffic

Both CSX and NS have indicated in their proposed Operating Plans that the postacquisition era will see substantial increases in freight train operations on the rail lines over which VRE provides service. Increased freight operations will further clog these already busy rail transportation arteries. As explained in greater detail in the Roberts Verified Statement, VRE is particularly concerned about the impact of this increase on VRE operations and its potential for further deterioration of VRE's commuter rail service. Despite diligent efforts to work with our rail partners to improve VRE's commuter operations, current service is simply not meeting the demands or expectations of VRE or its customers. Thus, in the event the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application are approved, VRE must be assured that its access and operating rights will not be diminished as a result of the increase in freight operations.

In its Operating Plan, NS has indicated that after the acquisition it will operate approximately two more freight trains per day on the line between Manassas and Alexandria. Even assuming this figure is not understated, it represents a 23 percent increase in freight train operations over the line shared with VRE. While NS states that there will be "no identifiable adverse effects" on any of its commuter rail operations (Primary Application ("App.") Vol. 3B at 306), VRE is very concerned about the impact this 23 percent increase will have on its current operation of fourteen commuter trains per weekday on the Manassas line. Roberts VS at 2. Moreover, the Banks Verified Statement calls into serious question the NS projection and concludes that in fact the increase will be closer to four trains per day or approximately <u>45</u> percent of current freight traffic. Banks VS at 9. For the most part, VRE and NS have been able to resolve problems as they arise, but given NS's desire to increase business on this line, VRE needs assurances that these plans will not impair its ability to provide reliable commuter service.

In addition, NS has acknowledged that the Manassas Line is a much more direct and desirable route for NS coal and other traffic to the Baltimore and Wilmington markets than the NS Hagerstown-Harrisburg route, creating the distinct likelihood that greater volumes of this traffic ultimately will be rerouted over the Manassas Line to the detriment of VRE commuter operations. Banks VS at 18-20.

The Operating Plan of CSX poses far greater concerns because of the very substantial increases in freight service CSX plans on an already highly congested line. According to the Plan, the CSX Fredericksburg-Alexandria segment currently carries 22 passenger trains per day (twelve of which are VRE trains) and is projected to experience an increase of seven freight trains per day. App., Vol. 3A at 279, 409. This represents a 43 percent increase in freight train operations on this 49-mile line segment. The post-acquisition increase in freight operations is even more dramatic on the line segment from Potomac Yard to Virginia Avenue. This line

carries 35 passenger trains per day (26 of which are VRE trains) and will have an increase of eleven freight trains per day (App., Vol. 3A at 280, 412), which represents an <u>increase of 61</u> <u>percent</u> over the pre-acquisition level.⁵ This projection is understated as CSX, after the Application was filed, began operating a dedicated waste train north of Fredericksburg. Banks VS at 17: Applicants' Response to Second Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission, CSX/NS - 109, at 6-7.

The CSXT Operating Plan itself reveals that of all the passenger lines that will undergo moderate to substantial increases in freight activity, both of these CSX lines -- and particularly the Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue segment -- are among the most sensitive to freight train increases. Table 13.8-2 of the CSX Operating Plan (App., Vol. 3A at 409-12) lists projected changes in freight trains per day on CSX and Conrail acquired line segments with passenger service. This table includes projected increases for <u>both</u> CSX and NS freight traffic. Orrison Tr. 369-72. Although there are more than ¹⁰⁰ lines listed, only <u>six</u> line segments are projected to have an increase of ten or more freight trains per day. With the <u>exception</u> of the Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue segment, however, <u>none</u> of these segments carries significant passenger traffic, as all of these lines have only two or fewer passenger trains per day. App., Vol. 3A at 409. In contrast, the Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue line segment carries <u>35</u> passenger trains per day. App., Vol. 3A at 412.

Thus, of all the CSX/Conrail lines that are scheduled to undergo substantial post-

⁵ CSX apparently has undercounted the number of trains on these lines. There are 28 (not 22) trains on the Fredericksburg-Alexandria segment and 45 (not 35) on the Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue segment. Banks VS at 5.

transaction increases in freight traffic (<u>i.e.</u>, ten trains or more per day), the line that has <u>by far</u> the greatest volume of passenger operations is the Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue line. Indeed, with the exception of a handful of lines, primarily in the New Jersey area, all of the CSX/Conrail lines with substantial passenger operations are scheduled for a <u>decrease</u> in freight traffic. The potential impact, therefore, of substantial projected increases in freight traffic on lines already carrying substantial passenger traffic -- and the corresponding need to protect such passenger operations -- is <u>nowhere</u> more clearly evident than on the CSX/Conrail Fredericksburg - Washington line.

Despite this clear evidence of the potential problems posed by such large increases in freight traffic on these particular lines, CSX summarily asserts that "these lines have *sufficient capacity* to accommodate the freight increases without adverse impact on commuter service" App., Vol. 3A at 27.6. (Emphasis added.) CSX Chairman John Snow, however, has stated: "The line from Fredericksburg to Washington is one of the *most capacity constrained* segments of the entire CSX system." Letter from John Snow to Terrence Spellane, Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission, June 28, 1995, attached as VRE-9 (Vol. II), Exhibit ---. (Emphasis added.) And, in its Operating/Access Agreement with VRE dated January 10, 1995, CSXT declared that its ability to operate its freight service in the Fredericksburg to Alexandria corridor is "*constrained* by existing passenger rail service within the Corridor." (Emphasis added.) Although capacity-related improvements on these lines have been made since that time, the fact remains that the Fredericksburg - Washington line is a heavily constrained line on which passenger operations 2.e extremely sensitive to freight operations. Yet, CSX now proposes a <u>43</u> percent-61 percent increase in freight train operations in this corridor, claiming that this

"moderate" increase will not have a significant impact on commuter operations. App., Vol. 3A at 276. The current state and recent history of VRE's commuter rail operations on CSX lines belies this pronouncement.

2. VRE Operations Have Had Significant Service Problems

The size of the projected increase in freight traffic over the CSX/Conrail lines, given the substantial passenger traffic on those lines, warrants concern in and of itself. This concern is justifiably heightened, however, in light of previous difficulties VKE has faced as a result of freight-related delays.

Historically, CSX has not been responsive to problems that arise in the joint operations over their lines. Oftentimes, VRE has been unsuccessful in getting CSX to the table to discuss, let alone resolve, many important issues. The post-acquisition increases in freight service as proposed by CSX will only serve to magnify the problems of VRE and further regress a commuter operation that is already in need of significant improvement. Robert VS at 2-3.

In particular, delays occasioned by CSX accidents and resulting repairs have severely impacted VRE's operations and ridership. For example, a CSX freight derailment in early July of this year and necessary repairs resulted in delays that in turn caused an approximate 25 percent decrease in VRE ridership over the ensuing two-month period. VRE's on-time performance dropped to less than 40 percent (for July 1997), with a year-to-date (January-August) actual ontime performance of only 83 percent. Roberts VS 3. A CSX internal memorandum,

See also "Officials

Say Drop in Riders, Revenue Has VRE Headed for Doom," <u>Washington Post</u>, Aug. 15, 1997, D1, D6, attached as VRE-9 (Vol. II), Exhibit --. In fact, during the July-early August time period, <u>VRE had the worst on-time performance record of any commuter rail system in the U.S.</u> <u>and Canada</u>. Roberts VS at 3. VRE lost \$300,000 in revenue because of these delays. Roberts VS at 3.⁶

While a derailment may be considered an atypical event, this recent incident demonstrates vividly the extreme sensitivity of VRE's operations to freight operations and how the latter can and has threatened the very existence of VRE. Moreover, delays to VRE passenger service as a result of freight train problems are routine occurrences on the CSX/VRE lines. Data assembled by VRE and included in the Roberts Verified Statement demonstrates that for the period July 1995 through August 1997 (which corresponds to VRE's 1996 and 1997 fiscal years, plus the first two months of fiscal year 1998), VRE's actual on-time performance averaged only 85.9 percent. In the commuter operations industry, this is substantially below desired on-time performance. Roberts VS at 3. For example, METRA, which serves the Chicago metropolitan area and is a well-regarded commuter operation, has an on-time performance that consistently averages in the 94-98 percent range. Roberts VS at 3. On-time performance is an absolute priority to most commuter rail passengers, as evidenced by the severe decline in VRE ridership in heavy delay periods and by commuter-passenger survey information. MacIsaac/Taube VS at 12.

The Roberts Verified Statement explains that much of this delay to VRE operations has

⁶ CSX's written response to VRE's concerns over this severe impact was to ask VRE why CSX should not terminate VRE's services <u>entirely</u> in the event of an accident or during periods of heavy maintenance. Roberts VS at 3.

been the result of freight problems, including numerous line-related malfunctions and maintenance-related problems. In particular, VRE trains on many occasions have been substantially delayed because of various CSX freight train-related problems, including, among others, signal failures, failure to clear outlawed freights, slow freight train clearing, delayed receipt of proper bulletin documents from CSX dispatching, defect detector malfunctions, various freight train malfunctions, broken rails and other track problems, delayed receipt of CSX dispatcher orders, and inability to contact CSX foreman. In fact, for the period May 1996 through August 1997, VRE delays attributable only to CSX freight derailments, interference from CSX trains, or CSX switch and signal failures (i.e., not counting other CSX-related delays) amounted to <u>43.6 percent</u> of all VRE delays. (The comparable figure for NS was 8.5 percent.) Roberts VS at 4.

These service problems experienced by VRE on the CSX lines are not a recent phenomenon, but are long-standing deficiencies and appear to be rooted in the inability or refusal of CSX to earnestly join in partnership with VRE to provide the reliable, on-time commuter rail service that riders expect and deserve. For its part, VRE provides professional crews and station, storage and maintenance facilities necessary to operate the service. In addition, VRE has provided <u>\$70 million</u> in passenger equipment, <u>\$30 million</u> in completed or planned facility improvements, and <u>\$2.3 million</u> in annual payments to CSX covering access fees and specific improvements in dispatching and communication services. Roberts VS, at 4.

The service problems on the CSX lines are most evident in two critical areas: (1) CSX's poor management and supervision of the rail lines; and (2) its failure to properly coordinate operations and communicate with VRE officials. In addition, as described in some of the

examples set forth below, these shortcomings appear to have contributed to a deterioration in the physical plant below the standards required for a first class commuter rail operation.

(a) Inadequate Management/Supervision On The Rail Corridor

Currently, there is no senior management supervision located on the line of railroad between Fredericksburg and Alexandria, Virginia. This section of railroad is currently the responsibility of the operating Superintendent in Baltimore, Maryland. It is now part of CSX's Baltimore Service Lane, but for the last three years responsibility for the territory has flipflopped between the Division Superintendents in Baltimore and Florence, South Carolina. This has created inconsistencies in how the line is managed and has contributed to the difficulties in making people accountable for performance on the line. If the proposed acquisition is approved, this territory will undergo yet another change in management to the newly established Atlantic Coast Service Lane.

Furthermore, because it generates little on-line freight business, this corridor is essentially an "orphan" with no on-site managers. The nearest transportation supervisor is a trainmaster located in Richmond, Virginia, sixty miles south of Fredericksburg. Roberts VS at 5. This lack of local supervision creates fundamental problems in communications, coordination of operations and timely decision-making.

For example, on June 26, 1997, heavy thunderstorms caused a signal failure on the line between Dalghren Junction and Quantico, Virginia. CSX had no alternate plan in place to operate the line unsignalled. With no local operating supervisors on the line to investigate and handle the matter, CSX dispatchers in Jacksonville, Florida were left to resolve the problem. VRE was advised that it would take two days to implement a track warrant system to enable train

operations on the line. Fortunately, the signal problem was rectified in quicker fashion, but five VRE trains were delayed up to 2 hours, 21 minutes that evening. Roberts VS at 5.

The shortcomings of CSX's management of the line were no better demonstrated than by actions taken to rectify service problems caused by a major derailment on the line at Rosslyn, Virginia on July 7, 1997, which took out the signal system. In response to these problems, a meeting was held between VRE officials and CSX management on July 17, 1997, at which CSX advised that they were prepared to fix the operational problems caused by the derailment. Their July 24, 1997 "fix" to the problem was simply to create an absolute block in a three mile section of track within the Alexandria to Washington, D.C. corridor. Allowing only one train into the block at any one time turned this already congested traffic lane into an absolute nightmare. Individual VRE trains were delayed up to 60 minutes and VRE was forced to cancel <u>55 percent</u> of its service for over two full weeks while the "fix" was in place and repairs were made to the track and signal systems. Roberts VS at 6.

Similarly, the absence of on-site signal and maintenance-of-way supervisors contributes significantly to unnecessary delay of VRE trains. During the past year, in the face of mounting signal problems in the Fredericksburg to Alexandria corridor, CSX reduced the number of signal maintainers on the line from three to two and expanded the territory of the assigned Signal Supervisor to include a heavily trafficked coal line from Richmond to Newport News, Virginia. Signal and defect detector system failures continued to occur, however. Excluding the July 8, 1997 derailment and the resultant 55 percent reduction in VRE operations, in the period from June 17 to August 11, 1997, there were seven separate instances of signal or defect detector failure in the corridor affecting <u>nineteen</u> separate trains. Delay on these trains ranged from ten

minutes to in excess of two hours. Roberts VS at 6.

Clearly, the absence of responsible CSX officers in the Fredericksburg to Washington, D.C. corridor is indicative of CSX's indifference to its role as VRE's partner in this important public transportation project. It demonstrates a lack of commitment to VRE and stands in sharp contradiction to CSX's statements in its merger application claiming efficient operation of and commitment to commuter services on its lines.

(b) Lack Of Coordinated Operations And Communications

CSX boldly states in its Operating Plan that its existing contracts with commuter agencies "contain various provisions that protect commuter service from interference from freight operations" and that CSX will "seek to accommodate local operating practices established by commuter agencies to further ensure that freight operations do not impair timely operation of commuter services." App., Vol. 3A at 275-76. Such statements ring hollow with VRE.

There is no such protection or freedom of interference from freight operations afforded to VRE in its Operating/Access Agreement with CSX. Nor is there such a thing as "timely operation of commuter services" for VRE. CSX freight trains, be they local, work or through trains, clearly enjoy priority of movement over VRE commuter trains.

CSX dispatchers in Jacksonville control all train movements in the Fredericksburg to Alexandria corridor. VRE trains are frequently delayed because CSX dispatchers do not timely send daily operating bulletins to VRE. These bulletins indicate special operating conditions and are required before train movements are allowed to proceed. Roberts VS at 7. For instance, in at least one recent case, on August 6, 1997, a CSX dispatcher in Jacksonville deliberately delayed an evening VRE train 25 minutes beyond its scheduled departure time from Fredericksburg in order to allow a local freight train access to the main line. Such unnecessary delays can be directly attributable to the dispatchers' unfamiliarity with the territory in the shared corridor. VRE has tried to address that issue, but to no avail. In each of the last four years, VRE has offered to fund training trips for CSX dispatchers over the VRE-served territory. CSX, however, has sent only two dispatchers (out of approximately eight) to train on the corridor. Roberts VS at 7.

Despite these difficulties, CSX plans to continue its dispatching practice post-acquisition, dispatching the VRE line out of Jacksonville "in the current way that the territory is dispatched today." Orrison Tr. 524. Since CSX plans to maintain its "current way of dispatching" the line over which VRE operates, there is no reason to expect that the inadequate CSX communication to its dispatchers with respect to this line will improve in any way. Indeed, since CSX will now have the added responsibilities of also dispatching the Conrail line segment from Potomac Yard to Virginia Avenue, D.C. and dispatching a substantially greater number of freight trains on the lines, the resulting CSX dispatching-related problems for VRE undoubtedly will increase.

Problems relating to CSX transportation personnel also extend to CSX's maintenance-ofway forces. During the maintenance season, CSX gives little or no regard to the operating schedule of VRE. Again citing some recent examples, during the period from June 26 to August 6, 1997, there were ten separate instances of CSX trains interfering with and delaying <u>34</u> VRE commuter trains for as much as two hours. Many of these delays involved work trains that failed to timely clear the corridor or freight trains that were not timely moved after their crews' work time expired under the Hours of Service Act, thereby blocking the movement of VRE

commuter trains. Also, work trains dumping ballast or spreading ties are often allowed to interfere with VRE operations. Roberts VS at 7.

CSX's responses to the Commissions' discovery requests reinforce rather than relieve VRE's continuing concerns regarding these work-related problems. CSX was asked how it plans to avoid further delays to VRE trains resulting from various freight-related clearance projects CSX is planning to make on the Fredericksburg to Washington line. CSX responded that it imposes curfews on its work crews "so as not to disrupt VRE service." CSX/NS-109 at 7-8. In fact, such curfews have been ineffective in the past; on numerous occasions work crews supposedly operating in curfew windows have caused substantial delays to VRE trains. Roberts VS at 8.

Another major problem area is VRE's inability to communicate with CSX maintenance forces when they are out on the line performing work. For example, on at least five occasions during July and August 1997, VRE trains were delayed at various locations simply because they could not make proper contact with the CSX maintenance-of-way foremen whose crews were performing work on the line. Roberts VS at 8. Operating rules, as well as safety considerations, require such communications before proceeding with train movement into the work area, and unnecessary delays to VRE service result when the CSX foremen are not reachable by radio or other available means. Roberts VS at 8.

Clearly, such chronic delays to VRE commuter trains disprove CSX's stated commitment to commuter operations and establish its inability or unwillingness to make such a commitment. Should CSX run <u>43 to 61 percent</u> more trains in the corridor as it plans, and given its propensity to ignore the importance of commuter service, VRE operations will worsen unless this Board

acts to protect the service.

3. <u>Absent Conditions, The Conrail Transactions Will Further Threaten</u> VRE's Operations

The methodology CSX T and NS used to arrive at projected freight train densities as a result of the acquisition was freight-driven and passenger-insensitive. McClellan Tr. 286-87; Orrison Tr. 534, 537. Existing passenger traffic on a line was not factored into the density calculations, nor was any effort made to consider the potential impact of any future increases, however modest, in passenger operations. Orrison Tr. 537; Mohan Tr. 383. In addition, the delay history of a particular line was not quantitatively factored into freight density calculations. Orrison Tr. 539-40; Mohan Tr. 360-61.

In light of these freight-driven evaluations, it is not surprising that CSXT has scheduled substantial increases in freight traffic over the Richmond-Washington line, despite the substantial passenger traffic that exists on that line. Moreover, in scheduling improvements to a line to accommodate freight operations (and specifically with regard to the CSXT Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue line), CSXT has made <u>no</u> effort to ascertain the possible delays to CSXT freight traffic or VRE passenger operations as a result of these improvements. Orrison Tr. 543. Yet, as explained in greater detail in the Banks Verified Statement, these freight train-related improvements, which include clearance of the Virginia Avenue tunnel to accommodate automotive vehicle freight and at various other places along the line, will cause substantial additional delays to VRE passenger trains. Banks VS at 15-16.

Consistent with basing their projected changes in freight train line density entirely on freight traffic considerations, Applicants have not attempted to address resulting freightpassenger conflicts through any "structural" undertakings specifically designed to ensure accommodation of passenger operations (e.g., reducing the number of freight trains because of existing passenger traffic, planning improvements to accommodate passenger traffic). Instead, Applicants will attempt to avoid any negative anpact on passenger operations solely by freight train scheduling. John Orrison of CSXT confirmed this fact in his deposition testimony. When asked specifically what "steps CSXT had taken to assure that there would be no adverse impact on passenger service" on the CSXT Richmond-Washington line, Mr. Orrison responded, "[T]he correct scheduling of the freight trains" to "accommodate" passenger operations. Orrison Tr. 380-81. The absence of consideration of passenger traffic in the projections of freight train density on CSXT lines is also evidenced in Mr. Orrison's testimony that if all VRE passenger traffic were removed from the CSXT Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue line, CSXT would not increase the number of freight trains on the line, but would only schedule them differently. Orrison Tr. 531-32.

CSXT's rationale that its <u>scheduling</u> alone will avoid freight-passenger congestion and conflict is clearly deficient. First, it ignores the chronic line-related and maintenance-related delays that have occurred on those lines. Second, it presumes -- and depends wholly upon -- an on-time performance that CSX has not met on the lines on which VRE operates. Data assembled and analyzed in the Banks Verified Statement show that CSX trains through Potomac Yard in a very recent month-long period on average deviated approximately

Third, CSX's purported reliance on its scheduling to avoid conflicts with VRE operations is undermined by the proposed scheduling of the substantial additional freight traffic CSX plans to add to the lines on which VRE operates. According to CSX's scheduling information,

at 7⁷. This will mean that, as a result of the acquisition, the number of CSX trains sharing the corridor with VRE trains will increase from 43 percent to <u>63 percent</u> (an increase of nearly 50 percent). Banks VS at 7. Post-acquisition, the number of CSX and NS trains that will operate within VRE commuter operating hours on either the Fredericksburg or Manassas lines that will also operate between Alexandria and Virginia Avenue, D.C. will

The Banks Verified Statement includes a conservative projection that VRE on-time performance after the acquisition will decline from the already unacceptably low 85.9 percent figure (Roberts VS at 3) to about <u>81 percent</u>. Banks VS at 1+. Thus, despite Applicants' repeated assurances that their scheduling will ensure noninterference with VRE operations, in reality the proposed scheduling of the substantially increased freight traffic (particularly CSX's traffic) will only exacerbate the freight-commuter conflicts that already exist.

For all the cited reasons, the current CSX projection of substantial increases in freight traffic is basis enough for concern. VRE is also concerned, however, that the CSX Fredericksburg - Washington, D.C. line ultimately will carry more freight traffic than CSX projects. CSX's Operating Plan states that traffic currently routed through St. Louis or Memphis may alternatively be routed via the New Orleans Service Route, which means that origindestination pairs such as Houston-Philadelphia will be better served via this route. App., Vol. 3A

⁷ This scheduling of new freight trains during VRE operating hours is not limited to CSX. All four of the new trains NS will be adding to the Manassas - Alexandria Line will operate

at 131-32. This also means, of course, that the CSX lines on which VRE operates will carry much of that traffic since key pairs, such as the Houston-Philadelphia pair, will be served by the New Orleans Service Route via the CSX Richmond-Washington, D.C. corridor. App., Vol. 3A at 130; Banks VS at 17.

Given the history of delays and resulting harm to VRE's operations and the public that depends on VRE, the substantial increase in freight traffic that CSXT projects on those lines, CSX's admitted reliance on its scheduling to avoid greater adverse impacts on VRE, and the scheduling that CSX actually has proposed, it is imperative that the Board grant the Commissions relief in the form of the contract revisions requested herein.

II. REQUEST FOR CONDITIONS

E. Introduction

The Commissions believe that recent discussions with the Applicants regarding revisions to the current VRE access agreements have been positive and should be continued to a mutually successful conclusion. Until that occurs, however, the Commissions require protection through conditions that closely parallel the contract revisions proposed by the Commissions. Specifically, the Commissions hereby request imposition of the following conditions on any Board approval of the Primary Application:⁸

> Acquisition of operating rights over Conrail's line of railroad between RO Interlocking in Arlington, Virginia and Virginia Avenue Interlocking, subject to terms and conditions to be negotiated by the parties, or failing a negotiated agreement, set by the Board.

⁸ See, VRE-3, Description of Anticipated Responsive Application of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission, August 22, 1997.

- Acquisition of operating rights over CSXT's line of railroad between XR Interlocking in Spotsylvania, Virginia and RO Interlocking in Arlington, Virginia, subject to terms and conditions to be negotiated by the parties in accordance with the language marked in Attachment 3, hereto, or failing a negotiated agreement, set by the Board.
- 3. Acquisition of operating rights over NS's line of railroad between the South Manassas turnout and NS's connection with CSX at CSX's AF Interlocking in Alexandria, Virginia, subject to terms and conditions to be negotiated by the parties in accordance with the language marked in Attachment 4 hereto, or failing a negotiated agreement, set by the Board.

The specific terms and conditions requested by the Commissions are set forth in Exhibits A and B hereto. Attachment 3 is the Commissions' proposed agreement between CSX and the Commissions covering the line of railroad between RO Interlocking in Arlington, Virginia and XR Interlocking in Spotsylvania, Virginia. This is the CSX rail line described in numbered item 2, above. Attachment 3 is the CSX Access Agreement, marked to show changes that the Commissions want the Board to impose as a condition on any approval of the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application. References herein to the "proposed CSX Agreement" refer to Attachment 3.

Attachment 4 is the Commissions' proposed agreement between NS and the Commissions regarding the line of railroad between the South Manassas turnout and NS's connection with CSX at CSX's AF Interlocking in Alexandria, Virginia. item number 3 above. Attachment 4 is the current NS/Commissions Access Agreement marked to show the changes that the Commissions want the Board to impose as a condition on any approval of the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application. References herein to the "proposed NS Agreement" refer to Attachment 4.

Both of the proposed agreements contain a number of changes that are substantive but speak for themselves. Other changes in the proposed agreements are not substantive. Such changes are not summarized in this section.⁹ What follows is a summary of the substantive proposed changes that the Commissions are requesting that the Board impose on the respective railroads which require some explanation.

F. Proposed Conditions Regarding CSX Agreement

As just noted, Attachment 3 is the current CSX Access Agreement marked to show changes that the Commissions request the Board impose on CSX as a condition to any approval of the Primary Application.

1. Incorporation Of The Conrail Line

The Conrail line between RO Interlocking and Virginia Avenue Interlocking is slated to be acquired by CSX. In addition to the changes contained in Attachment 3 and discussed below, the Commissions want the Board to modify the current CSX Agreement to include the Conrail line which will be acquired by CSX. Although incorporation of the Conrail line to be acquired by CSX will require adjustment of compensation terms and other changes in descriptions and definitions in the Agreement, incorporation of the Conrail line will not itself require any

⁹ Thus, as examples: the proposed CSX Agreement contains a new paragraph in the preamble referencing revisions to the Operating Agreement that were made between the Commissions and CSX as of December 1, 1994 and thereafter (not substantive); on page 3 of the proposed CSX Agreement, the Commissions are proposing that the phrase "unilaterally by Railroad at any time" be stricken from the definition of "TRACKS" (substantive, but self-explanatory); the Commissions propose deleting the definition "Rush Hour Periods" from Section 1.1 of the current CSX Agreement because that definition is not used in the Agreement (not substantive).

substantive changes in the CSX Agreement (other than as the changes described below would apply to the former Conrail line).

2. No Further Subordination Of VRE Service Rights

Section 2.6(a) of the current CSX Agreement permits CSX to grant new rights for use of the CSX rail line to third parties. The Commissions want this section to be changed so that any such grants of rights after the most recent amendment of the current CSX Agreement would be subject to the current rights (at the time of such grant) of the Commissions to use the CSX rail line. Attachment 3 at 14-15.

3. VRE Proposed Changes In VRE Schedules

Section 2.6(a) of the current CSX Agreement also permits CSX to approve or reject any proposed modification of the VRE commuter rail service or of the VRE commuter rail service schedule. The Commissions do not propose that this right be changed. However, the Commissions do want this section to be changed so that CSX is required to review any proposed modifications with the existing Joint Operations Committee¹⁰ and, if the Joint Operations Committee cannot agree on proposed modifications, the issue is submitted to the CSX chief operating officer and the Commissions' chairmen for review and recommendations. Attachment 3 at 15-16.

¹⁰ Under the current CSX Agreement, the parties have established an operating committee (the "Joint Operations Committee") consisting of representatives of CSX and the Commissions, which meets quarterly to discuss issues pertinent to the safe and efficient operation of rail services on the CSX rail line and to review service and performance and make findings, formulate recommendations for consideration of CSX and the Commissions regarding operation of the service. The findings and recommendations of the Joint Operations Committee are advisory only and CSX reserves the right to make its own determinations with respect to the subjects discussed by the Committee. Section 2.6(a). The Commissions do not propose to change this provision.

4. Changes In CSX Line Due To Current VRE Operations

Under Section 2.9(a) of the current CSX Agreement, capital improvements may be made to the CSX rail line when, in the judgment of CSX, they are necessary or desirable, or required by law. If CSX deems such capital improvements to be occasioned or required because of the presence of the VRE commuter rail service, the Commissions must pay for them.¹¹ If the Commissions fail to agree to pay for the capital improvements or if CSX is unable to make the improvements in the manner and time required for safe and economical operations, CSX is entitled to suspend all or part of the VRE commuter rail service. Once made, the costs of maintaining such capital improvements are charged back to the Commissions. The Commissions want this provision to be changed so that it governs only capital improvements required by law and not those deemed "desirable" by CSX. Attachment 3 at 18-19.

5. Certain Changes In The CSX Line Due To Changed VRE Operations

Certain proposed expansions in the VRE service are governed by Section 2.9(b) of the current CSX Agreement. Attachment 3 at 19-20. The Commissions do not propose any change in Section 2.9(b). However, Section 2.9(c) requires any expansion of the VRE commuter rail service (beyond that contemplated in Section 2.9(b)) to be contingent on the Commissions' commitment to undertake, at <u>no cost</u> to CSX, the construction of a third main line parallel to the existing CSX rail line. Thus, the Commissions may request further expansion of the VRE commuter rail service by presenting to CSX evidence of their commitment to implement and

¹¹ Capital improvements required by CSXT are subject to an advisory-only review of the Joint Operations Committee and the Commissions chairmen may make recommendations to the CSX chief operating officer. However, CSXT has the unilateral right to make capital improvements and charge the costs to VRE.

fund all or a significant portion of the third main line and such other capital improvements as CSX deems necessary to ensure that commuter operations will not interfere with freight and intercity passenger service on the CSX rail line.

The Commissions want this provision to be changed so that if CSX determines that changes are necessary to accommodate the Commissions' desired expansion of service beyond that called for in Section 2.9(b), CSX would have an obligation to meet and confer, CSX would have an obligation to work with the Commissions in a cooperative effort to design, construct and fund a third line parallel to the CSX rail line. Once built, the rail line would be used by both VRE and CSX, in coordination with the existing track mainline. The third mainline would be constructed based upon a Master Service and Capital Improvements Plan (the "Master Plan") jointly developed by a task force comprised of senior officials of CSX, the Commissions and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Failing agreement on a Master Plan, the Commissions would have the right to continue running existing VRE trains without any obligation to fund additional capital improvements, but would not be permitted to run any increased number of VRE trains. The specific improvements agreed to under Master Plan would be implemented pursuant to definitive agreements containing terms and conditions consistent with the Master Plan. Attachment 3 at 20-22.

6. <u>CSX Revenue Losses</u>

Section 5.1(a) of the current CSX Agreement requires, among other things, that if there is interference with CSX's ability to provide freight operations as a result of the VRE commuter rail service, the Commissions will participate fully in the costs incurred and revenues lost. The Commissions want this provision to be deleted from the CSX Agreement. Attachment 3 at 28.

7. Compensation Paid To CSX

Under the current CSX agreement, Section 5.1(b) the compensation to CSX is based on a combination of a base payment and train-mile fee. In addition, the compensation paid to CSX is subject to adjustment pursuant to a schedule, to account for inflation. The Commissions want this provision to be changed so that the base payment is adjusted annually by the greater of (i) four (4) percent or (ii) the CPI Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers for Washington, D.C. - Maryland - Virginia. The adjustment to the base payment would be subject to two incentive provisions. First, the base payment would not increase in any year in which the total number of passengers using the VRE commuter rail service decreased from the previous annual period by 15 percent or more. Secondly, any increase in the base payment would not be earned unless CSX achieved on time performance targets set forth in the agreement.¹² Attachment 3 at 29-30.

G. Proposed Conditions With Respect To The NS Lines

As noted above, Attachment 4 is a copy of the agreement between the Commissions and NS that the Commissions would ask the Board to impose as a condition on any approval of the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application (the "proposed NS Agreement").

1. No Further Subordination Of VRE Service Rights

Section 2.6(a) of the current NS Agreement provides that NS may elect to grant operating rights to third parties. The Commissions want this provision to be changed so that any such grant of rights after September 1, 1996 would be subject to the Commissions' rights to use the

¹² The proposed on-time performance criteria are set forth in Exhibit C-2 of the proposed CSX Agreement. See Attachment 3.

NS line for its then-current commuter rail operations. Attachment 4 at 7-8.

2. Changes In Line Due To Current VRE Operations

Under Section 2.9(a) of the current NS Agreement, NS has the right to make changes in, additions and betterments to, or retirements from the trackage (collectively referred to herein as "changes") as it deems necessary or desirable for the operation of such trackage or as are required by law. To the extent such changes are occasioned or required by operation of the VRE commuter rail service, NS has the right to require the Commissions to pay for them, and to pay for the cost of maintaining them. If the Commissions are unable to appropriate funding to pay for such changes, NS may suspend all or part of VRE's commuter rail service.

The Commissions want this provision to be changed so that if NS determines that changes are o casioned or required by the operation of the VRE commuter rail service, NS would have an obligation to meet and confer, and negotiate in good faith with the Commissions for the purpose of determining whether and to what extent the Commissions and NS should share the cost of such changes to the NS rail lines. If, after attempting such good faith negotiations, the parties are unable to agree on whether and to what extent the Commissions and NS should share the costs of such changes, the Commissions want the Board require NS to arbitrate the issue in accordance with a prescribed arbitration provision contained in the current NS Agreement. The Commissions would remain obligated to pursue appropriation of required funds for their share of the cost of such changes to the NS rail line that were determined to be the responsibility of the Commissions in the arbitration. NS would retain the right to suspend all or part of the VRE commuter rail service in the event that the Commissions could not pay for the changes that were their responsibility under the arbitration award. Attachment 4 at 9-11.

3. Changes In The NS Line Due To Changed VRE Operations

Section 2.9(b) of the current NS Agreement explains that changes in the NS rail line (including changes in communication and signal facilities and crossing warning devices) are or may be required to permit the continuation, modification or expansion of the VRE commuter rail service. Upon written notice to the Commissions, NS makes such changes and the Commissions are obligated to pay NS for the costs of such changes. In addition, the compendation to NS is increased to include the costs of normalized maintenance for such changes.

¹³ The changes marked in Section 2.9(d) of the NS agreement are conforming in nature and do not contain any substantive proposed change.

4. Term Of NS Agreement

Under Section 4.1 of the current NS Agreement as extended, the agreement terminates on July 15, 1998. The parties have an obligation to meet during the term of the agreement to discuss extension and possible modification of it. The Commissions want this provision to be changed so that the current NS agreement will run through July 31, 2006. Furthermore, the parties would have an obligation to meet during the last twelve months of the extended term. Attachment 4 at 15.

5. VRE Acquisition Of The NS Rail Line

Under Section 4.2(a) of the current NS Agreement, the right of the Commissions to seek the continuation or expansion of commuter rail service beyond the current term is conditioned upon the Commissions' assurance that they will work in good faith to develop a plan to purchase the NS rail line.

The Commissions want this section to be changed so that their obligation with respect to the NS rail line would be to work in good faith to develop a plan to purchase, lease or acquire an interest in the NS rail line. The Commissions want to extend the timetable for its obligation to purchase, lease or acquire an interest in the NS rail line. Under the Commissions' requested change, representatives of the Commissions and NS would meet during the last twelve months of the term of the proposed NS Agreement (July 31, 2005 would be the start of such period) to negotiate terms and conditions for the Commissions' purchase, lease or other acquisition of an interest in the NS rail line. If the parties were not able to reach agreement during a nine-month negotiation period, either party would have the right to submit the unresolved issues to arbitration under an arbitration provision contained in the current NS Agreement. In the event that neither party sought arbitration, NS would have the right to decline to renew the Agreement. In the event that arbitration was sought by one of the parties, the arbitrator's final decision would be binding on NS. The Commissions would have thirty (30) days within which to accept the terms and conditions set by the arbitrator. If the Commissions did not accept the terms and conditions set by the arbitrator, any continuation of their operations on the NS rail line would include a provision permitting NS to receive compensation reflecting the fair market value for the Commissions' use of the NS rail line. NS and the Commissions would have an obligation to meet and confer and negotiate in good faith for the purpose of determining the revised compensation terms. If, after attempting such negotiations the parties were unable to agree to revised compensation terms, that issue could be submitted for resolution by arbitration. If neither party sought arbitration, the Commissions' right to use the NS rail line would come to an end. The arbitrator's decision on the compensation award would be binding on NS. If the Commissions did not accept the terms and conditions set by the Board, the right to the continued use of the subject line would end ninety 90 days thereafter. Attachment 4 at 16-17.

6. Compensation Paid To NS/Performance Incentive

Under the current NS Agreement, Section 5.1(c) the compensation paid by the Commissions to NS is based on a combination of a base payment and a train-mile fee. In addition, the compensation paid to NS is subject to adjustment pursuant to a schedule, to account for inflation. The Commissions propose a new provision that would adjust the base payment on an annual basis by the greater of (i) four (4) percent or (ii) the CPI Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers for Washington, D.C. - Maryland - Virginia. The adjustment to the base payment would be subject to two provisions. First, the base payment would not increase in any year in which the total number of passengers using the VRE commuter rail service decreased from the previous annual period by fifteen (15) percent or more. Secondly, any increase in the base payment would not be earned unless NS achieved on-time performance targets in the agreement. Attachment 4 at 18-19.¹⁴

H. <u>The Requested Relief Will Not Diminish The Benefits Of The Merger And Is</u> Narrowly Tailored To Alleviate The Demonstrated Harm

The requested relief will not diminish the benefits of the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application because the relief is narrowly tailored to alleviate the demonstrated harm to VRE's commuter rail service. The Commissions seek conditions that would require NS and CSX to revise existing agreements they have with the Commissions on service that is currently operating.

With respect to the CSX Access Agreement, the Commissions want:

- Any future grants of rights to third parties to be subject to the then-current rights of the Commissions to the use the CSX rail line;
- CSX to have an obligation to explain its denial of the Commissions' proposed changes in the schedule for VRE service;
- CSX's unilateral right to make capital improvements and charge the Commissions for them to be limited to capital improvements required by law;
- Arbitration of disputes between CSX and VRE regarding their respective responsibility for capital improvements on the line in connection with expansion of VRE service;

¹⁴ The proposed on-time performance criteria are set forth in Exhibit C-2 of the proposed NS Agreement.

- CSX to no longer have the right to charge VRE for revenue losses attributable (in CSX's view) to the presence of VRE commuter rail service; and
- A small portion of the compensation paid to CSX to be dependent upon reasonable on-time performance standards.

None of these conditions would have any potential to interfere with CSX's operations or the anticipated benefits of the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application.

With respect to the NS Access Agreement, the Commissions want essentially the same changes they are seeking with respect to the CSX Access Agreement:

- No further subordination of VRE service rights;
- A process of explaining NS's decision to decline VRE's proposed commuter rail schedule changes;
- Arbitration of disputes between NS and the Commissions regarding whether capital improvements are necessary for continuation of VRE operations;
- A similar arbitration process for dispute resolution in connection with capital improvements that may be needed for expansion of VRE operations;
- An extension of the term of the agreement;
- An arbitration process regarding the Commissions' possible purchase of the NS rail line; and
- A modest portion of the compensation paid to NS set aside for performancebased incentives.

Like the CSX Access Agreement changes, the sought changes in the NS Access Agreement would have no potential to interfere with NS's operations or with the anticipated public benefits of the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application.

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissions respectfully request that the Board grant the conditions requested herein if it approves, in whole or in part, the transactions contemplated by the Primary Application.

Respectfully submitted,

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Counsel for Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission

Dated: October 21, 1997


Verified Statement of Stephen A. MacIsaac, Acting Executive Director of the Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission and

Richard K. Taube, Executive Director of the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission

A. Introduction

The Northern Virginia Transportation Commission ("NVTC") and the Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission ("PRTC") are political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Virginia organized pursuant to the Transportation District Act of 1964, § 15.1-1340 <u>et seq.</u>, VA Code Ann. Consistent with their enabling authority, NVTC and PRTC are authorized to provide planning, construction, operations and funding for a wide range of transportation-related purposes. Significant among these is NVTC's and PRTC's joint ownership and operation of the Virginia Railway Express ("VRE") commuter rail service, which since 1992 has operated on tracks owned by Norfolk Southern Corporation ("NS"), CSXT ("CSX"), which purchased RF&P Railroad, and Conrail.

Created in 1964, NVTC is comprised of the counties of Arlington, Fairfax and Loudon, and the cities of Alexandria, Falls Church and Fairfax. NVTC's territory has a population of 1.3 million and covers approximately 1,000 square miles.

Richard K. Taube is NVTC's Executive Director, reporting to a board of 19 elected officials and serving since 1984. Prior to joining NVTC, Mr. Taube served as an economic consultant to major transportation firms; directed policy development for a multi-modal trade association, congressional study commission and state department of transportation; as well as teaching university level economics. From 1994 through 1996 he served as chairman of the commuter rail committee of the American Public Transit Association and during that time authored APTA's <u>New</u> <u>Start Handbook-Tips and Resources for Planning and Implementing a Successful Commuter Rail</u> <u>Enterprise</u>, which has become a standard reference for scores of cities and counties in the United States and Canada that are actively planning to implement new commuter rail service.

PRTC was created in 1986 primarily to join NVTC in planning and implementing VRE. PRTC's member jurisdictions include the counties of Prince William and Stafford and the cities of Manassas, Manassas Park and Fredericksburg. PRTC's territory consists of 630 square miles with a total population of 410,000. Twenty-two percent of PRTC's working population commutes, primarily on the I-95 and I-66 corridors, to the employment centers within the District of Columbia and its immediate environs. PRTC generates a two percent tax on motor vehicle fuels to provide a dedicated revenue source to offset a portion of the PRTC member jurisdictions' share of VRE costs.

Stephen A. MacIsaac was appointed acting Executive Director of PRTC in July 1997. He remains Deputy County Attorney of Prince William County, Virginia, a position he has held since 1989. A member of the Prince William County Attorney's Office since 1982, Mr. MacIsaac was actively involved in the establishment of VRE and has served as legal counsel to PRTC and VRE since their inception. Mr. MacIsaac has been intimately involved in the evolution of VRE, including negotiating and drafting the master agreement which defines the structure, terms and conditions by which VRE's six participating and two contributing jurisdictions finance VRE. He has also negotiated and drafted agreements with the Virginia Division of Risk Management by which VRE's indemnification of the freight railroads and Amtrak is provided, with the three freight railroads by which VRE gains access to tracks and station facilities, and with Amtrak by which VRE receives crew and maintenance services and access to Union Station.

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This joint statement provides an overview of VRE, tracing its history, operating statistics and public investments. It also describes the role of VRE in the region's network of commuting options and demonstrates that VRE's continued success is clearly in the public interest.

B. VRE History

From NVTC's first meeting in 1964, the need to relieve ever-increasing congestion on the region's roads and the prospects of providing commuter rail service on existing freight railroad rights-of-way have been recognized and actively pursued. NVTC members recognized that in neighboring Maryland, commuter rail service has been continuously provided, growing to well over 20,000 daily passenger trips today. In Virginia, however, once successful passenger railroad operations were discontinued in the 1950's, they could not, despite repeated efforts, be restored until VRE began in June 1992.

The final and ultimately successful efforts to start VRE service connecting Fredericksburg, Virginia to Washington, D.C.'s Union Station (55 miles) and Manassas, Virginia to Union Station (35 miles) began in earnest in 1984. Feasibility studies, plans for demonstrations, financial plans and - most importantly - the commitment of RF&P's (later purchased by CSX) and NS's chief executive officers to Virginia's governor were accomplished by 1986.

The commitment of the railroads to provide VRE access to their lines was obtained only after the railroads' initial refusal and complete opposition was overcome. This came only after NVTC and PRTC agreed to provide the railroads absolute indemnification from all liability for VRE operations. Specific authorizing legislation was adopted by the Virginia General Assembly to satisfy the railroads' demand. Pursuant to the enabling authority, a \$200 million insurance plan was established to indemnify the RF&P (later CSXT), NS, Conrail and Amtrak.

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In 1987 an unfortunate accident involving Amtrak and Conrail at Chase, Maryland reinforced the railroads' concerns over liability and provided a severe setback to VRE. Unsatisfied with indemnification based on Virginia legislation alone, VRE's sponsors were required to obtain an act of Congress to establish liability limits for freight railroads leasing access to their tracks to VRE. This was accomplished in 1990 and currently authorizes full indemnification of freight railroad conduct, including gross negligence, capping the total liability at \$200 million. With this legislation in place, the insurance plan supports VRE's contractual obligation to indemnify the railroads. Under the plan, VRE is responsible for all damages that occur "but for" the existence of VRE's service, including gross negligence of the freight railroads themselves. While we believe this is not a fair standard for VRE, and far exceeds any standard required of others using the railroads' lines, it is one the railroads required as a condition of using their tracks.

By summer of 1992, VRE was ready to begin operations, having spent close to \$150 million on terminals, stations, track improvements, rolling stock and training. Contracts with RF&P, NS, Conrail and Amtrak were in place, the master agreement committing local governments to funding was signed and the Commonwealth of Virginia had agreed to a financial role.

The railroad agreements were a source of discontent to VRE's sponsors since, in addition to stringent indemnification provisions, they provided the freight railroads with unilateral powers to cancel or delay VRE trains, to impose schedule changes and restrictions, to compel VRE to make capital improvements to the railroads as a condition of continued operation, and to afford the freight railroads the right to force VRE to discontinue operations on short notice for any reason. These provisions have not been relaxed as the contracts have been renegotiated over the years, and have been exacerbated by the railroads' demand for sharply increased compensation without corresponding requirements for meaningful performance incentives or guarantees. As a result, local

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government officials and VRE and commission board members have only reluctantly approved significant capital investments required by the freight railroads, since they fear VRE's being expelled from the freight lines in response to growing freight traffic, or indeed for no reason at all, as permitted under the existing freight railroad contracts with VRE.

The NS and CSX forecasts of substantial increases in freight traffic on the lines on which VRE operates have compounded this concern, and as a result the commissioners have instructed their staffs to approach NS and CSX to seek negotiated improvements in the access agreements. While these negotiations have been positive, they have been unsuccessful.

C. Operating Statistics

VRE currently operates 26 daily trains (12 on the CSX Fredericksburg Line and 14 on the NS Manassas Line) serving 18 stations as shown in Attachment 1. South of Alexandria, Virginia the NS line joins the CSX line, and at the Potomac River both use the Conrail bridge and line to reach Union Station. In addition, VRE customers may use their VRE tickets on several Amtrak trains which to a limited extent expand the hours of service available to VRE customers beyond the restricted periods of operation allowed by the freight railroads.

VRE's current fares and schedules are shown in Attachments 2 and 3.

As can be seen in Attachments 4, 5, 6 and 7, VRE ridership grew sharply during the first three years of service, before reaching a high-water mark in mid-FY 1996. From about 3,500 average daily passenger trips in the first year to over 8,000 average daily trips in the fall of 1995 and winter of 1996, VRE demonstrated that it could provide a safe, affordable and reliable commuting alternative, carrying the equivalent of a freeway lane of automobile traffic in the heavily congested I-66 and I-95 corridors. Indeed, an analysis by NVTC staff revealed that the \$150 million investment in VRE by the Commonwealth of Virginia and VRE's local governments was less

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expensive than building instead the equivalent freeway capacity, when both were operated over a 20-year period.¹

Ridership since mid-FY 1996, however, has declined as a result of several factors, including ill-advised track maintenance procedures by NS in the summer of 1996, which penalized on-time performance on the Manassas Line, and various delays caused by CSXT freight operations, including most significantly a CSX derailment in July 1997 and subsequent track and signal repairs and upgrades, which impacted VRE on-time performance severely for more than a month.

With late trains, slow trains and annulled trains during this period, VRE's ridership continued a downward spiral, reaching a trough about 25 percent below mid FY 1996 levels by August 1997. Although VRE's early October 1997 ridership has rallied to about 6,500 average daily passenger trips, ridership remains down about 15 percent from 1996 on the Manassas Line and 20 percent on the Fredericksburg Line.

D. Public Investment

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VRE is a partnership between eight local governments, the Commonwealth and the VRE customers. VRE's Master Agreement requires a fare box recovery of at least 50 percent of its annual operating budget of about \$20 million. VRE's capital budget (including debt service) is over \$10 million annually. Customers have paid about a third, local governments a fifth, the federal government a third, and the Commonwealth the balance of the combined operating and capital budgets.

¹ "Investment Analysis: Virginia Railway Express Versus Equivalent Highway Capacity," NVTC (April 24, 1995).

VRE's balance sheet lists approximately \$100 million of assets. NVTC and its partner PRTC have issued appropriations based, tax-free debt of over \$100 million to finance rolling stock and stations. In cooperation with the Virginia Department of Rail and Pubic Transportation ("VDR&PT"), VRE's capital improvement program contains an ambitious set of track, bridge, signal and other improvements to be accomplished over the next several years. The great preponderance of these investments will be made on freight railroad rights-of-way. One example is a new bridge over Quantico Creek, which will add an additional track to replace the track that CSXT demolished shortly before VRE began operations. This location is now a bottleneck for F sth CSX and VRE, and VRE's capital program calls for raising over \$20 million to design and install a parallel bridge. VRE's investment will provide CSX the opportunity to install a third freight track as well.

Approximately a third of VRE's annual capital budget is devoted to improvements in the Washington, D.C.-Fredericksburg corridor, which is primarily funded by VDR&PT, using federal funds, and is coordinated with the Commonwealth's ongoing high-speed rail program. These include the Woodbridge/Aquia crossovers at \$1,500,000, RO to AF Interlocking and related track work at \$2,650,000, and \$4,000,000 for design of the Quantico Bridge.

Addition of crossovers at Woodbridge/Aquia on either side of the Quantico Bridge would double the number of crossovers in the area and help freight and passenger railroads avoid delays. These will also make it possible to use the second Quantico bridge crossing to better advantage. CSX will perform all design, engineering and construction work using VRE funds.

Track and signal improvements between the Potomac River (RO) and Telegraph Road (AF) are designed to increase train speeds, decrease travel time, and consequently increase VRE ridership. A properly designed system of signals and interlockings constructed to modern codes

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would increase track operating speeds to 45 miles per hour from 25 miles per hour. VRE's capacity simulation model identified these improvements as the highest priority for improved and expanded VRE operations. VRE is required by its existing access agreement with CSX to install these improvements as a precondition of any increased VRE service. Another part of the project will consolidate and move tracks to provide access to a new Metrorail and VRE station in Potomac Yard. A third mainline is now in place.

Finally, a second crossing of Quantico Creek with a second parallel mainline (with space for a third mainline) will address delays at this location that occur several times per week and last 10 minutes or longer. This is the only segment of single track on the entire Fredericksburg line, with speeds now limited to 45 miles per hour (versus 70 miles per hour elsewhere) over a four-mile segment. VRE's capacity simulation model confirms that removal of this bottleneck will greatly increase operating capacity on CSX south of Woodbridge.

Looking to the future, VRE is committed by its access agreement with CSX to provide a parallel third mainline along its entire route (Potomac River to Fredericksburg) as a precondition of any increased service beyond the current 12 trains on the Fredericksburg line and 14 trains on the Manassas line. To accomplish this will require about \$180 million of improvements, including signals to permit closer spacing of trains, and improving several curves with a curvature of greater than two degrees. Increasing the superelevation (banking) of these curves to five inches will allow all trains to travel at higher speeds through these curves. Increasing speeds will also require upgrading to FRA Class 5 track.

Unfortunately, CSX has been unwilling to agree to specific terms by which the Quantico Bridge (or any of the other "Third Track Improvements" made by VRE in Potomac Yard and elsewhere) would guarantee VRE's ability to operate additional service using the extra capacity it is

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paying to install. While discussions on the subject are ongoing between VRE and CSX (and NS), the inability to define a contractual partnership to own and operate publicly financed capital improvements on CSX and NS rights-of-way is jeopardizing the ability of VRE to program funds for this purpose.

E. Public Interest Benefits of VRE

While ridership in VRE has declined substantially from its mid-FY 1996 peak, its future can be bright. First, projections of employment and population in VRE's core markets show steady growth. Automobile ownership and vehicle miles traveled are forecast to outpace new highway capacity. Traffic congestion, which is already the second worst in the United States, will get worse. If VRE can restore its reputation for on-time performance, its ridership should resume a healthy growth trend. VRE uses a state-of-the art model to forecast future ridership, using as inputs official forecasts of population and employment provided by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.

Second, VRE's ridership is sensitive to the frequency of service. The freight railroads have not allowed VRE to expand service as it has wished, citing competition with existing freight traffic. The very substantial growth of freight train traffic predicted by NS and CSX in this proceeding suggests that even greater pressure will be placed on VRE's existing schedules, and any capacity enhancements resulting from VRE's investments in CSX and NS rights-of-way could be eroded before VRE is allowed to operate any new service. But if VRE is allowed to expand service frequency, its model shows a healthy ridership response.

Third, VRE is well placed to serve the region when special circumstances call for a quick and innovative response. For example, VRE carried 3,800 trips earlier this month to and from a Washington, D.C. rally of the Promise Keepers, using special trains. A pending 10-year

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reconstruction of the intersection of I-95/395/495 (Mixing Bowl) at Springfield, Virginia will take a lane of highway capacity out of service. In similar circumstances, commuter rail has provided an effective mitigation of the severe traffic congestion that would otherwise result (e.g., I-95 between Ft. Lauderdale and Miami). It is likely that VRE will be part of a multi-modal strategy to mitigate traffic congestion during the Mixing Bowl reconstruction, and this will boost VRE ridership. During snow storms, VRE also is heavily patronized and has been quite reliable.

VRE data compiled for submission to the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") National Transit Database reveal that in FY 1997 VRE provided 57,116,170 passenger miles of service at an average cost of only 32 cents per passenger mile. This compares very favorably with costs of operating single-occupant automobiles.

VRE has operated without a passenger fatality or even serious injury since 1992.

At VRE's FY 1997 level of ridership (1,758,471 passenger trips) approximately 125,000 annual vehicle miles traveled by single-occupant automobiles were saved, amounting to approximately 2,879,000 less gallons of gasoline.

Northern Virginia is designated as a "serious" ozone area by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Accordingly, the region must prepare air quality plans and spend millions of dollars to devise methods to reduce ozone level: to acceptable levels. An emissions analysis performed by NVTC in 1994 shows that each work day VRE results in 0.06 fewer tons of hydrocarbons, 0.42 fewer tons of carbon monoxide, 0.19 fewer tons of nitrogen oxide and 0.07 fewer tons of volatile organic compounds (the controlling pollutant in smog formation in the Washington, D.C. area). These amounts are net of the extra auto trips by VRE customers to and from VRE stations. Attachment 8. Commuter rail systems around the United States consistently generate economic activity that yields a substantial return on the investment of public funds. In a September 1997 study for the American Public Transit Association, the Carmen Group, Inc. estimated that commuter rail economic and societal benefits are \$5.2 billion annually.² These benefits include cost savings from avoided congestion; cost savings from the mitigation of traffic accidents and environmental damage; and tax revenues generated. These benefits are beyond those accruing directly to the 1.2 million daily commuter rail riders, including savings of \$2 to \$6 daily compared to auto commuting, 23 to 81 hours of reduced traffic congestion per year valued at \$247 to \$865 in time and fuel costs. Also, commuter rail capital projects over the last 10 years have totaled \$24 billion, creating 420,000 jobs. Another 23,000 individuals are employed in the U.S. commuter rail systems.

A December 1993 report for the U.S. DOT established a baseline for determining the impacts of VRE on highway congestion relief, land use changes and local economic development.³ Among the significant findings of this initial study were:

- In densely populated areas, VRE's market extends to five miles around each station and 10 miles around stations in less densely populated areas.
- 43 percent of home purchasers surveyed in 1992 indicated that VRE had been either a major or some consideration in their housing location choice.

² <u>Commuter Rail: Serving America's Emerging Suburban/Urban Economy</u>, Carmen Group, Inc. for APTA (September 1997).

³ Impact Assessment of the Virginia Railway Express Commuter Rail on Land Use Development Patterns in Northern Virginia. Northern Virginia Planning District Commission for USDOT/FTA (December 1993).

Each year VRE surveys its customers on-board, asking about demographic characteristics and attitudes. Almost 2,700 customers responded to the 1996 survey (a response rate approaching three-quarters). Among the responses of particular interest were:

- Over 700 respondents indicated a desire for additional VRE stations, including many beyond the current limits of VRE service (e.g., 200 favored Richmond).
- About a quarter of VRE customers transfer to/from Metrorail to complete their trips.
- Almost 60 percent of VRE customers drive alone in their automobiles on days on which they do not use VRE.
- Over 800 respondents reported shorter one-way travel times using VRE compared to their previous method of travel, while 400 reported no savings. Savings were as great as an hour, with most reporting savings of 15 to 30 minutes.
- Over a thousand riders reported longer travel times, with most of 30 minutes or less. This suggests that reliability is a stronger inducement to use VRE than speed. (Note that evidence from other commuter rail systems confirms this point. Chicago's METRA asked its riders in late 1996 to rate 51 service attributes; 77 percent chose "getting to the destination on time" while only 36 percent chose "getting to the destination quickly." On-time performance was the most important attribute on all 11 METRA lines.)⁴
- Most riders use VRE five days a week (73 percent).
- Almost 30 percent reported that VRE was a "major consideration" in choosing their current home location. Another 20 percent said VRE was of "some consideration." About 84 percent of VRE riders own their own homes.
- While VRE has a solid core of long-term riders (20 percent since the start of service in 1992 and another 20 percent three or more years), fully 25 percent of VRE riders are relatively new (less than a year).
- For those riding VRE less than six months, relocation of job (30 percent) or home (20 percent) were the most significant reasons for starting to use VRE, and another 15 percent relied on recommendations from friends.
- Fully 43 percent of VRE customers work for civilian government agencies and another 10 percent for the military.

⁴ "On the BiLevel," METRA (September 1977).

- In grading VRE's on-time performance, 11 percent gave an A, 43 percent a B, and 29 percent a C. Other factors receiving strong positive ratings were cleanliness of trains and stations, communication with management, helpfulness of crews, ease of buying a ticket, station parking availability and personal security. Even for VRE's fares, which are admittedly relatively high compared to other commuter rail systems, customers were relatively satisfied with the value of service received, with 83 percent giving a rating of A, B, or C. (Note, however, that this was in May, 1996, near the high-water mark of ridership and before the substantial loss of ridership and delay incidents previously noted.)
- Over 31 percent of VRE riders are 30 to 39 years old, 35 percent are 40 to 49, and 23 percent are 50 to 59; male riders comprise 64 percent of total ridership; and annual household income is \$50-75,000 for 30 percent of VRE riders, \$75-100,000 for 28 percent, and over \$100,000 for 27 percent.

F. Conclusion

VRE began in 1992 after a lengthy gestation period. The freight railroads (NS, Conrail and now CSX) have provided access to their tracks for VRE service on terms that we would characterize so far as "tough" and barely affordable. Nonetheless, VRE's ridership and overall performance has until recently been very positive. VRE ridership has suffered significantly, however, over the past year in large part due to freight-related delays. If the freight railroads provide on-time dispatching, properly scheduled maintenance, and the other necessary measures to minimize interference with scheduled passenger operations, we anticipate a recovery of VRE ridership to a reasonable growth trend.

VRE's customers are very sensitive to good service, since they are generally high income individuals with automobiles available. For VRE to spur economic growth, reduce traffic congestion and help clean our region's air, it must operate on-time. In turn, to expand service and capture a larger share of the commuting market, VRE understands its obligation to participate in an effective partnership with its freight railroad hosts to provide capital improvements to boost capacity. VRE's current contracts with the freight railroads, however, allow unilateral decisions that threaten the security of public investments in these freight railroad rights-of-way. With the sharp increases in freight train traffic forecasted by the freight railroads to result from their acquisition of Conrail, not only are future capacity increases occasioned by VRE's existing and planned investments threatened to be fully absorbed by new freight trains, but an even more serious concern is that on-time performance on VRE's existing trains will be placed in jeopardy.

CSX and NS have been unwilling to agree to specific terms to resolve these serious conflicts. Consequently, the STB should consider appropriate actions to protect the public's interest in CSX's and NS's lines and the public interest benefits of on-time VRE service.



- ----

Fredericksburg Line Fares		Zone 1 Um Sales	Zone 2 Cress Dry America	Zone 3 Hancomi Se whit	Zorne 4 Lanar	Zone 5 Rudbidge Name	Zone 6 Quellas Deny 10 distanti	Zone 7 Manute Futeri	Zone 8 Broke Laterd Md	Zone
7000 0	-	\$5.70	¥.25		\$4.00	\$1.60	\$1.20	\$2 M	\$2.45	-
Intertheters	TenTre	\$50.95	\$53 65	\$17 10	\$33.75	\$30.45	\$27.15	\$23 \$0	\$20.50	1
	-	8197.00	1185.55	\$124.20	\$116 75	\$105.75	\$93.60	\$42.35	\$70.85	
Zone B	Sightig	M 35	85.95	\$4.00	\$1.60	\$3.70	\$2.60	\$2.45	\$2.05	
Later No.	Tente	\$53.85	\$50.31	\$13.75	\$30.45	\$27.95	\$23.60	\$20.50	\$17.20	
Brette	Herety	\$185.55	\$174 05	\$118.75	\$105.25	\$93.50	\$41.35	STOR5	\$59.40]
Zone ?	ire ho	\$5.95	\$5.55	11.60	\$3.70	\$7.80	\$2.45	-		
Wirmen S-dard	Inite	\$50.35	BAT 05	\$30.45	\$27 15	\$73.80	\$20.50			
	Heretty	\$174.05	\$162.60	\$105.25	\$93.80	687.35	\$70 M5			
Zone 8	Sights	\$5.55	\$5 15	\$1.20	\$2.80	\$2.45	-			
	10-10	\$47.05	\$43.70	\$27 15	\$23.80	\$20 50				
Cherry HE Fransi	Mer Way	\$162.60	\$151 15	\$93 60	\$42.35	\$70.85				
Zone 6	Sector State	15.15	\$4.75	\$2.80	\$2.45	\$2.05				
Autor.	Inte	\$43 70	\$40 40	\$73.80	\$20 50	\$17.20				
Nedata	Merthe	\$151 15	\$139.65	\$42.35	\$70.85	859 40				
Zora 4	Segle Tata	1475	\$4.40	\$7.45						
1.000	10.10	\$15 55	\$36.30	\$20.50						
	Hardty.	\$1M 75	\$125.55	\$70.85						
Zone 1	Single-Rick	\$4.40	\$4 00							
Francis Sortaliat	10-10	\$36.30	\$33 10							
	Herety.	\$125.55	\$714 40							
2000 2	Single Auto	\$4.00	\$3.60							
Amardia	Tester	\$33 10	175.65							
Conditi Cito	MyRey	\$114 40	\$103.20							
Zone 1	Segla Fields	\$160								
1 Setas	Inla	\$2% AS								
itere from	-	1 101 20								

Fredericksburg Line Schedule

Northbound					ANTER	-	-	AMTEAL	ANTELLE	ANTEAS
Line #	Tani C	Sec. 2	3112	112		HO.	110	36	41111	947
Freedowney	MF	MF	MF	MI	MISA	M.F	MF	DAILY	DAILY	DAILY
4,25.11										1.1
Locland Kred	5.25	5.52	6.28	7:03	-	7:34	8.16	-	-	-
	111-Y A			1						
Quantico	5.38	6:09	645	7.2	7.37	7:51	8.13	1.58	11:42	5:03
				1					- T-	
Woodbridge	5.52	6.24	7:00	7:35	7:50	8.06	8.47	9:10	11:52	-
5		- 11-			_	1				
Franconia Springfield	6.04	6.36	7.14	7.49	-	8.18	8.59	-	-	-
2.1				- 1	1 1	1		E = 1	1.11	1
Crystal City (D)	6.26	0.57	7.33	8.05		8.39	919		-	-
mit-, 171 (11)	5-21		11	1.2		1.5				
Union Station	643	7:14	7:50	8.25	8.35	1.56	9.18	9.55	12.35	5.55
Southbound		ANTRAL	AMTENE				ANTRAS	1		AMTRA
Line #	114	7	41	144	10.1	105	91.99	hir*	Reitz	82
[marger]	MF	DAILY	M-SA	MF	MF	MF	SU-F	MF	M-F	DAILY
Sal Ind In			11 1							
L'Enfant	-	-	-	4.13	4.48	5:20	-	6.02	6.47	-
		1	L#			-14		. F.I.		1.24
Alexandru	7:07	10:37	3.23	4.29	5.04	5:39	6:03	6.19	6.59	8.32
			(1	and as		1. 11. 1	6.18	
Loriat	-	-	-	4:45	5:20	5.55	-	6.34	7:15	-
	10	F			3.1				1.18	r * ,
Report	-	-	-	4.58	5.33	6:06	-	6.46	7:26	-
		Vit 1	12038	1- al	main the	1.0	1. 10.15	1. 2.	-r 1	h2.1
and the state of t							-	3.04	2.44	
Brooke	-	-		5:18	5.53	6.28	-	1.100	1.00	
Brooke	-	-	-	5:18	5.53	6.28	-	/10	1.44	

* Indicases Antonia train accepting VRIT fee Trap and Monthly techers only No Single-Ride Tickets (D) - Stops in discharge persongers, train may leave about of a thefair when applies work in completed. Trains will only stop a stations where is time is indicated Effective September 8, 1997.

The Fredericksburg Line Train Stops Here

Our stations are easy to find. Look for roadside directional signs. Call these numbers for information on local transit connections to stations: In Fairfax, Arlington, Alexandria and the District of Columbia: 1-800-745-RIDE (TTY 800-833-3232) In Prince William, Manassas and Manassas Park: 703-490-4422 (TTY 800-828-1120) In Stafford, Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania: 703-373-2890 (TTY 800-828-1120)

Lorton

Fredericksburg P reserve texts of the second second

Leeland Road 225 Letand Rd, Falmouth Ameninies: Ticket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, pay phones. Parking: 300 free spaces. For parking information, please call (540) 659-8668.

Franconia/Springfield FT ant-offild/Spring reco 6800 Fronte Dr., Springfield Amenities: Ticket vending machinet (no cash), pay phones, waiting concourse, newspaper racks. Parking, 200 spaces. Metrovail access. Bile Line Local transf convercions. Metroka. 18R, 18S, Fairlas Cornector 109, 110, 111, 202, 204, 301, 303, 304, 305, 111.6, 407

311 4 401 For parking information, please call (703) 324-11(0.

8990 Potomac Bend Blvd., Lorton Amenities: Ticket vending machines (no cash) newspaper racks, bicycle racks, pay phones Parking: 200 spaces For parking information, please call (703) 324-1100.

Alexandria 110 Callahan Dr., Alexandria 110 Calinhan Dr., Alexandria Amenitis: Tricket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, pay phones. Trickets available for cash from Amtrak agents. Parking: None. Metrocal access: King Street Station (Yellow & Blue Lines). Local Insent compositions: TA&U. Local transit connections: DASH, Metrobus, Fairfax Connector.

Crystal City 1503 South Crystal Dr., Arlington Amenius: Ticket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, pay phones. Parking: None Metrorail access: Crystal City Station (Yellow & Blue Lines) Local transit conner sons: Metrobus & Arlington Trolley.

L'Enfant L. CHIERRY oth & Th SL at C SL S. W., Washington Amenities: Ticket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, pay phones. Parking: None Metrorail access: L'Enfant Plaza Station (Yellow, Blue, Consea & Conse Lines).

Blue, Crange & Green Lines). Local transit connection: Metrobus

Union Station

60 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. Washington Amenities: Ticket vending machines, pay phones waiting concourse, retail stores. Tickets available for cash from Amtrak agents Metrorail Access: Union Station (Red Line) Connections to Amtrak, MARC Local transit connection: Metrobus For parking information, please call (202) 898-1221.

















Quantico

Signalinoco ave., Ouantico Amenities Ticket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, bicycle rack, pay phones. Parking: 150 apaors For parking information, please call (705) 792-6820.

15511 Farm Creek Dr., Woodbridge Amenities: Ticket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, pay phones. Parking: 300 spaces. Local transit connection: OmniLink to Dale City, Route 1 and Montclair For parking information, please call (703) 792-5820.



1040 Express Way, Woodbridge Amenities Ticket vending machines (no cash). newspaper racks, pay phones. Curtiside vendor. Parking: 588 spaces Local transit connection: Omnil ink to Lake Ridge. For parking information, please call (703) 792-6820









The Manassas Line Train Stops Here

Our stations are easy to find. Look for roadside directional signs. Call these numbers for information on local transit connections to stations: In Fairfax, Arlington, Alexandria and the District of Columbia: 1-800-745-RIDE (TTY 1-800-833-3 In Prince William, Manassas and Marassas Park: 703-490-4422 (TTY 1-800-828-1120) In Stafford, Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania: 703-373-2890 (TTY 1-800-828-1120)



Broad Run/Airport 10637 Piper Lane, Manassas Amenities: Ticket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, bicycle racks, pay phones. Curbside vendor Parking: 300 spaces. For parking information, please call (703) 792-6820.









Manassas Park

pay phones.

Parking: 300 spaces.

(703) 335-8820.

9300 Manassas Dr., Manassas Park

Amenities: Ticket vending machines

For parking information, please call

(no cash), newspaper racks, bicycle racks,

(no cash), newspaper racks, bicycle racks, Local transit connection: Metrobus. For parking information, please call



(703) 324-1100.

Rolling Road 9016 Burke Rd., Burke Amenities: Ticket vending machines (ao cash), newspaper racks, bicycle racks, pay phones. Parking: 400 spaces. Local transit connection: Metrobus. For parking information, please call (703) 324-1100.

Backlick Road 6900 Hechinger Dr., Springfield Amenities: Ticket vending machines (no cash), newspaper racks, bicycle racks, pay phones. Parking: 220 spaces. Local transit connections: Fairfax

Connector, Metrobus.

(703) 324-1100.





Crystal City 1503 South Crystal Dr., Arlington Amenities: Ticket vending maching (no cash), newspaper racks, puy phones. No curbside vendor. Parking: None. Metrorail access: Crystal City Station (Yellow & Blue Lines). Local transit connections: Arlington

L'Enfant

Trolley, Metrobus.

6th & 7th St. at C Street S.W., Washington Amenities: Ticket vending machines (no cash), pay phones. No curbside vendor. Parking: None Metrorail access: L'Enfant Plaza Station (Yellow, Blue, Orange & Green Lines). Local transit connection: Metrobus.

Union Station

60 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Washington Amenities: Ticket vending machines, pay phones, waiting concourse, retail stores. Tickets available for cash from Amtrak agents. Metrorail Access: Union Station (Red Line). Connections to: Amtrak, MARC. Local transit connection: Metrobus For parking information, please call (202) 898-1221.



232)	Line Fares	5	Union Station. L'Enfant	Crystal City, Alexandria	Backlick Rd.	
	Zone 6	Single-Ride	\$5.55	\$5.15	\$3.20	
H	Broad Run, Manassas,	Ten-Trip	\$47.05	\$43.70	\$27.15	
	Manassas Pk.	Monthly	\$162,60	\$151.15	\$93.80	
	Zone 5	Single-Ride	\$5.15	\$4.75	\$2.80	
	Western Fairfax (Future)	Ten-Trip	\$43.70	\$40.40	\$23.80	
(i)		Monthly	\$151.15	\$139.65	\$82.35	ĺ
	Zone 4	Single-Ride	\$4.75	\$4.40	\$2.45	ĺ
	Burks Centre, Rolling Rd.	Ten-Trip	\$39.55	\$36.30	\$20.50	
		Month,	\$136.75	\$125.55	\$70.85	
	Zone 3	Single-Ride	\$4.40	\$4.00		1
- 3 11	Duriter Or	Ten Trin	1 25 30	833 10		

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Ten-Trip

Single

Ten-Trip

Month

Zone 1

Zone 2

Manassas

Zone 2

Zone 1

Alexandria, Crystal City

L'Enfant, Union Station

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	Burke Centre
	Backlick Road
	Crystal City (D)
	Union Station
	Southbound
	i le na #
	Fragency:
	-
	LERINA
	Alexandria
	Rolling Road

00	33.13	34./3	32.00	96.90
	\$43.70	\$40.40	\$23.80	\$20.50
	\$151.15	\$139.65	\$82.35	\$70.85
de	\$4.75	\$4.40	\$2.45	\$2.05
	\$39.55	\$36.30	\$20.50	\$16.95
	\$136.75	\$125.55	\$70.85	\$58.55
de	\$4.40	\$4.00		0.000
2.20	\$36.30	\$33.10		
	\$125.55	\$114.40		
de	\$4.00	\$3.60		
	\$33.10	\$29.85		
-	\$114.40	\$103.20		
ide	\$3.60			
	\$29.85			
	\$103.20			
	Manass	as Line Sci	hedule	

Zone 3

Zone 4

Rolling Rd.

Burke Centre

\$2.80

\$23.80

\$82.35

Zone 5

Western

Fairtax

(Future)

\$2.45

\$20.50

\$70.85

Zone 8

Annussas Pk.

Broad Run

\$2.05

\$17.20

\$59.40



Indicates Amerak main, accepting VIEE Teo-Trip and Monthly tick-m uply. No Single-Rade Tickem 9) = Stops to discharge passengers, this may know shead of schedule when station work is completed Trains will only stop at stations where a time is indicated. Effective September 6, 1997.

VRE Ridership Trends by System and Line

	Т	otal Ridershi	ip	Fredericksburg L	ine	Ν	Aanassas Line	
FY93	Jun-92	1,576	FY93	Jun-92	0	1,576	Jun-92	1,576
	Jul-92	3,668		Jul-92	1,955	3,668	Jul-92	1,713
	Aug-92	4,323		Aug-92	2,368	4,323	Aug-92	1,955
	Sep-92	4,929		Sep-92	2,750	4,929	Sep-92	2,179
	Oct-92	5,526		Oct-92	3,071	5,526	Oct-92	2,455
	Nov-92	5,857		Nov-92	3,263	5,857	Nov-92	2,594
	Dec-92	5,514		Dec-92	3,066	5,514	Dec-92	2,448
	Jan-93	6,243		Jan-93	3,622	6,243	Jan-93	2,621
	Feb-93	6,535		Feb-93	3,740	6,535	Feb-93	2,795
	Mar-93	6,476		Mar-93	3,684	6,476	Mar-93	2,791
	Apr-93	6,478		Apr-93	3,627	6,478	Apr-93	2,851
	May-93	6,487		May-93	3,721	6,487	May-93	2,766
	Jun-93	6,673		Jun-93	3,772	6,673	Jun-93	2,901
FY94	Jul-93	6,549	FY94	Jul-93	3.749	6,550	Jul-93	2,801
	Aug-93	6,638		Aug-93	3,873	6,638	Aug-93	2,765
	Sep-93	6,876		Sep-93	4,024	6,876	Sep-93	2,852
	Oct-93	7,092		Oct-93	4,088	7,092	Oct-93	3,004
	Nov-93	7,220		Nov-93	4,170	7,219	Nov-93	3,049
	Dec-93	6,495		Dec-93	3,762	6,495	Dec-93	2,734
	Jan-94	7,344		Jan-94	4,153	7,344	Jan-94	3,191
	Feb-94	7,568		Feb-94	4,296	7,568	Feb-94	3,272
	Mar-94	7,900		Mar-94	4,605	7,900	Mar-94	3,295
	Apr-94	7,206		Apr-94	4,226	7,206	Apr-94	2,980
	May-94	7,449		May-94	4,356	7,449	May-94	3,093
	Jun-94	7,559		Jun-94	4,328	7,559	Jun-94	3,231
FY95	Jul-94	7,380	FY95	Jul-94	4,254	7,380	Jul-94	3,126
	Aug-94	7,226		Aug-94	4,252	7,226	Aug-94	2,974
	Sep-94	7,327		Sep-94	4,243	7,327	Sep-94	3,084
	Oct-94	7,506		Oct-94	4,306	7,506	Oct-94	3,200
	Nov-94	7,860		Nov-94	4,500	7,860	Nov-94	3,360
	Dec-94	6,573		Dec-94	3,762	6,573	Dec-94	2,811
	Jan-95	7,557		Jan-95	4,326	7,557	Jan-95	3,231
	Feb-95	7,336		Feb-95	4,219	7,336	Feb-95	3,117
	Mar-95	7,254		Mar-95	4,239	7,254	Mar-95	3,015
	Apr-95	7,193		Apr-95	4,264	7,193	Apr-95	2,929
	May-95	7,424		May-95	4,394	7,425	May-95	3,031
	Jun-95	7,746		Jun-95	4,584	7,746	Jun-95	3,162

FY96	Jul-95	7,851	FY96	Jul-95	4,589	7,851	Jul-95	3,262
	Aug-95	7,678		Aug-95	4,502	7,677	Aug-95	3,175
	Sep-95	7,734		Sep-95	4,470	7,733	Sep-95	3,263
	Oct-95	8,310		Oct-95	4,717	8,309	Oct-95	3,592
	Nov-95	8,014		Nov-95	4,647	8,015	Nov-95	3,368
	Dec-95	6,444		L ec-95	3,970	6,444	Dec-95	2,474
	Jan-96	6,983		Jan-96	3,926	6,983	Jan-96	3,057
	Feb-96	8,110		Feb-96	4,492	8,109	Feb-96	3,617
	Mar-96	8,015		Mar-96	4,519	8,015	Mar-96	3,496
	Apr-96	7,625		Apr-96	4,297	7,625	Apr-96	3,328
	May-96	7,622		May-96	4,302	7,623	May-96	3,321
	Jun-96	7,480		Jun-96	4,165	7,479	Jun-96	3,314
FY97	Jul-96	7,072	FY97	Jul-96	4,019	7,072	Jul-96	3,053
	Aug-96	6,923		Aug-96	3,870	6,923	Aug-96	3,053
	Sep-96	7,367		Sep-96	4,044	7,367	Sep-96	3,323
	Oct-96	7,532		Oct-96	4,255	7,532	Oct-96	3,277
	Nov-96	7,168		Nov-96	3,970	7,169	Nov-96	3,199
	Dec-96	5,800		Dec-96	3,141	5,800	Dec-96	2,659
	Jan-97	7,354		Jan-97	3,934	7,354	Jan-97	3,420
	Feb-97	7,236		Feb-97	3,878	7,236	Feb-97	3,358
	Mar-97	7,142		Mar-97	3,878	7,142	Mar-97	3,264
	Apr-97	7,146		Apr-97	3,861	7,146	Apr-97	3,285
	May-97	7,623		May-97	4,302	7,623	May-97	3,321
	Jun-97	7,480		Jun-97	4,165	7,479	Jun-97	3,314
FY98	Jul-97	5,956	FY98	Jul-97	3,233	5,957	Jul-97	2,724
	Aug-97	4,986		Aug-97	2,700	4,986	Aug-97	2,286
	Sep-97	5,922		Sep-97	3,094	5,923	Sep-97	2,829

Average Annu	al Ridership	By Line					
	System	Fredericksburg	Manassas				
FY93	5,726	3,220	2,506				
FY94	7,158	4,136	3,022				
FY95	7,365	4,279	3,087				
FY96	7,656	4,383	3,272				
FY97	7,154	3,943	3,211				
FY98 (Q1)	5,621	3,009	2,613				



Manassas Line Ridership, June 1992 - September 1997



ATTACHMENT 6

Sheet4 Chart 1



ATTACHMENT 7

Sheet1

Emissions Saved - Base Ridership

Ridership figures f	rom October, 1995	, NOx and VOC	emissions for 1	997							All Figures	are d	ally		
Auto Emissions:	(1) VMT to and	(2) Emissions	(3) VMT to and		(4) Emissions	(5)	(6) Emissions		(7) Emissions		(8) Trips to	,	(9) Emissions	Kilogram	s Tons
General	From Core	x Factor	- from	×	Factor	+ Trips	x Factor for	+	Factor for	+	and From	x	Factor for	= Eliminate	d Eliminated
Formula	Eliminated	(35 mph)	Station		(20 mph)	Eliminated	Cold Starts		Hot Soaks		Stations	1	Hot Soaks	Per Day	Per Day
Project Figures															
Hydocarbons	142,998	C 4 62,347.1	17,809		0.8 14,389.9	677	2.330		1.9 2.849.1		3,305		1.88 6,209.96	57.0	2 0.06
Carbon Monoxide	142,998	3.4 491,055.0	17,809		7.1 126.516.8	677	20.891		0.0 14,141.4		3,305		0.00 0.00	378.6	8 0.42
Nitrogen Oxide	142,998	1.4 198,767.2	17,809		1.4 24,469.9	677	1.604		0.0 1,085.8		3,305		0.00	174.3	0 0.19
Volatile Organic									and a		S INC.				
Compounds	142,998	0.5 73,787.0	17,809		0.9	677	2.856		1.066		3,305		1.07 3,523.05	64.0	2 0.07
Note: emissions	factors in grams pe	er dav.				(1)			(3)		Added			(5)	(8)
	Estimated Riders	Miles to and	Total Daily	%		VMT	Miles to and		VMT to		Trips to	F	Percent not	Trips	Actual Addec
Station	Previously Driving	From Core	Pass. Miles	Elim.		Eliminated	From Station	1	and From Station		and From Stations		Driving to Stations	Eliminate From Add	d Trips To and ed From Stations
Broad Run/Airpor	133	74.0	9.808	100%		9,808	8		883.6		265		0.17	45.0	6 220.02
Manassas	234	70.0	16,351	100%		16,351	8		1,557.3		467		0.17	79.4	2 387.76
Manassas Park	110	64.0	7,039	100%		7.039	8		733.2		220		0.17	37.3	9 182.57
Burke Centre	193	47.0	9,057	100%		9,057	8		1,284.7		385		0.17	65.5	2 319.88
Rolling Road	138	39.0	5,371	100%		5,371	8		918.1		275		0.17	46.8	2 228.60
Backlick Road	50	27.0	1,358	100%		1 358	8	È	335.3		101		0.17	17.1	0 83.48
Fredericksburg	270	116.0	31,349	100%		31,349	12.8		2,882.7		541		0.17	91.8	9 448.62
Leeland Road	157	108.0	16,954	100%		16.954	12.8		1,674.5		314		0.17	53.3	7 260.59
Brooke	123	101.0	12,390	100%		12,390	12.8		1,308.5		245		0.17	41.7	1 203.63
Quantico	159	73.0	11,597	100%		11,597	12.8		1,694.5		318		0.7	54.0	1 263.71
Rippon	185	55.0	10,185	100%		10,185	12.8		1,975.3		370		0.17	62.9	6 307.40
Lorton	46	44.0	2,006	100%		2,006	12.8	1	486.3		91		0.17	15.5	0 75.68
Woodbridge	195	49.0	9,534	100%		9,534	12.8		2,075.5		389		0.17	66.1	6 323.00
TOTALS	1,991	867.0	142.998			142,998			17,809.2		3,982			676.9	1 3,304.93

Assumptions: Highway Miles average 35 mph. Cold Starts average 25 mph Estimated Riders Preiously Driving = 47% of total ridership Occupancy rates accessing stations = 1.2 people per vehicle

September 8, 1994 Draft Northern Virginia Transportation Commission ATTACHMENT 8

Verification

I, Stephen A. MacIsaac, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Further, I certify that I am qualified and authorized to file this Verified Statement.

STEPHEN A. MacISAAC Acting Executive Director, PRTC

Dated: October 20, 1997

Verification

I, Richard K. Taube, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Further, I certify that I am qualified and authorized to file this Verified Statement.

Richard K. Taube Executive Director of NVTC

Dated: October 20, 1997

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Verified Statement

of

Stephen T. Roberts

My name is Stephen T. Roberts and I am the Director of Operations for Virginia Railway Express ("VRE"). In this capacity, I am responsible for mair..aining VRE's operations at the highest possible standards to deliver safe, reliable and on-time service to our customers. My duties include coordinating VRE's commuter rail service with the operations of each of its rail partners, most notably NS and CSX. I have been Director of Operations since 1993, prior to which I served as Director of Project Development for the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission. In that position, I was closely involved with the development of VRE from its inception.

A. Introduction

VRE provides commuter rail service on two routes linking Northern Virginia with Washington, D.C. Service is provided over the rail lines of four railroad partners. VRE operates over the lines of Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("NSR") between Manassas and Alexandria, Virginia, and over CSXT Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT") between Fredericksburg, Virginia and Alexandria. From Alexandria north to Washington, D.C., VRE uses a combination of CSXT, Conrail and National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") lines. VRE operations over these lines are governed by separate operating agreements with each of its rail partners. Amtrak operates the commuter service for VRE pursuant to a service agreement between the parties.

VRE plays an important role in helping to meet the transportation needs of Northern Virginia and Washington, D.C. residents. As Director of Operations I am very familiar with VRE's weekday commuter rail operation and the service problems it encounters on the lines over which it operates. Despite diligent efforts to work with our rail partners to improve VRE's commuter operations, current service is simply not meeting the demands or expectations of VRE or its customers.

B. Impact of Freight Operations on VRE Operations

Significantly, both CSX and NS have indicated in their proposed Operating Plans that the post-acquisition era will see substantial increases in freight train operations on the rail lines over which VRE provides service. Hence, I am particularly concerned about the impact of this increase on VRE operations and its potential for further deterioration of our commuter rail service.

In its Operating Plan, NS has indicated that after the acquisition it will operate approximately two more freight trains per day on the line between Manassas and Alexandria. Even assuming that this projection is not understated, it represents a 23 percent increase in freight train operations over the line shared with VRE. VRE is very concerned about the impact this 23 percent increase will have on its current operation of fourteen commuter trains per weekday on the Manassas line.

The Operating Plan of CSX indicates that even greater increases in freight train traffic will occur in its new Atlantic Coast Service Lane, which includes the CSX lines on which VRE operates. CSX states that after the acquisition it will operate seven more freight trains per day in the Fredericksburg to Alexandria (Potomac Yard) corridor. This represents a 43 percent increase in freight train operations over this 49-mile commuter rail corridor. From Alexandria north to Washington, D.C., the post-acquisition increase in freight operations is even more dramatic. In this six mile corridor over which <u>all</u> VRE service must operate, CSX anticipates operating eleven more freight trains per day, 61 percent more than the pre-acquisition level. Such dramatic increases in freight train operations will undoubtedly affect VRE's service.

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Historically, CSX has not been responsive to problems that arise in the joint operations over the line. Oftentimes, VRE has not been successful in getting CSX to the table to discuss, let alone resolve, many important issues. The post-acquisition increases in freight service as proposed by CSX will only serve to magnify the problems of VRE and further regress a commuter operation that is already in need of significant improvement.

In particular, delays occasioned by CSX accidents and resulting repairs have severely impacted VRE's operations and ridership. For example, a CSX freight derailment in early July of this year and necessary repairs resulted in delays that in turn caused an approximate 25 percent decrease in VRE ridership over the ensuing two-month period. VRE's on-time performance dropped to less than 40 percent (for July 1997), with a year-to-date (January-August) actual on-time performance of only 83 percent. In fact, during the July-early August time period, <u>VRE had the worst on-time performance record of any commuter rail system in the U.S. and Canada</u>. VRE lost \$300,000 in revenue because of these delays. Yet CSX's formal response to VRE's concerns over this severe impact was to agree to "give VRE the opportunity to tell us [CSX] why we should not invoke the termination provisions" and terminate VRE's services <u>entirely</u> in the event of an accident or during periods of heavy maintenance. Attachment 1 (Letter from R.H. Young to Stephen T. Roberts, Sept. 3, 1997).

Delays to VRE passenger service as a result of freight train problems are routine occurrences on the CSX/VRE lines. Data assembled by VRE demonstrates that for the period July 1995 through August 1997 (which corresponds to VRE's 1996 and 1997 fiscal years, plus the first two months of fiscal year 1998), VRE's actual on-time performance averaged only 85.9 percent. Attachment 2. In the commuter operations industry, this is well below acceptable on-time performance. By way of contrast, METRA, which serves the Chicago metropolitan area and is a well-regarded commuter

-3-

operation, has an on-time performance consistently averaging in the 94-98 percent range. Attachment 3.

Much of the delay to VRE operations has been the result of freight-related problems, including numerous line-related malfunctions and maintenance-related problems. In particular, VRE trains on many occasions have been substantially delayed because of various CSX freight train-related problems, including, among others, signal failures, failure to clear outlawed freights, slow freight train clearing, delayed receipt of proper bulletin documents from CSX dispatching, defect detector malfunctions, various freight train malfunctions, broken rails and other track problems, delayed receipt of CSXT dispatcher orders, and inability to contact CSX foremen. In fact, for the period May 1996 througl. August 1997, VRE delays attributable only to CSX freight derailments, interference from CSX trains, or CSX switch and signal failures (i.e., not counting other CSX-related delays) amounted to <u>43.6 percent</u> of all VRE delays. (The comparable figure for NS was 8.5 percent.) Attachment 4.

These service problems experienced by ``RE on the CSX lines are not a recent phenomenon, but are long-standing deficiencies and appear to be rooted in the inability or refusal of CSX to earnestly join in partnership with VRE to provide the reliable, on-time commuter rail service that riders expect and deserve. For its part, VRE provides professional crews and station, storage and maintenance facilities necessary to operate the service. In addition, VRE has provided \$70 million in passenger equipment, \$30 million in completed or planned facility improvements, and \$2.3 million in annual payments to CSX covering access fees and specific improvements in dispatching and communication services.

The service problems on the CSX lines are most evident in two critical areas: (1) CSX's poor management and supervision of tl.e rail lines; and (2) its failure to properly coordinate

-4-

operations and communicate with VRE officials. In addition, as described in some of the examples set forth below, these shortcomings appear to have contributed to a deterioration in the physical plant below the standards required for a first-class commuter rail operation.

1. Inadequate Management/Supervision on the Rail Corridor

Currently, there is no senior management supervision located on the line of railroad between Fredericksburg and Alexandria, Virginia. This section of railroad is currently the responsibility of the operating Superintendent in Baltimore, Maryland. It is now part of CSX's Baltimore Service Lane, but for the last three years responsibility for the territory has flip-flopped between the Division Superintendents in Baltimore and Florence, South Carolina. This has created inconsistencies in how the line is managed and has contributed to the difficulties in making people accountable for performance on the line. If the proposed acquisition is approved, this territory will undergo yet another change in management to the newly established Atlantic Coast Service Lane.

Furthermore, because it generates little on-line freight business, this corridor is essentially an "orphan" with no on-site managers. The nearest transportation supervisor is a trainmaster located in Richmond, Virginia, sixty miles south of Fredericksburg. This lack of local supervision creates

For example, on June 26, 1997, heavy thunderstorms caused a signal failure on the line between Dalghren Junction and Quantico, Virginia. CSX had no alternate plan in place to operate the line unsignalled. With no local operating supervisors on the line to investigate and handle the matter, CSX dispatchers in Jacksonville, Florida were left to resolve the problem. VRE was advised that it would take two days to implement a track warrant system to enable train operations on the line. Fortunately, the signal problem was rectified in quicker fashion, but five VRE trains were delayed up to 2 hours, 21 minutes that evening.

- 5 -

The shortcomings of CSX's management of the line were no better demonstrated than by actions taken to rectify service problems caused by a major derailment on the line at Rosslyn, Virginia on July 7, 1997, which took out the signal system. In response to these problems, a meeting was held between VRE officials and CSX management on July 17, 1997, at which CSX advised that they were prepared to fix the operational problems caused by the derailment. Their July 24, 1997 "fix" to the problem was simply to create an absolute block in a three-mile section of track within the Alexandria to Washington, D.C. corridor. Allowing only one train into the block at any one time turned this already congested traffic lane into an absolute nightmare. Individual VRE trains were delayed up to 60 minutes, and VRE was forced to cancel <u>55 percent</u> of its service for over two full weeks while the "fix" was in place and repairs were made to the track and signal systems.

Similarly, the absence of on-site signal and maintenance-of-way supervisors contributes significantly to unnecessary delay of VRE trains. During the past year, in the face of mounting signal problems in the Fredericksburg to Alexandria corridor, CSX reduced the number of signal maintainers on the line from three to two and expanded the territory of the assigned Signal Supervisor to include a heavily trafficked coal line from Richmond to Newport News, Virginia. Signal and defect detector system failures continued to occur, however. Excluding the July 8, 1997 derailment and the resulting 55 percent reduction in VRE operations, in the period from June 17 to August 11, 1997, there were <u>seven</u> separate instances of signal or defect detector failure in the corridor affecting <u>nineteen</u> separate trains. Delay on these trains ranged from ten minutes to in excess of two hours.

I would also point out an additional recent example of CSX management's often indifferent attitude toward VRE operations. Over a year ago, VRE requested and agreed to pay for installation

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of a crossover south of its Woodbridge, Virginia station which would avoid various train delays. Despite more than ample time, that crossover still has not been installed and likely will not be completed until mid-1998 or later.

2. Lack of Coordinated Operations and Communications

CSX dispatchers in Jacksonville control all train movements in the Fredericksburg to Alexandria corridor. VRE trains are frequently delayed because CSX dispatchers do not timely send daily operating bulletins to VRE. These bulletins indicate special operating conditions and are required before train movements are allowed to proceed. For instance, in at least one recent case, on August 6, 1997, a CSX dispatcher in Jacksonville deliberately delayed an evening VRE train 25 minutes beyond its scheduled departure time from Fredericksburg in order to allow a local freight train access to the main line. Such unnecessary delays can be directly attributable to the dispatchers' unfamiliarity with the territory in the shared corridor. VRE has tried to address that issue, but to no avail. In each of the last four years, VRE has offered to fund training trips for CSX dispatchers over the VRE-served territory. CSX, however, has sent only two dispatchers (out of approximately eight) to train on the corridor.

Problems relating to CSX transportation personnel also extend to CSX's maintenance-ofway forces. During the maintenance season, CSX gives little or no regard to the operating schedule of VRE. Again citing some recent examples, during the period from June 26 to August 6, 1997, there were ten separate instances of CSX trains interfering with and delaying 34 VRE commuter trains for as much as two hours. Many of these delays involved work trains that failed to timely clear the corridor or freight trains that were not timely moved after their crews' work time expired under the Hours of Service Act, thereby blocking the movement of VRE commuter trains. Work trains dumping ballast or spreading ties are often allowed to interfere with VRE operations.

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I have read CSX's responses to the Commissions' discovery requests in which CSX was asked how it plans to avoid further delays to VRE trains resulting from various freight-related clearance projects CSX is planning to make on the Fredericksburg to Washington une. CSX responded that it plans to impose curfews on its work crews so that they would not interfere with VRE trains. In fact, such curfews have been ineffective in the past. On numerous occasions work crews supposedly operating in curfew windows have caused substantial delays to VRE trains by failing, for example, to be off the line when VRE trains were scheduled to begin running.

Equally troublesome is VRE's inability to communicate with CSX maintenance forces when they are out on the line performing work. For example, on at least five occasions during July and August of 1997, VRE trains were delayed at various locations simply because they could not make proper contact with the CSX maintenance-of-way foremen whose crews were performing work on the line. Operating rules, as well as safety considerations, require such communications before proceeding with train movement into the work area, and unnecessary delays to VRE service result when the CSX foremen are not reachable by radio or other available means.

Clearly, such commonplace delays to VRE commuter trains disprove CSX's stated commitment to commuter operations and demonstrate its inability or unwillingness to make such a commitment. Should CSXT run 43 to 61% more trains in the corridor as it plans, and given its propensity to ignore the importance of commuter service, VRE operations will most surely worsen unless this Board acts to protect the service.

C. Conclusion

Given the history of freight-related delays VRE has encountered and the damage they have done to VRE's performance and ridership, the substantial increases in freight traffic NS and CSX have projected will have a significant further adverse impact on VRE's operations unless conditions are imposed to protect VRE's service.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a conformed copy of the foregoing Comments and Request for Conditions of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission in Finance Docket No. 33388, by first class mail properly addressed, with postage pre-paid or by more expeditious manner of delivery upon Administrative Law Judge Jacob Leventhal and All Parties of Record on the Service List.

Kevin M. Sheys

Dated: October 21, 1997.

ATTACHMENT 1

500 Water Street Jacksonwile, PL 32202 (904) 359-1837



R.H. Young, Jr. Anistant Vice President Passenger Services and NRPC Operations Officer

> September 3, 1997 File: VRE

Mr. Stephen T. Roberts Director of Operations Virginia Railway Express 6800 Versar Center, Suite 247 Springfield, Virginia 22151-4147

Dear Mr. Roberts:

VRE has expressed dissatisfaction with the level of service provided by CSXT during the period when capacity of the RF&P Subdivision was severely limited due to the derailment at RO and the planned heavy maintenance work. We regret the service we were able to provide was unacceptable. Our operating agreement provides for service termination during Force integrate events and periods of heavy maintenance. I propose a meeting to address specifically these recent events as they relate to the operating agreement. In light of the unsatisfactory experiences, we would give VRE the opportunity to tell us why we should not invoke the termination provisions in the operating agreement when these types of events occur and reestablishing the service only when track capacity is restored.

Your letter of July 31, 1997, raised several contract issues of concern to VRE. This meeting would be an opportunity to express your concerns. I proposed this meeting for 10:00 a.m., September 24, 1997, in Jacksonville, Florida, at the CSXT General Office Building at 500 Water Street. We can adjust the starting time to accommodate flight schedules.

Sincerely R. H. Young

cy: Mr. P. H. Reistrup Mr. R. W. Shinn Mr. A. B. Aftoora

ATTACHMENT 2

VRE On-Time Performance

FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998
%	%	%
83.3	80.8	39.9
90.0	90.0	77.9
90.9	88.3	
91.6	91.8	
92.2	89.9	
91.2	94.1	
86.3	89.6	-
82.5	93.3	-
84.9	88.1	-
89.5	89.1	-
83.4	95.8	-
68.7	91.4	
86.2	90.1	58.9
	FY 1996 % 83.3 90.0 90.9 91.6 92.2 91.2 86.3 82.5 84.9 89.5 83.4 68.7 86.2	FY 1996 FY 1997 % % 83.3 80.8 90.0 90.0 90.9 88.3 91.6 91.8 92.2 89.9 91.2 94.1 86.3 89.6 82.5 93.3 84.9 88.1 89.5 89.1 83.4 95.8 68.7 91.4 86.2 90.1



3 ATTACHMENT

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EXAMPLES OF RECENT CSXT INCIDENTS OF DELAY

- June 25 Five evening trains delayed up to <u>2'21"</u> account signel failure in Quantico to Dalghren Jct. Area. Ballast train in way on #2 and had dumped ballast over defect detector at Brooke showing false defect.
- June 27 NO MAINTAINERS......they all outlawed. Five morning trains were delayed up to 31" due to unresolved signal problems from previous night. Evening train 301 delayed 39" account beliest train failed to clear up.
- July 8 THE WRECK AT Rossiyn.
- July 9 VRE morning tains delayed leaving Fredericksburg account outlawed freights in the way.
- July 10 Five morning trains delayed up to 38" at Fredericksburg account more outlawed freights blocking movement. 1" VRE evening train delayed account CSXT had outlawed freight on Potomac bridge.
- July 15 Night local freight delayed 1" VRE train 17" account slow clearing at Fredericksburg.
- July 17 1" VRE evening train delayed 38" waiting for proper bulletin documents from Jacksonville.
- July 21 Train 310 delayed 80° in am account Q40121 stopped ahead with defect detector malfunction and 90° to inspect train. Five evening trains delayed up to 65° between Quantico and Delghren Jct account unable to contact MW foreman and continuing defect detector malfunctions.
- July 22 Train 309 lost 23" again trying to contact MW foreman.
- July 24 CSXT creates absolute block for three miles......delays up to 50".........VRE forced to cut service by 55%.

ALL FOLLOWING DELAYS WERE TO VRE TRAINS RUNNING AT 45% SERVICE LEVEL

July 28 CSXT hy-rail heat inspection 2 hours late......set on behind 1st VRE evening train. Then derailed at Crystal City. Instead of







VIRGINIA RAILWAY EXPRESS CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - AUG96 TR INTF-CSX(32) 56%

FRA TEST-NS (3) 5%

SG/SWT-CSX (3) 5% SG/SWT-NS (1) 2% MW/SLO-CSX (1) 2% MW/SLO-NS (1) 2% PAX/OTHER (6) 11%

LATE TURNS (2) 3% MECHANICAL (1) 2% BRIDGE STRK.(7) 12%











ON-TIME PERFORMANCE

CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - JAN97





ON-TIME PERFORMANCE

CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - FEB97 (Operated = 494; Delays = 33; On-Time = 461; OTP% = 93.3%)





ON-TIME PERFORMANCE

CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - MAR97

(Operated = 536; Delays = 64; On-Time = 472; OTP% = 88.1%)





CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - APR97

(Operated = 566; Delays = 62; On-Time = 504; OTP% = 89.1%)





CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - MAY97 (Operated = 546; Delays = 23; On-Time = 523; OTP% = 95.8%)





CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - JUN97

(Operated = 546; Delays = 47; On-Time = 499; OTP% = 91.4%)



ON-TIME PERFORMANCE



CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - JUL97

(Operated = 486; Delays = 292; On-Time = 194; OTP% = 39.9%)



- M/W Slow Orders In Work Areas (21) - Wait For Permission Through Work Area (1) - Work Train Interference (5)

ON-TIME PERFORMANCE



CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - AUG97

(Operated = 440; Delays = 97; On-Time = 343; OTP% = 77.9%)



ON-TIME PERFORMANCS



CAUSE OF DELAYS (# OF TRAINS) - SEP97

(Operated = 546; Delays = 26; On-Time = 520; OTP% = 95.4%)



clearing main, CSXT decided to block BOTH main lines to rerail pick-up with boom truck. VRE suffered delays up to 1'30".

- July 29 Two VRE evening trains delayed up to 25" account unable to contact CSXT foreman, and following CSXT freight at 30 mph account rear end telemetry inoperative.
- July 31 Track kinked near Lectand account disturbed by tie gang. Freight train saw it and stopped on top ; without derailing. All VRE trains had to operate wrong main and delayed up to 45".
- August 1 VRE morning trains delayed up to 30" account tie gang occupied BOTH mains north of Dahlgren Jct and failed to clear on time.
- August 4 VRE morning trains delayed up to 35" account outlawed CSXT freight occupying track 2 at SRO. Was there for several hours.
- August 5 VRE evening trains were delayed up to TWO HOURS account work train distributing ties cleared up 30" late; then track circuit stayed on and was later found to be damage to electric lock on switch from tie gang. All maintainers were working at RO. Dispatcher contributed to this by requiring 302 to operate at "restricted speed" for 19 miles when other main line was clear.
- August 6 VRE 304 delayed 25" at Fredericksburg while dispatcher ran "night local" CSXT freight from Quantico to Dahlgren Jct.
- August 10 Signals at RO restored to service.
- August 11 304 delayed 15" by defect detector malfunction at Brooke. 309 delayed 10" attempting to contact MW foreman.
- August 12 323 delayed 15" at RO waiting for CSXT dispatcher to issue new slow orders.
- August 13 302 delayed 16" attempting to contact foreman Ogle.

AUG 97 Delays

	MINUTES			
DATE	TRAIN	LATE	RR	REASON FOR DELAY
8/1/97	300	42	CSX	33" DAHJCT FOR TRACK FOR TO CLEAR 3 TRACK 8" CSX S/O, 7" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
8/1/97	304	40	CSX	12" CSX S/O, 5" PAX, 1" R/T, 13" RAVENSWORTH WAIT ON 67 TO CLEAR 3 TRACK, 11" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
8/1/97	308	14	CSX	8" CSX S/O, 6" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
8/1/97	301	39	CSX	4" BY SRO-RO, 13" RAVENSWORTH FOR HEAT INSPECTION, 28" HAND THROW SWITCHES AT DAHJCT
8/1/97	303	42	CSX	8" BY SRO-RO, 2" SIO, 6" SIGNALS 94 3, 26" DAHJCT HANDTHROW SWITCH
8/1/97	309	30	CSX	7" BY SRO-RO, 10" FOLLOWING Q40531, 14" DAHJCT FOR Q405, Q40631, Q41231, PO66 AHEAD
8/4/97	300	20	CSX	28" PY-WAS DUE TO SIGNAL PROBLEMS, 7" CSX S/O
8/4/97	304	35	CSX	13" SRO-WAS FOLLOWING 84, 10" BACKUP AF TO X OVER, 7" CSX S/O, 4" R/T
B/4/97	308	13	CSX	8" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 5" CSX S/O, 4" FBG FOR 84
8/4/97	324	20	CSX	24" SRO-WAS SIGNAL PROBLEMS, 2" PAX, 1" R/T
8/4/97	328	27	CSX	22" S/S SEMINARY FOR 67 AND 304 AHEAD, 15" SRO-WAS FOLLOWING 304
8/4/97	330	21	CSX	14" S/S AF FOLLOWING 84, 4" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 4" PAX
8/4/97	301	31	CSX	32 WDG DUE TO CSX INSPECTION AT FEATHERSTONE, 3" CSX S/O, 2" PAX, 1" R/T
8/4/97	303	7	CSX	5" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 8" CSX S/O, 2" PAX, 1" R/T
8/4/97	309	8	CSX	5" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 5" CSX S/O
8/5/97	300	27	CSX	1" PAX, 20" CSX A/C WORK AREA, 6" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/5/97	304	30	CSX	23" CSX S/O A/C WORK AREA, 1" PAX, K6" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/5/97	308	22	CSX	4" FBG FOLLOWING PO84, 7" CSX S/O, 3" PAX, 8" REST SPPED SRO-CPVA
8/5/97	301	120	CSX	5" BY SRO-RO, 115" HELD QAN FOR Q2105(WORK TRAIN LATE) AND REST SPEED QAN-DAHJCT SIGNALS DOWN
8/5/97	303	49	CSX	5" BY SRO-RO, 45" FOR Q175 AHEAD-RAN 3 TRACK FROM QAN TO DAHJCT
8/5/97	305	15	CSX	5" K-TOWER, 4" BY SRO-RO, 7" SIGNAL 71.2, 4" S/O
8/5/97	325	16	CSX	13" S/S VIRGINAI AVE FOR PO90, 6" BY SRO-RO
8/5/97	327	12	CSX	10" BY SRO-RO, 1" PAX, 1" R/T
8/5/97	324	12	CSX	9" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 1" PAX, 1" R/T, 2" S/S AF FOR 300
8/5/97	328	22	CSX	3" PAX, 13" S/S AF FOR 304
8/6/97	300	24	CSX	21" CSX S/O A/C WORK AREA, 6" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/6/97	324	10	CSX	1" PAX, 1" R/T, 13" REST SPEED & FOLLOWING 300 ALEX-WAS
8/6/97	304	43	CSX	24" S/S DAHJCT A/C D792, 1"R/T, 7" CSX S/O, 2" PAX, 3" XOVER AF, 10" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/6/97	330	13	CSX	8" HC PAX, 6" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/6/97	308	16	CSX	6" FOLLOWING PO84 FBG-QAN, 6" CSX S/O, 5" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/6/97	301	12	CSX	10" BY SRO-RO, 6" UNLOAD PAX FROM 3 TRACK
8/6/97	303	11	CSX	6" BY SRO-RO, 8" UNLOAD FROM 3 TRACK
8/6/97	309	49	CSX	6" BY SRO-RO, 14" SIS DAHJCT FOR K41205 & K65005 AHEAD, 31 S/S QAN FOR 66 & DO2106 AHEAD
8/6/97	331	11	CSX	3" BY SRO-RO, 10" CAB SIGNAL PROBLEM, 4" HC PAX
8/7/97	300	20	CSX	6" FOLLOWING Q174 FBG-LLR, 5" PAX A/C WORKING FROM 3 TRACK, 1" CSX S/O, 10" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/7/97	304	31	CSX	2" R/T, 14" CSX S/O, 8" INCORRECT CAB SIGNAL PY, 7" REST SPEED SRO-RO
8/7/97	308	25	CSX	1" PAX, 12" SIGNAL FOLLOWING POB4 FBG-BKV, 10" CSX S/O, " REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/7/97	301	13	CSX	4" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 13" CSX S/O, 4" S/S AF FOR FREIGHT
8/7/97	303	17	CSX	p" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 11" CSX S/O, 1" R/T
8/7/97	331	10	CSX	18" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 3" R/T
8/7/97	309	10	CSX	p" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 13" CSX S/O, 2" R/T
8/8/97	300	19	CSX	D° CSX S/O, 6° PAX WORKING FROM 3 TRACK, 8° REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/8/97	304	28	CSX	21° CSX S/O, 1° PAX, 11° REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/8/97	308	21	CSX	4" FOLLOWING PO84, 11" CSX S/O, 8" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/8/97	330	15	CSX	A" H/C PAX, 2" PAX, 10" REST SPEED SRO-CPVA
8/8/97	301	13	CSX	3" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 2" AF FOR Q176, 12" CSX S/O

8/8/97	327	17 NS	11" S/S CR TOWER, 3" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 4" H/C PAX
8/8/97	303	BICSX	13" CSX 5/0, 4" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S
8/8/97	309	16 CSX	7" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 13" CSX S/O
8/11/97	300	7 CSX	13" CSX S/O, 3" H/C PAX
8/11/97	304	35 CSX	3" DP FBG CREW BREIFING, 12" SIG ALX-LEF APP, 12" S/O, 10" PO84 CHECKING TRAIN
8/11/97	308	9 CSX	12° S/O
8/11/97	301	9 CSX	15" CSX S/O
8/11/97	303	35 CSX	21" QAN-FBG FOLOWING E967,Q409 PO91,PO53; 7" CSX S/O, 3" RAVENSWORTH COPY NEW S/O
8/11/97	331	11 CSX	8" NALX WAIT ON 93 TO COPY NEW ORDERS, 3" PAX
8/11/97	309	30 CSX	3" ALX FOR NEW ORDERS, 16" CSX S/O, 12" DAHJCT FOR MOFW TO CLEAR
8/12/97	324	7 CSX	10" FOR 300 AHEAD, 3" RST 316 SRO & RO
8/12/97	300	23 CSX	3" FOLLOWING 174, 3" WOKING 3 TRACK LLR/BVK/QAN, 23" S/O 2" APP RO
8/12/97	302	27 CSX	9" LAODING FROM 3 TRACK, 23" S/O
B/12/97	304	19 CSX	1" PAX, 13" 3 TRACK LLR/BRK/QAN, 2" R/T, 4" APP RO
8/12/97	308	11 CSX	16° S/O
8/12/97	330	10 CSX	2" PAX 12" FOLLOWING 84
8/12/97	323	15 CSX	15" S/S RO FOR NEW SLOW ORDERS
B/12/97	301	31 CSX	6" S/S RO FRO NEW SLOW ORDERS, 5" CSX S/O, 21" S/R PASSING WORK CREWS
8/12/97	303	52 CSX	6" WAS-ALX FOLLOWING 91, 4" QAN FOR 91, 16" S/R QAN-FBG PASSING WORK CREWS, 176" LLR FOR NEW SLOW ORDRS, 13" DAHJCT FOR 80
8/12/97	305	24 CSX	10" CSX S/O. 14" S/R PASSING WORK CREWS
8/12/97	307	24 CSX	4" CSX S/O, 18" S/R PASSING WORK CREWS, 11" DAHJCT FOR NEW SLOW ORDERS
8/12/97	309	13 CSX	3" CSX S/O, 13" S/S BROOKE FOR PROTECTION ON 2 TRACK-OPERATED ON 3 TRACK
8/13/97	302	14 CSX	3" S/O 3 TRACK LLR/BRK/QAN, 16" TO CONTACT OGLE 71.0
8/13/97	304	10 CSX	5" 3 TRACK LLR/BRK/QAN, 6 " OGLE 71.0, 9" 321 AHEAD
8/13/97	300	14 CSX	3" 3 TRACK LLR/BRK/QAN, 13" S/O
8/13/97	321	15 CSX	15" FOLLOWING 67, 3" RST NAX FOR 67 AHEAD
8/13/97	301	17 CSX	4" CSX S/O, 3" CAB SIGNAL FLIPS, 14" S/R PASSING WORK CREWS
8/13/97	303	34 CSX	23" NPOSPT FOR 80, 18" S/R QAN-DAHJCT PASSING WORK CREWS
8/13/97	305	43 AMT	34" WAS EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS V21-SWAPPED EQUIPMENT, 13" S/T QAN-FBG PASSING WORK CREWS, 2" S/O
8/13/97	307	14 AMT	10" WAS V20 SPEEDOMETER PROBLEMS, 12" S/R QAN-FBG PASSING WORK CREWS
8/13/97	309	9 CSX	9" QAN-FBG S/R PASSING WORK CREWS
B/14/97	300	7 CSX	19" SP REST & WORK ORDER
8/14/97	321	10 CSX	13" DP WAS FOLLOWING 67
8/14/97	301	19 CSX	12" RO TESTING SWITCHES, 5" CSX S/O, 8" S/R QAN-FBG PASSING WORK CREWS
8/14/97	303	16 CSX	6" NALX FOR 91, 2" CSX S/O, 10" S/R QAN-FBG PASSING WORK CREWS
8/14/97	305	19 CSX	3" NPOSPO FOR 80, 7" QAN-FBG S/R PASSING WORK CREWS, 6" DAHJCT FOR Q175
8/14/97	322	13 CSX	1" PAX, 1" R/T, 1" S/G, 11" S/S RO Q143 AHEAD, 1" S/S CPVA
8/14/97	304	7 CSX	12" SP REST 2 TRACK WORK ORDER, 4" R/T
8/14/97	302	24 CSX	12" S/S DAHJCT FOR 98 X-OVER AHEAD, 19" SP REST & WORK ORDER 71.0-79.0
8/14/97	306	7 CSX	16" SR REST & WORK ORDER
8/14/97	308	16 CSX	4" FBG FOR 84 AHEAD, 7" FOLLOWING 84, 12" SP REST
8/15/97	332	8 AMT	13" DP BRV 20 AHEAD, 3" FOLLOWING 20
8/15/97	325	14 CSX	9" S/S RO SWITCH, 9" S/S CR TOWER SIGNAL
8/15/97	301	28 CSX	5" RO SWITCH, 2" CSX S/O, 1" NPOSPT FOR NO5111, 12" S/R PASSING WORK CREWS
8/15/97	303	24 CSX	5" CSX S/O, 10" NPOSPT FOR 90, 15" S/R QAN-FBG PASSING WORK CREWS
8/15/97	329	15 NS	8" S/S CR TOWER FOR SIGNAL PROBLEMS
8/15/97	305	11 CSX	4" CSX S/O, 3" NPOSPT FOR 80, 7" S/R QAN-FBG PASSING WORK CREWS
8/15/97	331	23 CSX	24" AF FOR TOL

8/21/97	323	7 NS	4" APP SRO, 6" GATE AT MAIN MSS
8/22/97	310	9 AMT	2" PAX, 14" FOLLOWING PO98 FBG-QAN
8/29/97	332	9 NS	13" FOLLOWING PO20 BRU-MPK, 4" H/C PAX



JULY 97 Delays

		MINUTES		
DATE	TRAIN	LAIE	RR	IST FOL DWING 0175 PW-DUANTICO 2" PAX
7/2/97	303	10	COA	13 FOLLOWING GEPSON AT RAVENSWORTH 3" PAX. 2" CSX S/O. 1" R/T
7/3/97	301	12	ANAT	IS WATHING ON POST FOR DIESEL 4" PAX. 2" R/T
7/3/97	323	10	CON	15" FOLLOWING PO53 ON 3 TRACK Q176 & PO90 ON 2 TRACK 5" PA' TO 3 TRACK
7/8/97	301	ANIAU	COA	DEPAIL MENT AT RO
7/8/97	307	INA	TOSA	DEFAILMENT AT ALEX DERAILMENT AT RO
7/8/97	221	ANNU	CSX	DEPAR MENT AT RO
7/9/07	333	27	CSX	DURING AT ALEX DERAILMENT AT RO
7/8/07	333	ANNI	CSX	DERAL MENT AT RO
7/0/07	307	21	CSX	18" DERAILMENR AT RO. 6" HAMILTON XOVER TO 3
7/9/97	306	25	CSX	21" DERAILMENT AT RO. 8" HAMILTON XOVER TO 3
7/9/97	310	29	CSX	21" DERAILMENT AT RO. 6" HAMILTON XOVER TO 3, 7" STOP AF
7/9/97	324	14	CSX	17 DERAILMENT AT RO
7/0/07	328	11	CSX	15" DERAILMENT AT RO
7/9/97	330	22	CSX	16" DERAILMENT AT RO, 4" AF FOLLOWING 306
7/9/97	332	39	CSX	38" DERAILMENT AT RO, 3" FOLLOWING 20
7/9/97	309	9	CSX	15" DERAILMENT AT RO
7/9/97	323	24	CSX	27" dERAILMENT AT RO
7/9/97	301	34	CSX	28" DERAILMENT AT RO, 6" PAX
7/9/97	327	61	CSX	64" DERAILMENT AT RO, WAITING FOR PANEL TRAIN
7/9/97	329	48	CSX	54" DERAILMENT AT RO, WAITING FOR PANEL TRAIN
7/9/97	305	66	CSX	54" DERAILMENT AT RO, WAITING FOR PANEL TRAIN, 6" FOLLOWING PO91, 2" PAX
7/9/97	333	48	CSX	48" DERAILMENT AT RO, 1" PAX
7/10/97	324	26	CSX	24" DERAILMENT AT RO, 6" FOLLOWING 3:0
7/10/97	326	23	CSX	19" DERAILMENT AT RO, 4" STOP SEM
7/10/97	328	30	CSX	27" DERAILMENT AT RO, 3" STOP SEM
7/10/97	330	50	CSX	7" DERAILMENT AT RO, 30" STOP SEM-410, 415, 306 AHEAD
7/10/97	332	12	CSX	12" DERAILMENT AT RO
7/10/97	300	32	CSX	17" DERAILMENT AT RO, 13" XOVER AT XR
7/10/97	302	54	CSX	23" DERAILMENT AT RO, 38" XOVER AT XR & FREIGHT TRAFFIC
7/10/97	304	25	CSX	10" DERAILMENT AT RO, 15" XOVER AT XR
7/10/97	306	48	CSX	28" DERAILMENT AT RO, 13" XOVER AT XR, 10" FOLLOWING FREIGHT
7/10/97	310	5	CSX	6" DERAILMENT AT RO, 31" FOLLOWING 174, 3" STOP TUNNEL
7/10/97	323	54	CSX	36" SINGLE TRACK WAS RO A/C Q400 OUT OF TIME, 20" RUNNING REST SPEED RO-SRO, 2" PAA
7/10/97	325	42	CSX	30" SINGLE TRACK WAS RO A/C Q400 OUT OF TIME, 16" RUNNING REST SPEED RO-SRO
7/10/97	327	27	CSX	18" SINGLE TRACK WAS-RO AC Q400 OUT OF TIME, 15" RUNNING REST SPEED RO-SRO
7/10/97	301	36	CSX	36" SINGLE TRACK WAS-RO A/C Q400 OUT OF TIME, 15" RUNNING REST SPEED RO-SRO, 5 PA
7/10/97	303	31	CSX	22" SINGLE TRACK WAS-RO A/C Q400 OUT OF TIME, 20" KUNNING REST SPEED RO-SRO
7/10/97	307	20	CSX	15" REST SPEED RO-SRO, 6" FOLLOWING PO93, 1" R/1, 5" SIS DARICE FOR G170
7/10/97	309	32	CSX	10" REST SPEED RO-SRO, 5" S/S NALX FOR POBU, 12" S/S AF FULLOWING UNIO, 6" 2.5 POSSFT AC UT/6
7/10/97	334	62	CSX	45" LATE TURN OFF 323, 17" REST SPEED SRO-RO
7/10/97	333	78	CSX	58" LATE TURN OFF 334, 15" REST SPEED RO-SRO
7/11/97	328	27	CSX	20" BY RO, 8" EDSALL 321 AHD, 3" PAX FALLING
7/11/97	330	10	CSX	10" BY RO
7/11/97	332	2 21	CSX	14" BY RO, 6" DP BRU LATE ARRIVAL
7/11/97	319	3	SCSX	35"-TURNED AT QUANTICO

7/11/97	310	90	SX	9" BY RO, 8" TURNED AT QUANTICO
7/11/97	321	21 C	SX	21" BY RO, 324 AHD
7/11/97	332	90	SX	11" BY RO
7/11/97	326	15 C	SX	10" BY RO, 8" Q405 AT SEM
7/11/97	300	9 C	SX	12" BY RO
7/11/97	302	21 C	SX	11" BY RO, 10" STOP AF
7/11/97	304	10 C	SX	10" BY RO
7/11/97	306	14 C	SX	16" BY RO, 2" XOVER AT AF
7/11/97	308	34 C	SX	16" BY RO, 18" FOLLOWING 34
7/11/97	323	10 C	SX	11" BY RO, 3" PAX
7/11/97	329	11 C	SX	10" BY RO, 2" PAX
7/11/97	331	25 C	SX	10" BY RO, 20" S/S FOR A/C 307 WAITING ON PO90 & PO80
7/11/97	334	48 C	SX	10" BY RO, 10" LATE TURN OFF 323, 58" S/S EM A/C PO90 & PO60 & 307
7/11/97	333	43 C	SX	35" LATE TURN OFF 334, 10" BY RO
7/11/97	301	15 C	SX	15" BY RO, 1" PAX
7/11/97	303	16 C	SX	12" BY RO, 5" REST SPEED A/C Q173 IN EMERGENCY, 2" PAX, 1" R/T
7/11/97	305	36 C	SX	7" SWITCHING EQUIPMENT AT IVY CITY, 10" BY RO, 19" FOLLOWING Q173 WAS-QUANTICO
7/11/97	307	31 C	SX	3" HEP, 8" BY RO, 1" R/T, 29" NALX A/C PO90 & PO80
7/11/97	309	19 CS	SX	12" BY RO, 4" FOLLOWING 331, 7" PAX
7/14/97	324	8 C	SX	13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	302	11 C	SX	16" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	326	17 C	SX	5" ALX C/O TRAIN CONTROL, 17" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	328	20 C	SX	6" AF FOR 98, 15" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 3" PAX
7/14/97	330	10 C	SX	11" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 3" PAX
7/14/97	304	12 CS	SX :	3" R/T, 1" CSX S/O, 12" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	305	10 CS	SX	4" FBG FOR 98, 9" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	308	12 CS	SX	10" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 2" S/S QUANTICO, 1" PAX
7/14/97	300	16 CS	SX	4" FBG FOR CREW, 16" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	321	33 CS	SX	17 LATE OFF 300, 19 WAS-ALX FOLLOWING 319 & 67 SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	332	32 CS	SX	20° BRU LATE OFF 321, 12° SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	322	10 CS	SX	11° SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 1° PAX, 1° R/T
7/14/97	319	26 03	SX	20 LATE OFF 322 & WAIT ON 300, 9 WAS SKO SIGNALS 0/S
7/14/97	310	25 CS	SX	22 LATE OFF 319, 7 SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/14/97	301	12 00		
7/14/97	305	14 0	SY .	
7/14/97	309	59 10	6	IS DEST SPEED VASDA, I WE IV. 3 NO 4401
7/14/97	325	51 NG	6	12' DEST SPEED VASBO, IT COT HIG FORM ER AT ALL, 3' SIGNAL FRODE MS CRIONERSTRINGTIELD
7/14/97	323	35 NG	0	12 REST SPEED VASION, SO SIGNAL PROBLEMS CRIOWERSTRINGFIELD, 5 35 WATTING ON 554
7/14/97	320	17 NG		
7/14/97	331	41 NS	s	ANT TURNET TRAIN AT ALLEY A/C SIGNAL FAILURE
7/14/97	334	Turned NS	s i	
7/15/97	305	30 05	SX	12" WAS HELD FOR PORT ST FOLLOWING PORT 14" REST SPEED CP/A-SRO
7/15/97	331	11 0	SX	
7/15/97	309	19 05	SX	14" REST SPPED CPVA-SRO 5" FOLLOWING 0175 MP 65 3
7/15/97	334	28 05	SX	20" SIGNAL PROBLEMS ON NS 28" S/S AF A'C PO 80 REST SPEED SRO- CPVA
7/15/97	333	23 05	SX	OF LATE OFF 334 107 REST SPEED OF VA. SPO
7/15/97	325	9 05	SX	14" REST SPPED CPVA-SRO 1" R/T

JULY 97 Delays

7/15/97	301	39 CSX	11" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 4" S/S RW A/C PO90, 22" S/S POSSPT A/C WORK TRAIN, HEAD INSP, * PO53
7/15/97	327	11 CSX	18" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/15/97	303	24 CSX	14" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 2" PAX, 15" S/S DAH JCT A/C Q401
7/15/97	329	16 CSX	15" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 5" FOLLOWING A/C 305
7/15/97	310	31 CSX	33" LATE TURN OFF 319, 7" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	300	35 CSX	17" FBG FOR SWITCH ENG TO CLEAR, 13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS S/O, 5" CSX S/O
7/15/97	321	50 CSX	31" WAS LATE TURN OFF 300, 16" WAS-SRO SIGNALS S/O, 3" S/S SEMINARY
7/15/97	332	64 CSX	37" BRU LATE TURN OFF 321, 19" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	323	12 CSX	12" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/15/97	306	10 CSX	18" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 3" R/T
7/15/97	330	23 CSX	9" S/S EDSALL FOR 321, 9" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	308	17 CSX	2" FBG FOR 84, 2" ALX FOR 84, 14" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	322	14 CSX	13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 1" PAX, 1" R/T
7/15/97	319	32 CSX	21" LATE TURN OFF 322, WAIT ON 98, 16" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	324	20 AMT	10" MSS FOR OVERSPEED PROBLEM, 15" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	326	17 CSX	17" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	328	7 CSX	8" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S,
7/15/97	302	21 CSX	10" ALX FOR 300, 13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/15/97	304	8 CSX	8" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	307	15 CSX	4" S/S VA AVE A/C Q409, 1" R/T, 13" REST SPEED CP VA-SRO, 3" S/S AF A/C PO80
7/16/97	309	14 CSX	1" PAX, 11' REST SPEED CP VA-SRO, 5" CSX S/O
7/16/97	334	32 CSX	45" FOLLOWING PO90 & PO80 THROOUGH DERAIL AREA
7/16/97	333	32 CSX	17" LATE TURN OFF 334, 8" REST SPEED CO VA-SRO, 9" MSS WAITING FOR PO19
7/16/97	323	15 CSX	13" REST SPPED CP VA-SRO, 2" PAX
7/16/97	327	11 CSX	11" REST SPEED CP VA-SRO, 4" S/S NALX A/C Q406
7/16/97	329	11 CSX	13" REST SPPED CP VA-SRO
7/16/97	303	31 CSX	10" REST SPEED CP VA-SRO, 1" R/T, 23" S/S AF A/C Q406, 2" PAX
7/16/97	305	14 CSX	14" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO,
7/16/97	332	26 CSX	13" BRU LATE TURN OFF 321, 13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	300	17 CSX	7" FBG FOR 98, 12" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	319	34 CSX	15" WAS LATE TURN OFF 300, 15" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S, 4" DAHJCT FOR Q409
7/16/97	310	60 CSX	38" LATE TURN OF 310, 21" DAHJCT TO OPERATE ON 3 TRACK-WORK TRAIN ON 2 TRACK, 8" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	301	33 CSX	17" REST SPEED CP VA-SRO, 13" PAX WORKING 3 TRACK, 2' HC PAX
7/16/97	306	10 CSX	13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	308	24 CSX	4" FBG FOR 84, 17" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 2" CSX S/O
7/16/97	330	30 CSX	16" AF FOR 84, 11' SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	321	29 CSX	16" LATE TURN OFF 300, 11" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 10" SEMINARY FOR 328
7/16/97	324	9 CSX	10" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	326	14 CSX	16" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	328	19 CSX	13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 10" S/S SEMINARY FOR 67
7/16/97	302	13 CSX	16" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/16/97	304	26 CSX	12" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 15" AF FOR 67 & 321
7/17/97	302	12 CSX	10" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 5" CSX S/O
7/17/97	326	8 CSX	12" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	304	15 CSX	11" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 6" AF FOR 321, 3" R/T
7/17/97	328	19 CSX	11" EDSALL FOR 98, 15" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	306	25 CSX	15" FBG-FOLLOWING Q174146 FROM XR, 10" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	330	25 CSX	10" AF FOR 306, 15" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S

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7/17/97	308	26	CSX	16" FBG FOR 84, 12" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	300	9	CSX	10° SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	321	10	CSX	4" LATE OFF 300, 10" WAS-SRO SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	322	7	CSX	10° SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	319	20	CSX	5" LATE OFF 322, 10" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 9" NPOSPT FOR 306
7/17/97	310	21	CSX	20"FBG LATE OFF 319, 8" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/17/97	323	ANNUL	AMT	ANNULLED C&S FAILURE AT COACH YARD WAS
7/17/97	334	ANNUL	AMT	ANNULLED C&S FAILURE AT COACH YARD WAS
7/17/97	301	75	AMT	38" LATE ORDERS FROM CSX, 18" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 11" CSX S/O, 11" S/S DAHJCT A/C PO80
7/17/97	325	17	AMT	5" C&S FAILURE AT COACH YARD, 5" PAX, 10" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/17/97	303	25	AMT	19" C&S FAILURE AT COACH YARD, 1" PAX, 8" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/17/97	329	17	CSX	9" WAS HELD FOR Q401 AT VA AVE, 10" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/17/97	305	44	CSX	25 WAS HELD FOR Q401 TO CLEAR VA AVE, 6 CSX S/O, 10" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 5" S/S POSPT A/C PO80
7/17/97	307	31	CSX	11" WAS HELD FOR PO93 TO CLEAR VA AVE, 5" CSX S/O, 10 REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 9" PERMISSION TO TRAVEL THROUGH WORK AREA
7/17/97	309	56	CSX	13" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 21" FOLLOWING Q401, 10" PERMISSION TO TRAVEL THROUGH WORK AREA, 5" HEP MALFUNCTION
7/18/97	330	15	CSX	13" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 2" PAX
7/18/97	308	22	CSX	12" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 8" FBG FOR 84, 3" CSX S/O
7/18/97	300	9	CSX	6" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 9" CSX S/O
7/18/97	322	14	CSX	(SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 4" S/S VA AVE., 2" PAX
7/18/97	319	23	CSX	11" LATE TURN OFF 322, 9" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 4" NPOST FOR Q174, 3" CSX S/O
7/18/97	310	29	CSX	24" FBG LATE TURN OFF 319, 8" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/18/97	323	10	CSX	10" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 3" PAX
7/18/97	301	29	CSX	6" WAITING FOR PO95 VA AVE., 2" CSX S/O, 11" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/18/97	303	9	CSX	6" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 1" R/T, 2" PAX, 7" S/S RW A/C HEAT INSPECTION
7/18/97	329	10	CSX	6" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 10" S/S POWELL A/C NS 211
7/18/97	334	20	CSX	15" WAITING FOR 325 TO ARRIVE, 8" S/S BURKE FOR 211 CROSSING OVER
7/18/97	333	23	CSX	10" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 11" FOLLOWING Q401, 2" MSS 50 AT STATION
7/18/97	326	19	CSX	6" S/S AF FOR 302, 18" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/18/97	328	7	CSX	7" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S
7/18/97	302	30	CSX	18" FBG FOR 98, 12" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 5" CSX S/O
7/18/97	304	10	CSX	10" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 4" CSX S/O
7/18/97	306	10	CSX	10" SRO-WAS SIGNALS O/S, 4" CSX S/O
7/21/97	305	19	CSX	5" REST SPEED CDVA-SRO, 2" XINGOVER AF, 12" S/S NPOSPNT FOR HEAT INSPECTION, 1" PAX
7/21/97	307	65	CSX	11" REST SXPEED CPVA-SRO, 26" STOPPED A/C Q401 INSPEWCTING AHEAD, 9" FOLLOWING PO93, 5 CSX S/O, 13" INSPECTING TRAIN AT ROSS
7/21/97	309	34	CSX	4" REST SPEED CDPVA-SRO, 4" SIGNALS, 28" ROSS-MALFUNCTIONING DRAG DETECTOR & PERMISSION THRU WORK AREA
7/21/97	333	8	CSX	5" REST SPEED CDVA-SRO, 8" S/S PO19 MSS
7/21/97	308	24	CSX	8" OP FBG FOLLOWING 84, 3" APP NA & PY, 10" BY STOP QAN, 3" BY STOP RO
7/21/97	310	80	CSX	37" START AT BRK LATE TURN OFF 319-Q406 TRIPPED DRAG DETECTOR, 38" RAN RES TO QAN, 2" STOP VA AVE
7/21/97	319	30	CSX	19" LATE TURN FROM 322, 9" CSX SIGNAL, 9" WAIT ON 84 AT QAN, TURNED AT BKV-Q405 TRIPPED DRAG DETECTOR
7/21/97	323	12	AMT	B" WAITING ON CSX ORDERS, 4" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/21/97	301	14	AMT	12" WAITING ON CSX ORDERS, 3" PAX, 4" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO
7/21/97	321	30	CSX	7" STOP VA AVE, 10" FOLLOWING 67, 3' BY RO
7/21/97	300	13	CSX	4" STOP QAN, 6" STOP AF FRIEGHT AHEAD, 9" STOP SRO & RO, 1" STOP 1ST ST.
7/21/97	302	13	CSX	2" STOP QAN, 16" SROP SRO & RO
7/21/97	304	10	CSX	10° STOP SRO & RO
7/21/97	306	23	CSX	5" S/S QAN, 10" STOP SRO & RO, 7" FOLLOWING 328
7/21/97	326	7	CSX	9° STOP SRO & RO
7/21/97	328	30	CSX	21" EDSALL TRAIN 321 AHEAD, 7" STOP SRO & RO

7/21/97	330	15 0	CSX	8" FOLLOWING 306, 3" STOP RO
7/21/97	332	26 0	CSX	15" LATE OFF 321, 3" FOLLOWING TRN 20, 12" STOP SRO & RO, 2" STOP 1ST ST.
7/21/97	322	19 0	CSX	20" STOP SRO & RO
7/22/97	300	10 0	CSX	12" S/O,9" BY SRO & RO
7/22/97	302	41 0	CSX	18" FGB 98 AHEAD, 13" 25MPH S/O, 10" BY SRO
7/22/97	304	16 0	SX	12" S/O, 5" 67 AHEAD, 6" BY SRO & RO
7/22/97	306	14 0	SX	12" BY SRO & RO, 9" S/O
7/22/97	308	70	SX	3" S/O, 5" BY SRO & RO
7/22/97	310	12 0	SX	10" LATE TURN, 13" BY SRO & RO
7/22/97	319	12 0	SX	5" LATE TURN, 5" BY VRE 300, 8" SIGNAL CSX
7/22/97	322	8 0	SX	2" YARD MOVE, 10 BY SRO & RO
7/22/97	324	8 0	SX	11" BY SRO & RO
7/22/97	330	20 0	SX	10" PAX NO A/C, 5" BYRD
7/22/97	332	36 N	IS	30" LATE TURN SIG NS, 10" BY SRO & RO
7/22/97	321	45 N	IS	42" STOP SPRINGFIELD TO FAIRFAX
7/22/97	329	14 0	SX	4" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 2" H/C PAX, 14" S/S AF A/C Q176
7/22/97	305	10 0	SX	8" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 6" S/S DAHJCT PO90 & 80
7/22/97	307	90	SX	5" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 8" FOLOWING PO 93 BKV-FBG
7/22/97	334	15 C	SX	14" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO, 6" APPROACH SIGNAL POWELL-BULL RUN
7/22/97	309	23 0	SX	23" PERMISSION AF LEE & CSX S/O, 1" PAX, 5" REST SPEED CPVA-SRO

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June 97 Delays

		MINUTES		
DATE	TRAIN	LATE	RR	REASON FOR DELAY
6/2/97	319	33	CSX	41* TRACK CIRCUIT FAILURE
6.'2/97	310	18	CSX	35° DATE TURN OFF 319
6/2/97	307	17	CSX	15' SEMINARY-RAVENSWORTH FOLLOW GAULY DANGET FOR GAU
6/3/97	307	33	CSX	42" REVERSE MOVE SEM TO ALEX DUE TO DAVID WITH DIESEL PROBLEM ON 2 TRACK OF EARLED ON DAVID RELEVANCE MANY
6/5/97	301	11	CSX	PRAVENSWORTH FOR SO CHI 2 TRACK (SU 35 LATE), 55 CH 3 TRACK, 5 LATING FOR THOSE INSPECTION OF 2 TRACK
6/6/97	301	19	CSX	24 3/S RAVENSWORTH WAIT ON OT/5 & 50 TO OPERATE ON 2 TRACK
6/10/97	301	28	CSX	32' DALJCT DUE TO SWITCH FAILURE, WAIT ON GROUP & GUTO CLEAR 2 TRACK
6/10/97	303		CSX	B WAS-ALL FOLLOWING 31, 6 DALLOT FOR SWITCH FAILURE
6/12/97	325	50	AMI	53'SWITCH FAILURE INT CITY MAS
6/12/97	327	26	AMI	31° SWITCH FAILURE IN TOTTY MAS
6/12/97	329	10	AMI	9" SWITCH FAILURE IVF GITTWAS, 7 ALA-BRU FOLLOWING 327
6/12/97	303	48	AMI	45 SWITCH FAILURE INT CIT TIMAS, 5 PAX, 1 MT, 2 CSX 3/0
6/12/97	331	21	AMI	
6/12/97	305		AMI	
6/12/97	307	39	AMI	45 SWITCH FAILURE INT CITTINAS
6/1//9/	305	21	CSA	21 SOUTH OF RAVENSWORTH FOR UNIT CHECKING THANK AND TRACK
6/18/97	323	10	CSA	10 CCV LOADING PAK OFF 2 TRACK DOE TO TRACK WORK ON 3 TRACK
6/18/97	331		CSA	B 3/5 RO, 5 MALA WAIT ON G400, 60
6/19/9/	323	15	CSA	14 AF FOR UTIONAUVER 3 10 2 FACK (0175 ON 3 TRACK) 41" ILB DUE TO SWITCH FAILURE AT DAHJUCT
6/19/9/	301	52	LOA	TE SIE DOME L CECNAL DE DOME TO CALE AND CALE AN
6/20/97	323		ANT	7 3'S POWELL (SIGIRAL DICOFED)
6/23/9/	325	16	ANAT	1 WAS, CONSIST IN CONSIST USED 134, VOS WITH OVERSPEED PROBLEM 2º CSX S/O
6/23/97	309	16	AMT	10 WAS USE VC2 DEDI AT COVERS DEDI AT COVERS DEDI NOTES TROBEN, 2 00/010
6/23/97	300	9	AMT	14" WAS OVERSPEED PROBLEM ON VOS
6/25/97	301	22	CSX	24" RAVENSWORTH FOR 0176 & 90 2" CSX S/O
6/25/97	325	34	NS	29" CLIFTON FOR RULES COMPLIENCE TESTING. 4" POWELL FOR 334
6/25/97	327	11	NS	15" CLIFTON FOR RULES COMPLIENCE TESTING
6/25/97	329	22	NS	25" CLIFTON FOR RULES COMPLIENCE TESTING
6/25/97	3.1	32	NS	32" CLIFTON FOR RULES COMPLIENCE TESTING
6/25/97	334	25	NS	25" CLIFTON FOR RULES COMPLIENCE TESTING, 15" BRU FOR 325
6/25/97	333	15	NS	20 LATE TURN OFF 334
6/26/97	301	141	CSX	141" LATE, OPERATED ON 3 TRACK BEHIND 95 & 53 TO DALICT. OPERATED RESTRICTED SPEED DUE TO TOL'S ON BOTH TRACKS
6/26/97	303	120	CSX	112" OPERATED ON 3 TRACK LOLR-FBG DUE TOL'S ON BOTH TRACKS, 18" RAVENSWORTH FOR 176 & 90
6/26/97	305	122	CSX	122" OPERATED ON 3 TRACK DUE TOL'S ON BOTH TRACKS
6/26/97	307	97	CSX	65" OPERATED ON 3 TRACK DU TOL'S ON BOTH TRACKS, 32" ALX-LOR FOLLOWING 93
6/26/97	309	74	CSX	74" QAN-FBG OPERATED ON 3 TRACK DUE TOL'S ON BOTH TRACKS
6/27/97	300	30	CSX	28" DAHJCT SIGNAL PROBLEMS-MP67.2, 2" PAX
6/27/97	302	21	CSX	28" DAHJCT SIGNAL PROBLEMS-MP67.2,
6/27/97	304	17	CSX	17" DAHJCT SIGNAL FAILURE-MP67.2
6/27/97	306	19	CSX	24" DAHJCT SIGNAL FAILURE-MP67.2, 3" FOLLOWING 330
6/27/97	308	XX	CSX	ANNULLED, USED AS 310
6/27/97	310	31	CSX	24" DAHJCT SIGNAL FAILURE-MP67.2, 6" FOLLOWING Q414, 1" PAX
6/27/97	319	XX	CSX	ANNULLED, DAHJCT SIGANL FAILURE-MP67.2
6/27/97	301	39	CSX	25" RAVENSWORTH FOR Q176 ON 2 TRACK, 18" FOLLOWING W065 TO FGB, 3" CSX S/O
6/30/97	332	11	CN	4" SMSS FOLLOWING 20, 5" S/S VA. AVE., 2" S/S TUNNEL
6/30/97	334	20	NS	38" SIGNAL FAILURE BURKE & SPRINGFIELD

May 97 delays

		MINUTE		
DATE	TRAIN	SLATE	RR	REASON FOR DELAY
5/2/97	323	31	CS	29" SWITCH FAILURE AF, 4" PAX, 1" CR S/O
5/2/97	325	13	CS	13", "OLLOWING VRE 323 A/C 323, 2" PAX
5/5/97	328	8	CS	5° CSX S/O, 5° PAX
5/5/97	330	12	CS	5" CSX S/O, 2" PAX, 3" FOLLOWING PO84, 3" S/S AF PO84
5/5/97	329	8	CS	11" S/S AC PO80 ON 2 TRACK
5/8/97	302	10	CS	13" QAN-WDB FOLLOWING Q414, 2" R/T
5/8/97	319	30	CS	36" NPOSPT DUE TO Q400 ON 3 TRACK WITH MECH PROBLEMS-308 TO CLEAR 2 TRACK AT QUANTICO
5/8/97	310	23	CS	31" LATE TURN OFF 319, 4" PAX
5/9/97	325	9	CR	11" FOLLOWING Q175 LEF-CCV, 2" PAX, 2" RT
5/9/97	333	8	AM	8" FOLLOWING PO19 WAS-ALEX (PO19 WAS LATE)
5/12/97	301	11	CS	1" PAX, 7" S/S RW A/C PO90, 2" R/T, 3" DAH JCT SWITCH PROBLEMS
5/12/97	303	15	CS	5" HEP PROBLEMS, 2" CSX S/O, 2" PAX, 10" DAH JCT SWITCH FAILURE
5/16/97	323	20	AM	14" SRO CAB SIGNAL FAILURE, 2" SIGNALS A/C PO90, 4" PAX
5/16/97	301	8	CS	10" S/S RW A/C Q176. 2" CSX S/O, 2" PAX
5/19/97	328	7	CS	7" S/S SEMINARY, 5" PAX
5/19/97	327	28	NS	33" SWITCH FAILURE CLIFTON
5/19/97	329	10	NS	11" SIGNAL FAILURE BURKE-BULL RUN
5/20/97	323	9	NS	9" EDSALL-FOLLOWING NS FREIGHT TRAIN
5/21/97	327	9	NS	13" S/S CLIFTON A/C VRE 334
5/23/97	301	18	CS	13" S/S m A/C Q176 & REVERSE MOVE, 4" PAX, 1" CSX S/O, 10" S/S POS A/C Q400
5/23/97	325	10	NS	1" PAX, 2" R/T, 8" S/S POWELL A/C NS 456
5/30/97	323	9	CS	3"PAX, 3" TRACK CIRCUIT FAILURE SRO-AF, 2" S/S POWELL A/C NS 211, 1" RIT
5/30/97	301	19	CS	4" PAX, 12" TRACK CIRCUIT FAILURE SRO-AF, 5" S/S R176, 4" FOLLOWING PO53, 1" R/T

		MINUTES		
DATE	TRAIN	LATE	RR	REASON FOR DELAY
4/1/97	305	24	22	16" VERIFYING CSX ORDERS, 9" SIS HALX AC PORO IN STATION, 3" X OVER AF
4/1/97	309	15	CS	I* RIT, 14*S/S DAH A/C Q401 IN EMERGENCY
4/1/97	330	10	AM	6" ASST CONDUCTOR, 3" PAX, 5" NS SIO, 1" CR SIO
41/97	323	12	CR	S" CONGESTION IN WASH TERM TUNNEL, Z" PAK, " CR SO, " NS SO
4/1/97	325	9	NS	16" NS \$20, 6" FOLLOWING R175, 3" RIT, 1" CR \$20
4/1/97	327	13	AM	IF UNABLE TO CONTACT HE DUNN, F NS SIO, T CR SIO
4/1/97	329	23	~	TO FOLLOWING 300 WAS NO, 12 SIS NALA WE FORD IN STATION, 2 IN SIG, 1 FRA
4/2/9/	300	Annuled	1	
4/2/9/	302	30		AV LIRACOUPLE TO THAT SAL AS THAT HO SAUSALS SOLATED
4/2/07	300			T SIGNALS AN 302/00 2 SOLVER 2 RT 1' CSX 50
4/2/07	121	24	NS	a washington congestion 1' Pax 2' CSX S/Q 25 FOLLOWING NS FREIGHT 307
44.497	321	40	NS	14" SIGNAL PROBLEMS AT EDSALL SPRINGFIELD & RAVENSWORTH, 17" NS S/O 23 MPH MP 20 TO 31 4
4497	332	16	NS	22' LATE TURN OF 321
4/4/97	334	15	NS	20° NS 5/0
4497	333	11	CS	1" CR SIO, 1" CSX SIO, 12" FOLLOWING PO19
4/7/97	330		CS	2"PAX, 1" R/T, 6" S/S AF A/C PO84, 1" FOLLOWING PO84
4/7/97	323	22	AM	21" WAS WAIT ON NS ORDERS, 3" PAX
4/7/97	303	11	CS	9" S/S RO FOR 91, 2" CSX S/O, 2" PAX
4/8/97	322	7	AM	11" CREW, 1" PAX, 1" R/T
4/8/97	323	34	CS	30' S/S RO FOR SIGNAL FAILURE, 3' PAX, 1' CR S/O
48/97	325	16	CS	9" S/S RO FOR SIGNAL FAILUF (; 10" MPU-BLR FOLLOWING 323, 1" CR S/O
4/9/97	302	6	CS	P HOT BOX DETECTOR (NO TROUBLE FOUND WITH TRAIN), 3" PAR
4/10/97	326	11	CR	16" SYS SEM AC 319 (319 LATE AC CR SWITCH FALURE SWIPT), IF SYS SHO AC 321 (321 LATE AC CR SWITCH FALURE)
4/10/97	332	10	CR	PLATE TURN OFF 321, 5° AC POZOAT S MSS
4/10/97	321	21	CR	12° AC CR SWITCH FALLURE-SWITS
4/10/9/	319	30	CR	JZ AC CR SWITCH FALURE SWITCH IS SUBJECT VA TO FOLL AC OTHER INCVENENTS
4/10/9/	310	30	CR.	13 DATE TORN OFF 319, 4 TORN TROUT, 2 AND OTEN, 4 AFF NO
4/11/9/	320		1CS	LE WAR ON OANT R/S CP VA STOP SIGNAL NALEX PORD AN. 409 IN ALEX ON 2 TRACK
4/11/97	305	50	CS	AA" LOR TO REVERSE MOVE 2 TO 3 TRK & RAVENSWORTH DUE TO G401 AT LOR IN EMERGENCY, & AF-LOR FOLLOWING G401
4/14/97	300		CS	11" S/S gUA: LICO FOR PO98 1" R/T. 1" APP BROWNFILED, 2" S/S NALX
4/14/97	327	77	AM	66" SEMINARY V21 SHUT DOWN (LOST WATER TO KIM HOTSTART)-329 COUPLED UP AND PUSHED TO BRU, 7" R/T, 6" PAX, 1" CR S/O
4/14/97	329	48	AM	30" SEMINARY COUPLE TO 327, 17" PAX, 4" R/T
4/14/97	331	13	CS	14" NALX FOR POBO & 334 TO CLEAR ALX
4/15/97	301	16	CS	22" SEMINARY DUE TO Q406 WITH WIDE LOADS
4/15/97	327	8	CS	6" NALX DUE TO Q406, 1" CR S/O, 7" PAX
4/16/97	332	11	NS	20" FOLLOWING PO20 FROM EDSALL, 2" REST RO, 3" S/S TUNNEL
4/16/97	329	41	CS	33* S/S RO FOR R176, 80,90, ON 3 TRACK DUE TO GAOB WIDE LOAD ON 2 TRACK, & CLIPTON FOR 50, 2 AMT S/O
4/16/97	307	19	CS	21' SYS RO BEHIND 329 (DUE TO GHOB), 2' AMT SO, 1' CSA SO
4/16/97	337	30	CS	AP EDSALL OUE TO CROSSITION CAUSED BY CAUSE
4/16/9/	333	10	1Ca	13 CATE TORN OFF 334 (DOE TO GROUP, 5 ROME BOO
4/20/07	305		AN	IT WAT DO NS ORDERS WAS
4/22/07	323		NS	11" S/S POWELL SIGNAL & SWITCH PROBLEMS
4/22/97	314	25	NS	30" S/S POWELL SIGNAL & SWITCH PROBLEMS
4/22/97	333	14	INS	7 W-S LATE TURN OFF 334, 11" BRU-MSS FOLLOWING PO19
4/24/97	330	7	CR	6" REST SIGNAL LEF, 1" PAX, 1" NS S/O, 1" GATES AT MSS
4/28/97	319	13	MA	13" WAS SWAP DUE TO VOS FUEL LEAK, USED EQUIP OFF 300, 4" CSX SVO
4/28/97	321	22	AM	15 WAS SWAP EQUIP DUE TO V05 SHUT DOWN, USED 324'S EQUIP, 4" CSX S/O, 3" AF FOR 328
4/28/97	310	18	AM	15" FGB LATE TURN OFF 319, 10" CSX S/O
4/28/97	325	13	NS	17 EFFICIENCY TEST CLIFTON, 1° CR S/O
4/28/97	327	15	NS	16" EFFICIENCY TEST CLIFTON, 1 CR S/O, 2" R/T
4/28/97	329	16	NS	18" EFFICIENCY TEST CLIFTON
4/28/97	331	28	NS	22 EFFICIENCY TEST CLETONERA TESTING, 1' PAX, 8' S/S AF FOR VRE334
4/28/97	334	20	NS	IP WAIIING ON VHE 320, 11° CSX SIO
4/26/97	333	10	NS	(* LATE TURN OFF 334, ¥ FOLLOWING POTY SHERE LORTON WATCH DE DON'S TO LEAVE AS DAY 3 TRACK
4/29/97	301	32	tce	31 33 LURION WAINO FOR FOOJ TO LEAKE, E FAA 3 TAGAK
4/28/97	300	16	Ce	P ALEX WAS FOLLOWING A & PAX
4/20/07	330	- 13	Ce	AT TERMINATED AT DUANTED OUT TO FOLLOWING NEW 27 RAVENSMORTH-NPOST 310'S PAX FOR FOR LCR. BKU ON 85
4/30/97	310	34	CS	34" AT QUANTICO, LATE TURN OFF 319 (319 TERMINATED AT QUANTICO)
March 97 delays

		MINUTES	1	
DATE	TRAIN	LATE	RR	REASON FOR DELAY
3/3/97	301	1	CS	P SS NOPOST FOR MANY ON 2 TRACK [CHECKING TOL ON 3 TRACK QUANTICO-DARIGOCT], 5 CSK SID
3/4/9/	328	12	ND	P SURAL PROBLEM AT BOLL RUN T PAR. T AT AT INTERVIEW
34/9/	330		NS	3 MAS CALLS T APP NEWBILL S APP 10 DOLL NO SOLUTION STATE AC FOR 326 (LATE BECAUSE OF BULL RN SIGNALS) & 304
3/4/97	305	9	CS	
36.07	328		100	A PAX
36.97	330	10	CS	5" ALEX A/C PO84 5" PAX. 1 R/T. 1" MPV GATES
3/6/97	321		CR	6" S/S CR TOWER, 3" CR S/O, 2" S/S CLIFTON A/C NS #30
3/6/97	329	1	CS	9" NALX WAT ON 90 IN ALEX, 1" WIC PAX
3/7/97	326	14	CS	18" FOLLOWING R174 AT NALEX TO 2 TRACK, AC ON 321 3 TRACK
3/7/97	304		CS	3* AC 321 (FOR R174), 1* CSX SIO, 3*R/T, 1* PAX, 3* XOVER
3/7/97	330	7	CR	I'MPU-GATES 2" RT, 2" REST RO. 1" PAX, 1" CR SIO
3/7/97	325	9	CS	11" LEF-CCV FOLLOWING R17507, Z RUT
3/7/97	303	12	CS	B"LEF-ALX FOLLOWING H175, 325, 91, B" RAVENSWORTH TO BPR 3 TRACK DOE TO K175 ON 2 TRACK IN EMERGENCE, 4 TAX
3/1/9.	305		CS	IS NALX FOR BO, J KIT, S PAA
3/10/97	301	13	CS	B REST SPD VA AVE AC HOTTUCADUTTU ADUT 3 CSA SO 4 35 POSSPT AC POSS
3/10/9/	323	21	Lo	3 ALEX RESI SPUNC SUTAND, S TAR, S SOURCES
1/12/07	302	17	NS	1 SIG WAS 7 CR SO A PAX T APP CR TO FDSALL & SS EDSALL T RT
11207	325	12	CS	1" CSX SQ Z NS SQ 3" R/T 3" APP SIG CR T SIGNALS AC K650 IN EMERGENCY #2
3/13/97	323	15	NS	14" NS EFFICIENCY TEST, Z' CR S/O, 1" CSX S/O
3/13/97	325		NS	9" NS BANNER TEST, 1" CR S/O, 1" CSX S/O
3/13/97	327	12	NS	12" AF AC POBO (DUE TO TEST), 4" PAX, 3" S/S HORN TRACK
3/13/97	329	10	NS	13" NS EFFICIENCY TEST
3/13/97	331	24	NS	25" AF-CR AC/ SIGNAL/BANNER TEST, 1" PAX, 1" CR SO, 1" R/T
3/13/97	333	20	NS	8" AC PC 19 AHD, 11" S/S SEMINARY A/C PO 19 AHD-bANNER TEST
3/13/97	304	81	AM	60" LLR DUE TO LOCOMOTIVE (POWER ASSEMBLY BLOWN), WAIT ON 306 TO COUPLE UP, 21" LLR-WAS 1 LOCOMOTIVE/12 CARS
3/13/97	306	46	AM	28"LLR COUPLE UP TO 304 20"LLR-WAS
3/13/97	308	22	AM	127 CLR-WAS BEHIND 304/306
3/14/97	326		CS	Instant FUR 319, UN 3 TRACK DUE TO UN TO UN 2 TRACK 3 & AURER 32 3 TRACK SKO
3/14/9/	304	10	Co	2 RAVENSIVOR IN FOR STIE OR 2 TRACK DOE TO RITE ON STROKES INT, 1 CON GO
114.07	310	- 11	tes	IS BOAL X WAIT ON 302 THEN ON 3 TRACK DUE TO G410 ON 2 TRACK
214.97	310	16	CS	14" FRG LATE TURN OFF 319 3" QUANT FOR ORDERS
3/14/97	329		CS	12 SA NALX AC FOR POSO
3/17/97	328	28	NS	15" S/S BURKE FOR SIGNAL PROBLEMS, 6" S/S AF FOR 306, 7" PAX
3/17/97	330	10	NS	T S/S BURKE FOR SIGNAL PROBLEMS, 2 CSX S/O, 2 PAX
3/17/97	308	21	AM	11* LOR DSL VO9 SHUTDOWN (RESTART), 13* AF DSL VO9 SHUTDOWN (RESTART)
3/17/97	321	22	NS	14" BURKE FOR NS 342, 4" WAS FOR 324, 3" S/S VA AVE, 1" CSX S/D
3/17/97	332	8	AM	5° BRU LATE TURN OFF 321, 7° ALX-WAS FOLLOWING 20, 310
3/17/97	323	32	AM	25° WAS WAIT FOR NS ORDENS, 11° FAX, 2° CSX SO
30107	325	12	CS	
3/21/9/	123	12	NS	TALE IL O OPP 25MPH NS SOUTH FOR TRACK WORK & CSX SO 7 PAX
3/24/97	125	10	INS	AF BLR OPF SOUTH FRT TRACK FOR NS TRACK WORK Z R/T. 1° CR SO
3/24/97	329	7	NS	9 AF-BLR OPR SOUTH FRT TRACK FOR NS TRACK WORK
3/25/97	330	7	NS	1" MSS GATES, 3" PAX, 6" NS S/O, 1" CR S/O
3/25/97	323	21	NS	15" NS SID DUE TO TRACK WORK, 4" PAX, 1" CR SID, 1" R/T
3/25/97	325	15	NS	15" NS SID DUE TO TRACK WORK, 1" PAX, 1" CR SID, 1" R/T
3/25/97	327	12	NS	12" NS SID DUE TO TRACK WORK, 1" CR SID, 2" PAX
3/25/97	329	14	NS	16"NS SKO DUE TO TRACK WORK
3/26/97	328	7	Oth	7 PAX, 2NS 50
3/26/97	330	13	NS	TIC INS SAU DUE TO TRACK WORK, 2 YAK, 2 CSX SU, 1 CK SU
3/26/97	332	12	NS	
3/20/9/	323		Ce	I TO AND DUE TO THOM TO THOM AN ANA NO TO A STOR SO
128.07	330	-	CS	IDT HELD AT SEMINARY FOR POM I' GATES AT MSS 1' CSX SO 1' PAX 1' CR SO
3/28/97	332	12	NS	13' SIGNAL S AC PO20 AHD 1" PAX
3/28/97	323	19	AN	10" WAS ON CSX & NS ORDERS, 5" CSX SIO, 4" PAX
3/31/97	330	12	NS	13" NS SIO, 1" MSS GATES, 2" PAX, 1" CR SIO
3/31/97	332	10	NS	13" BRU AC NS #41, 4" NS S/O
3/31/97	323	17	NS	9" NS 5/0, 5" S/S AF, 1" PAX, 3" CSX 5/0
3/31/97	325	9	NS	4* NS SIO, 4* SIS NALX, 3* RJT, 1* PAX, 1* CR SIO
3/31/97	327	8	NS	3" FLAGGING XING MSSPRK, 3" FLAGGING XING WELLINGTON RD., 1" CR S/O, 3" CSX ORDERS

Feb 97 delays

		MINUTE		
DATE	TRAIN	SLATE	RR	REASON FOR DELAY
2/4/97	309	90	AM	V03 LOST WATER/SHUT DOWN AT WOODBRIDGE, TRAIN TERMINATED PAX TRANSFERRED
2/5/97	330	15	AM	14" HELD AT VA AVE-TRESPASSER STRUCK ON 39 TRACK NEAR K BRIDGE
2/5/97	308	13	AM	12" HELD AT VA AVE- TRESSPASSER STRUCK ON 39 TRACK 5" S/S XR A/C PO64
2/5/97	332	7	NS	8" BRU A/C S/S WAIT ON PO20, 2" SIGNALS A/C FOLLOW PO20 TO MPU
2/5/97	301	19	CS	22" S/S RAVENSWORTH 3 TRACK, WAIT ON R17604 ON 2 TRAACK, 2" SHO KUN AROUND 240105
2/12/97	334	35	AM	50" MPV REPLACE CONTROL CARD ON CAB CAR
2/12/96	321	13	NS	13" S/S CLIFTON A/C NS #30
2/12/97	333	13	AM	15" WAS LATE TURN OFF 334
2/12/97	306	7	AM	10" RIP OVERSPEED FAILURE, 1" PAX, 1" K/I, 3" APP BROWN FIELD
2/12/97	303	10	AM	10" NPOSPT FOR 80, 6" BKV-LLR PAX FROM 3 I KAUK
2/14/97	326	24	NS	18" SIGNAL & BARRICADE TEST, 3" PAX, 6" S/S AF A/C VREJUA, 1" APP RU
2/14/97	328	15	NS	PREST SPEED NEWBILL TO BULL KUN AVE SIGNAL TEST, TAPP POWELL, 5 PAN
2/14/97	330	10	NS	T BARRICADE TEST, Z SIGNALS, 4 PAX
2/14/97	322	15	NS	16" SIGNALS TEST S/S POWELL & NEWBILL, 1" PAX, 3" R/1
2/14/97	332	34	NS	32" LATE TURN OFF 321, 4" S/S AF A/C PU86
2/14/97	321	47	NS	14" LATE TURN, 12" S/S BULL RUN, 13" S/S CLIFTON, 7" S/S AF AC
2/14/97	300	18	CS	18" SRO SZWITCH PAILURE
2/14/97	308	7	CS	16" XR SWITCH FAILURE
2/18/97	300	15	CS	17 BKV - CSX FR 141018 FOULING STATION ON 2 TRACK, 3 FOR 18 ONDERG, 2 FRATHOMO TRACK
2/18/97	325	10	CS	14" NO WAIT FUR RT/01/ TO CLEAR 3 TRACK 2 TVT
2/18/97	303	18	AM	TO WALT ON VESSALE TO CLEAR 3 TRACK 2 CSX S/O 2 PAX
2/19/97	301	8	CS	B ROWAIT ON ROOTS TO CLEAR 3 TRACK
2/19/97	329	12	CS	AT DO FOR ANT ON TO CLEAR & TRACK OF SRO-NALX CSX S/O ON 2 TRACK
2/19/97	331	12	CS	T CP SIO 10 CCV WAIT ON R413 WAITING ON 90 334 207 TO CLEAR ALEX
2/25/97	331	10	LS	P OPEN BRIEFING 1"PAY 2" RIT
2/26/97	322	9	AM	S" WAITING ON 08 & 324 1" XINGI OVER NAIX 8" CLIFTON A/C 330
2/26/97	321	9	AM	14* LE COVEDIL OWING R175/8 2* R/
2/26/97	325	10	ND CO	T CENSIO 12 EDILIONING RIZALIXI FE 3" CR S/O
2/2//97	302	10	CS	15" S/S AF A/C 319 & O410 ON 2 TRACK WITH A KNUCKLE, 1" CR S/O
2/28/97	302	11	ANA	T BADIO REPAIR ON CAB CAR Z' R/T 1" PAX 1" ALEX FOR 321
2/28/9/	304	10	CS	G FOLLOWING PORA ALEX-CCV 2" PAX 1" CR S/O
2/20/97	330	10	CS	18" S/S PO WITH 302 & 326 ON 3 TRACK - 0410 ON 2 TRACK WITH A KNUCKLE. 5" S/S POWELL A/C P020
2/20/91	521	10	100	

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1/15/071	330	514		2° BRD NS Orders, 2° AF for 84
1/15/07	321	51	S	T CLIFTON For 330. 2' RG
1/15/97	303	16 0	s	2 CSX S/O, 20" Restricted speed A/C Q401 in Emergency
1/17/97	332	50	N	10° VA AVE CONGESTION IN WASHINGTON
1/17/97	325	7 4	M	4" FOLLOWING ANT 300, 2" PAX, 2" XOVER AF, 3" RIT
1/17/97	321	SN	S	5° CLIFTON FOR 330. 2° CSX S/O
1/17/97	323	50	T	3 PAX, 3' XOVER SRO & AF
1/17/97	331	5 N	IS	11° FOLLOWING R175
1/17/97	301	11 0	S	5" S/S SRO A/C Q412 & YARDAGE, 15" S/S DJ A/C P090
1/17/97	303	38 C	S	43" S/S RW A/C P080 & P090, 1" RIT, 1" PAX (BROKEN RAIL)
1/17/97	305	19 C	S	2" XOVER AF, 23" FOLLOWING 303 A/C 303
1/17/97	307	80	S	3" WASH TERM A/C P091, 3" S/S SRO A/C P090, 4" FOLLOWING Q401
1/21/97	328	50	T	5° PAX
1/21/97	332	30 N	IS	32" BRU, LATE TURN OFF 321
1/21/97	321	49 N	IS	47 CLIFTON FOR 20,330 AND SIGNAL PROBLEMS
1/22/97	326	8 N	IS	5" S/S AF FOR R17421, 4" ALEX-RO FOLLOWING R174
1/22/97	306	25 C	S	14" RIPPON-RAVEN OPR 3 TRK DUE TO Q410 IN EMERGENCY AT WDBRDG, 9" ALX-WAS FOLLOWING 330 a 54, 2" GUAR FOR 319
1/22/97	307	7 A	M	8" ACTUATED DD TWICE INSPECTED TRAIN, 2" XOVER AF, 1" CSX 5:0
1/24/97	328	10 N	IS	15" S/S CR TOWER, SIGNAL FAILURE
1/24/97	330	15" N	IS	13° S/S CR TOWER, SIGNAL FAILURE, 7° CCV-WAS FOLLOWING 308
1/24/97	332 12*	N	IS	12" SY FOR R41324 DUE TO CR SIGNAL FAILURE, 3" CR SIGNAL FAILURE.
1/27/97	323 31"	A	M	B/O SPEED RECORDER (SPEEDOMETER WOULD NOT READ ABOVE 20MPH), 1 PAA
1/29/97	304 25"	A	M	22" QUANTICO - EMS REMAINING CREW MEMBER, 3" K/ I
1/30/97	333	11 0	N	8" EFFICIENCY TEST L'ENFANT, 5" S/S CP VA
1/31/97	322	20 0	S	23" CODE LINE FAILURE @ SRO, 2" PAX
1/31/97	300	14 0	S	15° CODE LINE FAILURE @ SRO, FOLLOWING 322

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Page 2

	IMINUTESI										
DATE	TRAIN	LATE	RR	REASON FOR DELAY							
1/2/97	324	5	CS	CODE LINE FAILURE SRO							
1/2/97	326	10	CS	11"CODE LINE FAILURE SRO							
1/2/97	328	38	CS	33°CODE LINE FAILURE SRO, 5°S/S EDSALL							
1/2/97	330	35	CS	22°CODE LINE FAILURE SRO, 14°SIGNALS A/C 321							
1/2/97	332	43	CS	39° LATE TURN OFF 321, 9° CODE LINE FAILURE SRO							
1/2/97	321	54	CS	54" CODE LINE FAULURE SRO							
1/2/97	329	10	CS	13" CODE LINE FAILURE SRO							
1/2/97	331	10	CS	CODE LINE FAILURE SRO							
1/2/97	302	19	CS	17 CODE LINE FAILURE SRO, 7 LOADING PASSENGER							
1/2/97	304	35	CS	30" CODE LINE FAILURE SRO, 9" OPERATING 3TRK QUANTICO							
1/2/97	306	26	CS	24" CODE LINE FAILURE SRO, 6" OPERATING 3 TRK QUANTICO							
1/2/97	308	20	CS	30" CODE LINE FAILURE SRO, 9" FOLLOWING AMT 64, 1" RIT							
1/2/97	310	12	CS	16" CODE LINE FAILURE SRO, 7" LATE TURN OFF 319							
1/2/97	307	18	CS	19" CHECKING SWITCHES AT SRO							
1/6/97	328	5		2° CR S/O 5° PAX							
1/6/97	332	5		8° S/S EDSALL FOR 20							
1/6/97	334		200	ANNULLED							
1/6/97	323			ANNULLED							
1/6/97	321	5	AM	4" CLIFTON FOR 330, 1" CR S/O							
1/6/97	325	19	AM	15" WAS TRANSFER PAX OFF 323, 7" PAX, 2"R/T							
1/6/97	329	10		5" LEF ENGINE FAILURE, 7" HVC PAX, 3" PAX							
1/6/97	303	5	AM	8" FOLLOWING 325, 2" CSX S/O, 1" R/T, 1" PAX							
1/7/97	308	5	AM	15" FBG FOR 84							
1/7/97	301	10	CS	PQUANTICO A/C SIGNAL/SWITCH FAILURE							
1/7/97	303	35	CS	31" SWITCH FAILURE POSSUM POINT, 7" UNLOADING PAX FROM 3 TRACK							
1/7/97	305	11	CS	8" S/S QUANTICO, 4" PAX, 3" SIGNAL XOVER FBG							
1/7/97	307	14	CS	13" S/S POSSUM POINT, 2" APP QUANTICO, 4" UNLOADING PAX TRACK 3							
1/8/97	319		CS	ANNULLED							
1/8/97	328	8	CS	8" ALEX-WAS FOLLOWING R174, 2" PAX							
1/8/97	321	5	CS	1" WAS FOR 324, 1" CR S/O							
1/8/97	300		CS	SWITCH FAILURE @ HAMILTON-ANNULLED							
1/8/97	302	15	CS	8" FBG FOR SWITCH PROBLEM @ HAMILTON, 7" MP95 FOR WORK ORDER							
1/8/97	303	5	CS	1° R/T, 11° WORK OFF #3 TRACK							
1/8/97	305	12	CS	11" ALEX, 2" X-OVER AT FNC, 1" #3 TRACK							
1/8/97	307	15	CS	11" S/S NORTH OF BKV WAIT FOR PRM TO WORK OFF #3 TRACK, 6" S/S FOR K65007, 3" CSX S/O, 3" #3 TRACK							
1/9/97	328	5	OT	8" PAX							
1/9/97	332	19	NS	19° CLIFTON SWITCH PROBLEM							
1/9/9 ?	334	5	AM	20° BRU LATE TURN OFF 323							
1/9/97	321	5	NS	2" AF FOR 326, 4" CLIFTON FOR 330							
1/9/97	323	29	AM	20" WAS FOR ORDERS NS							
1/9/97	325	16	NS	13" S/S CP VA A/C R17500							
1/9/97	327	5	AM	6" HANDICAPP LIFT OUT OF SERVICE							
1/9/97	304	5	OT	8" PAX. 3" R/T							
1/9/97	306	5	CS	7" QUANTICO FOLLOWING Q400, 2 R/T							
1/9/97	308	9	CS	10" XR FOR SWITCH PROBLEM, 4" R/T							
1/9/97	310	8	CS	19" FGB LATE TURN OFF 319							
1/9/97	319	16	CS	12" DAHJET FOR 84, 4" CSX S/O,. 1" CR S/O							
1/9/97	303	15	MA	11" WAS-BRAKE PROBLEM, 4" PAX, 2" QUANTICO A/C PO90							
1/13/97	330	9	CS	5" AF FOR 84, 3" ALEX-WAS FOLLOWING 84							
1/13/97	308	5	CS	7 RO FOR FORM D, 2* CSX \$/0							
1/13/97	301	12	CS	1* CSX S/O, 12* SIGNALS DJ, A/C Q400 & P090							

Verification

I, Stephen T. Roberts, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Further, I certify that I am qualified and authorized to file this Verified Statement.

/s/

Stephen T. Roberts Director of Operations - VRE

Dated: October 20, 1997



Verified Statement of Charles H. Banks

I. Qualifications and Introduction

My name is Charles H. Banks. I am President of R.L. Banks & Associates, Inc. ("RLBA"), a firm of transportation economists and engineers, with offices at 1717 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 and at 4 Britton Avenue, Belvedere, CA 94920. I have been RLBA's principal in charge of providing Commuter Rail Economic and Operations Consulting Services for the Virginia Railway Express ("VRE") since RLBA was awarded that competitively bid five-year service contract on June 26, 1995. Further details of my qualifications are set out at Attachment A.

In response to the proposed joint acquisition of Conrail by CSX Corporation ("CSX") and Norfolk Southern Corporation ("NS"), the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and the Petomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission ("Commissions") have asked me and my staff to review and evaluate CSX and NS Operating Plans and supporting materials that CSX, NS and Conrail have filed as part of their Joint Application as well as information they have provided in discovery and other items related to CSX, NS and VRE train performance and VRE ridership.

These matters merit the attention of the Surface Transportation Board ("STB") in this proceeding because, as I will demonstrate, the addition of freight trains reflected in the Applicants' respective Operating Plans, particularly those added by CSX, will adversely impact the on-time performance of VRE commuter trains so significantly as to threaten the viability of continued service on the line. Further, I believe this statement demonstrates that the Applicants' Operating Plans each understate the additional number of freight trains that will move through the VRE service territory. Therefore, the adverse impact of the pending acquisition on VRE service and rights is greater than suggested by the Operating Plans.

The Applicants currently and in the recent past have been providing no more than minimally sufficient levels of support as regards timely operation of VRE trains over tracks owned and dispatched by the Applicants. The proposed acquisition of Conrail promises to impact VRE adversely because it will increase the demand on existing capacity through a substantial increase in the number of freight train operations planned throughout the VRE territory.

In summary, my findings are:

1. The Applicants' Operating Plans reflect the addition of a significant number of freight trains to an existing mixture of freight, commuter and intercity trains on the same tracks over which VRE enjoys rights under extant operating/access agreements to run commuter rail service;

2. The Applicants' claim that VRE commuter train delays can be avoided by careful scheduling is not based on any facts in this proceeding. Applicants did not analyze the impacts on VRE on-time performance of running the additional freight trains that the Applicants expect to result from the merger. Existing VRE commuter trains clearly were ignored in developing the Operating Plans of both NS and CSX;

3. Even if CSX were to have scheduled freight trains in its Operating Plan to have little or no impact on VRE train service, such schedules would be unreliable because CSX's freight trains frequently fail to operate on schedule and because the variance from freight train schedules that either Applicant will tolerate far exceeds that necessary to coordinate freight and commuter train

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operations so that VRE trains will be able to adhere to published schedules and thus operate in a manner which attracts and retains commuters;

4. Even though numerous CSX freight trains fail to operate on schedule, that carrier is unwilling or unable to manage its operations in such as way as to prevent significant delays to VRE commuter trains; each month, a significant number of VRE trains and commuters are delayed waiting for or following freight trains or by other controllable circumstances;

5. VRE has an ongoing program to identify and pay for capital improvements to add operational capability and flexibility to the extant CSX and Conrail lines. VRE's efforts to date will not be sufficient to maintain even the current VRE commuter train on-time performance on the Fredericksburg line once the projected number of CSX freight trains is added;

6. Absent imposition of conditions by the STB, I project that railroad delays to VRE's commuter trains will substantially increase and VRE's on-time performance will fall from the long-term, pre-acquisition average of 85.9 to less than 81.1 percent.

Before discussing my specific findings below, I note that one seminal difference between the Applicants, in fact all other freight railroads, and VRE regards the different perspective in which the parties consider the term "capacity." The Applicants regard capacity as the number of trains that may be operated over the line irrespective of timely performance. For example, the Applicants stated:

Applicants are not aware of any uniform interpretation of the term "railroad line capacity" in all contexts. The term "railroad line capacity" may be defined with reference to numerous factors, which include the maximum volume of trains, tons or

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cars that can be moved over a segment in a given time period safely, cost-effectively, consistent with customer commitments and with minimal delay.¹

To a railroad, minimal delay may mean within an nour or two. For example, over the past month, the average CSX train through Alexandria in either direction varied from its schedule by about three hours. Such a perspective on capacity is meaningless to a commuter train operator such as VRE; if its trains do not consistently arrive at the time shown in public timetables, only the few commuters with no other alternative will ride them and the service will cease to exist. To VRE, a delay is defined as a VRE train arrival at a given station more than five minutes later than scheduled.

Given their differing perspectives, it should not be surprising that the Applicants provide blanket assurances that: (1) adequate capacity exists; and (2) VRE commuter operations will not be impacted. An old railroad saw goes "a railroad time period is fifteen minutes and nothing takes less than one time period and most take several."

The purpose of my statement is to demonstrate that the Operating Plans provided by CSX and NS will not maintain an acceptable level of on-time performance service for VRE, but rather, in fact, will seriously deteriorate it.

1. The Applicants' Operating Plans reflect the addition of a significant number of freight trains to an existing mixture of freight, commuter and intercity trains on the same tracks over which VRE enjoys rights under extant operating/access agreements to run commuter rail service.

¹ Applicants' Responses to First Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission ("Applicants' First Responses"), CSX/NS-79 at 19.

Figure A



Figure B

Post-Merger CSX Freight Trains



In the Applicants' Operating Plans, NS projected a 23 percent increase in freight trains per day, from 7.8 to 9.6 daily, between Alexandria and Manassas.² CSX projected a 44 percent increase in freight traffic in both directions, from 16.3 to 23.4 trains per day between Alexandria and Fredericksburg³, between Alexandria and CP Virginia (D.C. - Virginia line) CSX/Conrail projected an increase of 60 percent from 17.9 to 28.6 freight trains per day⁴

2. The Applicants' claim that VRE commuter train delays can be avoided by careful scheduling is not support able. The Applicants did not analyze the impacts on VRE on-time performance of running the additional freight trains that the Applicants expect to result from the merger. Existing VRE commuter trains clearly were ignored in the Operating Plans of both Applicants.

The Railroad Control Application addressed the issue simply as:

CSX will have sufficient capacity to handle the expected increase (including three tracks, with reverse signals, through the portion of the route in Alexandria that it will operate in common with Amtrak and with VRE trains to and from both Fredericksburg and Manassas).⁵

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² Railroad Control Application ("App"), Vol 3B, Figure D.6-2. Based on post-acquisition NS train schedules, the NS estimate appears to be understated as will be shown later.

³ App., Vol. 3A, Attachment 13-5.

⁴ App., Vol. 3A, Attachment 13-6. CSX apparently has undercounted the number of Amtrak trains and thus the total number of trains on these lines. There are 28 (not 22) trains on the Fredericksburg-Alexandria segment and 45 (not 35) on the Potomac Yard-Virginia Avenue segment.

⁵ App., Vol. 3A at 280.

There will be no identifiable adverse impacts on Amtrak or commuter operations as a result of NS' operation of the defined Conrail lines.⁶

VRE sought through interrogatories a more detailed description of any analyses that led to such claims by asking the Applicants to identify the capacity and capacity index ratings (a measure used by CSX for prioritizing capacity improvements) assigned to the subject lines only to receive the

following responses:

CSX: The nodes for the RF&P Subdivision which encompasses the Subject Lines have not yet been coded into the system and therefore no capacity ratings have been made for that subdivision.⁷

NS: NS does not use any formalized process or system to rate the NS subject line for capacity or assign capacity index ratings.⁸

In response to VRE questions, John W. Orrison of CSX stated in his deposition:

We have put in place schedules that our freight trains can adhere to these transit time schedules. That includes the time to wait for meets or passes, to allow for windows or, you know, the movements of different trains which would be the other passenger trains since they can't occupy the same tracks at a time.⁹

In my examination of the proposed freight schedules, I have focused upon scheduled through

intermodal and freight trains since local, way freight and other trains are expected to exit main tracks

in favor of all scheduled trains. VRE trains operate over CSX within two fairly narrow windows of

just over four hours in the morning and four hours in the evening.

⁶ App., Vol. 3B at 289 [similar unsubstantiated assurances may be found in Vol. 3B at 299 and 306).

⁷ Applicants' First Responses at 21.

⁸ Applicants' First Responses at 20.

⁹ Orrison Tr. at 532.

I found a disturbing change between present and post-acquisition freight schedules. As illustrated in Table 1, current CSX schedules indicate 43 percent of CSX freight trains share the Alexandria - Fredericksburg corridor with VRE trains. As can be readily seen from the stringline in Figure A, most CSX trains currently operate outside the windows. Post-acquisition, the number of scheduled trains sharing the corridor with VRE trains increases by nearly half again, to 63 percent. Please note that this analysis dropped CSX trains Q403 and Q402 which operate only a short distance from Long Bridge to interchange with NS at Alexandria. (Including these trains would decrease the current percentage to 38 percent.)

Post-merger, when CSX adds 7 trains per day to this line, due to new or revised schedules, 6 out of these 7 trains will be added to the morning and evening periods into which VRE's commuter trains are restricted at the insistence of CSX. I prepared two stringline figures to graphically illustrate how the concentration of CSX freight trains increases within VRE commuter train hours. Figure B illustrates post-acquisition schedules. Notice that the post-acquisition concentration of freight trains within the shaded morning period during which VRE operates seven trains and Amtrak operates four trains and the shaded evening period within which VRE operates five trains and Amtrak operates four trains. I have only portrayed the situation south of Alexandria; north of that location is even busier with all NS freight trains added to the mix. CSX, NS, VRE and Amtrak schedules are provided in Attachment B.

Proposed CSX schedules, in fact, appear to completely ignore the existence of VRE trains. For example,

TABLE 1 CSX TRAINS BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA and FREDERICKSBURG

1995 Base	Post-Acquisition	Increase		
Trains	Trains	(Percent)		

Source: Application Volume 3A, Attachment 13-5; Highly Confidential Depository Train Schedules; RLBA estimates.

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Given this tight, theoretical scheduling, it will take an unrealistically perfect railroad, superb dispatching, no mechanical, track or signal breakdowns nor any maintenance forces obtaining track time, and consistent on-time CSX train performance, to keep CSX trains from delaying VRE trains. However, based on CSX's present performance, the proposed freight train schedules cannot be realized without delaying a number of VRE trains every single weekday on the jointly used track segment.

Currently, 50 percent of NS scheduled intermodal and merchandise trains run during hours when VRE commuter rail service also is operated. Despite NS's assurances, it too has scheduled post-acquisition freight trains without regard for VRE commuter rail service schedules. Post-

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acquisition, this percentage is forecast in the Operating Plan to increase to 75 percent of scheduled intermodal and merchandise trains. In adding four new scheduled trains, the Operating Plan places all four within the two peak periods (3.5 hours in the morning and 4.5 hours in the evening) during which all VRE trains operate (Table 2).

Hence, the NS acquisition of Conrail lines and the accompanying train rescheduling will initiate a new and presumably permanent conflict between freight and commuter trains. As freight traffic in the Manassas corridor increases, conflicts and delays to commuter trains will become more frequent.

Two other discrepancies demonstrate that NS has not performed any meaningful analysis regarding the scheduling of freight trains in which confidence can be reposed: (1) its Triple Crown trains are scheduled to enter the NEC before 10 p.m. and exit it after 6 am, violating current Amtrak operating policy; and (2) it has continued to insist that only 1.8 trains per day would be added to the Manassas line despite providing train schedules in the depository which add eight new trains and eliminate the current four through freights, for a net gain of four trains (averaging 3.5 over seven days of the week).

Between Alexandria and CP Virginia, the impact of NS and CSX freight traffic increases (detailed above) will be cumulative. Total daily freight trains will increase from 17.9 to 28.6 (Table 3). Even more dramatically, the number of freight trains that operate within commuter peak period hours on either the Fredericksburg or Manassas lines that must also operate between Alexandria and CP Virginia triples from 6 to 18. This will be a busy and congested railroad twice a day.

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TABLE 2 NS TRAINS BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA and MANASSAS

1

Post-Acquisition	Increase
Trains	(Percent)
	Post-Acquisition Trains

Source: Application Volume 3B, Figure D.6-2; Highly Confidential Depository Train Schedules; RLBA estimates.

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TABLE 3 CSX AND NS TRAINS BETWEEN CP VIRGINIA and ALEXANDRIA

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1995 BasePost-AcquisitionIncreaseTrainsTrains(Percent)

Source: Application Volume 3A, Attachment 13-6; Highly Confidential Depository Freight Schedules; RLBA estimates.

3. Even were CSX to have scheduled freight trains in its Operating Plan to have little or no impact on VRE train service, such schedules would be unreliable because CSX's freight trains frequently fail to operate on schedule and the variance from freight train schedules that either Applicant will tolerate far exceeds that necessary to coordinate freight and commuter train operations so that VRE trains will be able to adhere to published schedules and thus operate in a manner that attracts and retains commuters.

CSX has proposed pro forma, theoretical, optimum schedules which require the careful threading of many freight trains through peak-period VRE commuter train schedules, employing sewing skills CSX has yet to demonstrate in the real world as it attempts to manage even fewer freight trains operating currently. However, its freight trains do not adhere to planned schedules. I examined the CSX scheduled freight train performance at Potomac Yard (Alexandria) for a 29-day period between September 18 and October 16, 1997. Only 36 percent of CSX freight trains examined operated ahead of or not more than Table 4 lists the actual performance. During that period, the average CSX train deviated from schedule an average of CSX's four premier, intermodal trains were much more

consistent, deviating from schedule only an average Figure C shows the wide dispersion from scheduled arrival times for all trains,

Intermodal trains operated far closer to schedule with most operating within The intermodal train on-time performance standard deviation was The superior performance of CSX's intermodal trains is only relative to all other CSX freight

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Table 4 CSX Freight Train Performance Number of Minutes Ahead or Behind Schedule

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Figure C

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CSX Through Freight Train On-Time Performance Actual Hours Early or Late Compared With Schedule

108

Figure D

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CSX Intermodal Freight Train On-Time Performance Actual Hours Early or Late Compared With Schedule trains. CSX intermodal train on-time performance, falling as it does within one hour of schedule itself would be insufficiently schedule-adherent to permit scheduled operation of mixed freight, VRE commuter and Amtrak intercity trains in the same corridor. Daily variances of this magnitude indicate that there is no consistent, predictable performance pattern and, therefore, no regular meeting points can be assumed between VRE commuter and CSX freight trains; that CSX clearly has far more tolerance of schedule variance than does VRE; and that the scheduling information provided by CSX in its Operating Plan is not indicative of actual operating times.

4. Even though numerous CSX freight trains fail to operate on schedule, that carrier is unwilling or unable to manage its operations in such as way as to prevent significant delays to VRE commuter trains; each month, a significant number of VRE trains and commuters are delayed waiting for or following freight trains or by other controllable circumstances.

In managing its day-to-day operations, CSX dispatchers must identify and react to a new and different real-world freight train scenario each and every day. Their goal is to advance all trains as efficiently as possible. While they are skilled professionals, each day they must play a game like chess with new pitfalls to avoid, attempting to advance "pieces" in both directions on a fixed and limited number of slots. Unlike the game of chess, however, when a CSX dispatcher makes an erroneous decision, a VRE train and hundreds of unhappy commuters may be delayed, sometimes up to an hour or two. This situation undoubtedly will worsen as dispatchers try to deal with a chess board with too many pieces on it.

Just because a freight train does not adhere to schedule does not mean that VRE commuter train delays must result but, under CSX management, delay to VRE trains too often have been the

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result of CSX freight train deviations from schedule. Whatever its freight train performance, CSX makes numerous decisions each day which affect VRE trains: freight and Amtrak intercity trains are advanced or held; maintenance activities are scheduled; dispatchers choose the trains or locations needing their attention. CSX obviously has priorities which guide these individual decisions, and VRE clearly does not stand high on that list of priorities. Whatever CSX might state about past, present or future performance, the result of its past decisions has been substantial delay to VRE trains, which can only get worse when freight train traffic increases post-acquisition.

Delays to VRE commuter trains attributable to CSX operations are detailed in item 6 below, but at this point suffice it to say that 8.5 percent of VRE Fredericksburg line trains during the period April 1996 through September 1997 (excluding the derailment-marred months of July and August 1997) were delayed five minutes or more as the direct result of CSX actions or failures to act. Many of these delays were attributable to CSX operations decisions, including freight trains and maintenance activities. Let me reiterate that these delays to 8.5 percent of VRE commuter trains were caused solely by CSX; other causes of delay such as mechanical or other failures on the part of VRE's equipment of of its service operator are excluded from the 8.5 percent figure.

5. VRE has an ongoing program to identify and pay for capital improvements to add operational capability and flexibility to the extant CSX and Conrail lines; VRE's efforts to date will not be sufficient to maintain VRE commuter train on-time performance on the Fredericksburg line once the projected number of CSX freight trains is added.

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As discussed in the verified statements of VRE officials herein, VRE has worked and continues to work with CSX to reduce the impacts of heavily utilized CSX railroad infrastructure by funding a series of capital improvements designed to add capacity and/or flexibility.

Despite these improvements, if the post-acquisition freight trains that CSX and NS reflect in their respective Operating Plans are added to the Fredericksburg line during the peak commuter hours, the crush of new trains will be so great that dispatchers will not enjoy the necessary flexibility and capacity to enable VRE trains to meet on-time customer expectations.

To provide an analogy, I would compare the situation to a winding and hilly two-lane highway with a limited number of dashed line safe passing strips. The capacity improvements inprogress funded by VRE effectively add more or longer passing strips on the hills, so that light, short VRE and Amtrak trains (equating to cars on the highway) have more locations to pass the slower freight trains (equating to the rest on the highway). While VRE's improvements will enable its (and Amtrak's) trains (cars) to pass freight trains (trucks) and remain on-time regardless of where the freight trains (trucks) may be encountered, both Applicants now propose to add a number of freight trains (slow, heavy trucks) in both directions. This means that there are more slow, freight trucks that must be passed to traverse the road, but increased truck traffic in the opposing direction means that there are fewer places on the road w⁴ ere faster traffic can pass, so the VRE commuter trains (cars) wind up being delayed as they follow the freight trains (trucks) for miles.

Many VRE-funded improvements to the CSX line are designed to provide the opportunity to pass a train moving in the same direction, using the other track. However, CSX has added so many freight trains within the limited VRE commuter train operating periods that, post-acquisition, it will

- 13 -

often become infeasible to use the other track because it already will be occupied by or reserved for immediate use by a series of CSX freight trains (or Amtrak trains) in the opposite direction.

6. Absent imposition of conditions by the STB, I project that railroad delays to VRE's commuter trains will increase and VRE's on-time performance will fall from the long-term, preacquisition average of 85.9 to less than 81.1 percent.

If the Applicants follow the proposed Operating Plan post-acquisition, I estimate VRE's ontime performance will decline by at least five percent. This would reduce long term on-time performance from about 85.9 (based on July 1995-August 1997) to below 81.1 percent. This probably understates the impact, as I applied a conservative approach to projecting delays that fails to fully reflect the interaction between multiple train delays that will occur on a busy rail line i. llowing a single adverse incident and thus underestimates the resultant reduction in on-time performance.

My approach to evaluating on-time performance was to review VRE train delay data from April 1996 through September 1997 (excluding July and August 1997 derailment delays). The delays caused by either CSX or NS were attributed to seven "delay type" categories including mechanical freight train breakdown, track and signal maintenance (including both failures and detours around program workforces), delay from other passenger trains, holding for freight trains, waiting on orders from the dispatcher, rules tests, and other congestion problems. Mechanical, freight train and other congestion delays were projected to increase at a rate corresponding to the increase in the number of freight trains scheduled during the hours of VRE commuter train operations. Track, signal and dispatcher delays probably also would increase at a similar rate due to

- 14 -

increased congestion, but to be conservative, I limited these types to no more than half the rate of increase in the number of freight trains. Finally, commuter train and rules test delays were assumed not to increase. As a result of this analysis, I project that CSX freight train-caused delays experienced by VRE Fredericksburg line trains would increase by 4.8 percent from 8.5 percent to 13.3 percent (Table 5) (an increase of 56.5 percent) and that corresponding VRE Manassas line delays would increase by 4.8 percent, from 9.7 to 14.5 percent as shown in Table 6 (an increase of 49.5 percent).

This delay prediction is seriourly understated by my conservative approach. As more freight trains are operated on the line, the decreased opportunities for CSX dispatchers to react to mechanical, track or signal breakdowns by switching VRE commuter trains to the other track will result in more and more VRE commuter trains becoming delayed behind freight trains or because of infrastructure problems.

While there is no known formula to correlate ridership with on-time performance, increasing the frequency of passenger train delays by one-third or more obviously will reduce ridership. Unlike the derailment delays, persistent long-term unreliability is not a short-term event which can be planned or otherwise anticipated and accommodated by VRE customers. The decline in on-time performance flowing from the planned increases in freight train movements would have adverse, long-term impacts on VRE ridership.

In addition to the delay issues discussed above one must consider negative ridership impacts that will result from several construction projects that CSX must implement to realize its anticipated merger benefits. To initiate its proposed automobile service between Northern New Jersey and the

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Table 5 Projected Post-Acquisition Delays to VRE Trains as a Result of Increased Freight Traffic During Peak Periods Fredericksburg Line

	CSX/Co	nrail line between	n CP Virginia	a and Freder	icksburg		
	Base P	eriod	Post-Acquisition				
Delay Type	Freights During Peak Periods	Actual VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes	Freights During Peak Periods	Rate of Increased Delay (percent)	Projected VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes		
Nechanical	6	21	12	100%	42		
rack	6	36	12	50%	54		
Signal	6	135	12	50%	203		
Freight	6	75	12	100%	150		
Passenger	6	61	12	0%	61		
Dispatcher	6	12	12	50%	18		
Rules Test	6	1	12	0%	1		
Congestion	6	2	12	100%	4		
Total		343			533		
/RE Trains Operated		4018			4018		
		8.5%			13.3%		

Data is from April 1996 through September 1997 excluding July and August 1997, which had unusual derailment and signal delays.

Source: VRE delay reports; RLBA estimates.

Table 6

Projected Post-Acquisition Delays to VRE Trains as a Result of Increased Freight Traffic During Peak Periods Manassas Line

	CSX/C	nrail line betwe	en CP Vir	ninia and Ale	xandria	NS line between Alexandria and Manassas/Broad Run					TOTAL BOTH RAILROADS CP Virginia and Manassas	
	Base	Period	Post-Acquisition			Base Period		P	Post-Acquisiti			Post-Acq.
Delay	Freights During Peak Periods	Actual VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes	Freights During Peak Periods	Rate of Increased Delay (percent)	Projected VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes	Freights During Peak Periods	Actual VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes	Freights During Peak Periods	Rate of Increased Delay (percent)	Projected VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes	Actual VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes	Projected VRE Delays Exceeding 5 Minutes
Mechanical	8	4	18	125%	9	2	0	6	200%	0	4	9
rack	8	20	18	50%	30	2	107	6	50%	161	127	191
Signal	8	53	18	50%	80	2	56	6	50%	85	109	164.62
reight	8	31	18	125%	70	2	20	6	200%	60	51	130
Dascenner	8	55	18	0%	55	2	33	6	0%	33	88	88
natcher	8	10	18	50%	15	2	5	6	50%	8	15	23
Puloe Toet	8	5	18	0%	5	2	44	6	0%	44	49	49
Concrestion	8	4	18	125%	9	2	5	6	200%	15	9	24
Total	Ŭ	182			273		270			406	452	679
/RE Trains (Operated	4672			4672		4672			4672	4672	4672
Percent dela	yed	3.9%			5.8%		5.8%			8.7%	9.7%	14.5%

Data is from April 1996 through September 1997 excluding July and August 1997 which had unusual derailment and signal delays.

Source: VRE delay reports; RLBA estimates.

The Virginia Avenue Tunnel is adjacent to, not part of VRE service routes. Its reconstruction will require large work force windows for nearly six months. Based upon past CSX practices this will result in delays to several VRE trains each week as northbound CSX trains await passage through the common approach tracks used to access both Virginia Avenue and the adjacent Union station tunnels.

These delays are <u>additional</u> burdens that will still further reduce use of VRE trains by its customers so that CSX can realize its merger benefits. Some of these anticipated, imposed delays will be avoidable through careful train and workforce scheduling, but history suggests that these projects will significantly add to the other delays discussed herein.

Potential for Even More Freight Trains and More Commuter Delays

My analysis has been based upon historical performance and the Applicants' Operating Plans, as set forth in the Application and supporting documents and testimony. However, there is a strong probability that actual freight traffic will increase even more than the Applicants acknowledge. I offer two examples related to CSX traffic. First, CSX claims sufficient capacity on its Fredericksburg - Alexandria line, but last month it instituted a new local train between Sealston and Annapolis Junction, Maryland to haul garbage. Currently, about an hour before the end of VRE evening operations, this local train is scheduled to enter the CSX line just north of Fredericksburg and head northward just ahead of Amtrak #66. This train will consume additional line capacity beyond that which is reflected in CSX's Operating Plan. Second, CSX's Application identifies a new unified route which encompasses VRE's Fredericksburg line and states:

The New Orleans Service Route offers an alternative route for chemicals and merchandise traffic that is currently routed through St. Louis or Memphis. For many origin-destination pairs, such as Houston to Philadelphia, the route through New Orleans is significantly shorter and more efficient. ... The increase of merchandise traffic through New Orleans will create an opportunity to pre-block UP and BNSF traffic as far east as Hamlet and Waycross.¹⁰

It is apparent to me that the creation of the New Orleans Service Route in and of itself is both testimony to the likelihood that CSX expects at least the potential for significant traffic volumes to be captured, not to mention the likelihood that the creation of a Service Route might well induce additional demand over that trackage. In any case, I believe the impact on VRE on-time performance of additional CSX freight trains operating through the VRE commuter service territory because of the subject merger is understated in the Applicant's Operating Plan because the impact of creating the New Orleans Service Route is not reflected in the portion of the Plan addressing the VRE service territory.

¹⁰ App., Vol. 3A at 131-32.

For NS, I also offer two examples of capacity consuming additional freight traffic not reflected in its Operating Plan which will adversely affect VRE on-time performance. First, NS claims that freight trains between Alexandria and Manassas will increase by only 1.8 trains per day. Current operations include four scheduled trains (341, 342, 203 and 204) plus three local trains and occasional coal trains. The Application indicates that NS will replace the existing four scheduled trains with eight new trains (Application Volume 3B Figure C 3-5 trains TCATPS, TCPSAT, IMBLNO, IMNOBL, GMLIOI, GMOILI, GMROBL and GMBLRO). Eight less four equals four additional trains, which when adjusted for less frequent Triple Crown Service, averages about 3.5 trains per day.

Second, NS has indicated it will route coal trains from west of Roanoke, Virginia to Baltimore via Riverton, Hagerstown, Harrisburg and Perryville. It claims as a benefit of the merger that the reroute of coal trains via "... Hagerstown and the Shenandoah Valley will save up to 200 miles per train and 143 miles on average."¹¹

Examination of Map One shows that NS could shave another 109 miles off the route between West Virginia and Baltimore by using its route via Riverton Jct. and Alexandria. I am confident that when NS implements its initial post-merger operating strategy, it will route those coal trains the 130 miles via Riverton Jct. - Manassas - Baltimore (Canton), including 36 miles on the NEC rather than the 239 miles necessary to move the traffic via the Riverton Jct. - Hagerstown - Harrisburg -Baltimore (Canton) route which includes a near equivalent 32 miles via Amtrak's NEC. Both

¹¹ App., Vol. 3B at 148.



Source: Norfolk Southern Railway 1995 Map; RLBA editing.

Applicants have clearly indicated that all freight schedules are subject to change. Therefore, a postmerger reroute of this NS coal traffic via a more efficient Alexandria route will increase traffic and adversely impact VRE commuter operations, absent the imposition of STB conditions. Consequently, VRE asked the following interrogatory and received the noted response:

5. (a) Describe in detail any analysis or evaluation by NS for routing coal traffic that currently is routed or is projected to be routed postacquisition to the greater Baltimore, Maryland area via Riverton Junction, Virginia-Hagerstown, Maryland-Harrisburg, Pennsylvania-Perryville, Maryland, over an alternative route from Riverton Junction, Virginia to the Baltimore area via Manassas, Virginia-Alexandria, Virginia-Landover, Maryland; (b) with respect to such alternative routing, please identify any reasons why such routing would be infeasible or otherwise unacceptable to NS; (c) describe in detail why NS would not route coal traffic to the Baltimore area via Manassas-Alexandria-Landover route when such route is substantially shorter that the route via Hagerstown-Harrisburg-Perryville. Response

5. Without waiving any objection, and subject to the General Objections set forth above, NS responds as follows:

Analysis and evaluation made by NS of coal traffic routes may be found in the NS Operating Plan, Volume 3B, and supporting work papers. Coal schedules and descriptions may be found in Volume 3B at pages 147-153. Projected train schedules may be found in Applicants' depository. See NS-21-CO-07358-09247. The NS Operating Plan attempts to route all traffic in the expanded NS system in the most efficient manner possible. The NS coal routings identified in the Application are considered by NS to be the most efficient routings in light of other traffic and overall operational considerations.¹²

¹² Applicants' Responses to Second Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission, CSX/NS - 109 at 8.


The response provides no explanation of why NS will not reroute the proposed coal traffic once operating considerations (e.g. train crew contracts) are revised. Moreover, in his deposition, Mr. McClellan of NS acknowledged that the Manassas -Baltimore route was "much shorter" than the Hagerstown - Harrisburg route, conceded NS's long-standing desire to route more coal traffic over the Manassas line, and expressed the hope that, over time, NS would obtain more coal and other business over that line into the Baltimore and Wilmington markets.¹³

Based upon the above examples, it is clear that rail freight traffic over lines upon which VRE operates will increase more than the Applicants have stated to the STE. When that occurs, absent protection imposed by STE, merger-related impacts such as delays to VRE commuter trains will increase for all of the reasons set forth above, and VRE's continued service to the citizens of Virginia and Washington, D.C. will be in peril.

¹³ McClellan Tr. at 300-05.

Attachment A

Qualifications

of

Charles H. Banks

Charles H. Banks, President, R.L. Banks & Associates, Inc., earned an MBA from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1977 with concentrons in Finance and Transportation and received a BA in Economics from Haverford College in 1974.

Since joining RLBA in 1985, Mr. Banks has focused on evaluating the economics advanced in connection with financing the rehabilitation, expansion or acquisition of numerous short line and regional railroads and assessing their potential viability. He interviewed hundreds of the largest existing and prospective rail customers on the Iowa Interstate Railroad, Gulf & Mississippi Railroad, Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad and more than a dozen other prospective enterprises as well as many large industrial customers served by Class I railroads.

In connection with acquisition financing of Wisconsin Central Ltd. by Irving Trust, New York Life and Berkshire Partners, Mr. Banks conducted special studies of the highly competitive pulp and paper, TOFC and coal markets. He researched the economics of unit train operations on light density freight lines and, with an RLBA colleague, co-authored a Utility Data Institute analysis entitled, "Is Your Railroad Leaving Town? New Transportation Challenges and Opportunities for Coal Producers and Users." Mr. Banks has participated in a number of the firm's waste-by-rail assignments and, with another RLBA colleague, co-authored articles published in The Management of World Wastes.

Mr. Banks has provided strategic railroad line evaluation and acquisition counsel to more than two dozen clients. On behalf of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, the New York City Economic Development Corporation, the Alameda Transportation Corridor (Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles) and the Maryland Mass Transportation Administration, Mr. Banks has managed strategic planning, valuation and negotiation efforts in connection with the acquisition of rail lines for emergent passenger, freight or joint operations.

Prior to joining RLBA, Mr. Banks was Director of Strategic and Financial Planning with the United States Railway Association, a public corporation which restructured bankrupt Northeast railroads into Conrail. His primary responsibility was to identify Conrail's competitive advantages and its potential for increased profits. He also directed studies to rebut claims, exceeding \$1.3 billion, against the government.

Previously, Mr. Banks conducted financial studies in the Costing and Economic Analysis section of Conrail's Finance Department and, subsequently, joined that carrier's Strategic Planning department. At Southern Pacific's Bureau of Transportation Research, he developed and implemented management information systems, studied rail line viability and testified before the Oregon and California Public Utilities Commissions. He also has worked in the Operating and Market Research Departments of three large railroads.

Attachment B Page 1 of 21

CSX PRESENT AND POST-ACQUISITION FREIGHT TRAIN SCHEDULES

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Attachment B Page 2 of 21

NS PRESENT AND POST-ACQUISITION FREIGHT TRAIN SCHEDLES

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Train Schedules

(As of September 22, 1997)

FREDERICKSBURG LINE - Northbound

Train #	300	302	304	306	84*	308	310	86*	94/194*	80*
Frequency	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-Sa	M-F	M-F	Daily	Daily	Daily
FREDERICKSBURG	5 15a	5 46a	6 22a	6 57a	718a	7 28a	8 10a	8 38a	11 22a	4 44p
LEELAND RD	5 21	5 52	6 28	7 03		7 34	8 16			
BROOKE	5 26	5 57	6 3 3	7 08		7 39	8 21			
QUANTICO	5 38	6 0 9	645	7 20	7 37	7 51	8 33	8 58a	11 42a	5 03p
RIPPON	5 47	618	6 54	7 29		8 00	8 41			
WOODBRIDGE	5 52	6 24	7 00	7 35	7 50	8 06	8 47	9 10a	11 52a	
LORTON	5 58	631	7 07	7 42		8 12	8 52			
FRAN/SPFLD	604	6 38	714	749		8 18	8 59			
ALEXANDRIA	617	648	7 24	7 59	8 09	8 30	910	9 30a	12 10p	5 33p
CRYSTAL CITY	6 26	6 57	7 33	8 08		8 39	919			
L'ENFANT	633	7 04	7 40	8 15		8 46	9 26			
UNION STATION	6 43a	714	7 50a	8 25a	8 35a	8 56a	9 38a	9 55a	12 35p	5 55p

FREDERICKSBURG LINE - Southbound

Train #	319	79*	95*	301	303	305	93/99*	307	309	85*
Frequency	M-F	Daily	M-Sa	M-F	M-F	M-F	Su-F	M-F	M-F	Daily
UNION STATION	6 53a	10 20a	3 05p	4 05p	4 40p	5 15p	5 45p	5 55p	6 40p	8:15p
L'ENFANT				413	4 4 8	5 23		6 02	6 47	
CRYSTAL CITY				4 21	4 56	5 31		611	6 52	
ALEXANDRIA	707	10 37	3 23	4 29	5 04	5 39	6 03	619	6 59	8 32
FRAN/SPFLD				4 38	513	5 48		628	7 08	
LORTON				4 4 5	5 20	5 55		634	715	
WOODBRIDGE		10 55	3 41	4 53	5 28	6 03		641	721	8 49
RIPPON				4 58	5 33	6 08		646	7 26	
QUANTICO	735	11 06	3 53	5 07	5 42	617	630	6 55	735	9 01
BROOKE				5 18	5 53	6 28		7 06	7 44	
LEELAND RD				5 24	5 59	6 34		712	7 50	
FREDERICKSBURG	8 00a	11 25a	411p	5 35p	611p	6 46p	6 48p	7 260	8 04p	9 19p

Attachment B Page 4 of 21



(As of September 22, 1997)



Train #	322	324	326	328	330	332	20*	334	50*
Frequency	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	Daily	M-F	Su,W,F
BROAD RUN	5 20a	5 50a	6 25a	6 50a	7 25a	7 50a		5 40p	
MANASSAS	5 2 5	5 57	6 32	6 57	7 32	7 57	8 19a	5 46	6 55p
MANASSAS PARK	5 30	6 0 2	637	7 02	7 37	8 02			
BURKE CENTRE	5 4 3	615	6 50	715	7 50	815			
ROLLING RD	5 47	619	6 54	719	7 54	819			
BACKLICK RD	5 53	6 26	701	7 26	8 01	8 26			
ALEXANDRIA	6 0 5	6 38	713	7 38	813	8 38	9 05a	618	7 42p
CRYSTAL CITY	613	648	723	7 48	8 23	8 48			
L'ENFANT	618	6 55	7 30	7 55	8 30	8 55			
UNION STATION	6 28a	7 05a	7 40a	8 05a	8 40a	9 05a	9 33a	7 00p	810p

MANASSAS LINE - Northbound

MANASSAS LINE - Southbound

Train #	321	51*	323	325	327	329	331	19*	333
Frequency	M-F	Su,W,F	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	Daily	M-F
UNION STATION	6 38a	11 30a	3 55p	4 25p	5 05p	5 35p	6 25p	7 15p	7 25p
L'ENFANT			4 02	4 32	512	5 4 3	6 32		7 32
CRYSTAL CITY			4 08	4 38	518	5 4 9	638		7 38
ALEXANDRIA	6 5 5	11 49	415	4 4 5	5 25	5 56	644	734	7 44
BACKLICK RD			4 26	4 56	5 36	607	6 5 5		7 55
ROLLING RD			4 33	5 03	5 43	613	7 01		8 01
BURKE CENTRE			4 38	5 08	5 49	619	7 06		8 06
MANASSAS PARK			4 51	521	6 03	633	7 20		8 20
MANASSAS	7 34	12 24a	4 57	5 27	610	638	7 25	8 08p	8 25
BROAD RUN	7 40a		5 08p	5 38p	621p	6 50p	7 37p		8 37p



Boston • Hartford • New York • Philadelphia • Baltimore • Washington • Newport News

Service/Train Name >			Northeast- Direct Twilight Shoreliner	Northeast- Direct Capitol Sunnse	Metroliner	Metrofine	Carolinian	Keystone	Metroliner	Pennsyl- vanian	Silver Paim	Metroliner
Train Number >			67	159	201	101	79	641	103	43	00	105
Normal Days of Operation >		-	Daily	M-F	M-F	M-F	Daily	M-F	M.F	Raily	Delby	105
Will Also Operate >										Unity	Dany	Mer
Will Not Operate	-			8/1	-	87		8/1	-		-	-
On Board Service >			C.a		Reserved	Reserved	30		-	C	Aure	Reserved
Boston, MA	Mile	1	-									
Boston, MA-Back Bay Sta	-	00	0.000					No			1	17
Route 128. MA	+	-	P 8 08P					Food			- 20 -	
Providence, RI	1 11	-						Service			1 35	1
Kingston, RI	1 7.	+++	0 36P								1 38 -	1.
Westerly RI	1 07		9180								29	
Myatic CT	8/	-	A 72h									
New London CT /Forwards Carne A	90	-	1								Lºa	
Old Savbrook CT	106	-	9 55P									
Sotiontiald MA	124	-	10 15P						1			
S Windsor Locks CT	98	-	+ +									
S Windsor CT	113	-	++						C. A.		L 8.	1
Hartford CT	118		++								1 3 5 1	
Barlin CT	124	-										12.000
e Maridao CT	135	++										
Wallingtond CT	142		++									
Wannigiord. C1	148	11	++			1						(a
New Haven, CT	160	Ar	10 55P									
Bridgepart. Ct	173	T	11130							-		
Stamford, CT	106	++-	12024									-
New Rochelle, NY	312		12034									i she
	272		1									S
New York, NY-Penn Sta	231	Do	1 304		5 204	6 004	- c					+
Newark. NJ	242	T	1 554		D S ASA	DETEA	AR C TEA	0 2UA	7004	7 15A	DI 746A	8 00 A
Metropark, NJ	256		2 104		5 504	A 0 154	CH 5 JAA	H 5 37A	R 7 15A	R 7 31A	ARO 8 AP	R 8 15A
New Brunswick, NJ	264		1		3 300	0 204	AB+C	6 51A	7 284	7 45A		8 28A
Princeton Jct., NJ	280		1					5 59A		7 53A		
Trenton, NJ	289		2 244		6 154	ACPO		7 12A		8 06A		
North Philadelphia, PA	318		- com		0 244	5 54A	/ 12A	7 22A		8 16A	R 8 53A	
Dhile DA	122	Ar	2054					7 43A		8 37A		
Filld., PA-30th St Sta		Dp	4 05A	6 10A	6 54A	7 244	0 7 40A	7 54A		8 48A		
Wilmington. DE	348		4 3JA	6 32A	7 154	7 454	RI B 11A		8 354		CH 94/A	9 14A
Newark, DE	360							Tat	0 334		EN10 13A	9 35A
Aberdeen, MD	388			7 00A				Hamiahura		10		-
Baltimore, MD- Penn Sta	416		5 30A	7 27A	A DO A	8 304	A 2 024	name burg		ternsburg.		
BWI Airport Rell Sta., MD	427		5 43A	7 404	8 134	3 300	Q IEA		9 204	Pittaburgh	CIRII OBA	10 20A
New Carrollton. MD	448		5 58A	D 7 544			0 224		9334			10 33A
Washington, DC	457	Ar Do	6 15A	8 10A	8 34A	9 03A	C 9 50A		9 58A			- 10 50A
Alexandria, VA	466		7 184				10 20A		-	- to a labor	DIR12 25P	
Woodbridge, VA	482		104				510 3/A				E12 44P	
Guentico, VA	402	-	7.464				B10 55A					
Fredericksburg, VA	512		ROSA				511 06A					
Ashland, VA	556	-	BASA				E11 25A					
Diehmand Ma	560	4	0 45A									c
Hichmond, VA	300	Do	9 154				CO12 27P				@ 2 25P	
Williamsburg, VA	621		10 204				Te					
Newport News. VA	644	Ar	10 504				Charter				To	
E C alter Char			10 JUA				Chanotte				Florida	

Kewe, VA
(ET) 644 Ar
10 50A
Char
Custom Class service available.
Stops only to discharge passengers.
R Stops only to receive passengers.
Reservations required fir travel to or from this station.
Siepeing Car service available.
Club Class Service available.
Club Class Service available.
Club Class Service available.
Amtrak Express Shipping and Checked Baggage services at stations indicated.
Amtrak Thruway connecting bus.
Note: Train 67. The Twillight Shoreliner, handles Amtrak Express Shipping between select stations. For uetails, call 1-800-368-TRAK.

Amtrak Throway Bus Conn Virginia Beach, VA. Reservation	and require	mport d.	-	VAV
Connecting Trein Number			A . 4	3. 17
Days of Operation	+1	Mile		TONY
Newport News, VA Norfolk, VA Virginia Beach, VA	(ET) (ET)	100	Dp Ar	DTT 454

boston - nat tion		IVIA					-		Charles Colored	-		
Service/Train Name -	-	Weekend Metroliner	Northeast- Direct Congres- sional	Metrolin er	Weekend Metroliner	Northeast- Direct Bankers	birect Foggy Bottom	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Direct Mount Vernon	Direct Nutmeg State	Keystone
Train Number >		205	181	107	207	141	183	109	209	185	143	643
Normal Days of Operation >		Sa	Daily	M-F	Su	M-F	Sa	M-F	Sa	M-F	SaSu	SaSu
Will Also Operate >		8/31			-				6/21		-	-
Will Not Operate >				-	8/31	8/1		-		8/1		
On Board Service -		Reserved O		Reserved	Reserved O	Ē		0	o		C	
Boston MA	-											No
BUSIUII, IVIA-South Sta. (ET)	00						-					Food
Douton, MA - Dack Day Sta.	-			-								Service
HOULE 128, MA												
Florence, HI	-											
Kingston, Hi	-				-					1		
Meeterly, HI	-				-					1.		
Mystic, CT	-								-	1		
New London, CT (Foxwoods Casino ew)	-			-						1		
Old Saybrook. CT	-					5 354	-		P	5	6 40A	
Springfield, MA	-				-	5 55A					7 00A	
Windsor Locks. CT	-				-	3004					7 05A	
Windsor, CT	_					6 124				1	7 17A	
a Hertford, CT	-			1	1	6 254		1	· · · · · /	1	7 30A	
Berlin, CT	-				-	6 344			1.00		7 39A	1
S Meriden, CT	-					6 424		-			7 47A	
Wallingford, CT				-		7.074					8 10A	
New Haven, CT	Dp		1000			7 17A	-				8 20A	
Bridgeport, CT				1	-	7 40A					8424	-
Stamford, CT				-		8 06A					9084	
New Rochelle, NY		1			1	8 28A					9 284	-
New York NV	Ar				0.000	9 00A	9 204	10.004	10 004	10 20A	10 00A	10 40
NEW TOTR, NT-Penn Sta.	Dp	8 00/	8 05	900	900	9204	0 0 26	B10 154	B10 154	B10 364	10 364	B10 56
Newark, NJ	-	R 8 15/	H 821	A H 9 15/	H 9 15/	9 300	9 50	1 10 104	10 284	10 504	10 504	
Metropark, NJ		8 28/	8 35	928	920	3 300	3 50		10			
New Brunswick, NJ				-								-
Princeton Jct., NJ			8 54			1 10 144	10.14			11 144	11 144	
Trenton, NJ			904	1		10 144	1014					
North Philadelphia, PA						10 424	10.42			11 424	11 424	11 55
Phila., PA-30th St Sta	on l	9 14	9 35	A 10 14	10 14	10 45A	10 45	A 11 11A	11 14A	11 45A	11 454	
Wilmington DE		9 35	9 58	A 10 35	10 35	A 11 08A	11 08	A 11 32A	11 354	12 08P	12 08	
Newark, DE		1	1									To
Aberdeen, MD						1				1		Harrisbu
Baltimore, MD-Penn Sta		10 20	10 47	A 11 20	A 11 20/	A 11 57A	11 57	A 12 17P	12 20	12 57P	12 57	
BWI Airport Rall Sta., MD		10 33	11 00	A 11 33	A 11 33	A 12 10P	12 10	P 12 30P	12 336	1 10P	1 105	2
New Carroliton, MD		D10 46	A D11 15	A	D11 48	A D12 25P	D12 25	P	D12 46P	D 1 25P	D 1 25	1
Weshington DC	Ar	11 04	A 11 35	A 11 59	A 12 04	P 12 45P	12 45	P 12 50P	1 045	1 45P	1 45	
washington, DC	Do			-		-		-			-	-
Alexandria, VA								-				-
Woodbridge, VA					1							
Quantico, VA												
Fredericksburg, VA			1	-	-							
Ashland, VA	V		_			-	1					
Richmond VA	Ar						1					
niciliiona, va	Dp								+			
Willemsburg, VA	-								1			-
Newport News VA (ET	Ar Ar	1							1 St. 1			

SPEED THROUGH TICKETING WITH QUIK-TRAK



Quik-Trak ticketing machines are now available at most Northeast Corndor stations. Pick up a ticket you've already reserved, or make reservations and pay on the spot for some destinations. Just follow the easy touch screen menus and you'll be on your way.

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Service/Train Name ►		Metrolin e r	Weekend Metroliner	Northeast- Direct Old Dominion	Northeast- Direct Tidewater	Silver Star	Metrolin er	Keystone	Northeast- Direct Mayflower	Northeast- Direct Mayflower	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner
Train Number >		111	211	95	195	91	113	645	471	171	115	215
Normal Days of Operation >		M-F	Su	Mo-Sa	Su	Daily	M-F	M-F	Daily	Daily	M-F	Su
Will Also Operate >			971		87							87
Will Not Operate		9/1	8/31	9/1			re	9/1			*1	801
On Board Service -		Reserved	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved	Accented	Reserved			CO	Name of the second	Reserves
Boston, MA-South Sta (FT)	Dn			6 25A				No	No	7 204		
Boston, MA - Back Bay Sta	Ť	1		R 6 32A	1	70		Food	Food	R 7 28A		
Route 128. MA				R 6 444				Service	Service	R 7 43A		
Providence, BI	-			7 124	1	- 20 -			North of	8 13A		
Kingston, RI	-	1				1 00			New Haven	8 39A		
Westerly RI	-	1			1	1 23 -			1	8 56A		
Mystic CT	-				1	- 5-				9074		
New London, CT (Filewoods Casing and						- 5.				9 224		
Old Savbrook CT		1								9 424		
Springtield MA						- 15 -			8 50A			
Windsor Locks CT						- go -			9 09A			
5 Windsor CT	-	1				- 98 -			9 144			
B Hartford CT	-								9 264			
T Berlin CT	-	1				- 3 -			9 184			
Maridan CT						- 8-			9 474			
Wallingtord CT	+								9 544			
New Here OT	Ar			9 054					10 15A	10 25A		
New Haven, CT	DD	1		9 15A			1			10 35A		
Bridgeport. CT					1					10 57A		
Stamford, CT									24	11 23A		
New Rochelle, NY									1 33	11 43A		
Many Varia MIV	Ar			10 45A					1 35	12 15P		
New YORK, INY -Penn Sta.	Du	11 00A	*1 00A	11 10A	11 10A	C11 50A	12 0014	12 15P	1 36	12 40P	1 00P	1 00P
Newark, NJ		R11 15A	R11 15A	11 26A	11 26A	CA12 17P	R12 15P	R12 31P	5	12 59P	R 1 15P	R 1 15P
Metropark, NJ		11 28A	11 28A	11 40A	11 40A			12 45P	ala			1 28P
New Brunswick, NJ									L 82_	1		
Princeton Jct., NJ									1 × B			
Trenton, NJ				12 04P	12 04P	R 100P		1 09P	Lato	1 35P		
North Philadelphia. PA									- YP			
Phila PA	Ar	1		12 32P	12 32P			1 40P	1 20	2 04P		
Wilmington DE	Up	12 140	12 14P	12 35P	12 350	CH 140P	1110		- 1-	21/1	2110	2140
Namest OF	-	12 35P	12 350	12 30	12 300	OH ZIZP	1 320			· · ·	2 328	2350
Abardona MO	-	1						10		1		
Pattimore MD Care Sta	-	1 100	1 200		1	20 1 170		marnsburg		3080	2470	1
Buildinger Ball Sta MD		1 200	1 200	14/1	14/1	THAN SUTP	21/1			3 370	3370	3 200
New Compilton MO	-	1 135	1 33P	200	2000		2 300			3 500	0.0.00	3 33P
New Carrollton, MD		1	0 1460	2 150	2150		0 2 439			0 - 05P	0 3 439	D 3 46P
Washington, DC	Do	1 1246	2040	3 05P	3 05P	PSR 4 30P	1 2.236			4 250	3 500	4 040
Alexandria VA	Ť	1		1 236	3 230	4 50P						
Woodbridge, VA	-			3 415	3 410							
Quantico, VA	-	1		3 530	3 530							
Fredericksburg VA	-			4 110	4 110							
Ashland VA	-			4 400	1 400							
	A			5 070	5 070	0 6 200						
Hichmond, VA	Do			5 17F	1 5000	M 0 30P					i	
Williamsburg, VA		1		5 22P	1	To						
Newport News, VA	Ar	1		6 52P		Fiorida						
The Amtres Throway Bus Connection	Naw	and Name V	A Missinia B	anch VA	Cobedule De	law						

Custom Class service available

Custom Class service available
D Stops only to discharge passengers.
L Stops primarily to discharge passengers. Itain may leave before the time shown
R Stops only to receive passengers
Sileeping Car service available.
O Club Class Service available.
O Club Class Service available.
Dining Car serving complete meals.
Amtrak Express Shipping and Checked Baggage services at stations indicated
Antrak Thruway connecting bus

W Am rek Thruway Bus Connection-Ne Virginia Beach, VA. Reservations require	d.	News,	VAL	
Connecting Train Number		1.2	96	99
Days of Operation	Mile		10-84	FrSu
Newport News, VA (ET) Norfolk, VA Virginia Besch, VA (ET)	22 41	Dp Ar	7 05P D 7 50P 8 30P	9 42P 0 10 12P 11 00P

Boston • Hartford • New York • Philadelphia • Baltimore • Washington • Newport News Northeast ortheast SOUTHBOUND Direct Northeast-Northeast ortheast-Crescent Metroliner Metroline Weekend Keystone Metroliner Metroliner Direct Yankee Direct Direct Direct Service/Train Name Bay State Choper Virginian Virginian Potomac 173 19 119 219 647 145 217 117 93 99 193 M-F SaSu Daily Daily M-F M-F Su Daily FrSu Sa Normal Days of Operation -Mo-Th 9/1 971 9/1 Will Also Operate 97 8/31 971 9/1 9.1 Will Not Operate Reserved Reserved Reserved Ratarved C O CO Reserved Reserved Reserved ax a 0 0 On Board Service 10 104 7 554 No Boston, MA-South Sta (ET) 3 05A 9 05A 3 05A Do R10 184 R 8 02A Food A 9 12A Stops only to New York to V A 9 12A R 9 12A Boston, MA-Back Bay Sta R10 33A Service A 924A B 924A R 9 24A Route 128. MA 11 03A 9 52A 9 52A 9 52A Providence, RI 11 29A Kingston, RI 11 46A Westerly, RI 11 57A washington, Mystic, CT 0012 12P New London, CT (Foxwoods Casino 12 32P Old Saybrook, CT R 8 30A Framingham, MA 9.00A Worcester MA 10 40A Springtield, MA 11 DOA haland Windsor Locks, CT 11 05A Windsor, CT 11 17A Hartford, CT 11 30A Bering, CT 11 30 Meriden, CT 11.4 Wellingtord. CT 1 15P 12 1 11 43A 11 53A 11 43A 11 43A Ar 12 20P New Haven, CT 12 42P Bridgeport CT 2 10P 1 08P 12 38P 12 38P 12 38P Steinford. CT 1 28P New Rochelle, NY 3 00P 2 00P 1 25P 1 25P 3 000 1 25P - 2 45P 3 00F Ar 2 40P New York, NY Penn Sta 2 00P 2 00P Op R 3 15P 3 36P R 2 56P OR 3 03P R 3 15P 2 36P 8 2 15P 2 01P R 2 15P 2 01P 2 01P Newark, NJ 3 28P 3 50P 2 50P 3 10P 2 28P 2 15P 2 28P 2 15P 2 15P Metropark, NJ New Brunswick, NJ Princeton Jct. NJ 4 14P 3 34P R 3 41P 3 14P 2 39P 2 39P 2 39P Trenton, NJ L 3 55P North Philadeiphia, PA 4 42P 4 05P 3 42P 3 07P 3 07P 3 07P 3 17P Ar OR 4 40P 4 11P 4 14P Phila., PA-30th St. Sta. 3 14P 3 14P 3 17P 3 17P 4 35P 5 08P 1 12P COR 5 05P 4 08P 3 35P 3 40P 3 40P 3 35P 3 40P Wilmington DE 5 18P To Newark, DE 5 38P Harrisburg Aberdeen. MD 5 07P 5 17P 5 20P CAR 6 00P 5 05P 4 20P 4 29P 4 29P 4 20P 4 29P Battimore. MD-Penn Sta 5 20P 5 30P 5 33P 5 20P 4 42P 4 33P 4 33P 4 420 BWI Airport Rail Sta., MD 4 42P D 5 43P D 5 46P D 6 35P D 4 46P D 5 37P D 4 46P 4 57P D 4 57P New Carrollton, MD 4 57P 5 04P 6 55P 5 59P 5 49P 5 04P 4 59P 5 15P 5 45P 5 15P 5 15P Ar CR 7 15P Washington, DC CO 7 34P 6 03P 5 03P Alexandria, VA Woodbridge, VA To 6 30P 5 30P Quantico, VA Atlanta. 6 48P 6 48P Fredericksburg. VA New 7 26P 7 26P Ashiand VA Orleans 7 47P 7 47P Ar Richmond, VA Dp 9 02P Williamsburg, VA 9 32P Newport News. VA ETI Ar

Aintrak Thruway Bus Connection -- Foxwoods Casino. CT-See page 38

ADVANCE PAYMENT BY PHONE

Pay by credit card when you call 1-800-USA-RAIL and you can pick up your tickets at ticket windows or Quik-Trak ticketing machines any time prior to departure. You can also pre-purchase tickets for someone else at no additional charge.

+ Nome

METROLINER/NORTHEASTDIRECT/CLOCKER SERVICE

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Service/Train Name ►		Keystone	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Keystone	Northeest- Direct Charter Oak	Keystone	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Northeast- Direct Minute Man	Clocker	Direct Capitol Hill
Train Number >		649	121	221	651	85	653	123	223	163	627	187
Normal Days of Operation >		M-F	M-F	Su	SaSu	Daily	M-F	M-F	Sa	Su-Fr	M-F	Mo-Sa
Will Also Operate >				8/1	9/1				8/31			
Will Not Operate ►		9/1	8/1	2/31			9/1	11			8/1	87
On Board Service ►			Reserved	Reserves		C			Resources	0		
Boston MA	00	No			No		No	1		12 10P	No	
Boston MA Back Bay Sta	T	Food			Food		Food			R12 18P	Food	
Boston, MA-Back Bay Sid	-	Canuca			Service	1	Service	1		R12 33P	Service	-
Pourde 128, MA	-	Service								1 03P		
Providence. Hi	-									1		
Kingston, Hi	-											
Westerly, Hi	-							1				-
Mystic, CT	-									2 079		
New London, CT (Foxwoods Casino wi)	-											
Old Saybrook. CT	-					12 405						
< Springfield, MA	_					12 40						
Windsor Locks. CT	-					100						
2 Windsor, CT	_					1 05P						
Hartford, CT	_					1 176						
D Berlin, CT	_					1 306						
5 Meriden, CT						1 396						
• Wallingford. CT	V					1 475						
New Heven CT	Ar			1	1	2 105		1	1	3 05P		
New Haven, CT	Dp					2 200				3 134		
Bridgeport. CT			1			2 425					1	
Stamford, CT	_					3 08						
New Rochelle, NY		-				3 28	1					
New York, NY-Penn Sta	Ar Dp	3 45P	4 00P	4 00P	4 10	P 4 205	4 455	5 00P	5 00P	5 090	5 156	5 399
Newark, NJ	9	R 4 01P	R 4 15P	R 4 15P	R 4 26	4 36	5 025	A 5 15P	R 5 15P	1 5 25P	5 325	A 5 55P
Metropark, NJ				4 28P	4 40	P	1	5 28P	5 28P			
New Brunswick, NJ					1							
Princeton Jct., NJ	12						L 5 32	2			L 6 08	
Trenton, NJ		L 4 33P			5 04	P 5 10	L 5 42F				L 6 21F	
North Philadeiphia, PA	V						L 6 11		1	D 6 18P	L 6 50	
Phila., PA-30th St. Sta.	Ar Dp	5 05P	5 11F	5 14	5 35	P 5 371 5 40	6 206	6 14P	6 14P	6 27P	7 00	6 54P 6 57P
Wilmington, DE			5 329	5 35	1	6 03	2	6 35P	6 35P	6 53P		7 20P
Newark, DE		To			To		To			-		
Aberdeen, MD		Harrisburg			Harrisbur	9 6 28	Harrisbur	9		7 200	1	
Baltimore, MD-Penn Sta.			6 175	6 205		6 57	P1	7 200	7 204	7 46		8 10P
BWI Airport Rail Sta., MD			6 30	6 33	2	7 10	P	7 33P	1 7 33F	7 596	1	8 23F
New Carrollton, MD			D 6 43F	D 6 46		7 25	P	D 7 46P	D 7 46	D 8 15		D 8 38P
Washington, DC	Ar		6 594	7 04	2	7 45		7 500	8 045	8 35		8 55
Alexandria, VA	T		1			8 32	P					
Woodbridge VA					1	8 49	P	1	1	1		
Questico VA						901	P		1	1		
Enderickeburg VA			1	1	1	9 10	P	1				
Ashland VA	+	1		+	1	9 57	P	1		1		
Aurillito, VA	1 Ar		1	1	1	10 22	P		1			1
Richmond, VA	Dp											
Hannahan VA	1.				1		1	1	1	1	1	
Newport News, VA (E1)	Ar	1		-	-	_	-				_	

Custom Class service available.
Stops only to discharge passengers.
Stops primarily to discharge passengers: train may leave before the

time shown.

Imme snown.
R Stops only to receive passengers.
O Club Class Service available.
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Amtrak Express Shipping and Checked Baggage services at stations

indicated. Amtrak Thruway connecting bus.

Amtrax Thruway Bus Connection-Foxwoods Casino, CT-See page 38

Boston • Hartford • New York • Philadelphia • Baltimore • Washington • Newport News

Service/Train Name >		Clocker N	letroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Clocker	Northeest- Direct Vermonter	Keystone	Metroliner	Silver Meteor	Northeest- Direct George- town	Northeast- Direct Patnot	Northeast- Direc's Patnot
Train Number ►	-	629	125	225	633	55	655	127	97	189	475	175
Normal Days of Operation >	-	M-F	M-F	Su	M-F	Daily	Daily	M-F	Daily	Su	Su	Dally
Will Also Operate >				8/1						9/1	9/1	
Will Not Operate D	-	9/1	-	8/31	9/1			87		8/31	8/31	
	-		Reserved	Reserved		Reserved		Reserved	Reserves			0D
	-		-	-								2.058
Boston, MA-South Sta. (ET)	Dp	No			No	From	No				Food	R 2 13P
Boston, MA-Back Bay Sta.		Food		N	Food	Vermont	Food		- NSI	1	Service	R 2 27P
Route 128. MA		Service			Service		Service		- 25 -		North of	3 00P
Providence, RI									- 30	1	New Haven	3 269
Kingston, RI		-							- 22			3 440
Westerly BI					1				- 5-			3 670
Mustic CT							1		- 50			A 120
New London CT (Forwoods Casino -		1			1	1.1.1			- 99			4 120
Old Saubrock CT						1	1		- 20.	+	-	4 Jar
Contractioned MA						D 2 25P	1		- 36		3 45P	
< Springfield, MA	-								- 62		4 04P	
S Windsor Locks. Ci									23		4 099	
Windsor, CT	-					2 2 58					4 21P	
B. Hartford, CT	-					3 116		1	3		4 32P	
D Berlin, CT						1 220	P	1	2		4 41P	
E Meriden, CT									- 0		4 489	
Wellingford. CT						1 3 3 55	P			1	5 109	5 206
New Haven CT	Ar	1				4 10	P	1		1	1	5 30
New Haven, OI	UD_					4 32	P				1 32.	5 525
Bridgeport, CT				+			2				36	6 18
Stamford, CT											1 33	6 421
New Rochelle, NY						1 20 4 00				-	Tu	7 15
New Verk NV	Ar			-	-	6 20	6 35	P 7 00P	0 7 05	P 718	P ==	7 35
New TOTK, INT-Penn Sta.	Dp	5 42P	6 00	600	6 24		PI 6.51	P 8 7 15P	CR 7 23	P R 7 34	PZY	7 51
Newark, NJ		6 00P	R 6 15	H 6 15	0 24	6.51		7 789	1		T ¥a	8 05
Metropark, NJ				6 28							TIS	
New Brunswick, NJ	100										1 25	
Princeton Jct. NJ		L 6 37P	-		1 1 701	P1	-	-	DRO	P	1 39	8 29
Trenton, NJ		L 6 49P	1		1 2 7 13	P 718	P 720		1		1 33	
North Philadelphia, PA	T	L 7 17P		1	L 741	P	L 745	P		0.25	1 50	8.57
Dhile DA	Ar	7 31P		-	7 53	P 745	P 7 55	P A 145	BR 8 31	P 833	P dg	9 00
Phila., PA-30th St. Sta	Up		711	P 714				8 355	CR 90	IPI 8 56	1 29	9 23
Wilmington, DE	-		7 32	P 735	-	10010	T				1 92	
Newark. DE		1			-		10				+ 30	
Aberdeen, MD		1	-				Herrisou			201 94	pt · · ·	10 12
Baitimore, MD-Penn Sta.			9 17	P 8 20	P	m 8 59	PI	9 200	Tran 9 5			10 25
BWI Airport Rail Sta., MD			\$ 30	P 833	P	912	P					D10 40
New Carroliton, MD			0 843	P D 8 48	P	D 9 28	BP	D 9 46	1	1	-	10.57
Washington, DC	Ar		8 56	P 904	8	0 94	7P	9 59	ER10 5	9P 10 2		10 3/
	100			-								
Alexandria, VA	++		-									-
Woodbridge, VA	++			+								-
Quentico, VA												
Fredericksburg, VA	-								1			
Ashland, VA	11	1							10125	74	-	-
Richmond, VA	Ar					_						
Williamsburg, VA				-					10			
Newport News VA (E	T) Ar								Florid		_	_

KINS HALF PRICE

Children 2 to 15 are eligible for 50% off the applicable adult fare on most Amtrak trains. Children must be accompanied by an adult—limit, two half fares per adult. To make a reservation call 1-800-USA-RAIL or your travel agent.

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Service/Train Name 🛏	Weeken Metrolin	Northeast- Direct Embassy	Northeast- Direct Narra- gansett	Northeast- Direct Senator	Northeast- Direct Senator	Direct Liberty Bell	Northeast- Direct Evening Metropolitan	Northeast-I Direct Evening Metropolitan	Northeest- Direct Twilight Shoreliner
Train Number ►	227	191	167	477	177	151	169	179	67
Normal Days of Operation >	Su	M-F	Su	Daily	Dany	Su	Su-Th	FrSa	Daily
Will Also Operate >	8/1		1 97			9/1		8/31	
Will Not Operate -	8/31	9/1	8/31			8/31	8/31		
On Board Service -		•					C	C,	C 8
Poston MA			1		4.740	No	8 100	6 100	3 000
BOSION, IVIA-South Sta. (ET)	00		4 000	NO	0 4 360	Eand	D & 180	D 6 18P	P & ORP
Boston, MA-Back Bay Sta			H 407P	F000	R 4 50P	Secure	B # 120	B 6 120	8 8 210
Route 128, MA		_	H 4 19P	Service	HASUP	Service	7 000	7 000	
Providence, RI			4 47P	North of	5210		708	7050	0 307
Kingston, Ri	-			New Haver	5 47P		735P	7 35P	9 180
Westerly, Al					6 04P		7 56P	7 56P	9334
Mystic, CT					6 15P		8 07P	8 07P	
New London, CT (Foxwoods Casino					6 30P		6 22P	8 22P	9 55P
Old Seybrook, CT					6 51P	1	8 47P	8 47P	10 15P
Springtield MA				5 55P		1			
Windsor Locks CT				6 14P		1			
3 Windsor CT	1	-		6 19P					
Handlord CT				6 316					
a Hartiona. Cr			+	6 426			-		
9 Marine CT				A 516					
S Menden, Ci	+		+	6 586				+	
Wallingtord, CT			6 400	7 750	7 160		9 250	9 250	10 55P
New Haven, CT	a l		6 50		7 45P		9 35P	9 35P	11 15P
Printer of the second s				+ 81	8070		9 57P	9 57P	
Bingeport. Ci			7 74	5 E 1	8 310		10 238	10 23P	12 03A
Stemford, CT			1	+ = -	8 510		10 430	10 43P	
New Hochelle, NY			-		0.30		11 160	11 150	1014
New York NV	Ar		8 25	201	9 250	10 450	11 350	11 35P	1 30A
iten ion, iti - en sta			0 000		10.010	BILOIP	11 516	11 51P	1 55A
Newark, NJ	HO	5P H 900	9 900	- 35	10 160	11 150	12.054	12 054	2 104
Metropark, NJ	- 3	920	920		10 15	1110	12 000	10.000	
New Brunswick, NJ	-			+ ==					
Princeton Jct., NJ									1244
Trenton, NJ	-	944	P 944	1 30	10 39P	11 399	12 294	12 294	2 344
North Philadeiphia, PA				1 2 -					
Dhila DA	Ar	10 12	P 10 12	Z	1107P	1	1 004	12 57A	3 054
Fillid., FA-30th St. Sta	00 9	14P 1015	P 1015		11100	12 104		1 1 224	1 204
Wilmington, DE	9	10 38	10 38	+ =	1 11 350			- con	
Newerk, DE									
Aberdeen, MD	_			1 9	11 59P				
Beltimore, MD-Penn Sta	10	20P 11 27	P 11 27	PI -	12 26A			2 12A	5 30A
BWI Airport Rail Sta., MD	10	30P 11 40	P 11 40	P	12 39A	-			5 43A
New Carrollton, MD	D10	6P D11 55	P D11 55	P	D12 544			D 2 37A	5 58A
Washington, DC	Ar 11	04P 12 15	A 12 15	A	1 15A			3 05A	6 15A 7 00A
Tradining com, Do							1032	+ 0 3 3	7 184
Alexandria, VA							1 335	1 235	1.04
Woodbridge, VA					+		1 35 9	+ sis	7.00
Quantico, VA			-				1 999	1 1999	ADP
Fredericksburg, VA	-	_					- DZO	1 9 ZS	8 05A
Ashland, VA		_					1 299	1 9 2 9	8 45A
Richmond VA	Ar	1		-	1	1	0.2	200	9 05A
nichinond, va	Up						1 2 1	t as	10 204
Williamaburg, VA							+ *	+ 76	10 204
Newport News 'A (ET)	Arl						1		10 50A

Custom Class service available.
Stops only to discharge passengers.
Stops primanly to discharge passengers; train may leave before the time shown.
R Stops only to receive passengers.
Steping Car service available.
Club Class Service available.
Amtrak Thruway connecting bus.

Note: Train 67. The Twillight Shorellner, handles Amtrak Express Shipping be-tween select stations. For details, call 1-800-368-TRAK.

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Service/Train Name ►			Nurtheast- Direct Twilight Shoreiner	Northeast- Direct Wkna Twilight Shareliner	Northeast- Direct Fast Mail	Northeast- Direct Fast Mail	Clocker	Clocker	Northeast- Direct Wall Street	Clocker	Metroimer	Northeast- Direct Patnot
Train Number -			66	76	12	412	622	624	180	628	100	170
Normal Days of Operation >			Su-Th	FrSa	Daily	Daily	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	M-F	Daily
Will Also Operate >												
Will Not Operate			7/19				9/1	9/1	9/1	9/1	-	
On Board Service ►			28	53							Amore O	O (Except Se)
	Mile	-										
Newport News. VA (ET)	0	C'p	4 30P	4 30P		No	No	No	1	No		
Williamsburg, VA	23		4 53P	4 53P		Food	Food	Food		Food		
Richmond VA	78	Ar	6 05P	6 05P		Service	Service	Service	1	Service		-
Antional, VA	00	Do	6 15P	6 15P		North of						
Fonderickeburg VA	122		2 070	7 070		The risten						
Quantice VA	152		7 27P	7 275								
Wondbridge, VA	162								1			1
Alexandria, VA	178	+	7 55P	7 55P							1	
Washington DC	187	Ar	8 20P	8 20P					1			
Washington, DC	-	Dp	8 45P	8 45P	3 00A				4 40A		5 25A	5 30A
New Carrollton, MD	196	-	FI 8 56P	R 8 56P					R 451A		R 5 35A	R 541A
BWI Airport Rail Sta., MD	217		9 15P	9 15P		- 83-			5 09A		5 50A	5 59A
Baltimore, MD-Penn Sta	227		9.33P	9 33P	3 40A	- 26 -			525A		e asa	0 15A
Aberdeen, MD	258		19 264	9 300		- 21-			5 46A			0 38A
Newark, DE	284		10 100	10 200	1 374	- 55			6 174		-	1074
Wilmington. DE	290	1	10 200	10 200	1 404	- == -			6 404		0.484	7 204
Phila., PA-30th St. Sta.	344	00	1103P	1 11 03P	5 08A	FE	5 41A	6 15A	6 50A	7 05A	7 16A	7 35A
North Philadelphia. PA	326					1 3	R 5 50A	R 6 244	6 59A	R 7 144		7 44A
Trenton, NJ	354		11 33 P	11 33P	5 36A	L ala	6 20A	6 57A		7 484		
Princeton Jct., NJ	364					1 22	6 33A	7 10A		7 59A		
New Brunswick, NJ	380					Ng		7 25A	-	8 14A		
Metropark, NJ	388		11 57P	11 57P								
Newark, NJ	402	V	12 17A	12 17A	5 21A	L	L 7 06A	L 7 53A	D 7 50A	L 8 384	D 8 13A	8 33A
New York NY Barn Sta	412	Ar	12 35A	12 35A	5 38A	2	7 26A	8 11A	A90.8	8 57A	8 30A	8 50A
New Pochalla NV	422	100			0.304							9 154
Stamford CT	4.02		2 000	2 104	7 194	- 9 -						10.064
Bridgeport CT	470											10 324
New Henry OT	487	Ar	2 50A	3 00A	8 37A							10 57A
New Haven, CT		Do	3 05A	3 15A	9 02A	8 52A		-				11 07A
< Wallingford. CT	500	1	Ne Sta	Na		911A						
Meriden, CT	506	-		Na Si		9 19A						
Berlin, CT	513	++	× 9 m	Kog		9 28A						
A Hartford, CT	524		Ban	BER		9 424						
Windsor CT	530		So so	20 So		9 50A						
Springfield MA	540		9	9		10 174						
Old Savbrook, CT	520	++	3 404	3 504	9 374				1		-	
New London, CT (Forwoods Casing min	538	++	4 014	4 114	9 584							11 504
Mystic, CT	547	11			10 114				1		1	
Westerly, RI	556	11	4 22A	4 32A	10 22A	1						
Kingston, RI	573	T	4 37A	447A	10 424							
Providence, RI	600		5 11A	5214	11 13A							12 59P
Route 128. MA	632		D 5 35A	D 5 45A	D11 43A						1	D 1 29P
Boston, MA-Back Bay Sta	643	V	D 5 51A	D 6 01A	1211 58A						1	D 1 44P
Boston, MA-South Sta (ET)	644	Ar	6 00A	5 10A	12 05P						1	1 50P

Custom Class service available.
D Stops only to discharge passengers.
L Stops primarily to discharge passengers; train may leave before

the time shown.

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R Stops only to receive passengers.
Ø Sleeping Car service available.
Ø Club Class Service available.
Ø Dining Car serving complete meals.

Amtrak Thruwey Bus Connection—Foxwoods Casino, CT—See page 38

C Amtrak Express Shipping and Checked Baggage services at stations indicated.

Note: Trains 66/76. The Twilight Shoreliner, handle Amtrak Express Shipping between select stations. For details, call 1-800-368-TRAK.

rvice/Train Name >	Metroline	Keystone	Silver Meteor	Northeast- Direct Mayflower	Direct Mayflower	Metroliner	Keystone	Northeast- Direct Vermonter	Metroliner	Veekend lethpliner
	200	640	98	172	472	102	642	56	104	204
ain Number >	ME	M.F	Daily	Daily	Su	M-F	M-F	Daily	M-F	58
ormai Days of Operation >	mer	Int			9/1					15/1
Will Also Operate >				-	101	-	87		51	
Will Not Operate >	m	81				Reserved	-	Recorved	Reserved	Reser ved
In Board Service >	0			CO		0			0	0
Internet News, VA (ET))p	No	From		No		Food			
Williemsburg, VA		Food	Florida		Food		Service			
Diehmand VA	Ar	Service	2 3 38A		North cf					
Alchinond, VA					New Haven		+	+		
Ashland. VA										
Fredericksburg, VA		-								
Weedbridge VA	1									
Alexandria VA				-						
Alexandria, VA	Ar		ED 5 40/	A		70	A	0 7 30A	8 00A	8 00A
Washington, DC	Dp 60	CA		010	+ 37	R 7 10	A	R 741A	R 8 10A	R 8 10A
New Carrollton, MD	Ret	CAL		644	1 54	72	SA	7 59A	8 25A	8 25A
BWI Airport Rail Sta., MD	62	54	1000 8.44	7 03	1 33	73	A	B 8 15A	8 38A	8 38A
Beltimore, MD-Penn Sta	83	BA Free	0000		TNE		From	_		
Aberdeen, MD		From			1 33		Herrisbu	19		
Newark, DE		Hernsour	PED 7 34	A 751	ALEA	82	3A	9 9 03/	9 234	9 234
Wilmington. DE	1 /1	34	ED 800	A 813	ATE	T		9 25/	9 15A	9 454
Phila PA ann St Sta	A 7.	ISA 7 50	A	8 25	A	84	54 8 58	3 200		
Hant Chiladalphia PA	1	7 59	A		191			9.57		
North Philadelphia. Ph		8 22	A D 841	A 854	A					
Princeton Ict NJ		8 32	A							
New Brucewick NJ					+ 40	+		10 21	A D10 31A	D10 314
Metropark NJ				918	AL 29	-	3A D 95	GAI 210 35	A D10 44A	D10 44
Newark NJ	DB	43A L 90	A 20 9 18	BA 3		+ 00	04 10 1	9A 210 55	A 10 59A	11 04/
Mark Mark NIV	Ar 8	59A 9 1	A 8 94	5A 95		1 .		11 20	A	
New YOFK, INT-Penn Sta.	0p			10.4	BAT W	-			-	
New Rochelie, NY			- 50	- 110	BAL 3	+		12 07	P	
Stamford, CT	-		+ :0		24 3	-		12 33	P	
Bridgeport, CT			+ 28	115	74		-	8 100	2	
New Haven, CT	ô l		1 2 2	121	7P 120	TP				
Herr Haven, C.					12 2	SP				
S Wallingtord. CT			1 20		123	4P		1.50		
T Rettin CT			Izi		124	3P		28 20		
Hartlard CT			39		125	6P				1
T Windsor, CT					10				-	1
Windsor Locks. CT			1 28		10	20		1 25	SP	
Soringfield. MA			- 2		13					T
Old Savbrook, CT				- 12	ABA I			To		
New London, CT (Foxwoods Casino					18P			Vermo	nt	
Mystic, CT			-+ 0		In					T
Westerly, RI					AZP					T
Kingston, RI					226					
Providence, Ri				2	SUP					
Route 128, MA				03	170					
Boston, MA -Back Bay Sta.				_ D 3	1/1					
							1			

METROLINER/NORTHEASTDIRECT/CLOCKER SERVICE Vock . Hartforn . Boston

Inhia a

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NORTHBOUND

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Service/ Train Name D-		Keystone	Northeast- Direct New Yorker	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Keystone	Northeast Direct Virginian	Northeest Direct Narra- ganset	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Northeest- Direct Charter
Train Number ►		644	184	106	206	646	84	164	108	208	86
Normal Days of Operation >		SaSu	Mo-Sa	M-F	Su	M-F	Mo-Sa	Su	M-F	Sa	Daily
Will Also Operate		9/1			1.0					8/31	
Will Not Oper iste			9/1	**	8/31	9/1			8/1		
On Board Service >				Reserved	Reserved		Reserved	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved	Ē
Newport News, VA (ET)	Dp	No				No			-	-	
Williamsburg, VA	_	Food				Food					
Richmond, VA	Ar	Service				Service					
Ashland, V A.	T						6 36A				7 45A
Fredericks tiurg, VA		1					7 184				7 55A
Quentico. VA							7 37A				0 50A
Woodbringe, VA							7 50A				0 10A
Alexandria, VA							8 09A				9 104
Washington, DC	Ar	100000					8 35A				9 55A
New Currollton, MD			D 9 26A	9 00A	9 00A		9 10A	9 10A	10 00A	10 00A	10 25A
BWI /Lirport Rall Sta., MD	-		BAAA	A JICA	ADIEN		921A	921A		R10 10A	10 36A
Belti more, MD-Penn Sta			9004	9 204	9 204		9 394	9 39A	10 23A	10 25A	10 54A
Aberdeen, MD	-	From	3004	7 304	3 304	Errom	ACCE	9 55A	10 38A	10 38A	11 10A
New ark. DE		Harrisburg				Herrishuro					
Willinington. DE	-	1	9 48A	10 234	10 234	manneourg	10 434	10 424			
Phila., PA-30th St. Sta.	Ar Do	9 48A	10 10A 10 15A	10 45A	10 45A	10 59A	11 05A 11 08A	11 05A 11 08A	11 43A	11 454	12 20P
North Philadelphia, PA	_										
Trenton, NJ	_	10 17A	10 44A			11 28A	11 37A	11 37A			12 52P
Princeton Jct., NJ	_				1						1 01P
New Brunswick, NJ	-										
Newark NJ	-		11 08A		D11 31A	11 52A				D12 31P	1 20P
Newerk, NJ	-	D10 53A	011 22A	011 43A	D11 44A	D12 08P	12 13P	12 13P	D12 41P	D12 44P	1 36P
New York, NY-Penn Sta	Do	11 15A	11 45A	11 59A	12 04P	12 27P	12 30P 12 50P	12 30P 12 50P	12 59P	1 04P	1 55P 2 15P
Stemford, CT	-						1 300				2 46F
Bridgeport. CT	+						1 304	1 36P			3 06P
New Haven CT	Ar						2 220	2 220			3 32P
New Haven, CI	Do						2 33P	2 33P			4 10P
S Wallingford, CT	_										4 29P
Partie CT	-										4 37P
Hertland CT											4 46P
T Windsor CT	-										4 59P
Windsor Locks CT	-										5 07P
Springfield, MA	-		-								5 12P
Old Savbrook, CT											5 40P
New London, CT (Forwoods Casino Sin)											
Mystic. CT	-						W 3 24P	W 3 24P			
Westerly, RI	-										
Kingston, Al											
Providence, RI							4 200	4 200			
Route 128. MA							D 4 42P	D 4 420			
Boston, MA -Back Bay Sta							D 5 02P	0 5 020			
Boston, MA-South Sta. (ET)	Ar						5 11P	5 11P			

Custom Class service available.
Stops only to discharge passengers.
R Stops only to receive passengers.
Sileeping Car service available.
Club Class Service available.
Dining Car service available.
Amtrak Express Shipping and Checked Baggage services at stations indicated.
Amtrak Thruway connecting bus.

Amtrak Thruway Bus Connection—Foxwoods Casino. CT—See page 38

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Service/Train Name >	-	Netroliner N	Veekend letroliner	Keystone	No	Direct Vankee Clipper	Silver	M	etroliner	Direc Bay St	ate	letroline	Wr Me	eekend stroliner	Ceystone
Tale Number b	1	110	210	648	T	174	92		112	142	2	114	+	214	650 Suc
Normal Dave of Operation >	+	M-F	Su	Mo-Sa		Daily	Dail	1	M-F	Dail	×+	M-F	+	30	Surri
	1		-		1						-		+	-	
	1	-	8/31	9/1	T				*1		1	-	1	631	
Will Not Operate	-	Reserved	Reserved	-	+	05	Reser		Reserved				•	O	
On Board Service >	_	0	0	No	+		Fro	-					-		No
Newport News, VA (ET) (Williamsburg, VA	90			Food	+		Flori	da		-	-		+		Service
Richmond VA	1A DO			Service	1		8 9	104			-		+		
Antional VA	Ť				-			-				-	-		
Fiedericksburg, VA					+			-		1	1				
Quantico. VA	-				+			-					-		
Woodbridge, VA	₽			+	+		10	53A				-	+		
Alexandria, VA	-		-		+		0011	15A	12 00		2 100	1 10	POP	1 000	
Washington, DC	Dp	11 004	11 00/		+	11 10A	-	-	R12 10	P AT	2 21P			A 1 10P	
New Carroliton, MD			R11 10/		+	11 394	-	-		1	2 39P	13	23P	1 25P	
BWI Airport Raii Sta., MD	÷	11 23	11 25/	From	+	11 55A	DD1	2 23P	12 34	P 1	2 55P	1 13	BP	1 369	From
Baltimore, MD-Penn Sta.	÷	11 38/	11.30	Harrisbu	urg					-			-		memeourg
Aberdeen, MD	ł		-							+		1 7	21P	2 235	
Newark, DE	+	12 21	12 23	P		12 43P	ED.	1 24P	110	-	2 05	-			
Dhile DA	Ar	1		124	AP	1 05P	00	1 499	1 41	P	2 08	2	43P	2 45	248P
Phila., PA-30th St. Sta	00	12 43	12.40							-			-		1 23/1
North Philadelphia, PA	ł			11	17P	1 379	D	2 54P			2 378	1-			
Trenton, NJ	t						-				2 40		-		
New Brunswick NJ	1			-			-			+	3 08	P D 3	29P	D 3 31	P
Metropark, NJ			0 1 31	P		201	100	3 440	0 24	IP	3 25	P D 3	42P	D 344	P 0 3 50P
Newark, NJ		D 141	P 014	PDI	53P	2 15	B	4 05P	25	90	3 45	P 3	59P	4 04	P 4 10P
New York, NY-Penn Sta.	Ar Dr	1 59	204	19 2	134	2 55			-	+	4 15	P	-		
New Rochelle, NY			-		_		+:	20 -		1	5 14	P			
Stamford. CT					-		+	10			5 40	P	-		
Bridgeport, CT						4 25	P	10			6 07	P			
New Haven, CT	6	0	-	_	_	4 35	P+ 4	음글 -	+	+	6 36	P			
Watingford, CT					-	+	+ :	28			6 44	P			
Meriden. CT	-				-		+	24			6 53	P	_		
Bertin, CT	+					1	T	e ch		-	7 04	P			
2 Hartford, CT	+						1	19	-		714	P	-	+	
Windsor, CT	H						+	38			7 1	SDI -			
Soriatield MA	T						+	C Da			85	SPI -		-	
Worcester, MA			_				+		+	-	0 93	SP			
Framingham, MA					-	51	PI	'n	+						
Old Saybrook, CT	1				-		apt	P							_
New London, CT (Forwoods Casino	-				-	54	SP			_				-	
Mystic. CT	+			-		55	7P								
Westerly, RI	+					61	BP							1-	
Ringston, HI	+					64	SP							1	
Route 128. MA	T				_	D 71	SP		+	-+-	D10	3P	-		
Boston, MA - Back Bay Sta.	T					073	2P		-				-		
Boston MA-South Sta (ET		Ar	1	1	-	74	OP	_	1	_	10 1	20P1	-	1	

THE STUDENT ADVANTAGE CARD

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					and the second second	-				AND STREET	
Service/Train Name ►		Northeast- Direct Old Dominion	Northeast- Direct Gotham Limited	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Northeast- Direct Times Square	Northeest- Direct Merchants Limited	Northeast- Direct Merchants Limited	Metroliner	Weekend Metroliner	Northeast- Direct Congres- sional
Train Number >		94	194	116	216	186	176	476	118	218	190
Normal Days of Operation >		Su-Fr	Sa	M-F	Su	Su	Daily	Daily	M-F	SaSu	Su-Fr
Will Also Operate >			8/31		9/1	9/1				9/1	
Will Not Operate >		8/31		8/1	6/31	6/31			8/1		8/31
On Board Service ►		Reserved	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved		00		Reserved	Asserved	
Amtrak Thruway Bus Connection-V	irgin	a Beach. VI	Newport	News. VA-	Schedule Be	low					
Newport News, VA (ET)	Dp	8 45A	8 45A				T	No			
Williamsburg, VA		9 08A	9 08A					Food			
Richmond, VA	Ar Do	10 20A 10 30A	10 20A 10 30A					Service North of			
Ashland, VA		10 40A	10 40A					New Haven			
Fredericksburg, VA		11 22A	11 22A								
Quantico. VA	_	11 42A	11 42A								
Woodbridge, VA	1	11 52A	11 52A								
Alexandria, VA		12 10P	12 10P								
Washington, DC	Ar	12 35P	12 35P	1 2000	2000	2 100		1	1000	1000	
New Carrolling MD		1 710	1 710	2000	8 2 100	2100	D 2 200	1	3.006	9 3 100	3 100
BWI Almost Ball Sta MD		1 210	1 100	1 2200	2 250		2 440	- 22 -	1 220	3 3 100	2 100
Ballimore MD-Page Sta	+	1550	1 550	2 340	2 230	2 450	1000	- 26 -	1 340	3 100	3 550
Aberdeen MD	+	1.55	1.301					- 22	3 301		A 180
Newark DE	-							- 35-			4 170
Wilmington, DE	+	2 43P	2 43P	1 210	3 23P	3 33P	3 48P	1 33	4 21P	4 21P	4 490
Dhile DA	Ar	3 05P	3 05P			3 55P	4 10P	- 33 -			5 11P
Phila., PA-30th St. Sta.	Do	3 06P	3 08P	3 43P	3 45P	3 589	4 13P	Tra	4 43P	4 45P	5 15P
Trenton, NJ	-	3 37P	3 37P	1			4 42P	- 35			5 470
Princeton Jct., NJ								1 35			5 56P
New Brunswick, NJ	-							- 00			6 099
Metropark, NJ	-	4 01P	4 01P	1	0 4 31P		5 06P	1 22	0 5 29P	D 5 31P	5 18P
Newark, NJ	*	4 15P	D 4 15P	D 4 41P	D 4 44P	D 4 58P	5 24P	1 2	D 5 43P	D 5 44P	D 6 33P
New York, NY-Penn Sta	Ar	4 34P 4 54P	4 34P	4 59P	5 04P	5 20P	5 45P 6 05P	Ha	5 59P	6 04P	6 53P
New Rochelle, NY							6 38P	T 6 -			
Stamford. CT							7 02P	† ?			
Bridgeport. CT	Y						7 28P				
New Haven, CT	Ar DD	6 22P 6 32P					7 55P 8 15P	8 05P			
< Weilingford. CT								8 24P			
Meriden, CT	_							8 32P			
Berlin, CT	-							8 41P			
a Hartford. CT	-							8 54P			
windsor. CT	-							9 C2P			
Windsor Locks. CT								9 07P			
Old Saubrock CT	-				-		-	9 30P			
New London CT (Second Course of Second Secon	-						8 49P				
Mustic CT	-	- / 32P					9 090				
Westerly Bl							9 220				
Kingston Bl	-						9 32P				
Providence Si	-	8 100					10 200				
Route 128 MA	-	D 8 540					D10 500				
Boston, MA - Back Bay Sta	+	D 9 12P					D11 078				
Boston, MA-South Sta (ET)	Ar	9 20P					11 15P				

Custom Class service available.

Amtrak Thruway Bus Connection—Foxwoods Casino, CT—See page 38

Custom Class service available.
Stops only to discharge passengers.
Stops only to discharge passengers.
Sleeping Car service available.
Club Class Service available.
Club Class Service available.
Dining Car serving complete meals.
Amtrak Express Shipping and Checked Baggage services at stations indicated.
Amtrak Thruway connecting bus
Stops on Monday thru Enday only

Amtrak Thruway Bus Conner Newport News, VA. Reservation	ction_Vin	ginie 8 1.	leech,	VAV
Connecting Train Number	1.00		94/194	
Days of Operation	Mile	1-9	Delly	
Virginia Beach, VA Norfolk, VA Newport News, VA	(ET) (ET)	0 19 41	Dp Ar	6 50A R 7 20A S 30A

NORTHBOUND

METROLINER/NORTHEASTDIRECT/CLOCKER SERVICE Newport News • Washington • Baltimore • Philadelphia • New York • Hartford • Boston Metroliner Metroliner Weekend Direct Weekend Metroliner Metroline Keystone Direct Metroliner Concord Service/Train Name Metroline Bankers 124 224 178 90 652 222 122 148 220 120 Train Number > Su M-F Daily Daily Daily M-F Sa Daily Su M-F Normal Days of Operation > -831 -Will Also Operate > 27 101 -8/31 -Will Not Operate A X D C) Reserv 0 0 0 ¢ 0 On Board Service 0 From NO Newport News, VA ET) DP Florida Food Williamsburg, VA Service 2 14P Ar **Richmond**, VA Aphiand, VA Fredericksburg, VA Quantico. VA 1 3 59P Woodbridge, VA DD 4 25P Alexandria. VA 5 35P 6 00P 6 009 Ar 5 00P 5 000 Washington, DC 4 05P 4 00P 4 000 R 6 10P A 5 46P R 5 10P R 4 16P R 4 10P 5 25P 6 04P 6 23P New Carrollton, MD 5 25P 5 23P 4 34P 4 25P 5 38P 5 38P BWI Airy ort Rall Sta., MD CO 5 45P 6 20P From 5 38P 5 38P 4 50P 4 33P 4 38P Baltimore, MD-Penn Sta 6 45P Harrisburg Aberdeen, MD 7 21P 7 23P 1010 6 40P 7 13P Newerk, DE. 6 23P 6 21P 5 38P 5 200 5 23P 7 35P 7 48P 00 7 04P Wilmington, DE 7 45P 6 00P 7 43P 7 00P 6 45P Ar 5 43P 5 45P Phila., PA-30th St. Sta 5 43P 7 090 0 7 57P 8 17P North Philadelphia, PA 7 32P 6 41P 7 11P 8 26P Trenton, NJ 7 41P ED 6 50P 7 209 Princeton Jct. NJ 7 54P D 8 31P D 8 29P 8 45P New Brunswick, NJ 8 03P D 7 31P 0 6 31P 7 05P 0 8 44P 0 6 29P D 8 43P 9 02P Metropark, NJ D 8 18P 00 P 48P D 7 44P D 7 48P 7 25P D 6 44P 9 04P D 6 43P 9 20P 8 59F C 9 10P Newerk, NJ 8 38P 8 05P 8 04P 7 45P 8 15P 7 04P 6 595 Ar New York, NY-Penn Sta 8 46P New Rochelle, NY Stops only to discharge p Washington to New York. 10 26P 9 06P Stamford. CT 9 32P 11 15P Bridgeport, CT 9 57P Ar New Haven, CT 10 26P Wallingford, CT 10 34P ≦ Meriden, CT 10 43P Berlin, CT nland 10 56P Hartford, C 11 04P Windsor, CT Route 11 11P Windsor Locks, CT passengers 11 37P 11 59P Springfield, MA Old Saybrook, CT 12 20A New London, CT (Forwoods Casino Mystic, CT 12 57A Westerly, RI 1 284 Kingston, RI D 1 57A Providence, RI D 2 18A Route 128. MA Boston, MA-Back Bay Sta 2 25A Boston, MA-South Sta (ET) Ar

AMTRAK VACATIONS

Amtrak offers vacation packages throughout the Northeast Corridor From historic Boston and Connecticut's stunning Foxwoods Resort and Casino to the excitement of Busch Gardens and Colonial Williamsburg, Amtrak Vacations can tailor a vacation to fit your interests and budget. Just call 1-800-321-8684 and let Amtrak Vacations arrange your travei, lodging, tours and rental car.

Attachment B Page 19 of 21

METROLINER/NORTHEASTDIRECT/CLOCKER SERVICE

Newport News • Washington • Baltimore • Philadelphia • New York • Hartford • Boston

Service/Train Name ►		Carolinian	Metroliner	Pennsyl- vanian	Northeast- Direct Big Apple	Weekend Metroliner	Northeast- Direct Twilight Shoreiner	Northeast- Direct Wknd Twilight Shoreliner	Northeast- Direct Bawery	Northeast- Direct James River
Train Number >		80	126	44	150	226	66	76	198	78
Normal Days of Operation >		Daily	M-F	Daily	Fr	Su	Su-Th	FrSa	Daily	Fr
Will Also Operate ►						9/1				
Will Not Operate			9/1			6/31	2015			
On Board Service		50	Reserved	¢		Reserved	G @	E D		<u>c</u>
Amirak Thruway Bus Connection-	lirgin	Beach. V	A/Newport !	Vews. VA-	Schedule Be	low	-		1.1.1.1	
Newport News, VA (ET)	Dp	From			No		4 30P	4 30P		8 15P
Williamsburg, VA		Charlotte			Food		4 53P	4 53P		8 38P
Richmond, VA	Do	PC 3 50P			Service		6 15P	6 15P		9 2014
Ashland, VA			1				6 25P	6 25P		
Fredericksburg, VA		· 4 44P					7 07P	7 07P		
Quantico. VA		* 5 03P					7 27P	7 27P		
Woodbridge, VA	+						1-7550	7 550		
Weakington DC	Ar	# 5 55P					8 20P	8 20P		
washington, DC	00	a 6 25P	7 00P			5 00P	8 45P	8 45P	10 30P	
New Carrollton. MD	_	6 37P	R 7 10P			R 8 10P	8 56P	8 56P	R10 41P	
BWI Airport Rail Sta., MD	-	1	7 25P			8 25P	9150	9 15P	10 58P	
Aberdeen MD-Perin Sta.		1 . 7080	7 360	Distaburan		8 30P	9 33P	9 540	11 400	
Newark, DE				Harrisburg						
Wilmington. DE	*	7 7 57P	8 23P	1		9 23P	10 28P	10 28P	12 10A	
Phila PA	Ar	3 8 18P				1	10 50P	10 50P	12 31A	
Fillia., FA-Juth St. Sta.	Do	○ 8 22P	8 45P	8 48	9 350	9 45P	1103P	11 03P	12 354	
Trenton NI		8 526		9 170	10.050		11 110	11 330	1.054	
Princeton Jct. NJ	-	0.021			1		1	1		
New Brunswick, NJ								-		
Metropark. NJ		D 9 17F	D 9 31P	941P		D10 31P	11 57P	11 57P	1 30A	
Newark, NJ	V	10 9 32P	D 9 44P	D 9 56P	D10 44P	D10 44P	12 17A	12 17A	D 1 45A	
New York, NY-Penn Sta	Ar Do	9 55P	9 59P	10 15P	11 089	11 04P	12 35A 1 10A	12 35A 1 10A	2 104	
New Rochelle, NY	T									
Stamford. CT		1 2					2 00A	2 10A		
Bridgeport. CT		-								
New Haven, CT	Dp	1	1	1			2 50A 3 05A	3 15A		
< Wailingford. CT	_						Ne Na	Ne		
Meriden. CT		-					in rev	Nar		
Berlin, CT	-	-					* Sole	Kap		
I Windsor CT				+		+	Big	Bant		
S Windsor Locks. CT	-	1					t osta	gs		
Springfield, MA		1					3	3		
Old Saybrook, CT	_						3 40A	3 50A		
New London, CT (Foxwoods Casino			+				4 01A	4 11A		
Mysuc. CT							1.000	1 204		
Kingston, RI							4 37A	4 32A		
Providence, RI	-						5 114	5214		
Route 128. MA	-			1	1		D 5 35A	D 5 45A		
Boston, MA - Back Bay Sta	V						D 5 51A	D 601A		
Boston, MA-South Sta. (ET)	Ar						6 00A	6 10A		

18

Custom Class service available.
Distops only to discharge passengers.
R Stops only to receive passengers.
R Reservations required for travel to or from this station.
Sileeping Car service available.
Club Class Service available.
Club Class Service available.
Amtrak Express Shipping and Checked Baggage services at stations indicated.
Note: Trains 66/76. The Twilight Shoreliner, handle Amtrak Express Shipping between select stations. For details. call 1-800-368-TRAK

Amtrek Thruwey Bus Conne Newport News, VA. Reservation	ction-Vir	ginie E 1.	leech.	VAV
Connecting Train Number				66/76
Days of Operation		Mile		Delity
Virginia Beach, VA Nortolk, VA Newport News, VA	(ET)	0 19 41	Dp Ar	2 20P R 3 05P 3 45P

Attachment B Page 20 of 21

(FE)

A.M.T.R.A.K[®] National Timetable

Spring/Summer 1997 Effective May 11. 1997 Amtrak[®] Schedules Will Change In The Fall Of 1997. Includes All Amtrak Schedules Except Northeast Routes.









Most Improved Customer Service!

Ch Ch	nica arl	est	• Indianapolis • Ci on • Washington • (ncinn New Y	ati Yor	• k)
50			⊲ Train Number ►			51
Dp CHI TuThSa		-	- Days of Operation >		-	Ar CHI
ReadDown	Mile	T		Sumpoi		Deed Up
8 10P		Do	Chicago II - Union Sta	Symbol	A.	2454
9 11P	28	T	Dver, IN	e mo	Ĩ	7514
9 52P	73		Rensseiger, IN			2054
10 48P	121		Latavette IN (EST)			E LAA
#11 18P	148		Crawfordsville IN			- 5 A1A
12 55A	195	Ar	Indianapolis, IN Nashvila	05	Do	H 4 35A
1 2 25A	257	T	Connersville, IN EST		T	1 2 25A
4 30A	300	*	Hamilton, OH		T	2 304
5 35A 5 65A	327	At Do	Cincinnati. OH-Union Term	-	Dp	1 40A
144	390		Maysville, KY			11 49P
8 03A	441		So. Portamouth-So. Shore, KY		T	10 55P
9 11A	477	10	Catlettsburg, KY Astand #75 Kerova #V	•		9 53P
9 32A	487		Huntington WV	-		9 33P
10 35A	537		Charleston, WV .	64		8 35P
11 06A	563		Montgomery, WV		-	7 410
#11 54A	605		Thurmond, WV			· 6 52P
12 11P	516		Prince. WV (Beckley via Yellow Cab)	115		6 36P
12 42P	639		Hinton, WV			5 06P
¥ 1 12P	659		Alderson, WV			1 5 13P
1 46P	684	V	White Sulphur Springs, WV (Greenprier)			5 02P
2 38P 2 41P	718	Ar Dp	Clifton Forge, VA (Homestead)	•	Dp	4 13P 4 10P
3 52P	775		Staunton, VA	•		3 03P
5 11P	814	V	Charlottesville, VA .	0.	T	2 05P
Amtrak	Thruw	ay Bu	a Connection-Richmond, VA/Charlotte	sville VA-	Sche	Jule Below
6 15P	862	Do	Culpeper, VA			12 59P
6 55P	896	T	Manassas, VA		T	12 240
D 7 42P	920	V	Alexandria, VA	04		11 494
8 10P	329	Ar	Weshington, DC .	101	Do	11 304
Ar WAS WeFrSu						Dp WAS SuWeFr
66/76	-		Connection Frain at Weakington N		-	70
NeFrSu		1	A Deve of Operation -		-	CuWaF-
10 00P	0	Dn	Washington OC .		1	Summer!
	9	Ar	New Carmilton HD	204	A	0 204
10.11P	70	T	BWI Almost MD	20	+	9324
10 53P	40	-	Retimore MD_Pana	er.	-	5 0 000
11 48P	100	-	Wilmington DE	2.5	-	- 902A
12 104	135	-	Philadelphia PA	6.4		A 7 100
12 574	167	-	Trenton MI	104	-	7 484
1 1 424	215	1	Newark NL Page Sta	0.1		ADE 14
		-	New York NY	va	-	SAND JAA
2 00A	225	Ar	-Penn Sta. • (ET)	104	Do	5 6 15A

Connecting Services (See page 7 for details.)

Amtrak	Thru	way	Bus Connection-Chicago, IL/Madisor	, WI-S	ee page	35							
Amtrak Thruway Bus Connection-Charlottesville, VA/Richmond, VA													
8 45P	0 69	Dp Ar	Charicttesville, VA-Union Sta. • Richmond, VA (ET)	90	Ar Dp	1 45P 12 15P							

SERVICES ON THE CARDINAL

Coaches: Reservations required

Sleeping Cars: First Class Superliner Service featuring tray meal service in the Sightseer Lounge

Sightseer Lounge: Sandwiches, snacks and beverages Entertainment: Guides provide scenic commentary between Charleston, WV

and White Sulphur Springs. WV eastbound on Train 50 Smoking: Cigarette smoking is permitted in a designated portion of the lounge area. At certain times of the day, as announced by the train crew the lounge area will be entirely non-smoking. No smoking in sleepers, coaches, or drining cars

CRESCENT

New York • Washington • Charlotte • Atlanta . Riemingham . New Orleans

19			< Train Number ►			20
Daily			< Days of Operation ►			Daily
ReadDown	Mile			Symbol		Reed Up
2 45P	0	Dp	New York, NY-Penn Sta (ET)	204	Ar	2 10P
R 3 03P	10	T	Newerk, NJ-Penn Sta.	ä.		D 1 45P
R 341P	58	13	Trenton, NJ	24		D 1 02P
R 4 40P	91		Philadelphia, PA-30th St Sta.	205		D12 07P
R 5 05P	116		Wilmington, DE	205		D11 39A
R 6 00P	185	V	Beltimore, MD-Penn Sta .	305		D10 44A
A 6 50P A 7 15P	225	Ar Dp	Washington, DC •	203	Dp Ar	D 9 33A
7 34P	233		Alexandria, VA	44		D 3 05A
8 08P	258		Manasaas. VA	•		8 19A
# 8 41P	292		Culpeper, VA	•		@ 7 45A
9 37P	337		Charlottesville, VA .	44		6 53A
10 55P	398		Lynchburg, VA	44		5 40A
11 59P	461	V	Danville, VA	•		4 29A
1 20A 1 40A	512	Ar Dp	Greensboro, NC (Winston-Salem)	45	Do	3 27A 3 07A
1 56A	524		High Point, NC	• •		2 39A
2 38A	558		Sallabury, NC	• •		1 58A
3 37A	601		Charlotte, NC	05		1 12A
9 4 04A	625		Gastonia, NC	•		12 41A
5 05A	678		Spertanburg, SC	•		11 41P
5 55A 6 10A	709	Ar Do	Greenville. SC	as	Op Ar	11 00P 10 45P
6 47A	739		Clemson, SC	•		9 55P
* 7 23A	772		Toccoa. GA	•		* 9 22P
8 05A	810		Gainesville. GA			8 41P
9 05A 9 25A	858	Ar Do	Atlanta. GA • (ET)	40	DD At	7 46P 7 07P
Amt)	ak Th	ruway	Bus Connection-Allanta. GA/Macc	n. GA-Sc	hedui	e Below
10 47A	960		Anniston, AL (CT)			3 42P
12 23P 12 43P	1024	Ar Do	Birmingham, AL	95	Do Ar	2 09P
1 53P	1079		Tuscaloosa. AL	03		12 38P
3 37P 3 40P	1176	Ar Op	Meridian, MS	99	Op Ar	11 05A
* 4 38P	1232		Laurei, MS	• •		@ 9 54A
5 09P	1261	0	Hattlesburg, MS	•	T	921A
9 6 12P	1325		Picayune. MS	•		* 9 16A
* 6 35P	1343	Y	Sildell. LA	•		* 7 55A
8 00P	1380	Ar	New Orleans, LA CT)	a .	Do	7 00A

Connecting Services (See page 7 for details.)

Amtrak	Thru	way	Bue Connection-Aliante, GA	Macon.	GA		
9 45A 12 15P	0 84	Dp Ar	Atlanta, GA . Macon, GA-Greyhound Sta.			Ar Do	5 05P 2 45P
Amtrak	Thru	way	Bus Connection-New Orlean	. LAB	ton Rou	ge, LA	
10 40P 12 15A	0 80	Dp Ar	New Orleans, LA	(CT)		A OP	5 20A 3 45A

SERVICES ON THE CRESCENT

Coaches: Reservations required

Sleeping Cars: First Class Viewiner Service Dining Car: Full meal service

Lounge: Sandwicnes, snacks and beverages Smoking: Cigarette smoking is nermitted in a designated portion of the lounge area. At certain times of the day, as announced by the train crew, the lounge area will be entirely non-smoking. No smoking in sleepers, coaches, or dining cars

- D Stops only to discharge passengers.
- R Stops only to receive passengers Stops only on signal, or advance notice to conductor. 7
- Free shuttle service between rail and air terminal.
- Direct transfer between train and motor coach at Amtrak station for connecting passengers only.

Verification

I, Charles H. Banks, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Further, I certify that I am qualified and authorized to file this Verified Statement.

Bach

Charles H. Banks President R.L. Banks & Associates, Inc.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of October, 1997.

Notary Public, DC

My commission expires:

2001

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served a conformed copy of the foregoing Comments and Request for Conditions of Northern Virginia Transportation Commission and Potomac and Rappahannock Transportation Commission in Finance Docket No. 33388, by first class mail properly addressed, with postage pre-paid or by more expeditious manner of delivery upon Administrative Law Juage Jacob Leventhal and All Parties of Record on the Service List.

Kevin M. Sheys

Dated:

October 21, 1997.



182782



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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BUILDING

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OF COUNSEL JOHN I. BRADSHAW, JR. E. ANDREW STEFFEN PHILLIP A. TERKY PAUL R. BLACK * JOHN S. CHAPPELL STEVEN G. CRACKAFT SUE A. BEESLEY 3317 MEM 2 (JOCS/MEM/PUBL/1721_1 85501 * AND ADMITTURE FLORIDA & CAURINAM

OFFICES IN INDIANAPOLIS AND JASPER October 20, 1997

Honorable Vernon A. Williams Secretary Surface Transportation Board 1925 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20423-0001

> Re: CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc., and Norfolk Southern Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway Company -Control and Operating Leases/Agreements - Conrail, Inc. and Consolidated Rail Corporation, STB Finance Docket No. 33388

Dear Secretary Williams:

Enclosed please find an original and 25 copies of an Unredacted version of Comments and Supporting Evidence of The City of Indianapolis in Opposition to the Application of CSX Corporation, et al., Unless Competitive Conditions are Imposed, and an original and 25 copies of a Redacted version of Comments and Supporting Evidence of The City of Indianapolis in Opposition to the Application of CSX Corporation, et al., Unless Competitive Conditions are Imposed.

Also enclosed are diskettes formatted in WordPerfect 5.2 with both documents.

Very truly yours.

Michael P. Maxwell, Jr.

Counsel for City of Indianapolis, Indiana

MPM/csg

Enclosures

cc:

U.S. Secretary of Transportation - Redacted U.S. Attorney General - Redacted Judge Leventhal - Redacted

