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DECLARATION OF JAMES L. HARKER

1. My name is James L. Harker. I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.

9. In addition, especially when considering that NS has not identified any of the work they are allegedly transferring, along with their increasingly aggressive cost cutting measures which have been announced publicly in various forums where it appears they are cutting as many employees as possible, I have serious concerns that there will be no work available for me at the locations NS identifies. Further, I am seriously concerned that even if jobs may be available initially, as alleged by NS, they may very well be eliminated in the in the near future, especially when considering NS' actions in reducing employees.

10. I am currently 62 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1970. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, James L. Harker, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

James L. Harker

James L. Harker

DECLARATION OF ROBERT L. DODSON

1. My name is Robert L. Dodson. I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder: ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.

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10. I am currently 58 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1971. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Robert L. Dodson, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Robert L. Dodson

Robert L. Dodson

DECLARATION OF STEPHEN R. GIBBONS

1. My name is Stephen R. Gibbons. I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

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(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.

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10. I am currently 49 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1970. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Stephen R. Gibbons, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Stephen R. Gibbons

Stephen R. Gibbons

DECLARATION OF JAMES DEGENNARO

1. My name is James DeGennaro. I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

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10. I am currently 60 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since ³⁻¹⁻⁷¹ 1971. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, James DeGennaro, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Machinist employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

James DeGennaro

James DeGennaro

DECLARATION OF WILLARD J. THOMPSON

1. My name is Willard J. Thompson. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.

2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.

3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.

4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

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(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

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10. I am currently 50 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1975. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Willard J. Thompson, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Willard J. Thompson

Willard J. Thompson

DECLARATION OF DONALD W. STAUB

1. My name is Donald W. Staub. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
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In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

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10. I am currently 52 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 03-13-74. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Donald W. Staub, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Donald W. Staub

Donald W. Staub

DECLARATION OF LARRY A. LYTLE

1. My name is Larry A. Lytle. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.

9. In addition, especially when considering that NS has not identified any of the work they are allegedly transferring, along with their increasingly aggressive cost cutting measures which have been announced publicly in various forums where it appears they are cutting as many employees as possible, I have serious concerns that there will be no work available for me at the locations NS identifies. Further, I am seriously concerned that even if jobs may be available initially, as alleged by NS, they may very well be eliminated in the in the near future, especially when considering NS' actions in reducing employees.

10. I am currently 53 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1976. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Larry A. Lytle, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Larry A. Lytle

Larry A. Lytle

DECLARATION OF JAMES M. LITTLE

1. My name is James M. Little. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

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(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

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10. I am currently 48 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1973. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, James M. Little, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

James M. Little

James M. Little

DECLARATION OF KENNETH J. JOHNSTON

1. My name is Kenneth J. Johnston. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
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(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

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Verification

I, Kenneth J. Johnston, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Kenneth J. Johnston

Kenneth J. Johnston

DECLARATION OF RICHARD L. HOOVER

1. My name is Richard L. Hoover. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
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(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

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
10. I am currently 49 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1975. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Richard L. Hoover, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Richard L. Hoover



DECLARATION OF ALLEN G. GLASS

1. My name is Allen G. Glass. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

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10. I am currently 47 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1974. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Allen G. Glass, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Allen G. Glass

Allen G. Glass

DECLARATION OF JEFFERY D. DELBAGGIO

1. My name is Jeffery D. DelBaggio. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
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In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

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Verification

I, Jeffery D. DelBaggio, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Jeffery D. DelBaggio

Jeffery K. DelBaggio

DECLARATION OF JAMES D. CAMPBELL

1. My name is James D. Campbell. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.

9. In addition, especially when considering that NS has not identified any of the work they are allegedly transferring, along with their increasingly aggressive cost cutting measures which have been announced publicly in various forums where it appears they are cutting as many employees as possible, I have serious concerns that there will be no work available for me at the locations NS identifies. Further, I am seriously concerned that even if jobs may be available initially, as alleged by NS, they may very well be eliminated in the in the near future, especially when considering NS' actions in reducing employees.


10. I am currently 50 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1973. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, James D. Campbell, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

James D. Campbell



DECLARATION OF STEVEN L. AYERS

1. My name is Steven L. Ayers. I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg /Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.

9. In addition, especially when considering that NS has not identified any of the work they are allegedly transferring, along with their increasingly aggressive cost cutting measures which have been announced publicly in various forums where it appears they are cutting as many employees as possible, I have serious concerns that there will be no work available for me at the locations NS identifies. Further, I am seriously concerned that even if jobs may be available initially, as alleged by NS, they may very well be eliminated in the in the near future, especially when considering NS' actions in reducing employees.


10. I am currently 47 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1973. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Steven L. Ayers, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Electrician employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 10, 2001

Steven L. Ayers

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Steven L. Ayers", is written over a horizontal line.

DECLARATION OF BILLY L. BONSELL

1. My name is Billy L. Bonsell. I am a Carman employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg / Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.


9. In addition, especially when considering that NS has not identified any of the work they are allegedly transferring, along with their increasingly aggressive cost cutting measures which have been announced publicly in various forums where it appears they are cutting as many employees as possible, I have serious concerns that there will be no work available for me at the locations NS identifies. Further, I am seriously concerned that even if jobs may be available initially, as alleged by NS, they may very well be eliminated in the in the near future, especially when considering NS' actions in reducing employees.

10. I am currently 45 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1975. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Billy L. Bonsell, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Carman employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 9, 2001


Billy L. Bonsell

DECLARATION OF ROBERT G. CHIRDON

1. My name is Robert G. Chirdon. I am a Carman employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania. I am a former employee of Consolidated Rail Corporation and was employed in Altoona during the years leading up to Norfolk Southern's acquisition of the Altoona shops (Hollidaysburg / Juniata) and split date, June 1, 1999.
2. As an employee of Conrail, subsequent to the announced merger of CSX and Conrail in 1996, and then the announced agreement between CSX and NS to acquire and divide Conrail's assets I had reason to be seriously concerned about my employment as a result of these proposed mergers. This concern resulted in my paying very close attention to what Norfolk Southern was saying with regard to the future of the shops in Altoona.
3. From October 1996, when the first merger between Conrail and CSX was announced through June 1, 1999, split date of the CSX/NS acquisition and division of Conrail, I personally read or was made aware of continuing commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the future of the shops in Altoona. I also read or was made aware of news paper advertisements taken out by NS, addressed to myself as a " stakeholder ", committing to the continued operation of both Hollidaysburg and Juniata shops, and the promotion of employment at these shops. In addition to numerous news articles and Norfolk Southern press releases, as time progressed towards the ultimate approval of the " Conrail Transaction " and then the actual takeover in June 1999, based on repeated news and other reports of commitments being made by Norfolk Southern with respect to the shops in Altoona, I had reason to be confident that my employment in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with Norfolk Southern was secure for years to come. In fact, based on Norfolk Southern's repeated commitments, I had reason to be confident that the work at the Altoona shops was going to grow, as well as employment levels. Based on what Norfolk Southern was telling everyone concerned, which was widespread public knowledge, I was quite confident concerning my employment.
4. Further, Norfolk Southern CEO David Goode, in a speech to us workers at Juniata Locomotive Shop on June 01, 1999, acknowledged and reaffirmed the commitments NS made to the shops in Altoona, this time subsequent to the merger being approved, once again providing reassurances concerning employment for years to come.

5. Unfortunately however, this has changed with Norfolk Southern's announced plans to close the shops. Since Norfolk Southern's announced closing of Hollidaysburg, obviously I have had cause to closely follow all that has happened. In doing so, there are at least two things which stand out based on my knowledge of Norfolk Southern's commitments to continue operations at the shops in Altoona.

(a) That Norfolk Southern's planned closing of Hollidaysburg Car Shop completely contradicts repeated, firm commitments to continue operations at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, and (b) That Norfolk Southern is now attempting to assert that they merely stated aspirations, expectations or beliefs concerning the shops, which is completely false. To the contrary, as employees, we were repeatedly assured via the news, advertisements run by NS, NS publications, and the operating plan that NS made an unconditional commitment to continue operation of the shops and promote employment at the shops. In fact, throughout this process NS officials made frequent visits to the shops, holding meetings with the workers, again, during which time they repeatedly told employees of the commitment NS made to the shops, and that we, as workers had no reason to be concerned.

In view of Norfolk Southern's obvious attempts to renege on the clear promises they made to the workers at Hollidaysburg, I have now lost all trust in Norfolk Southern.

6. Also, with respect to what work is allegedly being transferred to other locations, I am not aware of any such work which is being transferred, and to my knowledge Norfolk Southern has not advised anyone of specifically what work is actually being transferred.

7. With regard to protective benefits, again, I have no reason to believe that Norfolk Southern is going to provide protective benefits. Beyond having no reason to trust Norfolk Southern, as it is obvious they cannot be trusted, with respect to protective benefits, I have become aware of numerous co-workers who have been adversely affected by the Conrail Transaction who were denied protective benefits. As workers, our experience and understanding since implementation of this transaction is that Norfolk Southern does everything they possibly can to avoid the payment of protective benefits.

8. Finally, my reservations concerning the integrity, or lack thereof, of anything Norfolk Southern officials state is based on the obvious and outright lies stated by Norfolk Southern to gain approval of the Conrail Transaction.

9. In addition, especially when considering that NS has not identified any of the work they are allegedly transferring, along with their increasingly aggressive cost cutting measures which have been announced publicly in various forums where it appears they are cutting as many employees as possible, I have serious concerns that there will be no work available for me at the locations NS identifies. Further, I am seriously concerned that even if jobs may be available initially, as alleged by NS, they may very well be eliminated in the in the near future, especially when considering NS' actions in reducing employees.

10. I am currently 46 years old and have worked here at the shops in Altoona since 1974. I have deep family and other ties here in the Altoona area and fear uprooting these ties and disrupting my family, only to be told in a short period of time by Norfolk Southern, who obviously cannot be trusted, that again there is no work at a location that I may have the opportunity to transfer to.

Verification

I, Robert G. Chirdon, verify that under penalty of perjury that I am a Carman employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on July 9, 2001

Robert G. Chirdon
Robert G. Chirdon

**BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY**

BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Finance Docket No. 33388

CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc.,
Norfolk Southern Corp. and Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co.--Control and Operating
Leases/Agreements--Conrail Inc.
and Consolidated Rail Corporation
Transfer of Railroad Line by Norfolk
Southern Railway Company to CSX Transportation, Inc.



DECLARATION OF ALAN M. SCHEER

I, ALAN M. SCHEER, declare under penalty of perjury, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true, correct, and based upon personal knowledge.

1. I am an International Representative of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers ("IBB"). The IBB represents employees of Norfolk Southern Ry. ("NSR") at its Hollidaysburg Car Shop ("HCS") who, perform boilermaker and blacksmith work at the Shop. The IBB actively participated in the STB proceedings on the CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp. acquisition of control and division of the Consolidated Rail Corp. ("Conrail") ("Conrail Transaction").

2. Norfolk Southern's response to this Board's Order in Decision No. 186 regarding NS' planned closing of the HCS asserts that this organization did not rely on NS' representations that NS would retain and invest in the HCS and the Juniata Locomotive Shop ("Altoona Shops") because we did not refer to those representations when we withdrew our opposition to approval of the Conrail Transaction. However, we saw no need to explicitly state our reliance on NS' representations about the Altoona Shops because this was not a matter of a private arrangement

between the union and the carrier. In the Application filed with the Board, NS had stated clearly, and in detail, that it would continue to use and invest in the Altoona Shops, and that it expected to increase employment in the Shops. Moreover, NS had been explicit in its public statements about the commitments it had made in the Application and elsewhere about the Shops. We certainly did not understand NS to have said that NS merely thought the Shops would be useful and that it hoped and expected to use them, but for no definite period of time, as NS has claimed in its response to Decision No. 186. And no person at NS ever said that to us. Accordingly, we had no reason to recite NS' representations about the Altoona Shops as part of our reason for withdrawing from opposition to the Transaction.

3. I want to emphasize that NS' representations about the Altoona shops were a key consideration in the union's decision to withdraw from opposition to the Transaction. The Altoona shops were the largest shops on the Conrail system and therefore the largest employers of members of this union workers on the Conrail system. Continued employment, and stability of employment at current work locations for workers represented by this union was necessarily important for us in deciding our positions on the Transaction. There is simply no basis for NS' assertion that this organization did not rely on NS' representations about the Altoona Shops in withdrawing from opposition to the Conrail Transaction. NS' current plan to close the HCS is a clear repudiation of those representations on which we relied.

7/13/01
Date

Alan M. Scheer
Alan M. Scheer

**BEST
AVAILABLE
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BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Finance Docket No. 33388

CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc.,
Norfolk Southern Corp. and Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co.--Control and Operating
Leases/Agreements--Conrail Inc.
and Consolidated Rail Corporation
Transfer of Railroad Line by Norfolk
Southern Railway Company to CSX Transportation, Inc.

SECOND DECLARATION OF GEORGE J. FRANCISCO, JR.

I, GEORGE J. FRANCISCO, JR., declare under penalty of perjury, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true, correct, and based upon personal knowledge.

1. I am the President of the National Conference of Firemen and Oilers/Service Employees International Union ("SEIU"). The NCFO represents employees of Norfolk Southern Ry. ("NSR") at its Hollidaysburg Car Shop ("HCS") who, among other things, perform laborer functions in the shops. The NCFO actively participated in the STB proceedings on the CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp. acquisition of control and division of the Consolidated Rail Corp. ("Conrail") ("CSX/NS-Conrail Transaction").

2. Norfolk Southern's response to this Board's Order in Decision No. 186 asserts that this organization did not rely on NS' representations that it would about retain and invest in the HCS and the Juniata Locomotive Shop ("Altoona Shops") because we did not refer to those representations when we withdrew our opposition to approval of the Conrail Transaction. However, we saw no need to explicitly state our reliance on NS' representations about the Altoona Shops because this was not a matter of a private arrangement between the union and the

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
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3. I want to emphasize that NS' representations about the Altoona shops were a key consideration the union's decision to withdraw from opposition to the Transaction. The Altoona shops were the largest shops on the Conrail system and therefore the largest employers of members of this union workers on the Conrail system. Continued employment, and stability of employment at current work locations for workers represented by this union was necessarily a key consideration for us in deciding our positions on the Transaction. There is simply no basis for NS' assertion that this organization did not rely on NS' representations about the Altoona Shops in withdrawing from opposition to the Conrail Transaction. NS' current plan to close the HCS is a clear repudiation of those representations on which we relied.

7/13/01
Date


George J. Francisco, Jr.

**BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY**

EXHIBIT 35

DECLARATION OF

JOSEPH H. LETCHER

2020
EXHIBIT 33

DECLARATION OF

ALAN M. SCHEER

BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Finance Docket No. 33388

CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc.,
Norfolk Southern Corp. and Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co.--Control and Operating
Leases/Agreements--Conrail Inc.
and Consolidated Rail Corporation
Transfer of Railroad Line by Norfolk
Southern Railway Company to CSX Transportation, Inc.



DECLARATION OF ALAN M. SCHEER

I, ALAN M. SCHEER, declare under penalty of perjury, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true, correct, and based upon personal knowledge.

1. I am an International Representative of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers ("IBB"). The IBB represents employees of Norfolk Southern Ry. ("NSR") at its Hollidaysburg Car Shop ("HCS") who, perform boilermaker and blacksmith work at the Shop. The IBB actively participated in the STB proceedings on the CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp. acquisition of control and division of the Consolidated Rail Corp. ("Conrail") ("Conrail Transaction").

2. Norfolk Southern's response to this Board's Order in Decision No. 186 regarding NS' planned closing of the HCS asserts that this organization did not rely on NS' representations that NS would retain and invest in the HCS and the Juniata Locomotive Shop ("Altoona Shops") because we did not refer to those representations when we withdrew our opposition to approval of the Conrail Transaction. However, we saw no need to explicitly state our reliance on NS' representations about the Altoona Shops because this was not a matter of a private arrangement

between the union and the carrier. In the Application filed with the Board, NS had stated clearly, and in detail, that it would continue to use and invest in the Altoona Shops, and that it expected to increase employment in the Shops. Moreover, NS had been explicit in its public statements about the commitments it had made in the Application and elsewhere about the Shops. We certainly did not understand NS to have said that NS merely thought the Shops would be useful and that it hoped and expected to use them, but for no definite period of time, as NS has claimed in its response to Decision No. 186. And no person at NS ever said that to us. Accordingly, we had no reason to recite NS' representations about the Altoona Shops as part of our reason for withdrawing from opposition to the Transaction.

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7/13/01
Date

Alan M. Scheer
Alan M. Scheer

**BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY**

EXHIBIT 34

SECOND DECLARATION OF

GEORGE J. FRANCISCO, JR.

**BEFORE THE
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD**

Finance Docket No. 33388

**CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc.,
Norfolk Southern Corp. and Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co.--Control and Operating
Leases/Agreements--Conrail Inc.
and Consolidated Rail Corporation
Transfer of Railroad Line by Norfolk
Southern Railway Company to CSX Transportation, Inc.**

SECOND DECLARATION OF GEORGE J. FRANCISCO, JR.

I, GEORGE J. FRANCISCO, JR., declare under penalty of perjury, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true, correct, and based upon personal knowledge.


1. I am the President of the National Conference of Firemen and Oilers/Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") The NCFO represents employees of Norfolk Southern Ry. ("NSR") at its Hollidaysburg Car Shop ("HCS") who, among other things, perform laborer functions in the shops. The NCFO actively participated in the STB proceedings on the CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp. acquisition of control and division of the Consolidated Rail Corp. ("Conrail") ("CSX/NS-Conrail Transaction").

2. Norfolk Southern's response to this Board's Order in Decision No. 186 asserts that this organization did not rely on NS' representations that it would about retain and invest in the HCS and the Juniata Locomotive Shop ("Altoona Shops") because we did not refer to those representations when we withdrew our opposition to approval of the Conrail Transaction. However, we saw no need to explicitly state our reliance on NS' representations about the Altoona Shops because this was not a matter of a private arrangement between the union and the

carrier. In the Application filed with the Baord, NS had stated clearly, and in detail, that it would continue to use and invest in the Altoona Shops, and that it expected to increase employment in the Shops. Moreover, NS had been explicit in its public statements about the commitments it had made in the Application and elsewhere about the Shops. We certainly did not understand NS to have said that NS merely thought the Shops would be useful and that it hoped and expected to use them, but for no definite period of time as NS has claimed in its response to Decision No. 186. And no person at NS ever said that to us. Accordingly, we had no reason to recite NS' representations about the Altoona Shops as part of our reason for withdrawing from opposition to the Transaction.

3. I want to emphasize that NS' representations about the Altoona shops were a key consideration the union's decision to withdraw from opposition to the Transaction. The Altoona shops were the largest shops on the Conrail system and therefore the largest employers of members of this union workers on the Conrail system. Continued employment, and stability of employment at current work locations for workers represented by this union was necessarily a key consideration for us in deciding our positions on the Transaction. There is simply no basis for NS' assertion that this organization did not rely on NS' representations about the Altoona Shops in withdrawing from opposition to the Conrail Transaction. NS' current plan to close the HCS is a clear repudiation of those representations on which we relied.

7/13/01
Date


George J. Francisco, Jr.

**BEST
AVAILABLE
COPY**

EXHIBIT 35

DECLARATION OF

JOSEPH H. LETCHER

DECLARATION OF JOSEPH H. LETCHER

1. My name is Joseph H. Letcher. I was a Carman employed for Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania until May 04, 2001. Previously I was employed by Consolidated Rail Corporation, and the Penn Central Railroad, when I began my employment in the Altoona shops back in 1974.

2. In the mid to late 1990's Conrail, who operated the shops at that time embraced the concept of insourcing aimed at increasing utilization of the shops. Consistent with Conrail's focus on insourcing work I accepted a position on the insourcing team at Hollidaysburg Car Shop in late 1996, and was involved in insourcing projects on a full time basis until May of this year. As an estimator on the insourcing team I became increasingly involved with the process of estimating potential jobs and assisting in the preparation of proposals to secure insourcing projects. In fact, during my tenure on the insourcing team I traveled to numerous locations, both within and outside of the United States to review and estimate potential jobs.

Due to my involvement, and personal knowledge of the insourcing work efforts at the shops I have worked with and frequently spoken to Thomas Lutton, President of TWU Local 2017 concerning insourcing work at the shops. In fact, it was quite common for me to speak with Mr. Lutton concerning these issues because when Conrail was operating the shops the organization was viewed as a partner in the insourcing efforts. Unfortunately, however, as time progressed after split date it became increasingly evident that Norfolk Southern's management style did not involve the same type partnership that was in place during Conrail's operation.

3. I have also had the opportunity to read declarations of Mr. Lutton and verified statements of David L. Veron and Robert H. Belvin, as well as others in various filings in the current case involving the Hollidaysburg Car Shops before the United States Surface Transportation Board. In addition to addressing various other issues I will respond to various statements embodied in these verified statements which have been filed with the Board.

4. Having worked in the Car shops in Altoona over the past 27 years I have a quite extensive understanding of the shops operations and the type of work which is performed in the shops.

5. As time progressed, from the beginning of our insourcing efforts, our insourcing team grew more and more proficient. The ability of our insourcing team to secure projects was supported greatly by the reputation of the shops at Altoona and the work force which was recognized as having the ability to perform quality work in a timely fashion. In fact, the shops at Hollidaysburg were recognized for the ability to perform several type specialized projects which other car building and repair facilities were not suited to perform. These factors resulted in a steady increase in insourcing work being performed in the car shops in the late 1990's, into year 2000.

6. In late 1996 and early 1997 in response to merger announcements, first the CSX/CR proposal, then the CSX/NS acquisition of Conrail, our insourcing team became skeptical and was uncertain what to expect with regard to insourcing at the shops due to the proposed mergers. However, within only a short period of time, our insourcing team, as well as employees at the shops began receiving good news from Norfolk Southern who ultimately acquired the shops in the Conrail Transaction. The good news provided to us at the shops by Norfolk Southern was that they, NS was not only going to continue operation of the shops, but also consolidate other work into the shops and promote employment at the shops. Even more encouraging to the insourcing team, and employees at Hollidaysburg, was the fact that NS obviously recognized the shops for their ability to perform insourcing projects, and there repeated commitments to increase insourcing at the shops. These commitments to increasing insourcing were reaffirmed repeatedly by Norfolk Southern officials who visited the shops prior to acquisition date, publicly applauded the insourcing efforts and the quality of workmanship. In addition, during NS officials visits to Hollidaysburg, they repeatedly reassured employees that they were focused on increasing insourcing, as stated not only in their operating plan, but in new releases, via the media and throughout various other forums.

7. Upon split date, and the continuing commitments by Norfolk Southern to continue operations and promote employment at the shops our insourcing team rolled forward continuing on a steady and increasing rate of securing profitable insourcing projects for the shops. In fact, in year 2000 the shop insourced work on 1850 cars, nearly a 25% increase from the previous year, and the largest number of cars ever insourced at the shops in a given year. Moreover, these increasing projects brought in substantial profits for the shops. These profits could have been increased by the shops performing additional insourcing projects, which had already been secured, however had to be turned away due to inadequate staffing levels at the shops.

8. This brings me to my next point with respect to Norfolk Southern's claims concerning underutilized capacity in the shops. In fact, capacity in the shops is controlled by the company, and as illustrated in year 2000, several insourcing projects which were already scheduled for the shops beginning in the 4th quarter of 2000 and into 2001 were turned away by Norfolk Southern, in large part due to the fact that manpower at the shops had decreased considerably since split date, the day in which NS took over operations of the shops. Inasmuch there was not sufficient staffing in the shops to keep up with the increased flow of insourcing projects coming into the shops. Outlined below is a schedule of insourcing projects which were scheduled in the shops beginning in the 4th quarter of 2000, any number of which could have begun in year 2000 had there been sufficient manpower in the shops.

Table 1

SCHEDULED INSOURCING WORK FOR 4TH QUARTER OF YEAR 2000 INTO YEAR 2001

1.	Open Top Hopper Fastener Replacement Program	260 Cars
2.	CSX Box Car – Heavy Repair Program	333 Cars
3.	CSX Aggregate Rebody Program	350 Cars
4.	CCX (4300) Wood Chip Gondola Program	150 Cars
5.	Rail Trust Covered Hopper Program	25 Cars
6.	Greenbrier Quad Hopper Modification Program	100 Cars
7.	Greenbrier Quad Hopper Heavy Repair Program	75 Cars
8.	GCCX Hood Program	160 Hoods

Total of 8 Programs Scheduled, Including 1393 Cars & 160 Hoods for Repair or Modification

The programs outlined in Table 1 above were all scheduled in for the shops with preparations being made to order materials. Many of these programs could have been performed, at a substantial profit in the shops during year 2000, but were held back due to insufficient staffing in the shops, then ultimately turned away by Norfolk Southern. In fact, due to the success of the insourcing efforts and the amount of work scheduled for the shops, it is my understanding that in approximately October of 2000 Shop management attempted to get additional employees for the shops but were turned down by Corporate Norfolk Southern management in Roanoke, Virginia.

9. The news that manpower was requested to keep up with the insourcing work and refused was not only disturbing, but signaled problems for several reasons. First, the insourcing programs outlined in Table 1, scheduled into the shops, were all programs which would generate a substantial profit for the shops. Second, it is my understanding that the organization representing members at Hollidaysburg Car Shop, the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 2017 had previously negotiated a reduced rate agreement for new hires at the Hollidaysburg Car Shops, and that Norfolk Southern management, not the organization, backed out of the agreement. It is also my understanding that this agreement that the organization agreed to provided for new hires being paid at a 75% rate of pay, which would have resulted in even substantially higher profits on these insourcing programs. Third, it should be pointed out that these insourcing programs are negotiated to be fully allocated. In other words all of the overhead, material and labor costs are figured in, as well as a margin of profit. In addition, on a regular basis the margin of profit over the duration of a program usually increases substantially as increased efficiency and productivity normally occurs over the duration of a program. Forth, and certainly not last, Norfolk Southern's refusal to augment the forces in Hollidaysburg signaled quite strongly that they were beginning an attempt to renege on the unequivocal commitments they had made repeatedly to increase insourcing at the shops.

10. In response to reading both declarations of Thomas Lutton, and the verified statement of David L. Veron which attempted to refute statements in Mr. Lutton's declaration I do not find Mr. Veron's statement to be entirely accurate and detect several misleading statements. Before addressing various statements made by Mr. Veron I should point out that I find Mr. Lutton's declarations are consistent with my general knowledge of the insourcing efforts at Hollidaysburg car shops.

After having read Mr. Veron's verified statement in Norfolk Southern's June 25, 2001 filing with the Surface Transportation Board, in particular I would like to respond to the following statements made by Mr. Veron, which in my judgment do not accurately reflect the status of various insourcing projects based on my involvement and knowledge with the insourcing program at Hollidaysburg Car Shops.

(a) In response to Mr. Veron's statement at page 6 of his verified statement, "**Mr. Lutton is misinformed as to work that " would have kept the shops fully operational well into 2002 "**" I do not agree with Mr. Veron's statement. As outlined in Table 1 of this declaration, there are 8 programs

identified which were already scheduled into the shops in the last quarter of 2000, into 2001 which entailed a considerable amount of work. In addition, as I will discuss later in this declaration, we were in the process of securing numerous additional insourcing projects which would have obviously kept the shop fully operational, based on employment levels, throughout 2001, well into 2002 and most likely well beyond 2002. It is also important to emphasize that requests for additional employees at the shops were made and declined by Corporate Norfolk Southern management, further supporting our assessment that, in consideration of the work scheduled (Table 1) and additional projects nearing being secured the shops would have been fully operational at current employment levels well into 2002 and beyond.

(b) In response to Mr. Veron's statement at page 6 of his verified statement, "***For Example, he is mistaken that NS had a commitment from Bombardier for the conversion of 250 gondola cars at a cost of 4.5 million. Lutton V.S. at 4. In fact, NS did have some initial discussions with Bombardier to build and apply a drop-in trough to 225 gondolas, but Bombardier was willing to spend no more than 1.9 million on the project, not the 4.5 million Mr. Lutton claims.***" again I do not believe that Mr. Veron's statement accurately reflects the status of this insourcing proposal, which to my understanding, as part of the insourcing team was still in negotiation. My recollection of this insourcing proposal was that the cost of the cars was \$ 8300.00 per car x 250 cars equaling \$ 2,075,000.00, then the cost of hoods for the 250 cars which was \$ 7200.00 per car x 250 cars equaling \$ 1, 800,000.00, and in addition during negotiations additional truck work, at additional costs were being discussed. Inasmuch, based on my knowledge, Mr. Lutton's declaration more accurately described this insourcing project proposal, which as stated before was still in negotiation, with good potential and indications that this project would be secured based on the shops past experience in doing this type work.

(c) In response to Mr. Veron's statement at page 6 of his verified statement, "***Mr. Lutton incorrectly claims that NS passed up work on 200 covered hopper cars for Johnstown America at an asserted cost of \$ 5 million. In fact, in November of 2000, NS provided a quote to Johnstown America offering to work on these cars at a price of \$ 4.675 million. Although we were hopeful that we would bring that work to Hollidaysburg, Johnstown America informed in February that they would do the work in their own shops.***" , based on my knowledge concerning this insourcing proposal, again Mr. Veron's statement does not accurately reflect the status of this proposed project.

Although there does not appear to be a dispute concerning the cost of this particular insourcing project proposal, what transpired with this project, in my judgment and based on my knowledge is not accurately stated by Mr. Veron. It is my understanding that Johnstown America did not actually do this work, as alleged by Mr. Veron, but in fact contracted with Millennium rail in Altoona to do the work. In fact, it is interesting to note that Veron states that Johnstown America provided notification to NS in February 2001, alleging that they, Johnstown America were going to do the work, in the same time frame in which NS again announced it was closing the Hollidaysburg shops. When considering that the proposal was submitted in November 2000, then NS's announced closing in November 2000, then Johnstown America providing notice in February 2001, when NS again announced plans to close the shops, in addition to information that Millennium rail actually performed this work, it is quite apparent that Mr. Veron's statement is incorrect. It was also brought to my attention that the initial prototype car that Millennium did for this order was not successful. In this regard, the Hollidaysburg shops had successfully built prototypes and performed these types of orders in the past. In view of the foregoing it appears that indeed Johnstown America had no intentions of doing this work itself and was depending on Hollidaysburg car shops, which had experience with this type work, to do the work, but subsequent to two announced closing of the shops by NS contracted with Millennium rail to do the work.

(d) In response to Mr. Veron's statement at page 6 of his verified statement "***Mr. Lutton is also mistaken in claiming that NS received a \$1 million commitment from Greenbrier for 1,000 container car covers. Lutton V.S. at 4. NS is not aware of any such proposal from Greenbrier.***", I do not agree with Mr. Veron that there was no such proposal. Again, based on my involvement in the insourcing programs at Hollidaysburg, and my recollection, contrary to what Mr. Veron states, indeed we were in negotiation with Greenbrier for an order to build covers for CRLE cars. It was also in my recollection that the potential for securing this job was very good, and that we were in the process of working out details such as various sizes and other specifications.

(e) In response to Mr. Veron's statement at page 6 of his verified statement "***Nor have we received any proposals from First Union to provide warranty work on 400 gondola's, as Mr. Lutton claims on Page 4 of his statement.***", again I do not agree. Although I do not recall all the particulars of this particular insourcing proposal, I am quite certain that we were in discussions with First Union to perform warranty work on cars as stated in Mr. Lutton's declaration.

(f) with regard to Mr. Veron's statement at page 6 of his verified statement "*We did, however, have discussions with the Department of Defense. Those discussions concerned the possibility that NS would perform preventive maintenance on some of DoD's car fleet, and we had in fact provided them with a per-hour quote. Unfortunately, the Department of Defense did not contact us again until February 20 of this year- the day before NS announced the closure of the shops. Even if we had entered into an agreement with the Department of Defense, I seriously doubt that the work would have been worth even close to \$ 8 million per year. The contemplated arrangement would have been an agreement on price per hour for work done on cars-not an agreement for the repair of a set number of cars.*", for several reasons I disagree with Mr. Veron's statements and find them both incorrect and misleading. Based on my knowledge and recollection we were confident that we were going to get this work. In fact, it is my recollection that the DOD actually waived a mileage criteria in place to see that the work could be performed at Hollidaysburg Car Shops. It is also my recollection, that contrary to what Mr. Veron alleges with regard to the price and amount of work, this proposal entailed maintenance on a fleet of 2000 cars, at a minimum of \$ 4000.00 per car equating to the \$ 8 million dollar amount referred to in Mr. Lutton's declaration. It should also be pointed out that NS' November 2000 closure of the shops made customers a bit skeptical, however, as stated previously, and contrary to Mr. Veron's obviously self-serving choice of wording, such as the " Possibility " concerning securing this program, our insourcing team was quite confident right along that we were going to secure this program. Inasmuch, Mr. Veron's statement regarding being notified a day before the announced closing appears to imply that the securement of this project came as a surprise, which again based on my involvement and knowledge of this proposal was not the case.

(g) With regard to Mr. Veron's statement at page 7 of his verified statement "*Mr. Lutton claims that the Finger Lakes Railroad committed to have NS refurbish 20 cars at a price of \$380,000.00. Lutton V.S. at 4. In fact, this railroad expressed an interest in acquiring from NS an assortment of old cabooses and ballast cars. It wanted Norfolk Southern to then rework them. When we informed the Finger Lakes that we had no such cars for sale, the discussions ended.*", I do recall discussions concerning cabooses and that NS did not have any cabooses for sale. However, I do not believe Mr Lutton's declaration stated anything about cabooses. It is also my recollection based on my involvement in the insourcing programs that we were negotiating with the Finger Lakes concerning a project wherein they were interested in purchasing coal hauling (Tubs) from NS which would have been worked at Hollidaysburg Car Shop. I am also aware that these cars were available, in storage at

the yard in Juniata, and we were awaiting for a release to sell the cars to finalize the project, which to my understanding would have been at a cost of \$ 380,000.00.

In addition to the insourcing projects discussed above, and also due to an insufficient work force at the Hollidaysburg shops, other work, which was already in progress was farmed out. As an example, the shops had an insourcing order with GATX for SP Flat cars, a project which had already been started in the shops. The material (Steel Kits) for completing 24 of these cars had already been fabricated, when Norfolk Southern sold the kits to Millennium rail and farmed the work out.

In concluding on Mr. Veron's statements, based on my involvement, knowledge and recollection concerning insourcing projects at Hollidaysburg Car Shops, it is quite apparent that Mr. Veron's statements are not only incorrect in large part, but misleading and worded in a self serving fashion which fails to reflect an accurate picture of insourcing programs at the shops.

11. As stated previously, in addition to the insourcing work which was already scheduled into the shop beginning in the 4th quarter of year 2000, the insourcing team was in the process of negotiating numerous additional insourcing projects for the shops, many of which looked very promising and that we felt confident that we would be awarded based on the shops experience and reputation for doing the work in the past. Among other projects which were being considered, the insourcing team at Hollidaysburg was actively working on the insourcing projects outlined below in Table 2. Insourcing project proposals outlined in Table 2 are in addition to both the work which was already scheduled, as outlined in Table 1, and in addition to insourcing projects discussed above, as outlined in Mr. Lutton's declaration and Mr. Veron's verified statement. As noted in Table 2, an excellent potential for securing work on up to 2,832 addition cars and 300 containers existed and was being actively pursued. I believe it is also important to point out that in Mr. Veron's verified statement at page 4, the chart showing insourcing customers reflects several of the same customers outlined in Table 2 below. This, I believe is significant because it establishes that the customers negotiations were ongoing with in Table 2 are customers which have used the Hollidaysburg Car Shop facilities in the past, and who recognize the shops abilities and the quality of work, adding to our confidence that much, if not all of the work outlined in Table 2 would have been secured.

Table 2

INSOURCING PROJECTS BEING ACTIVELY NEGOTIATED

1. Greenbrier - CRLE Container Well Car PM Program	2000 Cars
\$ 800.00 - \$ 1000.00 Per Car	
2. GATX - FURX High Side Gondola Mod Program	200 Cars
\$ 19, 282.00 Per Car	
3. GATX - Flat Car Container Repair Project	300 Containers
\$ 2500.00 Per Container	
5. ANDERSONS - Covered Hopper Mod Program (Cut Down)	200 Cars
6. ANDERSONS - Box Car Conversion 70T-To 100T	92 Cars
7. ANDERSONS - Twin Aggregate Re-Body Program	200 Cars
8. 1 st Union Rail - Rapid Discharge Car Modification Program	40 Cars
\$ 23,000 Per Car	
9. Gilford Rail - Sell & Refurbish Open Top Hoppers (Tubs)	50 Cars
10. Altoona P/S - Sell & Refurbish Open Top Hoppers (Tubs)	50 Cars
10 Additional Insourcing Projects involving 2832 Cars and 300 Containers	

12. I have had the opportunity to read various statements by Norfolk Southern representatives who attempt to state that the company made a significant attempt at increasing insourcing work at Hollidaysburg, however that such attempts were unsuccessful. With regard to statements saying significant attempts to increase insourcing work were made, from at least a local vantage point I can certainly agree, as I was involved in this process and can comfortably state that our efforts to increase insourcing were quite aggressive.

However, with regard to statements alleging that these insourcing efforts were not successful, I could not disagree more. Such statements are completely false and appear to be nothing more than self


serving to justify the carriers actions. To the contrary, as supported by information provided in this declaration, and elsewhere, the insourcing efforts at Hollidaysburg Car Shops over the past few years were very successful and insourcing work was continually increasing.

To be clear, when considering the increase in insourcing work and numerous additional pending insourcing programs, it is obvious that contrary to Norfolk Southern's allegations that they attempted to increase insourcing and were not successful, the fact is Norfolk Southern, for no apparent good cause literally pulled the plug on insourcing work at Hollidaysburg Car Shops.

Verification

I, Joseph H. Letcher, verify that under penalty of perjury that I was a Carman employed by Norfolk Southern in Altoona, Pennsylvania until May 04, 2001, that I have read the foregoing document and its contents, and that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.


Executed July 11, 2001



Joseph H. Letcher

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EXHIBIT 36
STATEMENTS OF
DAVID R. GOODE TO
SHAREHOLDERS & MERRILL LYNCH



The following material does or may contain "forward-looking statements," as that term is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements are in all respects subject to these cautions. Readers especially are reminded that (1) any forward-looking statement herein was believed in good faith to be accurate and reliable as of its date, (2) and Norfolk Southern undertakes no obligation publicly to update or otherwise to revise any such statement.

Remarks by:

David R. Goode
Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer
Norfolk Southern Corporation

Before the:

2001 Annual Meeting of Stockholders
May 10, 2001
Norfolk, Virginia

First, let's recognize the plain truth. Our performance in 2000 was not what we wanted as shareholders.

The simple fact is, Norfolk Southern's financial performance last year did not measure up to our standards. We had to reduce our dividend. That was a difficult but necessary decision required to position ourselves for the future.

But it is also true that we operated better over the course of the year, and we improved service and the efficiency of our transportation network. We now have good service that is getting better. It should be a source of pride to everyone that we earned a 12th consecutive Gold Harriman award for safety, which we accepted just last week.

And, let's be equally candid - so far in 2001, we have done much better - in operations, service and in our financial results. The stock has performed better accordingly.

We have demonstrated the resilience and durability of the Thoroughbred. Norfolk Southern has the network, the determination and the value to be the most successful transportation company in the 21st century.

Observing what happened last year, some things are clear. The economy hit us hard, as it will. After all, rail traffic is very closely linked to economic performance. It was a tough year for the industry, particularly the second half, as carloadings reflected the economic slowdown, and rising diesel fuel prices dramatically affected costs.

We responded on the cost side, but not fast enough to offset the record rise in fuel prices. We did better in the first quarter, and we continue to respond well - although the economy remains soft.

So where do we go from here?

We're moving forward to improve your company's financial performance.

And I am certain of two things.

One - we have the right people in place to meet Norfolk Southern's toughest challenges.
And two - we have a dynamic and workable plan for continuing Norfolk Southern's

improvement.

Our people are the best in the business. Right now, I'd like you to meet two Norfolk Southern people who were recognized for important things they accomplished this year.

First, Rudy Bilka.

Rudy is a locomotive engineer on the Pittsburgh Division and local chairman of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. He also is the recipient of the Harold F. Hammond Award for his individual safety achievements during 2000. The Hammond Award is the rail industry's top employee safety honor.

In the large photograph in this room, Rudy is positioned front and center among the group of people from all around the NS system who proudly represented your company at the Harriman and Hammond award presentations.

A former chairman and long-time member of the Altoona Safety Committee, Rudy helped the committee attain a goal of zero incidents and injuries for 2000. We salute him for his personal and professional dedication to safety, which has earned him national recognition.

Rudy, please stand and let us thank you.

Seated next to Rudy is Paul Contrado, mechanical supervisor at Lambert's Point here at Norfolk. Last month in Washington, he received the John H. Chafee North American Railroad Employee Environmental Excellence Award.

Paul's work to make sure wastewater from locomotive shops is cleaned before it is discharged has earned Lambert's Point several environmental awards. He also conceived and implemented a program to recover and recycle coal as hoppers are cleaned in the car shop, and he is a leader in local efforts to improve the environment.

Paul, please stand and let us thank you.

Rudy Bilka and Paul Contrado represent a team of some 31,000 people whose ingenuity, drive and talents are dedicated to the fulfillment of Norfolk Southern's vision.

And our first quarter this year shows the tangible evidence that our efforts are working, even in the midst of economic uncertainty.

I am encouraged with our progress in the first quarter. We saw growth in railway operating revenues, fueled by double-digit increases in both coal and intermodal. We also improved our operating ratio. We did this in a quarter when the economy was not good, as we all know.

This gives us reason for guarded optimism. I say guarded because the second quarter shows continued traffic softness across the board. And though fuel prices are lower than the record highs of the fourth quarter, we again are seeing prices increase.

Still, the first quarter was encouraging. Our earnings beat the Street consensus, and our stock responded to the improvements we made.

Furthermore, service performance measurements indicate sustained improvement in service and operations.

Here are some examples.

In March, system average train speed was the fastest recorded since June 1, 1999. Train speed is up 12.5 percent from a year ago and better than pre-Conrail levels.

Also in March, average terminal dwell time was 4 percent better than last year - good but with room to improve. The number of cars on line is 7.3 percent better than a year ago, showing the fluidity of our network.

We have a smoothly performing transportation system, and service levels are good. That doesn't mean everything is OK. It does mean we are concentrating fully on making real service improvements that will help us market and sell our business.

Service and infrastructure improvements - along with restructuring initiatives announced in January - demonstrate our adaptability to fundamental changes in our markets. We're looking to grow our business, and we're making the changes to do it.

Let me now tell you something about our restructuring progress.

Employee productivity - measured both by operating revenue per employee and ton-miles per employee - is at its best level in five years. That's a necessity for us to offset wage increases and fuel costs. We have reduced our work force from 35,000 on June 1, 1999, to 31,000 today.

We're more than halfway done in disposing of 12,000 surplus freight cars. And we are deploying new data tools that enable our car management team to wring increased productivity out of our "right-sized" car fleet.

Our line rationalization program is making our system more efficient and reducing the demand for capital. In the first quarter, we eliminated more than 200 miles from our network through abandonments, sales and leases, and we are in negotiations to eliminate an additional 350 miles of lines.

We need to concentrate on our core business activity - moving freight - and we are consolidating or disposing of underutilized or redundant facilities. We have closed the Roanoke foundry and the Roanoke reclamation facility. We have announced plans to close the Hollidaysburg Car Shop on Sept. 1, and we are negotiating possible transactions involving several other facilities.

I can tell you that closing facilities is not a popular activity, and our efforts are meeting resistance. But we will persevere because our obligation to you as investors and to our employees is to move forward with sound business decisions to benefit the enterprise.

We are redesigning our train service network using software created by MultiModal Applied Systems. We know we can improve the efficiency of our operations, and the MultiModal software is helping us develop a new scheduled railroad plan that will optimize the use of our assets and provide our customers with consistent and reliable service.

We are redesigning to minimize transit variation, reduce car handling and improve service reliability while reducing costs and assets. Basically, this is about building a new operating plan around our traffic base, and optimizing how we run our system.

At the same time, we are examining our pricing structure. Improving service reliability is important to our customers, and it is a key to making sure we are fairly compensated for the valuable services we provide. Reliability improvements add to that value, which ultimately helps build revenues. Rising fuel and labor expenses make it necessary that we have improved pricing, but we also have the responsibility to realize fair value for the inherent advantages of rail transportation in the marketplace.

In the financial arena, we have converted short-term commercial paper into longer-term financing. This helps protect the company from some of the financial market's volatility. We have started a program of fuel hedging to reduce the variability of this important cost. We are managing our cash carefully and prudently, as indicated by the difficult but necessary decision to lower the dividend, and the financial condition of your company is very sound. Norfolk Southern's credit rating is one of the highest in the transportation industry.

All these benefits of our restructuring program provide us greater opportunity to launch initiatives to increase shareholder value and achieve growth in our business. These initiatives include infrastructure improvements, new service products and a comprehensive examination of our business processes.

First, we have made important new investments, and they are paying off for customers in the form of better productivity, efficiency and service.

We are completing construction of intermodal facilities at Atlanta and Cleveland. These facilities, in combination with our new intermodal facility outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, will give Norfolk Southern more capacity and customers more service options. We have the most robust intermodal network.

We also are creating new service products.

ModalGistics, for example, is a new supply chain management group created by consolidating the forest products, distribution and automotive supply chain groups into one organization. By doing that, we can leverage our capabilities across those service offerings. ModalGistics is helping us build market share in some traditional carload markets as well as generating new business.

We combined Coal Marketing and Coal Transportation to form the Coal Business Group. This group will improve asset utilization and drive down equipment costs. At the same time, it pushes hard for new growth, which we are certainly seeing in utility markets.

One of our responses to the challenge of making money in all types of economic times is a major company-wide effort called NS 21, a way of adapting Norfolk Southern's business processes for the 21st century.

At its core, NS 21 is a comprehensive process analysis of key areas of our business to improve customer service and reduce costs.

When times and economic circumstances change, we change, too. NS 21 is changing how we think about our business, our customers and our operations. And it's helping Norfolk Southern create added value for stockholders.

This is an important initiative, and I invite you to watch and listen as some of our people talk about it.

(Video: "Norfolk Southern for the 21st Century")

As Rob Martinez said in the video, we're on our way, and we have the people here to make things work. We are going through a period of great change. NS people excel when times are tough. You have seen some examples today.

The quality of our people permeates the organization. We have a sound team, and they work hard for you. Most are stockholders as well, so they understand the need for concrete financial results.

With all the change and challenges we have faced, one thing has remained constant. The Norfolk Southern franchise remains strong.

This company has staying power, but more important, it has growing power. Our expanded transportation network has the capacity and reach to take on large amounts of additional business.

We did what was necessary for the future when we decided to expand the company. We have been through some tough times making it work right. And we still have some tough work to do.

But we are doing it. We're not only "on the right track." We're moving full speed ahead in our efforts to deliver the value you expect from your investment in Norfolk Southern.

I've talked longer than usual today, because I want everyone to understand where we are and where we will go. We have come far, and the Thoroughbred is back in full stride, and we're ready for the long run. I appreciate your continued support as we make a great company even greater for the 21st century.



Executive Speeches

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The following material does or may contain "forward-looking statements," as that term is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements are in all respects subject to these cautions. Readers especially are reminded that (1) any forward-looking statement herein was believed in good faith to be accurate and reliable as of its date, (2) and Norfolk Southern undertakes no obligation publicly to update or otherwise to revise any such statement.

Remarks by:

David R. Goode
Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer
Norfolk Southern Corporation

Before the:

Merrill Lynch Global Transportation Leaders Conference
New York, N.Y.
June 6, 2001

Good morning. It is a pleasure to be here. With me are Hank Wolf, Norfolk Southern vice chairman and chief financial officer, and Leanne McGruder, director of investor relations.

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this event, which comes at a good time for Norfolk Southern.

It has been about four and a half months since we announced a restructuring program designed to grow revenues, reduce costs and enhance value for investors. In that time, we have seen the first fruits of our efforts.

Today, I will give you an update on our restructuring progress and talk about significant efforts we are making to increase revenues and cut costs, while continuing our drive to improve service. I will close with a look on the cost side at our comprehensive business review process that is designed to position Norfolk Southern to be the most successful transportation company in the 21st century.

Today, Norfolk Southern has worked through the operating challenges of expanding our network. You know as well as I that it has not been an easy task for us; but we have gotten past our issues on service.

Earlier this year, the Surface Transportation Board declared that we have "substantially resolved" service problems related to the Conrail transaction. We have a smoothly functioning network, and we now have good service that is getting better.

I'll give you just a couple of statistics to illustrate our improvement. Intermodal on-time train performance within a two-hour window was 90 percent in May, compared with 79 percent for the same period last year.

And the phone calls to our National Customer Service Center are down significantly, which is an indicator of customer satisfaction. Calls last month were 20 percent fewer than in May of last year and 61 percent fewer than in June 1999.

We still have plenty of room to get better, but I am encouraged by signs that our improvement plans are working.

Slide Net Income First Quarter

I am encouraged also by our results in the first quarter. We saw growth in railway operating revenues, fueled by double-digit increases in both coal and intermodal. We did this in a quarter when the economy was soft, as we all know.

This gives us reason for guarded optimism. I say guarded because the second quarter shows continued traffic softness across the board.

Though diesel fuel prices moderated from fourth-quarter levels, we have seen an increase in prices this quarter. They remain higher than a year ago and well above the average price per gallon over the last several years. Obviously, the high cost of fuel has had a significant impact on our financial results - at the same time, it offers us long-term growth potential, as I'll mention later.

Still, the first quarter was encouraging. Our earnings beat the Street consensus, and our stock responded to the improvements we made.

Slide Operating ratio improvement 2001 vs. 2000

An important barometer of our progress is the operating ratio, which was 86.7 percent in the first quarter, improved from 88.2 percent in the fourth quarter and almost 5 percent better than a year ago. The extent to which we are able to continue that trend will help determine our future success. We are zeroing in on opportunities to grow revenues and reduce costs so we can get back down to the level of operating ratio that Norfolk Southern historically has achieved.

We have demonstrated a good track record in other performance measurements.

Slide Train Speed, Dwell Time, Cars On Line

On June 1 this year, system average train speed was up 11.3 percent from a year ago and better than pre-Contail levels.

Also, average terminal dwell time is 4.3 percent better than last year - good but with room to improve. The number of cars on line is 7.8 percent better than a year ago, showing the fluidity of our network.

We believe we have sustainable efficiency improvements in the basics of moving trains over our new and larger system. We have turned our attention to the next phase of making further improvements in speed, scheduling and - most important - reliability of service.

To get better, we are taking decisive steps in all areas of our business to improve service, strengthen our revenue base and drive efficiencies throughout the organization. To that end, we announced in January a plan of restructuring for service and efficiency improvement. Those restructuring initiatives have already begun to generate momentum.

Slide Restructuring Benefits: Improved employee productivity)

Employee productivity - measured both by operating revenue per employee and ton-miles per employee - is at its best level in five years. That's a necessity for us to offset wage increases and fuel costs. We have reduced our work force from 35,000 on June 1, 1999, to 31,000 today. And I'm proud to say that throughout our work-force restructuring, our people have continued to set the industry standard in employee safety by earning a 12th consecutive Gold Harriman Award for 2000.

Slide Restructuring Benefits: Increased freight car productivity

We're more than halfway done in disposing of 12,000 surplus freight cars. We've eliminated about 7,200 cars thus far. And we are deploying new data tools that enable our car management team to wring increased productivity out of our "right-sized" car fleet.

Better managing our freight car fleet will enable us to achieve savings in maintenance, depreciation and car hire.

Slide Restructuring Benefits: Improved efficiency through line rationalization

Our line rationalization program is making our system more efficient and reducing the demand for capital. In the first quarter, we eliminated more than 200 miles from our network through abandonments, sales and leases, and we are currently in negotiations to eliminate an additional 350 miles of lines.

Slide Restructuring Benefits: Reduced support facility costs

We need to concentrate on our core business activity - moving freight - and we are consolidating or disposing of underutilized or redundant facilities. We have closed the Roanoke foundry and the Roanoke reclamation facility. We announced last week our intent to sell our Birmingham, Alabama, frog shop and our wheel shop in Tennessee.

We earlier announced plans to close the Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, Car Shop on September 1, although this is being contested, and we are negotiating possible transactions involving several other facilities.

Closing facilities can be a difficult proposition, and our efforts meet resistance. But our obligation to our investors and our customers is to move forward with sound business decisions to benefit the enterprise as a whole.

I am convinced, and I hope the state and federal authorities will be, that these changes are necessary for our company - like any other company - to move into the future successfully. We are convinced that concentrating on our core transportation business is the best way for us to improve our basic service and our bottom line, and we will continue to pursue those goals.

Slide Restructuring Benefits: Enhanced service reliability through

<http://www.nscorp.com/nscorp/html/speech01/drg0606.html>

7/8/01

network redesign

We are redesigning our train service network using software created by MultiModal Applied Systems. Our goal here is to reduce costs and improve reliability.

New traffic patterns require that we rethink how our railroad is operated. Building a new operating plan around our 2001 traffic base and the base we will have in the future will enable us to minimize transit variation and reduce car handling.

By getting the most out of our system, we will improve service reliability while reducing costs and assets.

Slide Restructuring Benefits: Improved pricing opportunities

At the same time, we are examining our pricing structure. Improving service reliability is important to our customers, and it is a key to making sure our prices are consistent with the valuable services we provide. Reliability improvements add to that value, which ultimately helps build revenues.

Rising fuel and labor expenses make it necessary that we have improved pricing, but we also have the responsibility to realize fair value for the inherent advantages of rail transportation in the marketplace.

Our first-quarter numbers reflect some success in this effort. We saw an improvement in revenue yield in all of our markets as revenues rose by 2 percent, despite a 1 percent decline in total carloadings.

Slide Increased coal revenue per car

Coal is an especially good example. First-quarter coal revenues were the highest since the Conrail transaction. Revenue per car improved due to rate increases, an increase in tonnage per car and some shifting to longer-haul movements.

We are taking a disciplined approach to pricing and working with customers. Reasonable rate adjustments are being applied in all business sectors, reflecting the current market value of rail services and the costs associated with providing those services.

Slide Restructuring Benefits: Protection of company's financial strength

In the financial arena, our dividend reduction from 20 cents to 6 cents per share was a difficult decision but a necessary component of our plan to rebuild our financial performance and enhance the long-term value of our company.

Reducing the dividend is only one step in a strategy to improve financial performance by adapting to changing economic realities even as we strengthen our commitments to safety and customer service.

We have this year converted short-term commercial paper into longer-term financing. This makes interest expense more predictable and improves our financial flexibility.

<http://www.nscorp.com/nscorp/html/speech01/arg0606.html>

7/8/01

We also are addressing the pressure that unusually high diesel fuel prices have put on our cost structure. Last year, we began imposing fuel surcharges. This year, we launched a fuel-hedging program to reduce the risk of volatility in fuel costs.

We are managing our cash carefully and prudently. As our free cash flow strengthens, a primary use of the cash will be to pay down debt. Norfolk Southern's credit rating remains one of the highest in the transportation industry.

The financial condition of Norfolk Southern is very sound, and the balance sheet reflects well-maintained, modern assets and substantial amounts of property and other assets with market values above their book values.

All the benefits of our restructuring program provide us greater opportunity to launch initiatives on the revenue side. While many of our actions focus on cutting costs, we also are working to grow our top line.

Slide Train scene

One way we will grow our revenues is through increasing traffic volumes. While we are concerned about current business levels, especially the impact of the industrial economy on our general merchandise volumes - and we do not yet see the upturn reflected in carloadings - we do see several opportunities for volume growth.

We continue our aggressive efforts to locate rail-served facilities along our lines. At the same time, we work to increase our market share with existing customers. We do this by offering new products and providing superior rail transportation services, particularly those designed to compete with trucking.

Along those lines, we have made important investments that are paying off for customers in the form of better productivity, efficiency and service.

Slide Rutherford Intermodal Facility

We are completing construction of intermodal facilities at Atlanta and Cleveland. The Atlanta facility will be the largest intermodal terminal east of the Mississippi.

These facilities, in combination with our new intermodal facility outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, shown here, will give Norfolk Southern more capacity in both our routes and terminals to capitalize on the intermodal market, which we believe is one of the keys to the transportation business of the future.

We have superior long-haul routes, and the new terminal capacity gives us the capacity to handle growth in east-west and north-south markets throughout the East.

In partnership with our western and Canadian friends, we are improving transit times and offering new through services.

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We have superior long-haul routes, and the new terminal capacity gives us the capacity to handle growth in east-west and north-south markets throughout the East.

In partnership with our western and Canadian friends, we are improving transit times and offering new through services.

As we expand our infrastructure to handle growth markets, we also are creating some innovative service products.

Just last month, we announced two important service opportunities for customers.

TransWorks - formerly a part of our Triple Crown Services unit - will provide information technology, accounting services and back-office software development to transportation companies throughout North America.

Plus, TransWorks will provide process outsourcing for Thoroughbred Direct Intermodal Services, our postal logistics and intermodal retail subsidiary.

We also launched an Internet bill-of-lading system that gives customers an estimated rate immediately upon requesting a shipment. That's a first for the industry. The system is part of Norfolk Southern's package of Web-based e-commerce applications designed to make Norfolk Southern more user-friendly while also reducing transaction costs.

In February, we announced the formation of ModalGistics, our supply chain management business group. ModalGistics combines into one organization our distribution services unit, our paper and forest products group and our auto supply chain activities.

Over the past few years, we have experienced major changes in the markets we serve.

Slide Our Business Post-Conrail

One result is an increasingly balanced portfolio of business at Norfolk Southern, as you can see here.

An increase in annual sales volumes of automobiles prompted us to expand our automotive network. We now have the largest rail market share of vehicles and parts in North America.

Conversely, export coal markets have seen dramatic sustained decline while utility coal has come on strong. Other markets - including traditional paper and metals business - have been undergoing significant change. New areas such as bulk distribution take hold at an increasing rate.

ModalGistics will help us build market share in some traditional carload markets as well as generate new business.

Slide Coal train

We also have combined Coal Marketing and Coal Transportation to form the Coal Business Group. This group improves asset utilization and drives down equipment costs. At the same time, it pushes hard for new growth, which we are certainly seeing in utility markets.

The world coal market and particularly the U.S. market have undergone

<http://www.nscorp.com/nscorp/html/speech01/drg0606.html>

7/8/01

major transformation since November. Demand has exceeded availability and prices are up, which is good news for an industry that has been suffering from depressed prices.

Recognition from the White House of the importance of coal as an energy resource is welcome news for our company and our coal customers. This is business for which we have ample capacity already in place.

And, when looking at Norfolk Southern, don't forget, we own or control more than a million acres of land and 1.7 billion tons of coal reserves in our Pocahontas Land Corporation, which we see as an ever more valuable asset.

All the infrastructure and service initiatives I have mentioned - and others, such as business partnerships with other carriers - are parts of our strategy to optimize our expanded system. The objective is to offer superior service for our current business and to provide opportunities for growth that we are convinced will come from consistent and reliable transportation operations.

On the cost side, I've described how our restructuring efforts already are paying off after four months. In concert with that, we have launched a major company-wide effort we call NS 21, a way of adapting Norfolk Southern's business processes for the 21st century.

Slide NS 21 logo

At its core, NS 21 is a comprehensive process analysis of key areas of our business around the twin goals of improving customer service and reducing costs.

When times and economic circumstances change, we change, too. NS 21 is changing how we think about our business, our customers and our operations. And it's helping Norfolk Southern create added value for shareholders.

This is an important initiative. The process involves benchmarking other railroads as well as leaders in other industries. The processes we are studying range from customer interface and customer billing to information access, materials purchasing and the handling of casualty claims, as well as the freight car fleet and facilities reductions I mentioned earlier.

We now have 40 NS 21 projects under way that provide opportunities for us to secure improvements in productivity and efficiency.

Just one example: In March, we launched our strategic sourcing initiative to enhance our processes for purchasing. We spend more than \$2 billion each year for materials and services, so this initiative has significant potential to help us identify cost saving opportunities.

As we move ahead with NS 21, we will identify and complete additional projects to target growth, cost savings and service improvements.

Slide NS logo

With all the change and challenges we have faced, one thing has remained constant. The Norfolk Southern franchise remains strong.

We have demonstrated through some struggles that this company has staying power, but more important, it has growing power. Our expanded transportation network has the capacity and reach to take on large amounts of additional business. We have just begun the process of developing that potential.

With the strategic steps I have outlined for you - our restructuring, additional efforts on both the revenue and cost sides, and NS 21 - we are working hard to deliver the value our shareholders expect from their investment in Norfolk Southern.

We did what was necessary for the future when we decided to expand the company. We have been through some tough times making it work right. And we still have some tough work to do.

But we are doing it. Norfolk Southern has the network, the determination and the value to succeed.

The Thoroughbred is back in full stride, and we're ready for the long run.

Thank you for your continuing support.

Executive Speeches

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EXHIBIT 37

HOLLIDAYSBURG CAR SHOP

INSOURCING SUMMARY

**HOLLIDAYSBURG CAR SHOP
INSOURCING SUMMARY**

November 21, 2000

Closed Shop Orders - 1/1/00 through 11/20/00
(Final Accounting completed)

Sales

\$10,141,570 Billed to Customers

Cost of goods sold

\$ 1,218,210 Direct Labor
\$ 2,608,555 Overheads
\$ 4,277,645 Material
\$ 202,831 Warranty Accrual

\$ 8,307,241 Total Cost of goods sold

\$ 1,834,329 Gain = 18.08% Profit

It should be noted that although most jobs are bid at a 4% margin, the actual profit is usually increased due to:

- the learning curve on larger jobs driving up efficiencies and reducing actual man-hours
- extras that the customer may ask for once the cars are in the shop, and
- lower than expected pricing on required material.

Also, other income not included in the above figures is realized through:

- transportation charges for cars moved in & out of the shop
- other work performed such as customer car inspections

Marketing Summary - 1/1/00 through 10/31/00

22 Jobs awarded (includes some jobs that were bid in 1999)

50 Proposals sent to customers

28 Proposals declined by customer

27 Proposals under study not furnished to customer

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EXHIBIT 38

VERIFIED STATEMENT OF

RICHARD HUDIC

VERIFIED STATEMENT OF RICHARD HUDIC

The undersigned, Richard Hudic, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states the following:

1. My name is Richard Hudic.

2. I am employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and since 1998 I have been the Keystone Opportunity Zone Manager ("KOZ Manager") for the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development ("DCED").

3. As KOZ Manager, I oversee all aspects of the Commonwealth's Keystone Opportunity Zone ("KOZ") program, including the recruitment of potential developers and businesses, the promotion of incentives to economic development professionals, the administration of regional KOZ coordinators, the interpretation of legislation, and the representation of DCED at various events.

4. The KOZ program was established in 1998, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Keystone Opportunity Zone Act, 73 P.S. §§ 820.101 - 820.1309, as amended.

5. In December, 2000, the KOZ program was expanded by statute to permit the creation of new Keystone Opportunity Expansion Zones ("KOEZ") throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

6. I am familiar with the KOEZ sub-zone parcel designated as the Samuel Rea Site in the Borough of Hollidaysburg, Blair County.

7. The Samuel Rea Site incorporates the present site of the Norfolk Southern Sam Rea Car Repair Facility.

8. In January, 2001, it was common knowledge throughout the Hollidaysburg community and area economic development organizations in the Southern Allegheny region that Norfolk Southern was considering closing the Sam Rea Car Repair Facility.

9. On February 2, 2001, I visited the Southern Alleghenies region with DCED Executive Office representative Ryan Kociolek, and met with representatives from the Altoona Blair County Development Corporation ("ABCD"), including ABCD president Martin Marasco, and others.

10. During our visit with ABCD, I was shown maps of the proposed Samuel Rea Site, and given extensive details of the plans for that site.

11. ABCD was clear in its intent to include the Samuel Rea site in the KOEZ to make the site more attractive to potential businesses, if Norfolk Southern could not be encouraged to keep the Sam Rea Car Repair Facility open.

12. On February 21, 2001, Norfolk Southern announced its plans to close the Sam Rea Car Repair Facility.

13. On March 27, 2001, the Samuel Rea Site was designated as a KOEZ with a duration of thirteen years, until December 31, 2013.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has hereunto set his hand this 13 day of July, 2001.

Richard Hudic
Richard Hudic

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of July, 2001.

Tara L. Gritman
Notary Public


My commission expires:




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have caused to be mailed copies of the foregoing Reply of Various Unions and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to Norfolk Southern Corporation's Response to Decision No. 186 by First Class Mail upon the persons listed on the current official service list in Finance Docket No. 33388. Because of the length of the service list in this proceeding representatives of the Applicants and as many other parties as possible were served by mail on July 16, 2001, other parties will be served on July 17, 2001.

7/16/01
Date


Murshed Zaheed



STB

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202724

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Memorandum

202724



DATE: June 21, 2001

TO : Ellen Keys, Assistant Secretary
Section of Publications/Records
Office of the Secretary

FROM : Mel Clemens, Director
Office of Compliance and Enforcement

SUBJECT : STB FINANCE DOCKET NO. 33388 - OPERATIONAL MONITORING DATA

Attached are the original and two copies of the latest weekly public data files provided to this office by CSX and Norfolk Southern as required in the above proceeding, which are to be committed to the docket for public reference. As requested, I am providing the three paper copies to Ron Douglas, two for the docket and one for Da To Da Office Solutions. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Ed Nelson.

Attachments

cc: Chairman Morgan
Vice Chairman Clyburn
Commissioner Burkes
Richard Armstrong
Ron Douglas
Charles Renninger

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500 Water Street (J407)
Jacksonville, FL 32202
Phone (904) 366-4134
Fax (904) 359-1571

T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President -
Service Measurements

June 20, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
The Mercury Building
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 780
Washington, DC 20423

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Enclosed with this transmittal letter are CSX Transportation's operational monitoring reports to the Board for the week ending Friday, June 15th. Cars on-line slightly increased from 239,626 to 239,639. Terminal dwell time continues at its pre-holiday shutdown range, Terminal dwell time further improved, from 24.9 hours to 24.3 hours. Train velocity increased slightly from 20.7 to 21.0 miles-per-hour.

We would offer the following observations and interpretations regarding the data CSXT provides the STB, Conrail Transaction Council, and the AAR:

Chicago Gateway Operations

During this reporting week, the on-time-to-two-hours-late measure of deliveries to western carriers through Chicago moved unfavorably six percentage points to 75%. The more-than-six-hours-late category moved unfavorably one percentage point to 9%.

Yards and Terminals

Car volumes and dwell times changed very little, remaining within expected levels at most terminals across the network. Eight of the 14 measured yards showed an improvement in dwell time compared to the prior week.

Corridor Performance

Three of the six measured corridors showed an improvement compared to the prior week. The best performance in the on-time-to-two-hours-late category (88%), occurred on the I-95 corridor. Overall, the on-time-to-two-hours-late category was 71%, the same percentage as last week, and the percent of trains in the greater-than-six-hours-late was 14%, improving two percentage points from 16%, reported last week.

Shared Areas

Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at Oak Island and Pavonia, and increased marginally at Detroit North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods. Overall terminal dwell time was 25.6 hours, down from 29.7 hours last week.

Additional Measurements

Train Delay Metric: For 755 train starts, weekly train delay totaled 45 hours for Power and 174 hours for Crew. Power delay and Crew delay both increased from the previous week.

Train Crew Delay Metric: The percent of crews not departing within two hours of the on-duty time averaged 24.3% for the week, up from 20.1% reported last week.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage: Crew Availability Percentage was 80%, down one percentage point from 81%, reported for the last two weeks.

Daily Number of Recrews Required: Of 1863 crew starts, 55 (3%) were recrews, up from the 2% recorded last week.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay Metric: SAA Train Delays averaged two trains for North Jersey, one for South Jersey, and none for Detroit.

Locomotives: Gross Locomotives = 3841, Average Available = 3506, and Out-of-Service Ratio = 5.1%, improving from 5.3% the previous week.

Cars Offered in Interchange: averaged 202 cars daily, 30 of which were for the Norfolk Southern. The NS-offered increased while the total-offered decreased this week.

On-time performance, passenger trains through Brunswick, MD: 20% for 10 AMTRAK trains (Pittsburgh – Washington) and 90% for 90 MARC trains (West Virginia – Washington).

Buffalo Customer Service (Hot-Line): the customer service center received no calls this week.

Last week we met the goal for 13 of the 18 key service measures established for the second quarter. Goals were met for FRA Reportable Derailments, cars on-line, overall train velocity, merchandise train velocity, slow order miles, crew delay hours, car dwell, right connection, on-time origin departure, 30-hour cars, industrial switching, hours of locomotive delay, and leased locomotive out of service ratio.

CSXT's service performance continues at near-record levels, with little movement in indicators. Operations are very fluid and CSXT is able to absorb additional traffic.

Sincerely,

Darrell E. Bailey
Director Network Service Quality
Service Measurements

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

For the week ending: 06/15/01

Yard Performance

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01
Oak Island, NJ	Fluid Capacity	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	287	291	338	368	308
	Cars On Hand - Empty	312	251	346	479	368
	Cars On Hand - Total	599	542	684	847	676
	Cars Handled	480	457	613	704	509
	Dwell Hours	35.5	22.7	22.0	27.4	24.9
Pavonia, NJ	Fluid Capacity	900	900	900	900	900
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	285	240	189	378	280
	Cars On Hand - Empty	375	327	291	288	413
	Cars On Hand - Total	660	567	480	666	693
	Cars Handled	407	441	441	508	587
	Dwell Hours	40.1	27.6	23.3	20.8	23.3
North Yard, MI	Fluid Capacity	850	850	850	850	850
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	195	170	281	184	271
	Cars On Hand - Empty	203	77	195	229	133
	Cars On Hand - Total	398	247	476	413	404
	Cars Handled	388	198	390	380	366
	Dwell Hours	34.8	29.9	16.9	18.6	18.1

CSX Comments: Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at Oak Island and Pavonia, and increased marginally at Detroit North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected norms for comparable periods.
Overall terminal dwell time was 25.6 hours, down from 29.7 hours last week.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

Train Originations

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01
North Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	7	7	11	9	9
	% Ontime	100%	43%	64%	33%	11%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	57%	27%	22%	56%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	9%	0%	33%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	44%	0%
South Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	1	3	3	3	3
	% Ontime	100%	67%	67%	67%	100%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	33%	33%	33%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit SAA	Number of Originations	7	7	8	8	8
	% Ontime	86%	86%	63%	88%	100%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	0%	38%	13%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	14%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	14%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

CSX Comments: Total road train delays were 21 trains. Crew delays were 13 trains for 42 hours; no trains were delayed for power; originating trains 8 for 15 hours, due to late connections.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

(Snapshot at Midnight for Day Measured)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Railroad Offered To	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Average
Cars Offered	NS	29	88	0	12	20	30
	All Other	172	255	132	103	199	172
	Total	201	343	132	115	219	202

Measures all cars in offered interchange status on acquired Conrail territory only. Volumes are listed by cars offered to NS (Norfolk Southern) and All Other Railroads.

CSXT On Time Passenger Train Performance

"Brunswick Line"

Between West Virginia/Washington, DC

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Service	Measure	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Totals
AMTK	Trains	2	2	2	2	2	10
	% On Time	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%	20%
MARC	Trains	18	18	18	18	18	90
	% On Time	100%	100%	94%	67%	94%	91%

AMTK measured according to contract with CSXT.

Surface Transportation Board
Performance Measures
CSXT Train Crew Delay

	Causes of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Terminal	Trains / Hours	06/09/01	06/10/01	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Total
Baltimore	Train Crew Starts	22	15	15	20	17	18	18	125
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	12	8	4	10	9	8	5	56
	% Delayed +2 Hours	55%	53%	27%	50%	53%	44%	28%	45%
Buffalo	Train Crew Starts	48	44	39	44	50	48	50	323
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	6	7	9	4	10	11	6	53
	% Delayed +2 Hours	13%	16%	23%	9%	20%	23%	12%	16%
Chicago	Train Crew Starts	23	26	23	22	22	20	24	160
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	8	7	5	4	8	6	6	44
	% Delayed +2 Hours	35%	27%	22%	18%	36%	30%	25%	28%
Cincinnati	Train Crew Starts	37	35	39	35	34	33	33	246
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	1	1	0	3	1	3	11
	% Delayed +2 Hours	5%	3%	3%	0%	9%	3%	9%	4%
Cleveland	Train Crew Starts	21	20	21	18	24	24	20	148
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	6	9	10	7	5	10	6	53
	% Delayed +2 Hours	29%	45%	48%	39%	21%	42%	30%	36%
Cumberland	Train Crew Starts	31	33	29	30	32	32	28	215
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	3	6	3	4	2	1	22
	% Delayed +2 Hours	10%	9%	21%	10%	13%	6%	4%	10%
Detroit	Train Crew Starts	6	5	5	7	5	7	5	40
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	0	2	2	2	2	2	13
	% Delayed +2 Hours	50%	0%	40%	29%	40%	29%	40%	33%
Philadelphia	Train Crew Starts	14	13	11	12	11	11	14	86
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	2	2	4	5	1	2	20
	% Delayed +2 Hours	29%	15%	18%	33%	45%	9%	14%	23%
Selkirk	Train Crew Starts	47	35	34	44	42	47	55	304
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	17	11	9	14	11	12	19	93
	% Delayed +2 Hours	36%	31%	26%	32%	26%	26%	35%	31%
Toledo	Train Crew Starts	32	35	30	33	33	29	25	217
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	4	6	1	1	6	9	30
	% Delayed +2 Hours	9%	11%	20%	3%	3%	21%	36%	14%
Willard	Train Crew Starts	49	42	32	36	37	37	37	270
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	15	9	9	10	14	14	14	85
	% Delayed +2 Hours	31%	21%	28%	28%	38%	38%	38%	31%

Daily number of train crew starts from selected yards or terminals and the number of those originating train crews that were delayed in those yards or terminals for two hours or more after going on-duty. The percentage of those delayed starts.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Train Delay - Northern Region Lines

	Cause of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Trains / Hours	06/09/01	06/10/01	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Total
Train Delay	Originating Train Starts	108	103	107	102	101	117	117	755
	Delayed Hours - Power	14	7	4	0	3	0	17	45
	Delayed Hours - Crews	64	61	12	0	0	0	37	174

Daily number of originating train starts on the Northern Region and the hours delayed due to lack of power and crew of those originating train crews. The delayed train starts will be broken down between power and crew delayed hours.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage - Northern Region Lines

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Crew Availability	06/09/01	06/10/01	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Average
Crew Availability		78%	78%	79%	82%	83%	81%	81%	80%

Daily percentage of CSXT road train crews that are available for work on the Northern Region Lines.

Daily Number of Train Crew Starts and Recrews Required

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Crew/Recrews	06/09/01	06/10/01	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Total
Crews/Recrews	Train Crew Starts	284	226	229	259	279	294	292	1863
	Recrews	4	4	7	5	12	20	3	55
	% Recrewed	1%	2%	3%	2%	4%	7%	1%	3%

Daily number of CSXT road train crew starts, the number of recrews and percentage of recrews for the Northern Region Lines.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Locomotive Fleet Condition

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Locomotives	06/09/01	06/10/01	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Average
Locomotives	Gross Fleet Size	3843	3822	3808	3796	3794	3801	3835	3814
	Avg. Number Available	3516	3521	3501	3477	3499	3493	3538	3506
	OOS Ratio	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.5	5.3	4.6	4.9	5.1

The measure for Gross Fleet will consist of CSX owned, leased, and foreign locomotives on-line. The Average Number Available will be the number of net fleet available to move traffic. The Out-of-Service Ratio (OOS) is the ratio of CSXT owned locomotives not available.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Shared Area	06/09/01	06/10/01	06/11/01	06/12/01	06/13/01	06/14/01	06/15/01	Average
Train Delay	Philadelphia/South Jersey	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	1
	North Jersey	2	2	2	1	0	3	2	2
	Detroit	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification. The measure will be a composite of CSX and NS trains.

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

(757) 629-2657
(757) 533-4872
E-mail: gaaspato@nscorp.com

June 20, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Pursuant to Decision No. 89 issued in STB Finance Docket No. 33388, for the week ending June 15, 2001, enclosed are schedules reporting Train Origination Performance, Yard Performance, and Trains Held in the Shared Assets Areas. Also enclosed is a schedule showing a daily snapshot of NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted, and our Locomotive Fleet Statistics. This schedule also includes NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays that are not limited to a snapshot period.

Another schedule incorporated into this transmittal shows NS Crew Starts and Delays, NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage, and NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews.

Additionally, this transmittal includes confidential reports containing performance statistics for NS's Chicago Gateway Interchange Operations, Corridor Train Performance and Yard Performance. In an effort to provide you with more detailed information regarding delays, I have included two schedules supporting NS's Chicago Gateway and Corridor Train Performance reports, which identify the number and total time for delays due to crew, power, or other issues. I also have supplied the Public Reporting Measures that we provide to the Conrail Transaction Council and the AAR.

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
June 20, 2001
Page 2

As always, I am including a letter written by Tony L. Ingram, Vice President Transportation – Operations, which discusses delays in our rail operations. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me.

Sincerely,

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

Enclosures

June 20, 2001


Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001


Dear Mr. Clemens:

Norfolk Southern's performance metrics remain within normal operating range. The number of cars on line decreased, the average train speed decreased, and the average terminal dwell increased. On the monitored corridors and Chicago gateway operations, 51 trains were held for terminal delays, 31 trains were held for crews, and 9 trains were held for power.

In the Shared Assets Areas, daily average on-hand car volume increased marginally at North Yard and decreased marginally at Pavonia and Oak Island. All volume counts were within expected operating norms. Overall average terminal dwell time decreased. The number of reported road train delays for crews and power decreased from last week. Thirteen trains were delayed 42 hours for lack of crews and no trains were delayed awaiting power. Eight originating trains were delayed a total of 15 hours due to late arrivals from CSXT and/or NS. Together, these delays accounted for 14% of the delay hours reported in the SAAs.

Sincerely,






For the week ending 6/15/01

Shared Asset Area - Yard Performance


Yard	date	Fluid Capacity	On hand -Empty	On hand - Loaded	On hand - Total	Cars handled	Average dwell
North Yard MI	6/11/01	850	203	195	398	388	34.8
	6/12/01	850	77	170	247	198	29.9
	6/13/01	850	195	281	476	390	16.9
	6/14/01	850	229	184	413	380	18.6
	6/15/01	850	133	271	404	366	18.1
North Yard MI Average		850	167	220	388	344	23.1
Oak Island NJ	6/11/01	1200	312	287	599	480	35.5
	6/12/01	1200	251	291	542	457	22.7
	6/13/01	1200	346	338	684	613	22.0
	6/14/01	1200	479	368	847	704	27.4
	6/15/01	1200	368	308	676	509	24.9
Oak Island NJ Average		1200	351	318	670	553	26.4
Pavonia NJ	6/11/01	900	375	285	660	407	40.1
	6/12/01	900	327	240	567	441	27.6
	6/13/01	900	291	189	480	441	23.3
	6/14/01	900	288	378	666	508	20.8
	6/15/01	900	413	280	693	587	23.3
Pavonia Average		900	339	274	613	477	26.5



For the week ending 6/15/01

Shared Asset Train Origination Performance

location	date	Trains	On time	0-2 hours late	2-4 hours late	4-6 hours late	6+ hours late
Detroit Total	11-Jun	7	86%	0%	14%	0%	0%
	12-Jun	7	86%	0%	0%	14%	0%
	13-Jun	8	63%	38%	0%	0%	0%
	14-Jun	8	88%	13%	0%	0%	0%
	15-Jun	8	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit Total		38	84%	11%	3%	3%	0%
North Jersey Total	11-Jun	7	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	12-Jun	7	43%	57%	0%	0%	0%
	13-Jun	11	64%	27%	9%	0%	0%
	14-Jun	9	33%	22%	0%	0%	44%
	15-Jun	9	11%	56%	33%	0%	0%
North Jersey Total		43	49%	33%	9%	0%	9%
South Jersey Total	11-Jun	1	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	12-Jun	3	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%
	13-Jun	3	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%
	14-Jun	3	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%
	15-Jun	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
South Jersey Total		13	77%	23%	0%	0%	0%
Grand Total		94	67%	22%	5%	1%	4%




**NORFOLK
SOUTHERN**

For the week ending 6/15/01

Shared Asset Area Trains Held

area	Sat 09-Jun	Sun 10-Jun	Mon 11-Jun	Tue 12-Jun	Wed 13-Jun	Thu 14-Jun	Fri 15-Jun	Grand Total
North Jersey	2	2	2	1	0	3	2	12
South Jersey	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	6
Detroit	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	3

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification.



NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

offered	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Total
CSX	0	0	0	78	0	78
other	59	0	0	0	0	59
Total	59	0	0	78	0	137

Snapshot taken between 2:00 and 3:00 each day
NS acquired territory only

NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays


	Saturday 9-Jun	Sunday 10-Jun	Monday 11-Jun	Tuesday 12-Jun	Wednesday 13-Jun	Thursday 14-Jun	Friday 15-Jun	Grand Total
# of Train Starts	158	143	164	173	170	165	166	1133
Delay Cause								
Crew Delays (hrs)	25.6	30.2	6.8	1.9	10.8	13.4	3.6	92.2
Power Delays (hrs)	1.0	11.0	41.8	28.5	21.0	92.8	19.8	215.8

The delay numbers are expressed in hours

Locomotive Fleet Statistics

	Saturday 9-Jun	Sunday 10-Jun	Monday 11-Jun	Tuesday 12-Jun	Wednesday 13-Jun	Thursday 14-Jun	Friday 15-Jun	average
Fleet Size	3192	3164	3165	3224	3253	3218	3212	3204
available	3015	2971	2954	3030	3052	3021	3026	3010
out of service %	5.5%	6.1%	6.7%	6.0%	6.2%	6.1%	5.8%	6.1%

Snapshot taken at midnight
Fleet size is all locomotives on line. Includes owned, leased and foreign.



NS Crew Starts and Delays

		Saturday 9-Jun	Sunday 10-Jun	Monday 11-Jun	Tuesday 12-Jun	Wednesday 13-Jun	Thursday 14-Jun	Friday 15-Jun	Grand Total
Allentown	crew starts	15	13	16	16	18	16	15	109
	crews delayed	6	3	6	3	6	5	7	36
Bellevue	crew starts	43	33	31	40	41	43	40	271
	crews delayed	6	5	6	5	11	14	8	55
Buffalo	crew starts	20	22	21	23	24	21	20	151
	crews delayed	3	3	4	6	1	0	3	20
Chicago	crew starts	32	31	33	32	31	39	30	228
	crews delayed	9	12	11	13	11	16	8	80
Cincinnati	crew starts	36	32	31	28	41	31	33	232
	crews delayed	8	6	6	2	9	9	8	48
Cleveland	crew starts	10	8	9	10	9	11	10	67
	crews delayed	3	1	5	1	0	3	4	17
Conway	crew starts	54	54	47	48	60	57	57	377
	crews delayed	11	16	12	12	13	17	12	93
Detroit	crew starts	16	17	18	18	19	19	20	127
	crews delayed	4	6	4	2	6	4	5	31
Elkhart	crew starts	34	37	28	36	40	36	34	245
	crews delayed	15	14	13	22	17	16	15	112
Harrishburg	crew starts	53	47	45	49	62	60	59	375
	crews delayed	15	17	18	16	26	17	19	128
Toledo	crew starts	62	48	49	57	62	53	71	402
	crews delayed	14	13	10	17	13	16	21	104

Notes: Data source is T&E employees' "End of Trip" reporting
 A summary of all "E-O-T's" where departure time is reported as two or more hours after time crew ordered.
 Includes all trains for location, whether originating or run-through.
 A delayed crew is one delayed two hours or more after coming on duty

NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage


	Saturday 9-Jun	Sunday 10-Jun	Monday 11-Jun	Tuesday 12-Jun	Wednesday 13-Jun	Thursday 14-Jun	Friday 15-Jun	average
availability%	74%	73%	75%	76%	79%	79%	75%	76%

Notes: A "snapshot" of percent of Train and Engineman available at approximately 5:00 AM

NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews

	Saturday 9-Jun	Sunday 10-Jun	Monday 11-Jun	Tuesday 12-Jun	Wednesday 13-Jun	Thursday 14-Jun	Friday 15-Jun	Grand Total
crew starts	316	295	280	303	336	333	331	2194
recrews	7	7	12	12	23	21	19	101

Notes: A summary of trains ordered by field transportation using relief crew (recrew) train symbol
 Does not include recrews/trains pulled into terminals by yard crews or road crews called and used in regular service



STB

FD-33388

6-14-01

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202651

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Memorandum

DATE: June 14, 2001

TO : Ellen Keys, Assistant Secretary
Section of Publications/Records
Office of the Secretary

FROM : Mel Clemens, Director
Office of Compliance and Enforcement

SUBJECT : STB FINANCE DOCKET NO. 33388 - OPERATIONAL MONITORING DATA

Attached are the original and two copies of the latest weekly public data files provided to this office by CSX and Norfolk Southern as required in the above proceeding, which are to be committed to the docket for public reference. As requested, I am providing the three paper copies to Ron Douglas, two for the docket and one for Da To Da Office Solutions. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Ed Nelson.

Attachments

cc: Chairman Morgan
Vice Chairman Clyburn
Commissioner Burkes
Richard Armstrong
Ron Douglas
Charles Kenninger

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Office of the Secretary

JUN 14 2001

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Public Record





500 Water Street (J407)
Jacksonville, FL 32202
Phone (904) 366-4134
Fax (904) 359-1571

T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President -
Service Measurements

June 13, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
The Mercury Building
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 780
Washington, DC 20423

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Enclosed with this transmittal letter are CSX Transportation's operational monitoring reports to the Board for the week ending Friday, June 8th. Cars on-line decreased from 240,225 to 239,626. Terminal dwell time returned to its pre-holiday shutdown range, improving from 28.1 hours to 24.8 hours. Train velocity decreased slightly from 21.2 to 20.7 miles-per-hour.

We would offer the following observations and interpretations regarding the data CSXT provides the STB, Conrail Transaction Council, and the AAR:

Chicago Gateway Operations

During this reporting week, the on-time-to-two-hours-late measure of deliveries to western carriers through Chicago moved unfavorably three percentage points to 81%. The more-than-six-hours-late category moved favorably one percentage point to 8%.

Yards and Terminals

Car volumes and dwell times changed very little, remaining within expected levels at most terminals across the network. Twelve of the 14 measured yards showed an improvement in dwell time compared to the prior week.

Corridor Performance

Two of the six measured corridors showed an improvement compared to the prior week. The best performance in the on-time-to-two-hours-late category (94%) occurred on the East St. Louis to Northeast corridor. Overall, the on-time-to-two-hours-late category was 71%, down five percentage points from last week's 76%, and the percent of trains in the greater-than-six-hours-late category remained at the same percentage level, 16% for a second week.

Shared Areas

Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at North Yard, and increased marginally at Pavonia and Oak Island. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods. Overall terminal dwell time was 29.7 hours, down from 30.3 hours last week.

Additional Measurements

Train Delay Metric: For 755 train starts, weekly train delay totaled 10 hours for Power and 56 hours for Crew. Power delay increased while Crew delay decreased from the previous week.

Train Crew Delay Metric: The percent of crews not departing within two hours of the on-duty time averaged 20.1% for the week, improved from 21.3% last week.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage: Crew Availability Percentage was 81%, same percentage as last week.

Daily Number of Recrews Required: Of 1819 crew starts, 44 (2%) were recrews, same percentage as last week.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay Metric: SAA Train Delays averaged two trains for North Jersey, one for South Jersey, and none for Detroit.

Locomotives: Gross Locomotives = 3841, Average Available = 3532, and Out-of-Service Ratio = 5.3%, up from 4.9% the previous week.

Cars Offered in Interchange: averaged 222 cars daily, 24 of which were for the Norfolk Southern. The NS-offered and total-offered both decreased this week.

On-time performance, passenger trains through Brunswick, MD: 80% for 10 AMTRAK trains (Pittsburgh – Washington) and 96% for 90 MARC trains (West Virginia – Washington).

Buffalo Customer Service (Hot-Line): the customer service center received no calls this week.

Last week we met the goal for 11 of the 18 key service measures established for the second quarter. Goals were met for cars on-line, merchandise train velocity, slow order miles, relief crews, crew delay hours, car dwell, right connection, on-time origin departure, 30-hour cars, industrial switching, and hours of locomotive delay.

CSXT's service performance continues at near-record levels, with little movement in indicators. Operations are very fluid and CSXT is able to absorb additional traffic.

Sincerely,

L.L. Hayes
Director
Service Measurements

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

For the week ending: 06/08/01

Yard Performance

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01
Oak Island, NJ	Fluid Capacity	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	465	298	324	462	464
	Cars On Hand - Empty	389	321	313	437	439
	Cars On Hand - Total	854	619	637	899	603
	Cars Handled	722	509	564	616	735
	Dwell Hours	40.0	33.1	25.8	29.7	29.2
Pavonia, NJ	Fluid Capacity	900	900	900	900	900
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	284	344	209	254	311
	Cars On Hand - Empty	317	328	384	396	372
	Cars On Hand - Total	601	672	593	650	683
	Cars Handled	310	455	510	404	324
	Dwell Hours	41.5	38.3	22.5	27.7	33.3
North Yard, MI	Fluid Capacity	850	850	850	850	850
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	153	160	170	254	190
	Cars On Hand - Empty	199	187	149	125	194
	Cars On Hand - Total	352	347	319	379	384
	Cars Handled	377	400	240	429	369
	Dwell Hours	32.1	26.6	18.7	20.7	19.4

CSX Comments: Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at North Yard, and increased marginally at Pavonia and Oak Island. All volumes still remain within expected norms for comparable periods.
Overall terminal dwell time was 29.7 hours, down from 30.3 hours last week.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

Train Originations

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01
North Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	6	8	9	10	10
	% Ontime	50%	63%	44%	30%	60%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	17%	25%	33%	10%	30%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	33%	13%	0%	50%	10%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	11%	10%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	11%	0%	0%
South Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	1	3	3	3	3
	% Ontime	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit SAA	Number of Originations	7	7	8	8	8
	% Ontime	86%	86%	75%	88%	75%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	14%	14%	25%	13%	25%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

CSX Comments: Total road train delays were 24 trains. Crew delays were 9 trains for 27 hours; no trains were delayed for power; originating trains 15 for 47 hours, due to late connections.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

(Snapshot at Midnight for Day Measured)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Railroad Offered To	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Average
Cars Offered	NS	38	60	9	14	0	24
	All Other	136	145	196	170	348	199
	Total	174	205	205	180	348	222

Measures all cars in offered interchange status on acquired Conrail territory only. Volumes are listed by cars offered to NS (Norfolk Southern) and All Other Railroads.

CSXT On Time Passenger Train Performance

"Brunswick Line"

Between West Virginia/Washington, DC

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Service	Measure	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Totals
AMTK	Trains	2	2	2	2	2	10
	% On Time	100%	100%	50%	100%	50%	80%
MARC	Trains	18	18	18	18	18	90
	% On Time	100%	97%	100%	84%	100%	96%

AMTK measured according to contract with CSXT.

Surface Transportation Board
Performance Measures
CSXT Train Crew Delay

	Causes of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Terminal	Trains / Hours	06/02/01	06/03/01	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Total
Baltimore	Train Crew Starts	16	16	19	17	16	20	19	123
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	10	9	8	7	7	6	12	59
	% Delayed +2 Hours	63%	56%	42%	41%	44%	30%	63%	48%
Buffalo	Train Crew Starts	47	34	31	41	50	47	48	298
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	2	3	0	5	8	5	27
	% Delayed +2 Hours	9%	6%	10%	0%	10%	17%	10%	9%
Chicago	Train Crew Starts	22	26	20	21	24	23	24	160
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	9	4	6	8	4	8	43
	% Delayed +2 Hours	18%	35%	20%	29%	33%	17%	33%	27%
Cincinnati	Train Crew Starts	43	43	35	36	34	46	41	272
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	0	1	2	1	1	1	3	9
	% Delayed +2 Hours	0%	2%	6%	3%	3%	3%	7%	3%
Cleveland	Train Crew Starts	24	21	16	21	26	21	26	155
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	9	6	5	6	10	5	3	44
	% Delayed +2 Hours	38%	29%	31%	29%	38%	24%	12%	28%
Cumberland	Train Crew Starts	33	34	30	35	32	29	30	223
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	6	3	1	1	5	6	1	23
	% Delayed +2 Hours	18%	9%	3%	3%	16%	21%	3%	10%
Detroit	Train Crew Starts	7	6	8	6	7	7	5	46
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	0	2	2	3	4	1	2	14
	% Delayed +2 Hours	0%	33%	25%	50%	57%	14%	40%	30%
Philadelphia	Train Crew Starts	12	13	9	11	16	15	16	92
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	3	2	3	4	0	4	20
	% Delayed +2 Hours	33%	23%	22%	27%	25%	0%	25%	22%
Selkirk	Train Crew Starts	44	38	31	45	46	45	47	296
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	9	9	7	13	8	14	12	72
	% Delayed +2 Hours	20%	24%	23%	29%	17%	31%	26%	24%
Toledo	Train Crew Starts	39	32	32	28	30	31	34	226
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	5	4	4	1	7	5	4	30
	% Delayed +2 Hours	13%	13%	13%	4%	23%	16%	12%	13%
Willard	Train Crew Starts	38	40	33	36	37	34	38	256
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	11	11	6	6	12	12	11	69
	% Delayed +2 Hours	29%	28%	18%	17%	32%	35%	29%	27%

Daily number of train crew starts from selected yards or terminals and the number of those originating train crews that were delayed in those yards or terminals for two hours or more after going on-duty. The percentage of those delayed starts.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Train Delay - Northern Region Lines

	Cause of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Trains / Hours	06/02/01	06/03/01	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Total
Train Delay	Originating Train Starts	112	105	95	100	113	106	124	755
	Delayed Hours - Power	1	7	1	0	0	0	1	10
	Delayed Hours - Crews	5	0	6	9	1	22	13	56

Daily number of originating train starts on the Northern Region and the hours delayed due to lack of power and crew of those originating train crews. The delayed train starts will be broken down between power and crew delayed hours.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage - Northern Region Lines

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Crew Availability	06/02/01	06/03/01	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Average
Crew Availability		80%	80%	81%	82%	83%	82%	81%	81%

Daily percentage of CSXT road train crews that are available for work on the Northern Region Lines.

Daily Number of Train Crew Starts and Recrews Required

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Crew/Recrews	06/02/01	06/03/01	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Total
Crews/Recrews	Train Crew Starts	287	233	203	252	269	277	298	1819
	Recrews	7	5	3	3	7	9	10	44
	% Recrewed	2%	2%	1%	1%	3%	3%	3%	2%

Daily number of CSXT road train crew starts, the number of recrews and percentage of recrews for the Northern Region Lines.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Locomotive Fleet Condition

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Locomotives	06/02/01	06/03/01	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Average
Locomotives	Gross Fleet Size	3854	3836	3844	3840	3819	3847	3845	3841
	Avg. Number Available	3550	3537	3533	3530	3511	3542	3518	3532
	OOS Ratio	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.2	5.4	5.2	5.4	5.3

The measure for Gross Fleet will consist of CSX owned, leased, and foreign locomotives on-line. The Average Number Available will be the number of net fleet available to move traffic. The Out-of-Service Ratio (OOS) is the ratio of CSXT owned locomotives not available.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Shared Area	06/02/01	06/03/01	06/04/01	06/05/01	06/06/01	06/07/01	06/08/01	Average
Train Delay	Philadelphia/South Jersey	0	3	2	1	1	2	0	1
	North Jersey	1	2	2	1	3	2	1	2
	Detroit	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification. The measure will be a composite of CSX and NS trains.

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

(757) 629-2657
(757) 533-4872
E-mail gaaspato@nscorp.com

June 13, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Pursuant to Decision No. 89 issued in STB Finance Docket No. 33388, for the week ending June 8, 2001, enclosed are schedules reporting Train Origination Performance, Yard Performance, and Trains Held in the Shared Assets Areas. Also enclosed is a schedule showing a daily snapshot of NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted, and our Locomotive Fleet Statistics. This schedule also includes NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays that are not limited to a snapshot period.

Another schedule incorporated into this transmittal shows NS Crew Starts and Delays, NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage, and NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews. Also included is the bi-weekly Buffalo update.

Additionally, this transmittal includes confidential reports containing performance statistics for NS's Chicago Gateway Interchange Operations, Corridor Train Performance and Yard Performance. In an effort to provide you with more detailed information regarding delays, I have included two schedules supporting NS's Chicago Gateway and Corridor Train Performance reports, which identify the number and total time for delays due to crew, power, or other issues. I also have supplied the Public Reporting Measures that we provide to the Conrail Transaction Council and the AAR.

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
June 13, 2001
Page 2

As always, I am including a letter written by Tony L. Ingram, Vice President Transportation – Operations, which discusses delays in our rail operations. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me.

Sincerely,

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

Enclosures

June 13, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001


Dear Mr. Clemens:


Norfolk Southern's performance metrics remain within normal operating range. The number of cars on line increased, the average train speed decreased, and the average terminal dwell decreased. On the monitored corridors and Chicago gateway operations, 51 trains were held for terminal delays, 18 trains were held for crews, and 23 trains were held for power.

With respect to our customer service hotline in Buffalo, NS did not receive any calls over the two-week period.

In the Shared Assets Areas, daily average on-hand car volume increased marginally at Oak Island and Pavonia and decreased marginally at North Yard. All volume counts were within expected operating norms. Overall average terminal dwell time decreased. Reported road train delays for crews and power increased from the prior week. Nine trains were delayed 27 hours for lack of crews and no trains were delayed awaiting power. Fifteen originating trains were delayed a total of 47 hours due to late arrivals from CSXT and/or NS. Together, these delays accounted for 19% of the delay hours reported in the SAAs.

Sincerely,






For the week ending 6/8/01

Shared Asset Area - Yard Performance


Yard	date	Fluid Capacity	On hand -Empty	On hand - Loaded	On hand - Total	Cars handled	Average dwell
North Yard MI	6/4/01	850	199	153	352	377	32.1
	6/5/01	850	187	160	347	400	26.6
	6/6/01	850	149	170	319	240	18.7
	6/7/01	850	125	254	379	429	20.7
	6/8/01	850	194	190	384	369	19.4
North Yard MI Average		850	171	185	356	363	23.8
Oak Island NJ	6/4/01	1200	389	465	854	722	40.1
	6/5/01	1200	321	298	619	509	33.1
	6/6/01	1200	313	324	637	564	25.8
	6/7/01	1200	437	462	899	616	29.7
	6/8/01	1200	439	464	903	735	29.2
Oak Island NJ Average		1200	380	403	782	629	31.8
Pavonia NJ	6/4/01	900	317	284	601	310	41.5
	6/5/01	900	328	344	672	455	38.3
	6/6/01	900	384	209	593	510	22.5
	6/7/01	900	396	254	650	404	27.7
	6/8/01	900	372	311	683	324	33.3
Pavonia Average		900	359	280	640	401	31.8



For the week ending 6/8/01

Shared Asset Train Origination Performance

location	date	Trains	On time	0-2 hours late	2-4 hours late	4-6 hours late	6+ hours late
Detroit Total	4-Jun	7	86%	14%	0%	0%	0%
	5-Jun	7	86%	14%	0%	0%	0%
	6-Jun	8	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%
	7-Jun	8	88%	13%	0%	0%	0%
	8-Jun	8	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit Total		38	82%	18%	0%	0%	0%
North Jersey Total	4-Jun	6	50%	17%	33%	0%	0%
	5-Jun	8	63%	25%	13%	0%	0%
	6-Jun	9	44%	33%	0%	11%	11%
	7-Jun	10	30%	10%	50%	10%	0%
	8-Jun	10	60%	30%	10%	0%	0%
North Jersey Total		43	49%	23%	21%	5%	2%
South Jersey Total	4-Jun	1	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%
	5-Jun	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	6-Jun	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	7-Jun	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	8-Jun	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
South Jersey Total		13	92%	0%	0%	8%	0%
Grand Total		94	68%	18%	10%	3%	1%




**NORFOLK
SOUTHERN**

For the week ending 6/8/01

Shared Asset Area Trains Held

area	Sat 02-Jun	Sun 03-Jun	Mon 04-Jun	Tue 05-Jun	Wed 06-Jun	Thu 07-Jun	Fri 08-Jun	Grand Total
North Jersey	1	2	2	1	3	2	1	12
South Jersey	0	3	2	1	1	2	0	9
Detroit	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	3

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification.



NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

offered	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Total
CSX	0	0	0	0	0	0
other	0	173	25	176	0	374
Total	0	173	25	176	0	374

Snapshot taken between 2:00 and 3:00 each day
NS acquired territory only

NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays

	Saturday 2-Jun	Sunday 3-Jun	Monday 4-Jun	Tuesday 5-Jun	Wednesday 6-Jun	Thursday 7-Jun	Friday 8-Jun	Grand Total
# of Train Starts	160	136	148	157	169	174	158	1102
Delay Cause								
Crew Delays (hrs)	8.5	17.3	0.0	8.4	2.0	3.4	6.5	46.1
Power Delays (hrs)	7.8	5.8	4.0	11.2	18.1	8.8	10.0	65.6

The delay numbers are expressed in hours

Locomotive Fleet Statistics

	Saturday 2-Jun	Sunday 3-Jun	Monday 4-Jun	Tuesday 5-Jun	Wednesday 6-Jun	Thursday 7-Jun	Friday 8-Jun	average
Fleet Size	3294	3287	3284	3284	3254	3243	3212	3265
available	3093	3075	3085	3090	3073	3054	3022	3070
out of service %	6.1%	6.4%	6.1%	5.9%	5.6%	5.8%	5.9%	6.0%

Snapshot taken at midnight
Fleet size is all locomotives on line. Includes owned, leased and foreign.



NS Crew Starts and Delays

		Saturday 2-Jun	Sunday 3-Jun	Monday 4-Jun	Tuesday 5-Jun	Wednesday 6-Jun	Thursday 7-Jun	Friday 8-Jun	Grand Total
Allentown	crew starts	14	13	15	17	17	21	15	112
	crews delayed	3	2	6	5	4	10	3	33
Bellevue	crew starts	37	41	35	38	38	38	38	265
	crews delayed	10	6	8	5	6	4	7	46
Buffalo	crew starts	22	21	19	25	21	22	23	153
	crews delayed	5	3	4	2	3	3	3	23
Chicago	crew starts	33	31	32	34	34	36	34	234
	crews delayed	9	10	9	11	13	13	14	79
Cincinnati	crew starts	35	33	29	37	37	35	41	247
	crews delayed	6	8	7	11	7	5	7	51
Cleveland	crew starts	7	7	8	10	10	10	13	65
	crews delayed	2	5	2	5	5	3	5	27
Conway	crew starts	52	52	43	53	52	53	55	360
	crews delayed	17	11	17	14	7	20	18	104
Detroit	crew starts	20	14	19	19	19	20	21	132
	crews delayed	8	5	4	3	5	9	7	41
Elkhart	crew starts	29	33	35	31	39	37	34	238
	crews delayed	10	14	13	13	16	15	14	95
Harrisburg	crew starts	54	46	35	46	63	58	53	355
	crews delayed	20	13	8	12	23	12	18	106
Toledo	crew starts	56	58	50	46	51	67	57	385
	crews delayed	10	11	12	8	9	16	13	79

Notes: Data source is T&E employees' "End of Trip" reporting
 A summary of all "E-O-T's" where departure time is reported as two or more hours after time crew ordered.
 Includes all trains for location, whether originating or run-through.
 A delayed crew is one delayed two hours or more after coming on duty

NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage


	Saturday 2-Jun	Sunday 3-Jun	Monday 4-Jun	Tuesday 5-Jun	Wednesday 6-Jun	Thursday 7-Jun	Friday 8-Jun	average
availability%	75%	74%	76%	78%	78%	77%	78%	77%

Notes: A "snapshot" of percent of Train and Engineman available at approximately 5:00 AM

NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews

	Saturday 2-Jun	Sunday 3-Jun	Monday 4-Jun	Tuesday 5-Jun	Wednesday 6-Jun	Thursday 7-Jun	Friday 8-Jun	Grand Total
crew starts	308	304	273	296	319	345	320	2165
recrews	20	12	13	16	14	12	15	102

Notes: A summary of trains ordered by field transportation using relief crew (recrew) train symbol
 Does not include recrews/trains pulled into terminals by yard crews or road crews called and used in regular service



STB

FD-33388

5-31-01

D

202429

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Memorandum

202429

ENTERED
Office of the Secretary

MAY 31 2001

Part of
Public Record

DATE: May 31, 2001



TO : Ellen Keys, Assistant Secretary
Section of Publications/Records
Office of the Secretary

FROM : Mel Clemens, Director
Office of Compliance and Enforcement

SUBJECT : STB FINANCE DOCKET NO. 33388 - OPERATIONAL MONITORING DATA

Attached are the original and two copies of the latest weekly public data files provided to this office by CSX and Norfolk Southern as required in the above proceeding, which are to be committed to the docket for public reference. As requested, I am providing the three paper copies to Ron Douglas, two for the docket and one for Da To Da Office Solutions. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Ed Nelson.

Attachments

cc: Chairman Morgan
Vice Chairman Clyburn
Commissioner Burkes
Richard Armstrong
Ron Douglas
Charles Renninger



500 Water Street (J407)
Jacksonville, FL 32202
Phone (904) 366-4134
Fax (904) 359-1571

T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President -
Service Measurements

May 30, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
The Mercury Building
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 780
Washington, DC 20423

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Enclosed with this transmittal letter are CSX Transportation's operational monitoring reports to the Board for the week ending Friday, May 25th. Cars on-line improved from 239,430 to 238,538. Train velocity decreased slightly from 21.2 to 21.1 miles-per-hour, and terminal dwell remained flat at 24.9 hours.

We would offer the following observations and interpretations regarding the data CSXT provides the STB, Conrail Transaction Council, and the AAR:

Chicago Gateway Operations

During this reporting week, the on-time-to-two-hours-late measure of deliveries to western carriers through Chicago moved favorably eight percentage points to 80%. The more-than-six-hours-late category moved favorably five percentage points to 7%.

Yards and Terminals

Car volumes and dwell times changed very little, remaining within expected levels at most terminals across the network. Seven of the 14 measured yards showed an improvement in dwell time compared to the prior week.

Corridor Performance

Four of the six measured corridors showed an improvement compared to the prior week. The best performance in the on-time-to-two-hours-late category (94%) occurred on the East St. Louis to Northeast corridor. Overall, the on-time-to-two-hours-late category was 79%, up three percentage points from last week's 76%, and the percent of trains in the greater-than-six-hours-late category moved favorably two percentage points to 11%.

Shared Areas

Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at Oak Island, and increased marginally at Pavonia and North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods. Overall terminal dwell time was 25.6 hours, improved from 26.7 hours last week.

Additional Measurements

Train Delay Metric: For 777 train starts, weekly train delay totaled 9 hours for Power and 27 hours for Crew. Power delay and Crew delay both decreased from the previous week.

Train Crew Delay Metric: The percent of crews not departing within two hours of the on-duty time averaged 21.6% for the week, improved from 23.8% last week.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage: Crew Availability Percentage was 82%, same percentage as the last four weeks.

Daily Number of Recrews Required: Of 1806 crew starts, 38 (2%) were recrews, same percentage as last week.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay Metric: SAA Train Delays averaged one train each for North Jersey, South Jersey, and Detroit.

Locomotives: Gross Locomotives = 3842, Average Available = 3534, and Out-of-Service Ratio = 5.5%, up from 5.2% the previous week.

Cars Offered in Interchange: averaged 205 cars daily, 14 of which were for the Norfolk Southern. The NS-offered and total-offered both decreased this week.

On-time performance, passenger trains through Brunswick, MD: 50% for 10 AMTRAK trains (Pittsburgh – Washington) and 89% for 90 MARC trains (West Virginia – Washington).

Buffalo Customer Service (Hot-Line): the customer service center received no calls this week.

Last week we met the goal for 14 of the 18 key service measures established for the second quarter. Goals were met for FRA-reportable injuries, cars on-line, overall train velocity, merchandise train velocity, slow order miles, crews on duty greater than 12 hours, relief crews, car dwell, right connection, on-time originations, 30-hour cars, industrial switching, hours of locomotive delay, and leased locomotive out-of-service ratio.

CSXT's service performance continues at near-record levels, with little movement in indicators. Operations are very fluid and CSXT is able to absorb additional traffic.

Sincerely,

T.J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President
Service Measurements

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

For the week ending:

05/25/01

Yard Performance

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01
Oak Island, NJ	Fluid Capacity	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	262	307	418	308	333
	Cars On Hand - Empty	236	328	428	343	272
	Cars On Hand - Total	498	635	846	651	605
	Cars Handled	441	535	399	547	557
	Dwell Hours	33.2	28.3	34.8	21.5	23.2
Pavonia, NJ	Fluid Capacity	900	900	900	900	900
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	417	284	366	256	227
	Cars On Hand - Empty	193	197	334	329	375
	Cars On Hand - Total	610	481	700	585	602
	Cars Handled	208	333	442	531	510
	Dwell Hours	34.0	25.4	21.0	17.3	23.6
North Yard, MI	Fluid Capacity	850	850	850	850	850
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	218	174	188	169	153
	Cars On Hand - Empty	185	187	96	121	168
	Cars On Hand - Total	403	361	284	290	321
	Cars Handled	431	254	322	373	345
	Dwell Hours	29.7	23.8	16.6	16.6	22.3

CSX Comments: Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at Oak Island, and increased marginally at Pavonia and North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods.
Overall terminal dwell time was 25.6 hours, improved from 26.7 hours last week.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

Train Originations

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01
North Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	5	7	10	7	11
	% Ontime	100%	43%	30%	29%	45%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	43%	40%	71%	27%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	14%	20%	0%	9%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	10%	0%	9%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%
South Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	3	3	3	3	3
	% Ontime	100%	100%	33%	100%	100%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%
Detroit SAA	Number of Originations	6	7	8	9	8
	% Ontime	100%	86%	88%	67%	75%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	14%	0%	22%	25%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	13%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	11%	0%

CSX Comments: Total road train delays were 20 trains. Crew delays were 6 trains for 16 hours; no trains were delayed for power; originating trains 14 for 81 hours, due to late connections.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

(Snapshot at Midnight for Day Measured)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Railroad Offered To	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Average
Cars Offered	NS	18	35	0	0	19	14
	All Other	116	366	175	195	100	190
	Total	134	401	175	195	119	205

Measures all cars in offered interchange status on acquired Conrail territory only. Volumes are listed by cars offered to NS (Norfolk Southern) and All Other Railroads.

CSXT On Time Passenger Train Performance

"Brunswick Line"

Between West Virginia/Washington, DC

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Service	Measure	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Totals
AMTK	Trains	2	2	2	2	2	10
	% On Time	0%	100%	50%	0%	100%	50%
MARC	Trains	18	18	18	18	18	90
	% On Time	83%	83%	78%	100%	100%	89%

AMTK measured according to contract with CSXT.

Surface Transportation Board
Performance Measures
CSXT Train Crew Delay

	Causes of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Terminal	Trains / Hours	05/19/01	05/20/01	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Total
Baltimore	Train Crew Starts	20	19	11	16	18	19	22	125
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	9	5	6	10	10	9	53
	% Delayed +2 Hours	20%	47%	45%	38%	56%	53%	41%	42%
Buffalo	Train Crew Starts	48	39	34	45	49	49	48	312
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	8	8	4	4	6	14	7	51
	% Delayed +2 Hours	17%	21%	12%	9%	12%	29%	15%	16%
Chicago	Train Crew Starts	23	26	24	27	26	29	24	179
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	10	8	6	10	5	8	6	53
	% Delayed +2 Hours	43%	31%	25%	37%	19%	28%	25%	30%
Cincinnati	Train Crew Starts	40	40	37	39	41	33	34	264
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	1	2	1	1	0	4	11
	% Delayed +2 Hours	5%	3%	5%	3%	2%	0%	12%	4%
Cleveland	Train Crew Starts	20	27	27	21	23	17	24	159
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	10	7	6	12	8	7	9	59
	% Delayed +2 Hours	50%	26%	22%	57%	35%	41%	38%	37%
Cumberland	Train Crew Starts	34	32	30	29	34	30	32	221
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	3	1	2	2	1	3	16
	% Delayed +2 Hours	11%	9%	3%	7%	6%	3%	9%	7%
Detroit	Train Crew Starts	6	7	4	8	6	7	6	44
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	0	2	3	2	2	2	12
	% Delayed +2 Hours	17%	0%	50%	38%	33%	29%	33%	27%
Philadelphia	Train Crew Starts	14	13	11	10	12	14	14	88
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	3	0	1	2	1	4	12
	% Delayed +2 Hours	7%	23%	0%	10%	17%	7%	29%	14%
Selkirk	Train Crew Starts	49	34	33	37	48	43	49	293
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	12	12	6	3	13	9	14	69
	% Delayed +2 Hours	24%	35%	18%	8%	27%	21%	29%	24%
Toledo	Train Crew Starts	29	33	36	31	26	35	37	227
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	6	8	3	2	5	10	36
	% Delayed +2 Hours	17%	18%	22%	10%	8%	14%	27%	16%
Willard	Train Crew Starts	39	37	33	42	35	39	46	271
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	13	12	6	10	6	12	7	66
	% Delayed +2 Hours	33%	32%	18%	24%	17%	31%	15%	24%

Daily number of train crew starts from selected yards or terminals and the number of those originating train crews that were delayed in those yards or terminals for two hours or more after going on-duty. The percentage of those delayed starts.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Train Delay - Northern Region Lines

	Cause of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Trains / Hours	05/19/01	05/20/01	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Total
Train Delay	Originating Train Starts	118	98	108	100	117	110	126	777
	Delayed Hours - Power	0	3	3	2	0	0	1	9
	Delayed Hours - Crews	0	13	6	2	1	5	0	27

Daily number of originating train starts on the Northern Region and the hours delayed due to lack of power and crew of those originating train crews. The delayed train starts will be broken down between power and crew delayed hours.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage - Northern Region Lines

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Crew Availability	05/19/01	05/20/01	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Average
Crew Availability		81%	80%	81%	82%	83%	83%	83%	82%

Daily percentage of CSXT road train crews that are available for work on the Northern Region Lines.

Daily Number of Train Crew Starts and Recrews Required

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Crew/Recrews	05/19/01	05/20/01	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Total
Crews/Recrews	Train Crew Starts	285	231	235	242	269	260	284	1806
	Recrews	9	6	5	4	6	3	5	38
	% Recrewed	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%

Daily number of CSXT road train crew starts, the number of recrews and percentage of recrews for the Northern Region Lines.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Locomotive Fleet Condition

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Locomotives	05/19/01	05/20/01	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Average

Locomotives	Gross Fleet Size	3853	3842	3820	3842	3840	3852	3848	3842
	Avg. Number Available	3519	3523	3531	3548	3531	3539	3545	3534
	OOS Ratio	5.3	5.8	5.7	5.4	5.7	5.7	4.9	5.5

The measure for Gross Fleet will consist of CSX owned, leased, and foreign locomotives on-line. The Average Number Available will be the number of net fleet available to move traffic. The Out-of-Service Ratio (OOS) is the ratio of CSXT owned locomotives not available.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Shared Area	05/19/01	05/20/01	05/21/01	05/22/01	05/23/01	05/24/01	05/25/01	Average

Train Delay	Philadelphia/South Jersey	0	2	0	1	2	2	1	1
	North Jersey	2	0	4	1	0	0	1	1
	Detroit	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification. The measure will be a composite of CSX and NS trains.

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

(757) 629-2657
(757) 533-4872
E-mail gaaspato@nscorp.com

May 30, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Pursuant to Decision No. 89 issued in STB Finance Docket No. 33388, for the week ending May 25, 2001, enclosed are schedules reporting Train Origination Performance, Yard Performance, and Trains Held in the Shared Assets Areas. Also enclosed is a schedule showing a daily snapshot of NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted, and our Locomotive Fleet Statistics. This schedule also includes NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays that are not limited to a snapshot period.

Another schedule incorporated into this transmittal shows NS Crew Starts and Delays, NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage, and NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews. Also included is the bi-weekly Buffalo update.

Additionally, this transmittal includes confidential reports containing performance statistics for NS's Chicago Gateway Interchange Operations, Corridor Train Performance and Yard Performance. In an effort to provide you with more detailed information regarding delays, I have included two schedules supporting NS's Chicago Gateway and Corridor Train Performance reports, which identify the number and total time for delays due to crew, power, or other issues. I also have supplied the Public Reporting Measures that we provide to the Conrail Transaction Council and the AAR.

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
May 30, 2001
Page 2

As always, I am including a letter written by Tony L. Ingram, Vice President Transportation – Operations, which discusses delays in our rail operations. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me.

Sincerely,

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

Enclosures

May 30, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001


Dear Mr. Clemens:


Norfolk Southern's performance metrics remain within normal operating range. The number of cars on line decreased, the average train speed increased, and the average terminal dwell decreased. On the monitored corridors and Chicago gateway operations, 52 trains were held for terminal delays, 27 trains were held for crews, and 21 trains were held for power.

With respect to our customer service hotline in Buffalo, NS did not receive any calls over the two-week period.

In the Shared Assets Areas, daily average on-hand car volume increased marginally at North Yard and Pavonia and decreased marginally at Oak Island. All volume counts were within expected operating norms. Overall average terminal dwell time decreased. Reported road train delays for crews and power increased from the prior week. Six trains were delayed 16 hours for lack of crews and no trains were delayed for power. Fourteen originating trains were delayed a total of 81 hours due to late arrivals from CSXT and/or NS. Together, these delays accounted for 24% of the delay hours reported in the SAAs.

Sincerely,


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For the week ending 5/25/01

Shared Asset Area - Yard Performance


Yard	date	Fluid Capacity	On hand - Empty	On hand - Loaded	On hand - Total	Cars handled	Average dwell
North Yard MI	5/21/01	850	185	218	403	431	29.7
	5/22/01	850	187	174	361	254	23.8
	5/23/01	850	96	188	284	322	16.6
	5/24/01	850	121	169	290	373	16.6
	5/25/01	850	168	153	321	345	22.3
North Yard MI Average		850	151	180	332	345	22.1
Oak Island NJ	5/21/01	1200	236	262	498	441	33.2
	5/22/01	1200	328	307	635	535	28.3
	5/23/01	1200	428	418	846	399	34.8
	5/24/01	1200	343	308	651	547	21.5
	5/25/01	1200	272	333	605	557	23.2
Oak Island NJ Average		1200	321	326	647	496	27.6
Pavonia NJ	5/21/01	900	193	417	610	208	34.0
	5/22/01	900	197	284	481	333	25.4
	5/23/01	900	334	366	700	442	21.0
	5/24/01	900	329	256	585	531	17.3
	5/25/01	900	375	227	602	510	23.6
Pavonia Average		900	286	310	596	405	22.7



For the week ending 5/25/01

Shared Asset Train Origination Performance

location	date	Trains	On time	0-2 hours late	2-4 hours late	4-6 hours late	6+ hours late
Detroit Total	21-May	6	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	22-May	7	86%	14%	0%	0%	0%
	23-May	8	88%	0%	0%	13%	0%
	24-May	9	67%	22%	0%	0%	11%
	25-May	8	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit Total		38	82%	13%	0%	3%	3%
North Jersey Total	21-May	5	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	22-May	7	43%	43%	14%	0%	0%
	23-May	10	30%	40%	20%	10%	0%
	24-May	7	29%	71%	0%	0%	0%
	25-May	11	45%	27%	9%	9%	9%
North Jersey Total		40	45%	38%	10%	5%	3%
South Jersey Total	21-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	22-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	23-May	3	33%	33%	0%	0%	33%
	24-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	25-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
South Jersey Total		15	87%	7%	0%	0%	7%
Grand Total		93	67%	23%	4%	3%	3%




**NORFOLK
SOUTHERN**

For the week ending 5/25/01

Shared Asset Area Trains Held

area	Sat 19-May	Sun 20-May	Mon 21-May	Tue 22-May	Wed 23-May	Thu 24-May	Fri 25-May	Grand Total
North Jersey	2	0	4	1	0	0	1	8
South Jersey	0	2	0	1	2	2	1	8
Detroit	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	4

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification.



NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

offered	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Total
CSX	0	0	0	0	0	0
other	0	0	0	4	0	4
Total	0	0	0	4	0	4

Snapshot taken between 2:00 and 3:00 each day
NS acquired territory only

NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays


	Saturday 19-May	Sunday 20-May	Monday 21-May	Tuesday 22-May	Wednesday 23-May	Thursday 24-May	Friday 25-May	Grand Total
# of Train Starts	176	167	157	202	171	266	173	1312
Delay Cause								
Crew Delays (hrs)	8.6	19.5	0.0	3.0	0.0	6.6	3.7	41.3
Power Delays (hrs)	49.8	29.0	7.5	20.6	34.1	36.1	78.4	255.3

The delay numbers are expressed in hours

Locomotive Fleet Statistics

	Saturday 19-May	Sunday 20-May	Monday 21-May	Tuesday 22-May	Wednesday 23-May	Thursday 24-May	Friday 25-May	average
Fleet Size	3135	3158	3184	3190	3220	3187	3208	3183
available	2963	2987	2989	3004	3041	3010	3013	3001
out of service %	5.5%	5.4%	6.1%	5.8%	5.6%	5.6%	6.1%	5.7%

Snapshot taken at midnight
Fleet size is all locomotives on line. Includes owned, leased and foreign.



NS Crew Starts and Delays

		Saturday 19-May	Sunday 20-May	Monday 21-May	Tuesday 22-May	Wednesday 23-May	Thursday 24-May	Friday 25-May	Grand Total
Allentown	crew starts	13	15	16	16	18	21	16	115
	crews delayed	3	3	5	3	6	8	5	33
Bellevue	crew starts	39	39	37	41	40	32	42	270
	crews delayed	10	7	4	7	13	8	11	60
Buffalo	crew starts	24	17	20	24	23	25	25	158
	crews delayed	2	2	2	4	1	8	5	24
Chicago	crew starts	37	32	29	34	39	33	32	236
	crews delayed	13	12	9	14	10	13	11	82
Cincinnati	crew starts	38	36	26	35	32	38	34	239
	crews delayed	9	5	2	4	6	3	4	33
Cleveland	crew starts	10	8	11	10	7	9	12	67
	crews delayed	6	1	2	5	3	3	3	23
Conway	crew starts	63	51	43	49	60	52	55	373
	crews delayed	18	9	14	7	21	13	19	101
Detroit	crew starts	17	15	18	17	26	22	20	135
	crews delayed	1	5	2	1	8	8	8	33
Elkhart	crew starts	40	36	36	31	33	38	33	247
	crews delayed	14	15	15	14	12	15	13	98
Harrisburg	crew starts	49	51	37	58	55	61	55	366
	crews delayed	21	17	18	21	22	20	19	138
Toledo	crew starts	61	60	51	50	60	57	60	399
	crews delayed	19	16	14	11	13	22	17	112

Notes:

Data source is T&E employees' "End of Trip" reporting

A summary of all "E-O-T's" where departure time is reported as two or more hours after time crew ordered.

Includes all trains for location, whether originating or run-through.

A delayed crew is one delayed two hours or more after coming on duty

NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage

	Saturday 19-May	Sunday 20-May	Monday 21-May	Tuesday 22-May	Wednesday 23-May	Thursday 24-May	Friday 25-May	average
availability%	75%	73%	76%	80%	81%	79%	79%	78%

Notes:

A "snapshot" of percent of Train and Engineman available at approximately 5:00 AM


NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews

	Saturday 19-May	Sunday 20-May	Monday 21-May	Tuesday 22-May	Wednesday 23-May	Thursday 24-May	Friday 25-May	Grand Total
crew starts	333	302	266	317	337	330	326	2211
recrews	17	15	17	11	15	19	18	112

Notes:

A summary of trains ordered by field transportation using relief crew (recrew) train symbol

Does not include recrews/trains pulled into terminals by yard crews or road crews called and used in regular service



STB

FD-33388

5-24-01

D

202337

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Memorandum



202337

DATE: May 24, 2001

TO : Ellen Keys, Assistant Secretary
Section of Publications/Records
Office of the Secretary

FROM *KFC*: Mel Clemens, Director
Office of Compliance and Enforcement

SUBJECT : STB FINANCE DOCKET NO. 33388 - OPERATIONAL MONITORING DATA

Attached are the original and two copies of the latest weekly public data files provided to this office by CSX and Norfolk Southern as required in the above proceeding, which are to be committed to the docket for public reference. As requested, I am providing the three paper copies to Ron Douglas, two for the docket and one for Da To Da Office Solutions. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Ed Nelson.

Attachments

cc: Chairman Morgan
Vice Chairman Clyburn
Commissioner Burkes
Richard Armstrong
Ron Douglas
Charles Renninger

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Office of the Secretary
MAY 25 2001
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Public Record



500 Water Street (J407)
Jacksonville, FL 32202
Phone (904) 366-4134
Fax (904) 359-1571

T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President -
Service Measurements

May 23, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
The Mercury Building
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 780
Washington, DC 20423

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Enclosed with this transmittal letter are CSX Transportation's operational monitoring reports to the Board for the week ending Friday, May 18th. Cars on-line dropped from 240,186 to 239,430 and train velocity increased from 21.0 to 21.2 miles-per-hour. Terminal dwell slightly increased to 24.9 hours from the previous week's 24.3.

We would offer the following observations and interpretations regarding the data CSXT provides the STB, Conrail Transaction Council, and the AAR:

Chicago Gateway Operations

During this reporting week, the on-time-to-two-hours-late measure of deliveries to western carriers through Chicago moved unfavorably ten percentage points to 72%. The more-than-six-hours-late category moved unfavorably five percentage points to 12%.

Yards and Terminals

Car volumes and dwell times changed very little, remaining within expected levels at most terminals across the network. Six of the 14 measured yards showed an improvement in dwell time compared to the prior week.

Corridor Performance

Three of the six measured corridors showed an improvement compared to the prior week. The best performance in the on-time-to-two-hours-late category (90%) occurred on both the I-95 and the East St. Louis to Northeast corridors. Overall, the on-time-to-two-hours-late category was 76%, down three percentage points from last week's 79%, and the percent of trains in the greater-than-six-hours-late category moved unfavorably one percentage point to 13%.

Shared Areas

Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at Oak Island and Pavonia and increased marginally at North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods. Overall terminal dwell time was 26.7 hours, up from 25.9 hours last week.

Additional Measurements

Train Delay Metric: For 742 train starts, weekly train delay totaled 12 hours for Power and 69 hours for Crew. Power delay increased from the previous week, while crew delay decreased.

Train Crew Delay Metric: The percent of crews not departing within two hours of the on-duty time averaged 23.8% for the week, up from 21.2% last week.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage: Crew Availability Percentage was 82%, same percentage as the last three weeks.

Daily Number of Recrews Required: Of 1832 crew starts, 39 (2%) were recrews, same percentage as last week.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay Metric: SAA Train Delays averaged one train for North Jersey, and no trains for either South Jersey or Detroit.

Locomotives: Gross Locomotives = 3843, Average Available = 3557, and Out-of-Service Ratio = 5.2%, remaining the same as the previous week.

Cars Offered in Interchange: averaged 213 cars daily, 52 of which were for the Norfolk Southern. The NS-offered increased this week, as well as the total-offered cars.

On-time performance, passenger trains through Brunswick, MD: 50% for 10 AMTRAK trains (Pittsburgh – Washington) and 96% for 90 MARC trains (West Virginia – Washington).

Buffalo Customer Service (Hot-Line): the customer service center received no calls this week.

Last week we met the goal for 14 of the 18 key service measures established for the second quarter. Goals were met for FRA-reportable injuries, cars on-line, overall train velocity, merchandise train velocity, slow order miles, crews on duty greater than 12 hours, relief crews, car dwell, right connection, on-time originations, 30-hour cars, industrial switching, hours of locomotive delay, and leased locomotive out-of-service ratio.

CSXT's service performance continues at near-record levels, with little movement in indicators, in spite of the shortage of crews over Mother's Day weekend. Operations are very fluid and CSXT is able to absorb additional traffic.

Sincerely,

T.J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President
Service Measurements

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

For the week ending:

05/18/01

Yard Performance

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01
Oak Island, NJ	Fluid Capacity	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	337	383	436	348	258
	Cars On Hand - Empty	283	304	307	325	284
	Cars On Hand - Total	620	687	743	673	542
	Cars Handled	518	581	570	659	576
	Dwell Hours	32.4	29.6	29.1	27.9	24.2
Pavonia, NJ	Fluid Capacity	900	900	900	900	900
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	355	312	257	286	182
	Cars On Hand - Empty	265	265	363	391	256
	Cars On Hand - Total	620	577	620	677	438
	Cars Handled	271	362	577	565	419
	Dwell Hours	51.5	37.1	25.6	20.7	25.9
North Yard, MI	Fluid Capacity	850	850	850	850	850
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	192	158	181	231	145
	Cars On Hand - Empty	48	76	92	118	118
	Cars On Hand - Total	240	234	273	349	263
	Cars Handled	358	238	230	286	390
	Dwell Hours	22.2	17.0	21.7	17.6	16.2

CSX Comments: Daily average on hand cars decreased marginally at Oak Island and Pavonia, and increased marginally at North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods.
Overall terminal dwell time was 26.7 hours, up from 25.9 hours last week.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

Train Originations

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01
North Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	4	9	9	9	9
	% Ontime	100%	33%	56%	67%	33%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	44%	44%	11%	22%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	22%	0%	0%	11%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	11%	33%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	11%	0%
South Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	1	3	3	3	3
	% Ontime	0%	67%	100%	100%	100%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	33%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit SAA	Number of Originations	6	7	8	9	8
	% Ontime	100%	71%	50%	78%	88%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	29%	50%	11%	13%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	11%	0%

CSX Comments: Total road train delays were 10 trains. Crew delays were 7 trains for 14 hours; no trains were delayed for power; originating trains 3 for 9 hours, due to late connections.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

(Snapshot at Midnight for Day Measured)

Measure	Railroad Offered To	Monday 05/14/01	Tuesday 05/15/01	Wednesday 05/16/01	Thursday 05/17/01	Friday 05/18/01	Daily Average
Cars Offered	NS	0	57	43	133	25	52
	All Other	194	162	168	256	29	162
	Total	194	219	211	389	54	213

Measures all cars in offered interchange status on acquired Conrail territory only. Volumes are listed by cars offered to NS (Norfolk Southern) and All Other Railroads.

CSXT On Time Passenger Train Performance

"Brunswick Line"

Between West Virginia/Washington, DC

Service	Measure	Monday 05/14/01	Tuesday 05/15/01	Wednesday 05/16/01	Thursday 05/17/01	Friday 05/18/01	Weekly Totals
AMTK	Trains	2	2	2	2	2	10
	% On Time	0%	50%	50%	100%	50%	50%
MARC	Trains	18	18	18	18	18	90
	% On Time	94%	100%	83%	100%	100%	96%

AMTK measured according to contract with CSXT.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Train Crew Delay

	Causes of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Terminal	Trains / Hours	05/12/01	05/13/01	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01	Total
Baltimore	Train Crew Starts	19	16	15	23	17	20	19	129
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	9	6	5	10	5	4	9	48
	% Delayed +2 Hours	47%	38%	33%	43%	29%	20%	47%	37%
Buffalo	Train Crew Starts	51	42	30	44	45	50	50	312
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	11	1	3	4	7	10	10	46
	% Delayed +2 Hours	22%	2%	10%	9%	16%	20%	20%	15%
Chicago	Train Crew Starts	24	21	24	21	24	26	27	167
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	8	7	8	6	5	8	14	56
	% Delayed +2 Hours	33%	33%	33%	29%	21%	31%	52%	34%
Cincinnati	Train Crew Starts	38	35	33	39	36	36	42	259
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	1	2	3	3	3	1	16
	% Delayed +2 Hours	8%	3%	6%	8%	8%	8%	2%	6%
Cleveland	Train Crew Starts	22	27	20	21	25	24	26	165
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	6	11	6	6	11	8	7	55
	% Delayed +2 Hours	27%	41%	30%	29%	44%	33%	27%	33%
Cumberland	Train Crew Starts	35	33	29	28	32	30	35	222
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	1	3	3	5	10	5	28
	% Delayed +2 Hours	3%	3%	10%	11%	16%	30%	14%	13%
Detroit	Train Crew Starts	9	7	4	7	6	8	8	49
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	0	2	3	3	3	2	16
	% Delayed +2 Hours	33%	0%	50%	43%	50%	38%	25%	33%
Philadelphia	Train Crew Starts	14	13	13	14	12	11	12	89
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	0	3	2	2	2	2	12
	% Delayed +2 Hours	7%	0%	23%	14%	17%	18%	17%	13%
Selkirk	Train Crew Starts	47	35	30	39	40	44	45	280
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	9	13	7	14	11	10	14	78
	% Delayed +2 Hours	19%	37%	23%	36%	28%	23%	31%	28%
Toledo	Train Crew Starts	34	38	25	30	28	35	32	222
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	8	7	1	5	10	9	9	49
	% Delayed +2 Hours	24%	18%	4%	17%	36%	26%	28%	22%
Willard	Train Crew Starts	46	36	33	36	39	37	47	274
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	11	12	8	18	13	8	20	90
	% Delayed +2 Hours	24%	33%	24%	50%	33%	22%	43%	33%

Daily number of train crew starts from selected yards or terminals and the number of those originating train crews that were delayed in those yards or terminals for two hours or more after going on-duty. The percentage of those delayed starts.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Train Delay - Northern Region Lines

	Cause of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Trains / Hours	05/12/01	05/13/01	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01	Total
Train Delay	Originating Train Starts	109	109	100	91	112	109	112	742
	Delayed Hours - Power	1	4	4	0	0	3	0	12
	Delayed Hours - Crews	19	22	0	7	12	9	0	69

Daily number of originating train starts on the Northern Region and the hours delayed due to lack of power and crew of those originating train crews. The delayed train starts will be broken down between power and crew delayed hours.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage - Northern Region Lines

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Crew Availability	05/12/01	05/13/01	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01	Average
Crew Availability		81%	81%	82%	82%	83%	83%	82%	82%

Daily percentage of CSXT road train crews that are available for work on the Northern Region Lines.

Daily Number of Train Crew Starts and Recrews Required

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Crew/Recrews	05/12/01	05/13/01	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01	Total
Crews/Recrews	Train Crew Starts	286	246	216	252	276	274	282	1832
	Recrews	5	3	5	4	6	11	5	39
	% Recrewed	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	4%	2%	2%

Daily number of CSXT road train crew starts, the number of recrews and percentage of recrews for the Northern Region Lines.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Locomotive Fleet Condition

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Locomotives	05/12/01	05/13/01	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01	Average
Locomotives	Gross Fleet Size	3867	3867	3878	3861	3813	3798	3820	3843
	Avg. Number Available	3582	3582	3591	3560	3536	3516	3532	3557
	OOS Ratio	5.1	5.0	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.2

The measure for Gross Fleet will consist of CSX owned, leased, and foreign locomotives on-line. The Average Number Available will be the number of net fleet available to move traffic. The Out-of-Service Ratio (OOS) is the ratio of CSXT owned locomotives not available.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Shared Area	05/12/01	05/13/01	05/14/01	05/15/01	05/16/01	05/17/01	05/18/01	Average
Train Delay	Philadelphia/South Jersey	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	North Jersey	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	1
	Detroit	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification. The measure will be a composite of CSX and NS trains.

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

(757) 629-2657
(757) 533-4872
E-mail gaaspat@nscorp.com

May 23, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Pursuant to Decision No. 89 issued in STB Finance Docket No. 33388, for the week ending May 18, 2001, enclosed are schedules reporting Train Origination Performance, Yard Performance, and Trains Held in the Shared Assets Areas. Also enclosed is a schedule showing a daily snapshot of NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted, and our Locomotive Fleet Statistics. This schedule also includes NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays that are not limited to a snapshot period.

Another schedule incorporated into this transmittal shows NS Crew Starts and Delays, NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage, and NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews.

Additionally, this transmittal includes confidential reports containing performance statistics for NS's Chicago Gateway Interchange Operations, Corridor Train Performance and Yard Performance. In an effort to provide you with more detailed information regarding delays, I have included two schedules supporting NS's Chicago Gateway and Corridor Train Performance reports, which identify the number and total time for delays due to crew, power, or other issues. I also have supplied the Public Reporting Measures that we provide to the Conrail Transaction Council and the AAR.

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
May 23, 2001
Page 2

As always, I am including a letter written by Tony L. Ingram, Vice President Transportation – Operations, which discusses delays in our rail operations. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me.

Sincerely,

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

Enclosures

May 23, 2001


Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Norfolk Southern's performance metrics remain within normal operating range. The number of cars on line decreased, the average train speed decreased, and the average terminal dwell increased. On the monitored corridors and Chicago gateway operations, 86 trains were held for terminal delays, 31 trains were held for crews, and 34 trains were held for power.

In the Shared Assets Areas, daily average on-hand car volume increased marginally at North Yard and decreased marginally at Pavonia and Oak Island. All volume counts were within expected operating norms. Overall average terminal dwell time increased. The number of reported road train delays for crews and power decreased from last week. Seven trains were delayed 14 hours for lack of crews and no trains were delayed awaiting power. Three originating trains were delayed a total of 9 hours due to late arrivals from CSXT and/or NS. Together, these delays accounted for 8% of the delay hours reported in the SAAs.

Sincerely,






For the week ending 5/18/01

Shared Asset Area - Yard Performance


Yard	date	Fluid Capacity	On hand -Empty	On hand - Loaded	On hand - Total	Cars handled	Average dwell
North Yard MI	5/14/01	850	48	192	240	358	22.2
	5/15/01	850	76	158	234	238	17.0
	5/16/01	850	92	181	273	230	21.7
	5/17/01	850	118	231	349	286	17.6
	5/18/01	850	118	145	263	390	16.2
North Yard MI Average		850	90	181	272	300	18.9
Oak Island NJ	5/14/01	1200	283	337	620	518	32.4
	5/15/01	1200	304	383	687	581	29.6
	5/16/01	1200	307	436	743	570	29.1
	5/17/01	1200	325	348	673	659	27.9
	5/18/01	1200	284	258	542	576	24.2
Oak Island NJ Average		1200	301	352	653	581	28.6
Pavonia NJ	5/14/01	900	265	355	620	271	51.5
	5/15/01	900	265	312	577	362	37.1
	5/16/01	900	363	257	620	577	25.6
	5/17/01	900	391	286	677	565	20.7
	5/18/01	900	256	182	438	419	25.9
Pavonia Average		900	308	278	586	439	29.5



For the week ending 5/18/01

Shared Asset Train Origination Performance

location	date	Trains	On time	0-2 hours late	2-4 hours late	4-6 hours late	6+ hours late
Detroit Total	14-May	6	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	15-May	7	71%	29%	0%	0%	0%
	16-May	8	50%	50%	0%	0%	0%
	17-May	9	78%	11%	0%	0%	11%
	18-May	8	88%	13%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit Total		38	76%	21%	0%	0%	3%
North Jersey Total	14-May	4	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	15-May	9	33%	44%	22%	0%	0%
	16-May	9	56%	44%	0%	0%	0%
	17-May	9	67%	11%	0%	11%	11%
	18-May	9	33%	22%	11%	33%	0%
North Jersey Total		40	53%	28%	8%	10%	3%
South Jersey Total	14-May	1	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%
	15-May	3	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%
	16-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	17-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	18-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
South Jersey Total		13	85%	8%	0%	8%	0%
Grand Total		91	67%	22%	3%	5%	2%




For the week ending 5/18/01

Shared Asset Area Trains Held

area	Sat 12-May	Sun 13-May	Mon 14-May	Tue 15-May	Wed 16-May	Thu 17-May	Fri 18-May	Grand Total
North Jersey	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	6
South Jersey	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Detroit	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	3

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification.



NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

offered	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Total
CSX	0	0	0	0	0	0
other	0	115	25	100	0	240
Total	0	115	25	100	0	240

Snapshot taken between 2:00 and 3:00 each day
NS acquired territory only

NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays


	Saturday 12-May	Sunday 13-May	Monday 14-May	Tuesday 15-May	Wednesday 16-May	Thursday 17-May	Friday 18-May	Grand Total
# of Train Starts	173	170	183	200	224	170	178	1298
Delay Cause								
Crew Delays (hrs)	0.0	12.5	2.6	0.0	0.0	1.2	8.0	24.2
Power Delays (hrs)	37.8	10.5	17.8	36.6	69.3	32.3	54.1	258.3

The delay numbers are expressed in hours

Locomotive Fleet Statistics

	Saturday 12-May	Sunday 13-May	Monday 14-May	Tuesday 15-May	Wednesday 16-May	Thursday 17-May	Friday 18-May	average
Fleet Size	3175	3193	3157	3140	3110	3132	3149	3151
available	2984	3010	2983	2980	2933	2945	2983	2974
out of service %	6.0%	5.7%	5.5%	5.1%	5.7%	6.0%	5.3%	5.6%

Snapshot taken at midnight
Fleet size is all locomotives on line. Includes owned, leased and foreign.



**NORFOLK
SOUTHERN**

NS Crew Starts and Delays

		Saturday 12-May	Sunday 13-May	Monday 14-May	Tuesday 15-May	Wednesday 16-May	Thursday 17-May	Friday 18-May	Grand Total
Allentown	crew starts	12	15	15	14	15	18	17	106
	crews delayed	3	3	3	3	6	6	4	28
Bellevue	crew starts	42	37	38	35	37	41	44	274
	crews delayed	14	7	4	7	10	10	12	64
Buffalo	crew starts	20	18	22	26	21	23	22	152
	crews delayed	2	5	4	5		6	3	28
Chicago	crew starts	34	34	30	32	36	36	33	235
	crews delayed	16	8	11	10	10	11	7	73
Cincinnati	crew starts	38	35	29	33	34	36	37	242
	crews delayed	9	8	4	6	1	2	3	33
Cleveland	crew starts	14	5	10	9	7	11	11	67
	crews delayed	3	1	4	3	3	5	4	23
Conway	crew starts	58	54	45	47	52	60	55	371
	crews delayed	15	13	24	15	20	19	16	122
Detroit	crew starts	16	20	15	21	22	21	20	135
	crews delayed	3	3	4	4	4	4	6	28
Elkhart	crew starts	46	34	31	32	34	36	33	246
	crews delayed	15	13	14	17	13	13	13	98
Harrisburg	crew starts	57	49	38	48	62	60	56	370
	crews delayed	17	15	12	7	22	23	18	114
Toledo	crew starts	62	58	47	52	51	56	68	394
	crews delayed	9	10	8	6	13	11	17	74

Notes:

Data source is T&E employees' "End of Trip" reporting

A summary of all "E-O-T's" where departure time is reported as two or more hours after time crew ordered.

Includes all trains for location, whether originating or run-through.

A delayed crew is one delayed two hours or more after coming on duty

NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage

	Saturday 12-May	Sunday 13-May	Monday 14-May	Tuesday 15-May	Wednesday 16-May	Thursday 17-May	Friday 18-May	average
availability%	77%	75%	78%	79%	80%	80%	78%	78%

Notes:

A "snapshot" of percent of Train and Engineman available at approximately 5:00 AM


NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews

	Saturday 12-May	Sunday 13-May	Monday 14-May	Tuesday 15-May	Wednesday 16-May	Thursday 17-May	Friday 18-May	Grand Total
crew starts	340	299	264	304	309	339	333	2188
recrews	10	4	17	17	27	24	19	118

Notes:

A summary of trains ordered by field transportation using relief crew (recrew) train symbol

Does not include recrews/trains pulled into terminals by yard crews or road crews called and used in regular service



STB

FD-33388

5-10-01

D

202186

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Memorandum

202186 ENTERED
Office of the Secretary
MAY 10 2001
Part of
Public Record



DATE: May 10, 2001

TO : Ellen Keys, Assistant Secretary
Section of Publications/Records
Office of the Secretary

FROM : Mel Clemens, Director
Office of Compliance and Enforcement

SUBJECT : STB FINANCE DOCKET NO. 33388 - OPERATIONAL MONITORING DATA

Attached are the original and two copies of the latest weekly public data files provided to this office by CSX and Norfolk Southern as required in the above proceeding, which are to be committed to the docket for public reference. As requested, I am providing the three paper copies to Ron Douglas, two for the docket and one for Da To Da Office Solutions. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Ed Nelson.

Attachments

cc: Chairman Morgan
Vice Chairman Clyburn
Commissioner Burkes
Richard Armstrong
Ron Douglas
Charles Renninger



500 Water Street (J407)
Jacksonville, FL 32202
Phone (904) 366-4134
Fax (904) 359-1571

T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President -
Service Measurements

May 9, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
The Mercury Building
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 780
Washington, DC 20423

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Enclosed with this transmittal letter are CSX Transportation's operational monitoring reports to the Board for the week ending Friday, May 4th. Cars on-line improved from 240,359 to 239,859 and train velocity slightly decreased from 21.6 to 21.2 miles-per-hour. Terminal dwell improved to 24.2 hours from the previous week's 24.5. Cars on-line and terminal dwell achieved their best performance since the Acquisition.

We would offer the following observations and interpretations regarding the data CSXT provides the STB, Conrail Transaction Council, and the AAR:

Chicago Gateway Operations

During this reporting week, the on-time-to-two-hours-late measure of deliveries to western carriers through Chicago moved unfavorably four percentage points to 71%. The more-than-six-hours-late category moved unfavorably three percentage points to 14%.

Yards and Terminals

Car volumes and dwell times changed very little, remaining within expected levels at most terminals across the network. Eight of the 14 measured yards showed an improvement in dwell time compared to the prior week.

Corridor Performance

One of the six measured corridors showed an improvement compared to the prior week. The best performance in the on-time-to-two-hours-late category was the I-95 corridor with 94%. Overall, the on-time-to-two-hours-late category was 80%, down three percentage points from last week's 83%, and the percent of trains in the greater-than-six-hours-late category moved favorably one percentage point to 9%.

Shared Areas

Daily average on hand cars increased marginally at Oak Island, while decreasing marginally at Pavonia and North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods. Overall terminal dwell time was 26.0 hours, down from 29.4 hours last week.

Additional Measurements

Train Delay Metric: For 774 train starts, weekly train delay totaled 11 hours for Power and 54 hours for Crew. Power delay decreased as well as crew from the previous week.

Train Crew Delay Metric: The percent of crews not departing within two hours of the on-duty time averaged 20.5% for the week, up from 18.2% last week.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage: Crew Availability Percentage was 82%, same percentage as last week.

Daily Number of Recrews Required: Of 1839 crew starts, 26 (1%) were recrews, improving one percentage point from last week.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay Metric: SAA Train Delays averaged one train each for South Jersey, North Jersey, and Detroit.

Locomotives: Gross Locomotives = 3875, Average Available = 3556, and Out-of-Service Ratio = 4.9%, down from 5.1% the previous week.

Cars Offered in Interchange: averaged 294 cars daily, of which 52 were for the Norfolk Southern. The NS-offered cars increased this week, while the total-offered cars decreased.

On-time performance, passenger trains through Brunswick, MD: 10% for 10 AMTRAK trains (Pittsburgh – Washington) and 87% for 90 MARC trains (West Virginia – Washington).

Buffalo Customer Service (Hot-Line): the customer service center received no calls this week.

Last week we met the goal for 17 of the 18 key service measures established for the second quarter. Goals were met for FRA-reportable derailments, cars on-line, overall train velocity, merchandise

train velocity, slow order miles, crews on duty greater than 12 hours, relief crews, hours of crew delay, car dwell, right connection, on-time originations, on-time arrivals, 30-hour cars, industrial switching, hours of locomotive delay, CSXT locomotive out-of-service ratio, and leased locomotive out-of-service ratio. Most of the goals were made more stringent for the second quarter. The railroad is focused on meeting the ambitious goals we have set for these two areas.

CSXT's service performance continues at near-record levels, with little movement in indicators. Operations are very fluid and CSXT is able to absorb additional traffic.

Sincerely,

L. L. Hayes
Director Management and Regulatory Reporting
Service Measurements

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

For the week ending: 05/04/01

Yard Performance

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01
Oak Island, NJ	Fluid Capacity	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	377	270	233	415	412
	Cars On Hand - Empty	390	380	360	362	406
	Cars On Hand - Total	767	650	593	777	818
	Cars Handled	540	373	705	770	738
	Dwell Hours	35.9	26.2	24.2	24.5	24.9
Pavonia, NJ	Fluid Capacity	900	900	900	900	900
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	249	231	163	342	129
	Cars On Hand - Empty	285	333	291	258	289
	Cars On Hand - Total	534	564	454	600	418
	Cars Handled	434	399	333	532	429
	Dwell Hours	35.0	35.8	22.7	29.9	26.9
North Yard, MI	Fluid Capacity	850	850	850	850	850
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	121	203	198	160	152
	Cars On Hand - Empty	196	146	117	187	53
	Cars On Hand - Total	317	349	315	347	205
	Cars Handled	304	316	346	314	335
	Dwell Hours	21.4	21.6	18.4	18.7	16.1

CSX Comments: Daily average on hand cars increased marginally at Oak Island, while decreasing marginally at Pavonia and North Yard. All volumes still remain within expected or observed norms for comparable periods.
Overall terminal dwell time was 26.0 hours, down from 29.4 hours last week.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

Train Originations

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01
North Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	5	7	9	9	7
	% Ontime	80%	43%	44%	33%	29%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	20%	43%	44%	56%	43%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	29%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	14%	0%	11%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	11%	0%	0%
South Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	1	3	3	3	3
	% Ontime	100%	100%	33%	67%	67%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	0%	33%	0%	33%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%
Detroit SAA	Number of Originations	6	7	8	8	4
	% Ontime	100%	86%	100%	75%	75%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	14%	0%	25%	25%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

CSX Comments: Total road train delays were 19 trains. Crew delays were 6 trains for 22 hours; no trains were delayed for power; originating trains 13 for 100 hours, due to late connections.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

(Snapshot at Midnight for Day Measured)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Railroad Offered To	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Average
Cars Offered	NS	18	28	53	92	68	52
	All Other	198	206	303	256	256	244
	Total	216	234	356	342	324	294

Measures all cars in offered interchange status on acquired Conrail territory only. Volumes are listed by cars offered to NS (Norfolk Southern) and All Other Railroads.

CSXT On Time Passenger Train Performance

"Brunswick Line"

Between West Virginia/Washington, DC

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Service	Measure	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Totals
AMTK	Trains	2	2	2	2	2	10
	% On Time	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%
MARC	Trains	18	18	18	18	18	90
	% On Time	78%	100%	67%	89%	100%	87%

AMTK measured according to contract with CSXT.

Surface Transportation Board
Performance Measures
CSXT Train Crew Delay

	Causes of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Terminal	Trains / Hours	04/28/01	04/29/01	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Total
Baltimore	Train Crew Starts	20	15	20	16	20	20	19	130
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	9	7	9	7	10	10	9	61
	% Delayed +2 Hours	45%	47%	45%	44%	50%	50%	47%	47%
Buffalo	Train Crew Starts	50	33	33	40	47	47	43	293
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	5	2	4	6	9	11	5	42
	% Delayed +2 Hours	10%	6%	12%	15%	19%	23%	12%	14%
Chicago	Train Crew Starts	21	29	19	24	21	22	24	160
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	5	11	4	5	6	1	7	39
	% Delayed +2 Hours	24%	38%	21%	21%	29%	5%	29%	24%
Cincinnati	Train Crew Starts	37	38	38	32	36	36	38	255
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	2	1	0	0	4	2	10
	% Delayed +2 Hours	3%	5%	3%	0%	0%	11%	5%	4%
Cleveland	Train Crew Starts	26	25	22	24	21	24	25	167
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	10	6	6	6	8	4	8	48
	% Delayed +2 Hours	38%	24%	27%	25%	38%	17%	32%	29%
Cumberland	Train Crew Starts	37	34	33	33	34	30	33	234
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	5	1	5	7	7	5	32
	% Delayed +2 Hours	5%	15%	3%	15%	21%	23%	15%	14%
Detroit	Train Crew Starts	7	4	5	6	7	6	6	41
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	0	2	3	2	2	3	13
	% Delayed +2 Hours	14%	0%	40%	50%	29%	33%	50%	32%
Philadelphia	Train Crew Starts	15	11	12	16	13	15	18	100
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	0	1	1	2	1	3	10
	% Delayed +2 Hours	13%	0%	8%	6%	15%	7%	17%	10%
Selkirk	Train Crew Starts	49	42	29	38	46	47	46	297
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	12	8	3	4	14	14	21	76
	% Delayed +2 Hours	24%	19%	10%	11%	30%	30%	46%	26%
Toledo	Train Crew Starts	34	31	29	30	35	35	32	226
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	4	4	4	4	3	8	29
	% Delayed +2 Hours	6%	13%	14%	13%	11%	9%	25%	13%
Willard	Train Crew Starts	41	33	31	37	41	33	43	259
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	8	9	7	7	9	10	11	61
	% Delayed +2 Hours	20%	27%	23%	19%	22%	30%	26%	24%

Daily number of train crew starts from selected yards or terminals and the number of those originating train crews that were delayed in those yards or terminals for two hours or more after going on-duty. The percentage of those delayed starts.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Train Delay - Northern Region Lines

	Cause of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Trains / Hours	04/28/01	04/29/01	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Total
Train Delay	Originating Train Starts	108	117	97	103	110	117	122	774
	Delayed Hours - Power	0	1	10	0	0	0	0	11
	Delayed Hours - Crews	10	27	0	4	4	0	9	54

Daily number of originating train starts on the Northern Region and the hours delayed due to lack of power and crew of those originating train crews. The delayed train starts will be broken down between power and crew delayed hours.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage - Northern Region Lines

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Crew Availability	04/28/01	04/29/01	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Average
Crew Availability		81%	80%	82%	83%	84%	83%	82%	82%

Daily percentage of CSXT road train crews that are available for work on the Northern Region Lines.

Daily Number of Train Crew Starts and Recrews Required

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Crew/Recrews	04/28/01	04/29/01	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Total
Crews/Recrews	Train Crew Starts	279	244	237	262	273	275	269	1839
	Recrews	4	1	2	2	7	5	5	26
	% Recrewed	1%	0%	1%	1%	3%	2%	2%	1%

Daily number of CSXT road train crew starts, the number of recrews and percentage of recrews for the Northern Region Lines.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Locomotive Fleet Condition

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Locomotives	04/28/01	04/29/01	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Average

Locomotives	Gross Fleet Size	3873	3883	3860	3889	3872	3878	3867	3875
	Avg. Number Available	3554	3547	3548	3562	3555	3575	3553	3556
	OOS Ratio	5.1	5.5	5.0	4.9	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.9

The measure for Gross Fleet will consist of CSX owned, leased, and foreign locomotives on-line. The Average Number Available will be the number of net fleet available to move traffic. The Out-of-Service Ratio (OOS) is the ratio of CSXT owned locomotives not available.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Shared Area	04/28/01	04/29/01	04/30/01	05/01/01	05/02/01	05/03/01	05/04/01	Average

Train Delay	Philadelphia/South Jersey	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	1
	North Jersey	2	3	0	0	2	0	1	1
	Detroit	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification. The measure will be a composite of CSX and NS trains.

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

(757) 629-2657
(757) 533-4872
E-mail gaaspato@nscorp.com

May 9, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Pursuant to Decision No. 89 issued in STB Finance Docket No. 33388, for the week ending May 4, 2001, enclosed are schedules reporting Train Origination Performance, Yard Performance, and Trains Held in the Shared Assets Areas. Also enclosed is a schedule showing a daily snapshot of NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted, and our Locomotive Fleet Statistics. This schedule also includes NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays that are not limited to a snapshot period.

Another schedule incorporated into this transmittal shows NS Crew Starts and Delays, NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage, and NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews.

Additionally, this transmittal includes confidential reports containing performance statistics for NS's Chicago Gateway Interchange Operations, Corridor Train Performance and Yard Performance. In an effort to provide you with more detailed information regarding delays, I have included two schedules supporting NS's Chicago Gateway and Corridor Train Performance reports, which identify the number and total time for delays due to crew, power, or other issues. I also have supplied the Public Reporting Measures that we provide to the Conrail Transaction Council and the AAR.

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
May 9, 2001
Page 2

As always, I am including a letter written by Tony L. Ingram, Vice President Transportation – Operations, which discusses delays in our rail operations. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me.

Sincerely,

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

Enclosures

May 9, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001


Dear Mr. Clemens:


Norfolk Southern's performance metrics remain within normal operating range. The number of cars on line increased, the average train speed decreased, and the average terminal dwell increased. On the monitored corridors and Chicago gateway operations, 69 trains were held for terminal delays, 28 trains were held for crews, and 14 trains were held for power.

In the Shared Assets Areas, daily average on-hand car volume increased at Oak Island and decreased at Pavonia and North Yard. All volume counts were within expected operating norms. Overall average terminal dwell time decreased. The number of reported road train delays for crews and power increased from the prior week. Six trains were delayed 22 hours for lack of crews and no trains were delayed awaiting power. Thirteen originating trains were delayed a total of 100 hours due to late arrivals from CSXT and/or NS. Together, these delays accounted for 35% of the delay hours reported in the SAAs.

Due to technical difficulties, information normally supplied in the Shared Asset Area Trains Held table was not included in last week's report. The Shared Asset Area Trains Held table for the week ending April 27, 2001, is appended to this week's report.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Th. Long", followed by a horizontal line.



For the week ending 5/4/01

Shared Asset Area - Yard Performance


Yard	date	Fluid Capacity	On hand - Empty	On hand - Loaded	On hand - Total	Cars handled	Average dwell
North Yard MI	4/30/01	850	196	121	317	304	21.4
	5/1/01	850	146	203	349	316	21.6
	5/2/01	850	117	198	315	346	18.4
	5/3/01	850	187	160	347	314	18.7
	5/4/01	850	53	152	205	335	16.1
North Yard MI Average		850	140	167	307	323	19.2
Oak Island NJ	4/30/01	1200	390	377	767	540	35.9
	5/1/01	1200	380	270	650	373	26.2
	5/2/01	1200	360	233	593	705	24.2
	5/3/01	1200	362	415	777	770	24.5
	5/4/01	1200	406	412	818	738	24.9
Oak Island NJ Average		1200	380	341	721	625	26.7
Pavonia NJ	4/30/01	900	285	249	534	434	35.0
	5/1/01	900	333	231	564	399	35.8
	5/2/01	900	291	163	454	333	22.7
	5/3/01	900	258	342	600	532	29.9
	5/4/01	900	289	129	418	429	26.9
Pavonia Average		900	291	223	514	425	30.3



For the week ending 5/4/01

Shared Asset Train Origination Performance

location	date	Trains	On time	0-2 hours late	2-4 hours late	4-6 hours late	6+ hours late
Detroit Total	30-Apr	6	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	1-May	7	86%	14%	0%	0%	0%
	2-May	8	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	3-May	8	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%
	4-May	4	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit Total		33	88%	12%	0%	0%	0%
North Jersey Total	30-Apr	5	80%	20%	0%	0%	0%
	1-May	7	43%	43%	0%	14%	0%
	2-May	9	44%	44%	0%	0%	11%
	3-May	9	33%	56%	0%	11%	0%
	4-May	7	29%	43%	29%	0%	0%
North Jersey Total		37	43%	43%	5%	5%	3%
South Jersey Total	30-Apr	1	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	1-May	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	2-May	3	33%	33%	33%	0%	0%
	3-May	3	67%	0%	0%	0%	33%
	4-May	3	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%
South Jersey Total		13	69%	15%	8%	0%	8%
Grand Total		83	65%	27%	4%	2%	2%




For the week ending 5/4/01

Shared Asset Area Trains Held

area	Sat 28-Apr	Sun 29-Apr	Mon 30-Apr	Tue 01-May	Wed 02-May	Thu 03-May	Fri 04-May	Grand Total
North Jersey	2	3	0	0	2	0	1	8
South Jersey	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	7
Detroit	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	4

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification.



NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

offered	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Total
CSX	105	0	0	0	0	105
other	112	0	0	0	0	112
Total	217	0	0	0	0	217

Snapshot taken between 2:00 and 3:00 each day
NS acquired territory only

NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays

	Saturday 28-Apr	Sunday 29-Apr	Monday 30-Apr	Tuesday 1-May	Wednesday 2-May	Thursday 3-May	Friday 4-May	Grand Total
# of Train Starts	167	152	173	193	170	210	173	1238
Delay Cause								
Crew Delays (hrs)	17.1	6.6	3.2	11.3	3.4	10.0	14.5	66.1
Power Delays (hrs)	14.0	0.0	0.0	10.3	0.0	27.5	38.8	90.6

The delay numbers are expressed in hours

Locomotive Fleet Statistics

	Saturday 28-Apr	Sunday 29-Apr	Monday 30-Apr	Tuesday 1-May	Wednesday 2-May	Thursday 3-May	Friday 4-May	average
Fleet Size	3184	3194	3216	3192	3219	3258	3227	3213
available	3003	3004	3036	3027	3019	3055	3043	3027
out of service %	5.7%	5.9%	5.6%	5.2%	6.2%	6.2%	5.7%	5.8%

Snapshot taken at midnight
Fleet size is all locomotives on line. Includes owned, leased and foreign.



NS Crew Starts and Delays

		Saturday 28-Apr	Sunday 29-Apr	Monday 30-Apr	Tuesday 1-May	Wednesday 2-May	Thursday 3-May	Friday 4-May	Grand Total
Allentown	crew starts	13	15	16	17	15	18	15	109
	crews delayed	6	5	5	7	4	5	4	36
Bellevue	crew starts	41	41	32	40	43	41	34	272
	crews delayed	16	10	13	10	9	11	8	77
Buffalo	crew starts	18	17	22	23	22	20	23	145
	crews delayed	1	2	4	4	1	2	5	19
Chicago	crew starts	35	33	35	30	37	34	31	235
	crews delayed	16	5	8	10	12	12	10	73
Cincinnati	crew starts	32	41	28	38	35	38	35	247
	crews delayed	5	4	5	4	3	8	6	35
Cleveland	crew starts	12	13	9	11	8	10	14	77
	crews delayed	7	4	3	4	3	1	2	24
Conway	crew starts	62	63	51	46	56	50	61	389
	crews delayed	22	18	12	12	12	12	12	100
Detroit	crew starts	18	13	18	20	18	23	17	127
	crews delayed	10	5	4	5	4	11	6	45
Elkhart	crew starts	37	41	33	33	36	37	41	258
	crews delayed	18	18	12	8	15	9	15	95
Harrisburg	crew starts	55	58	35	56	59	57	61	381
	crews delayed	20	28	12	20	19	20	27	146
Toledo	crew starts	60	58	48	45	52	59	60	382
	crews delayed	20	7	14	5	12	17	14	89

Notes:

Data source is T&E employees' "End of Trip" reporting

A summary of all "E-O-T's" where departure time is reported as two or more hours after time crew ordered.

Includes all trains for location, whether originating or run-through.

A delayed crew is one delayed two hours or more after coming on duty

NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage

	Saturday 28-Apr	Sunday 29-Apr	Monday 30-Apr	Tuesday 1-May	Wednesday 2-May	Thursday 3-May	Friday 4-May	average
availability%	75%	74%	78%	80%	80%	81%	78%	78%

Notes:

A "snapshot" of percent of Train and Engineman available at approximately 5:00 AM


NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews

	Saturday 28-Apr	Sunday 29-Apr	Monday 30-Apr	Tuesday 1-May	Wednesday 2-May	Thursday 3-May	Friday 4-May	Grand Total
crew starts	330	319	277	298	324	326	343	2217
recrews	15	8	8	14	11	17	21	94

Notes:

A summary of trains ordered by field transportation using relief crew (recrew) train symbol

Does not include recrews/trains pulled into terminals by yard crews or road crews called and used in regular service



STB

FD-33388

3-29-01

D

201880

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Memorandum



201880

DATE: March 29, 2001

TO : Ellen Keys, Assistant Secretary
Section of Publications/Records
Office of the Secretary

FROM *gic* Mel Clemens, Director
Office of Compliance and Enforcement

SUBJECT : STB FINANCE DOCKET NO. 33388 - OPERATIONAL MONITORING DATA

ENTERED
Office of the Secretary

MAR 29 2001

Part of
Public Record



Attached are the original and two copies of the latest weekly public data files provided to this office by CSX and Norfolk Southern as required in the above proceeding, which are to be committed to the docket for public reference. As requested, I am providing the three paper copies to Ron Douglas, two for the docket and one for Da To Da Office Solutions. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Ed Nelson.

Attachments

cc: Chairman Morgan
Vice Chairman Clyburn
Commissioner Burkes
Richard Armstrong
Ron Douglas
Charles Renninger



500 Water Street (J407)
Jacksonville, FL 32202
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T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President -
Service Measurements

March 28, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
The Mercury Building
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 780
Washington, DC 20423

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Enclosed with this transmittal letter are CSX Transportation's operational monitoring reports to the Board for the week ending Friday, March 23rd. Our three key indicators again showed no significant trends. Cars on-line increased from 244,082 to 244,229. Terminal dwell increased from 25.4 to 25.6 hours, and train velocity improved from 21.3 to 21.4 miles-per-hour.

We would offer the following observations and interpretations regarding the data CSXT provides the STB, Conrail Transaction Council, and the AAR:

Chicago Gateway Operations

During this reporting week, the on-time-to-two-hours-late measure of deliveries to western carriers through Chicago moved unfavorably seven percentage points to 78%. The more-than-six-hours-late category moved unfavorably two percentage points to 7%.

Yards and Terminals

Car volumes and dwell times changed very little, remaining within expected levels at most terminals across the network. Seven of the 14 measured yards showed an improvement in dwell time compared to the prior week.

Corridor Performance

Three of the six measured corridors showed an improvement compared to the prior week. The best performance in the on-time-to-two-hours-late category was the I-95 corridor with 97%. Overall, the on-time-to-two-hours-late category moved unfavorably five percentage points to 82%, and the percent of trains in the greater-than-six-hours-late category moved unfavorably six percentage points to 11%.

Shared Areas

Daily average on hand cars increased marginally at Pavonia and decreased marginally at Oak Island and North Yard. A one-day spike impacted Pavonia average volume. Overall terminal dwell time was 24.7 hours, compared to 27.3 hours last week. For the week, there were a total of 29 trains delayed for CSXT and NS: 17 for crew, 0 for power, and 12 for late arrivals by CSX and NS.

Additional Measurements

Train Delay Metric: For 736 train starts, weekly train delay totaled 23 hours for Power and 7 hours for Crew. Delay hours for crew decreased, while delay for power increased from the prior week.

Train Crew Delay Metric: The percent of crews not departing within two hours of the on-duty time averaged 20.5% for the week, up from 18.7% last week.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage: Crew Availability Percentage was 85%, remaining at the same percentage as the last two weeks.

Daily Number of Recrews Required: Of 1845 crew starts, 63 (3%) were recrews, up from 2% the prior week.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay Metric: SAA Train Delays averaged two trains for South Jersey, one train for North Jersey, and one for Detroit.

Locomotives: Gross Locomotives = 3826, Average Available = 3476, and Out-of-Service Ratio = 5.8%, up from 5.5% the prior week.

Cars Offered in Interchange: averaged 213 cars daily, of which 5 were for the Norfolk Southern. Daily average decreased as well as the NS average from the prior week.

On-time performance, passenger trains through Brunswick, MD: 90% for 10 A.M. MTRAK trains (Pittsburgh – Washington) and 92% for 90 MARC trains (West Virginia – Washington).

Buffalo Customer Service (Hot-Line): the customer service center received and resolved one hot-line call.

Last week we met the goal for 13 of the 18 key service measures established for the first quarter. Goals were met for cars on-line, overall velocity, merchandise train velocity, crews on duty over 12 hours, relief crews, hours of crew delay, car dwell, right connection, on-time origin departure, on-time destination arrival, 30-hour cars, industrial switching, and hours of locomotive delay.

CSXT's operations performance continues at near-record levels, with little movement of any indicators. CSXT's operations are very fluid and able to absorb additional traffic.

Sincerely,

T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President
Service Measurements

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

For the week ending: 03/23/01

Yard Performance

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01
Oak Island, NJ	Fluid Capacity	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	238	266	435	359	363
	Cars On Hand - Empty	210	237	331	325	352
	Cars On Hand - Total	448	503	766	684	715
	Cars Handled	315	483	566	587	630
	Dwell Hours	27.3	30.8	23.4	26.9	27.0
Pavonia, NJ	Fluid Capacity	900	900	900	900	900
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	275	209	222	358	222
	Cars On Hand - Empty	333	284	475	397	355
	Cars On Hand - Total	608	493	697	755	577
	Cars Handled	299	244	578	654	224
	Dwell Hours	41.1	32.3	17.4	24.4	35.7
North Yard, MI	Fluid Capacity	850	850	850	850	850
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	135	145	230	129	200
	Cars On Hand - Empty	77	56	76	152	123
	Cars On Hand - Total	212	211	306	281	323
	Cars Handled	372	238	356	348	259
	Dwell Hours	20.6	20.0	18.3	16.0	13.3

CSX Comments: Daily average on hand cars increased marginally at Pavonia and decreased marginally at Oak Island and North Yard. Pavonia average volume was impacted by a one-day spike. Overall terminal dwell time was 24.7 hours, down from 27.3 last week.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

Train Originations

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01
North Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	4	8	9	8	4
	% Ontime	75%	63%	33%	50%	25%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	25%	38%	44%	50%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	22%	0%	25%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%
South Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	2	3	3	3	2
	% Ontime	100%	67%	100%	33%	50%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	33%	3%	33%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	33%	50%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit SAA	Number of Originations	5	7	7	7	3
	% Ontime	80%	43%	71%	71%	33%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	20%	29%	29%	29%	67%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	14%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	14%	0%	0%	0%

CSX Comments: Total road train delays were 29 trains. Crew delays were 17 trains for 49 hours; no trains were delayed for power; originating trains 12 for 44 hours, due to late connections.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

(Snapshot at Midnight for Day Measured)

Measure	Railroad Offered To	Monday 03/19/01	Tuesday 03/20/01	Wednesday 03/21/01	Thursday 03/22/01	Friday 03/23/01	Daily Average
Cars Offered	NS	0	0	25	0	0	5
	All Other	245	312	326	116	65	213
	Total	245	312	351	116	65	218

Measures all cars in offered interchange status on acquired Conrail territory only. Volumes are listed by cars offered to NS (Norfolk Southern) and All Other Railroads.

CSXT On Time Passenger Train Performance

"Brunswick Line"

Between West Virginia/Washington, DC

Service	Measure	Monday 03/19/01	Tuesday 03/20/01	Wednesday 03/21/01	Thursday 03/22/01	Friday 03/23/01	Weekly Totals
AMTK	Trains	2	2	2	2	2	10
	% On Time	100%	50%	100%	100%	100%	90%
MARC	Trains	18	18	18	18	18	90
	% On Time	89%	100%	94%	100%	78%	92%

AMTK measured according to contract with CSXT.

Surface Transportation Board
Performance Measures
CSXT Train Crew Delay

	Causes of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Terminal	Trains / Hours	03/17/01	03/18/01	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01	Total
Baltimore	Train Crew Starts	22	16	17	20	19	19	21	134
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	5	9	5	11	8	4	8	50
	% Delayed +2 Hours	23%	56%	29%	55%	42%	21%	38%	37%
Buffalo	Train Crew Starts	50	36	38	42	47	52	51	316
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	16	5	8	9	7	9	8	62
	% Delayed +2 Hours	32%	14%	21%	21%	15%	17%	16%	20%
Chicago	Train Crew Starts	23	27	27	26	28	22	24	177
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	2	8	4	6	4	4	31
	% Delayed +2 Hours	13%	7%	30%	15%	21%	18%	17%	18%
Cincinnati	Train Crew Starts	37	39	33	34	41	39	33	256
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	3	1	3	4	3	0	15
	% Delayed +2 Hours	3%	8%	3%	9%	10%	8%	0%	6%
Cleveland	Train Crew Starts	26	25	18	24	24	23	23	163
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	6	5	1	6	6	8	36
	% Delayed +2 Hours	15%	24%	28%	4%	25%	26%	35%	22%
Cumberland	Train Crew Starts	37	34	32	33	31	34	34	235
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	7	2	2	2	0	8	23
	% Delayed +2 Hours	5%	21%	6%	6%	6%	0%	24%	10%
Detroit	Train Crew Starts	9	4	6	8	6	7	6	46
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	0	2	1	1	2	2	10
	% Delayed +2 Hours	22%	0%	33%	13%	17%	29%	33%	22%
Philadelphia	Train Crew Starts	10	8	14	15	10	15	12	84
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	2	0	3	3	1	6	7	22
	% Delayed +2 Hours	20%	0%	21%	20%	10%	40%	8%	26%
Selkirk	Train Crew Starts	40	43	34	42	44	48	50	301
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	12	18	11	15	17	15	18	106
	% Delayed +2 Hours	30%	42%	32%	36%	39%	31%	36%	35%
Toledo	Train Crew Starts	30	36	28	24	29	30	29	206
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	8	5	4	0	2	5	3	27
	% Delayed +2 Hours	27%	14%	14%	0%	7%	17%	10%	13%
Willard	Train Crew Starts	45	34	31	39	44	43	45	281
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	11	7	3	1	7	2	16	47
	% Delayed +2 Hours	24%	21%	10%	3%	16%	5%	36%	17%

Daily number of train crew starts from selected yards or terminals and the number of those originating train crews that were delayed in those yards or terminals for two hours or more after going on-duty. The percentage of those delayed starts.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Train Delay - Northern Region Lines

	Cause of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Trains / Hours	03/17/01	03/18/01	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01	Total
Train Delay	Originating Train Starts	109	103	103	103	119	114	121	772
	Delayed Hours - Power	9	1	3	12	19	0	0	44
	Delayed Hours - Crews	11	36	0	1	6	3	2	59

Daily number of originating train starts on the Northern Region and the hours delayed due to lack of power and crew of those originating train crews. The delayed train starts will be broken down between power and crew delayed hours.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage - Northern Region Lines

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Crew Availability	03/17/01	03/18/01	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01	Average
Crew Availability		85%	84%	85%	85%	86%	85%	85%	85%

Daily percentage of CSXT road train crews that are available for work on the Northern Region Lines.

Daily Number of Train Crew Starts and Recrews Required

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Crew/Recrews	03/17/01	03/18/01	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01	Total
Crews/Recrews	Train Crew Starts	280	242	217	268	282	281	275	1845
	Recrews	13	8	6	4	5	14	13	63
	% Recrewed	5%	3%	3%	1%	2%	5%	5%	3%

Daily number of CSXT road train crew starts, the number of recrews and percentage of recrews for the Northern Region Lines.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Locomotive Fleet Condition

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Locomotives	03/17/01	03/18/01	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01	Average
Locomotives	Gross Fleet Size	3818	3819	3833	3835	3831	3820	3823	3826
	Avg. Number Available	3480	3476	3484	3479	3476	3474	3464	3476
	OOS Ratio	5.8	6.1	6.1	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.8

The measure for Gross Fleet will consist of CSX owned, leased, and foreign locomotives on-line. The Average Number Available will be the number of net fleet available to move traffic. The Out-of-Service Ratio (OOS) is the ratio of CSXT owned locomotives not available.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Shared Area	03/17/01	03/18/01	03/19/01	03/20/01	03/21/01	03/22/01	03/23/01	Average
Train Delay	Philadelphia/South Jersey	3	0	2	2	2	1	5	2
	North Jersey	2	2	1	0	1	2	1	1
	Detroit	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	1

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification. The measure will be a composite of CSX and NS trains.

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

(757) 629-2657
(757) 533-4872
E-mail gaaspato@nscorp.com

March 28, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Pursuant to Decision No. 89 issued in STB Finance Docket No. 33388, for the week ending March 23, 2001, enclosed are schedules reporting Train Origination Performance, Yard Performance, and Trains Held in the Shared Assets Areas. Also enclosed is a schedule showing a daily snapshot of NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted, and our Locomotive Fleet Statistics. This schedule also includes NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays that are not limited to a snapshot period.

Another schedule incorporated into this transmittal shows NS Crew Starts and Delays, NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage, and NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews.

Additionally, this transmittal includes confidential reports containing performance statistics for NS's Chicago Gateway Interchange Operations, Corridor Train Performance and Yard Performance. In an effort to provide you with more detailed information regarding delays, I have included two schedules supporting NS's Chicago Gateway and Corridor Train Performance reports, which identify the number and total time for delays due to crew, power, or other issues. I also have supplied the Public Reporting Measures that we provide to the Conrail Transaction Council and the AAR.

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
March 28, 2001
Page 2

As always, I am including a letter written by Tony L. Ingram, Vice President Transportation – Operations, which discusses delays in our rail operations. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me.

Sincerely,

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

Enclosures

March 28, 2001


Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001


Dear Mr. Clemens:

Norfolk Southern's performance metrics remain within normal operating range. The number of cars on line decreased, the average train speed increased, and the average terminal dwell decreased. On the monitored corridors and Chicago gateway operations, 40 trains were held for terminal delays, 10 trains were held for crews, and 11 trains were held for power.

In the Shared Assets Areas, daily average on-hand car volume decreased slightly at Oak Island and North Yard while increasing slightly at Pavonia. All volume counts were within expected operating norms. Overall average terminal dwell time decreased. The number of reported road train delays for crews and power decreased from last week. Seventeen trains were delayed forty-nine hours for lack of crews and no trains were delayed awaiting power. Twelve originating trains were delayed a total of 44 hours due to late arrivals from CSXT and/or NS. Together, these delays accounted for 34% of the delay hours reported in the SAAs.

Sincerely,






For the week ending 3/23/01

Shared Asset Area - Yard Performance


Yard	date	Fluid Capacity	On hand -Empty	On hand - Loaded	On hand - Total	Cars handled	Average dwell
North Yard MI	3/19/01	850	77	135	212	372	20.6
	3/20/01	850	66	145	211	238	20.0
	3/21/01	850	76	230	306	356	18.3
	3/22/01	850	152	129	281	348	16.0
	3/23/01	850	123	200	323	259	13.3
North Yard MI Average		850	99	168	267	315	17.8
Oak Island NJ	3/19/01	1200	210	238	448	315	27.3
	3/20/01	1200	237	266	503	483	30.8
	3/21/01	1200	331	435	766	566	23.4
	3/22/01	1200	325	359	684	587	26.9
	3/23/01	1200	352	363	715	630	27.0
Oak Island NJ Average		1200	291	332	623	516	26.9
Pavonia NJ	3/19/01	900	333	275	608	299	41.1
	3/20/01	900	284	209	493	244	32.3
	3/21/01	900	475	222	697	578	17.4
	3/22/01	900	397	358	755	654	24.4
	3/23/01	900	355	222	577	224	35.7
Pavonia Average		900	369	257	626	400	27.1



For the week ending 3/23/01

Shared Asset Train Origination Performance

location	date	Trains	On time	0-2 hours late	2-4 hours late	4-6 hours late	6+ hours late
Detroit Total	19-Mar	5	80%	20%	0%	0%	0%
	20-Mar	7	43%	29%	0%	14%	14%
	21-Mar	7	71%	29%	0%	0%	0%
	22-Mar	7	71%	29%	0%	0%	0%
	23-Mar	3	33%	67%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit Total		29	62%	31%	0%	3%	3%
North Jersey Total	19-Mar	4	75%	25%	0%	0%	0%
	20-Mar	8	63%	38%	0%	0%	0%
	21-Mar	9	33%	44%	22%	0%	0%
	22-Mar	8	50%	50%	0%	0%	0%
	23-Mar	4	25%	0%	25%	25%	25%
North Jersey Total		33	48%	36%	9%	3%	3%
South Jersey Total	19-Mar	2	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	20-Mar	3	67%	33%	0%	0%	0%
	21-Mar	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	22-Mar	3	33%	33%	33%	0%	0%
	23-Mar	2	50%	0%	50%	0%	0%
South Jersey Total		13	69%	15%	15%	0%	0%
Grand Total		75	57%	31%	7%	3%	3%




For the week ending 3/23/01

Shared Asset Area Trains Held

area	Sat 17-Mar	Sun 18-Mar	Mon 19-Mar	Tue 20-Mar	Wed 21-Mar	Thu 22-Mar	Fri 23-Mar	Grand Total
North Jersey	2	2	1	0	1	2	1	9
South Jersey	3	0	2	2	2	1	5	15
Detroit	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	5

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification.



NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

offered	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Total
CSX	0	0	0	0	0	0
other	0	0	0	26	0	26
Total	0	0	0	26	0	26

Snapshot taken between 2:00 and 3:00 each day
NS acquired territory only

NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays

	Saturday 17-Mar	Sunday 18-Mar	Monday 19-Mar	Tuesday 20-Mar	Wednesday 21-Mar	Thursday 22-Mar	Friday 23-Mar	Grand Total
# of Train Starts	156	138	146	155	165	159	160	1079
Delay Cause								
Crew Delays (hrs)	5.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.5	5.3	2.3	16.2
Power Delays (hrs)	0.0	6.0	0.0	8.8	12.4	42.3	5.0	74.4

The delay numbers are expressed in hours

Locomotive Fleet Statistics

	Saturday 17-Mar	Sunday 18-Mar	Monday 19-Mar	Tuesday 20-Mar	Wednesday 21-Mar	Thursday 22-Mar	Friday 23-Mar	average
Fleet Size	3431	3434	3458	3463	3443	3444	3438	3444
available	3246	3247	3248	3249	3250	3251	3252	3249
out of service %	5.4%	5.4%	6.1%	6.2%	5.6%	5.6%	5.4%	5.7%

Snapshot taken at midnight
Fleet size is all locomotives on line. Includes owned, leased and foreign.



NS Crew Starts and Delays

		Saturday 17-Mar	Sunday 18-Mar	Monday 19-Mar	Tuesday 20-Mar	Wednesday 21-Mar	Thursday 22-Mar	Friday 23-Mar	Grand Total
Allentown	crew starts	13	11	15	14	15	15	17	100
	crews delayed	7	6	8	5	5	3	5	39
Bellevue	crew starts	44	39	25	32	41	36	38	255
	crews delayed	15	12	6	5	7	4	7	56
Buffalo	crew starts	21	19	20	22	22	23	23	150
	crews delayed	3	4	4	4	1	2	3	21
Chicago	crew starts	32	29	35	36	36	32	33	233
	crews delayed	16	11	11	12	11	9	9	79
Cincinnati	crew starts	36	36	29	37	32	32	44	246
	crews delayed	6	6	9	8	4	4	7	44
Cleveland	crew starts	10	14	12	10	14	12	11	83
	crews delayed	6	7	4	5	5	8	3	38
Conway	crew starts	51	49	41	55	57	50	57	360
	crews delayed	14	11	10	12	9	13	10	79
Detroit	crew starts	16	15	17	22	22	19	18	129
	crews delayed	7	2	2	7	8	6	7	39
Elkhart	crew starts	43	35	31	35	41	36	32	253
	crews delayed	14	14	11	9	13	8	12	81
Harrisburg	crew starts	51	49	38	55	49	56	53	351
	crews delayed	15	17	11	19	17	17	17	113
Toledo	crew starts	63	48	45	49	61	51	51	368
	crews delayed	15	10	15	13	13	7	16	89

Notes:

Data source is T&E employees' "End of Trip" reporting

A summary of all "E-O-T's" where departure time is reported as two or more hours after time crew ordered.

Includes all trains for location, whether originating or run-through.

A delayed crew is one delayed two hours or more after coming on duty

NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage

	Saturday 17-Mar	Sunday 18-Mar	Monday 19-Mar	Tuesday 20-Mar	Wednesday 21-Mar	Thursday 22-Mar	Friday 23-Mar	average
availability%	78%	78%	80%	82%	83%	82%	81%	81%

Notes:

A "snapshot" of percent of Train and Engineman available at approximately 5:00 AM


NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews

	Saturday 17-Mar	Sunday 18-Mar	Monday 19-Mar	Tuesday 20-Mar	Wednesday 21-Mar	Thursday 22-Mar	Friday 23-Mar	Grand Total
crew starts	312	296	258	303	326	312	320	2127
recrews	6	7	10	6	12	15	15	71

Notes:

A summary of trains ordered by field transportation using relief crew (recrew) train symbol

Does not include recrews/trains pulled into terminals by yard crews or road crews called and used in regular service



STB

FD-33388

3-15-01

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201801

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

Memorandum

201801



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DATE: March 15, 2001

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TO : Ellen Keys, Assistant Secretary
Section of Publications/Records
Office of the Secretary

FROM *JKH* Mel Clemens, Director
Office of Compliance and Enforcement

SUBJECT : STB FINANCE DOCKET NO. 33388 - OPERATIONAL MONITORING DATA

Attached are the original and two copies of the latest weekly public data files provided to this office by CSX and Norfolk Southern as required in the above proceeding, which are to be committed to the docket for public reference. As requested, I am providing the three paper copies to Ron Douglas, two for the docket and one for Da To Da Office Solutions. If there are any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me or Ed Nelson.

Attachments

cc: Chairman Morgan
Vice Chairman Clyburn
Commissioner Burkes
Richard Armstrong
Ron Douglas
Charles Renninger



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T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President -
Service Measurements

March 14, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
The Mercury Building
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 780
Washington, DC 20423

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Enclosed with this transmittal letter are CSX Transportation's operational monitoring reports to the Board for the week ending Friday, March 9th. The report shows a slight decline in the major service indicators, compared to the previous week. This is attributed to severe winter weather conditions over the northern half of the network last week. Cars on-line increased from 242,887 to 243,339. Terminal dwell increased from 25.0 to 25.8 hours, and train velocity decreased slightly from 21.6 to 21.5 miles-per-hour.

We would offer the following observations and interpretations regarding the data CSXT provides the STB, Conrail Transaction Council, and the AAR:

Chicago Gateway Operations

During this reporting week, the on-time-to-two-hours-late measure of deliveries to western carriers through Chicago moved favorably one percentage point to 79%. The more-than-six-hours-late category move favorably six percentage points to 6%.

Yards and Terminals

Car volumes and dwell times changed very little, remaining within expected levels at most terminals across the network. Nine of the 14 measured yards showed an improvement in dwell time compared to the prior week.

Corridor Performance

Two of the six measured corridors showed an improvement compared to the prior week. The I-95 corridor and the East St. Louis to Northeast corridor tied for best performance in the on-time-to-two-hours-late category with 94%. Overall, the on-time-to-two-hours-late category moved unfavorably one percentage point to 82%, and the percent of trains in the greater-than-six-hours-late category moved unfavorably four percentage points to 10%.

Shared Areas

Daily average on hand cars decreased slightly at all three yards. Overall terminal dwell time was 29.4 hours, compared to 29.3 hours last week. For the week, there were a total of 35 trains delayed for CSXT and NS: 18 for crew, 7 for power, and 10 for late arrivals by CSX and NS.

Additional Measurements

Train Delay Metric: For 718 train starts, weekly train delay totaled 21 hours for Power and 44 hours for Crew. Delay hours for crew increased, while delay for power decreased from the prior week.

Train Crew Delay Metric: The percent of crews not departing within two hours of the on-duty time averaged 20.8% for the week, up from 19.7% last week.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage: Crew Availability Percentage was 85%, down from 86% the prior week.

Daily Number of Recrews Required: Of 1745 crew starts, 53 (3%) were recrews, up from 2% the prior week.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay Metric: SAA Train Delays averaged two trains for South Jersey, two trains for North Jersey, and one for Detroit.

Locomotives: Gross Locomotives = 3793, Average Available = 3463, and Out-of-Service Ratio = 5.9%, up from 5.6% the prior week.

Cars Offered in Interchange: averaged 203 cars daily, of which 25 were for the Norfolk Southern. Daily average and the NS average decreased from the prior week.

On-time performance, passenger trains through Brunswick, MD: 90% for 10 AMTRAK trains (Pittsburgh – Washington) and 94% for 90 MARC trains (West Virginia – Washington).

Buffalo Customer Service (Hot-Line): the customer service center received no hot-line calls.

Last week we met the goal for 15 of the 18 key service measures established for the first quarter. Goals were met for personal injuries, cars on-line, overall velocity, merchandise train velocity, crews on duty over 12 hours, relief crews, hours of crew delay, car dwell, right connection, on-time

origin departure, on-time destination arrival, 30-hour cars, industrial switching, hours of locomotive delay, and leased locomotive out-of-service ratio.

Even though last week's measurements declined slightly from the record performances of the previous two weeks, network operations remained fluid. The railroad remains healthy and is well positioned to absorb increased volumes.

Sincerely,

T. J. Stephenson
Assistant Vice President
Service Measurements

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

For the week ending: 03/09/01

Yard Performance

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01
Oak Island, NJ	Fluid Capacity	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	425	384	359	318	395
	Cars On Hand - Empty	241	304	335	335	385
	Cars On Hand - Total	666	688	694	653	780
	Cars Handled	420	466	566	600	652
	Dwell Hours	31.4	40.2	28.8	31.9	27.8
Pavonia, NJ	Fluid Capacity	900	900	900	900	900
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	382	252	292	220	255
	Cars On Hand - Empty	399	300	360	287	302
	Cars On Hand - Total	781	552	652	507	557
	Cars Handled	481	431	481	266	366
	Dwell Hours	43.9	31.0	29.9	27.1	26.4
North Yard, MI	Fluid Capacity	850	850	850	850	850
	Cars On Hand - Loaded	146	128	137	111	180
	Cars On Hand - Empty	125	29	131	135	189
	Cars On Hand - Total	271	227	268	246	369
	Cars Handled	302	228	210	183	324
	Dwell Hours	24.6	14.5	20.6	23.4	16.2

CSX Comments: Daily average on hand cars decreased slightly at all three yards.
Overall terminal dwell time was 29.4 hours, up slightly from 29.3 last week.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

Train Originations

(Composite of NS/CSX Traffic)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
Location	Measure	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01
North Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	7	2	7	2	8
	% Ontime	57%	100%	43%	33%	50%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	0%	43%	33%	0%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	14%	0%	14%	22%	50%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	29%	0%	0%	11%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
South Jersey SAA	Number of Originations	2	3	3	3	4
	% Ontime	50%	100%	0%	67%	50%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	0%	0%	67%	0%	25%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	50%	0%	33%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%
Detroit SAA	Number of Originations	5	4	7	7	7
	% Ontime	80%	50%	57%	57%	57%
	% Late 0-2 Hours	20%	50%	43%	43%	43%
	% Late 2-4 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late 4-6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	% Late GT 6 Hours	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

CSX Comments: Total road train delays were 35 trains. Crew delays were 18 trains for 60 hours; power 7 trains for 19 hours; originating trains 10 for 33 hours, due to late connections.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

(Snapshot at Midnight for Day Measured)

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Railroad Offered To	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Average
Cars Offered	NS	120	1	1	3	0	25
	All Other	83	254	268	170	116	178
	Total	203	255	269	173	116	203

Measures all cars in offered interchange status on acquired Conrail territory only. Volumes are listed by cars offered to NS (Norfolk Southern) and All Other Railroads.

CSXT On Time Passenger Train Performance

"Brunswick Line"

Between West Virginia/Washington, DC

		Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Service	Measure	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Totals
AMTK	Trains	2	2	2	2	2	10
	% On Time	50%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%
MARC	Trains	18	18	18	18	18	90
	% On Time	83%	94%	100%	94%	100%	94%

AMTK measured according to contract with CSXT.

Surface Transportation Board

Performance Measures

CSXT Train Crew Delay

	Causes of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Terminal	Trains / Hours	03/03/01	03/04/01	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Total
Baltimore	Train Crew Starts	21	16	17	18	19	21	17	129
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	11	7	5	9	8	11	5	56
	% Delayed +2 Hours	52%	44%	29%	50%	42%	52%	29%	43%
Buffalo	Train Crew Starts	48	40	34	38	37	49	48	294
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	4	5	6	9	5	7	10	46
	% Delayed +2 Hours	8%	15%	18%	24%	14%	14%	21%	16%
Chicago	Train Crew Starts	26	26	23	27	29	27	25	183
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	5	4	6	3	5	9	5	37
	% Delayed +2 Hours	19%	15%	26%	11%	17%	33%	20%	20%
Cincinnati	Train Crew Starts	37	35	36	33	36	35	36	248
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	8
	% Delayed +2 Hours	3%	6%	6%	0%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Cleveland	Train Crew Starts	23	30	18	21	18	27	24	161
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	8	9	6	6	7	5	6	47
	% Delayed +2 Hours	35%	30%	33%	29%	39%	19%	25%	29%
Cumberland	Train Crew Starts	32	36	32	28	37	36	36	237
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	0	4	2	1	1	3	14
	% Delayed +2 Hours	9%	0%	13%	7%	3%	3%	8%	6%
Detroit	Train Crew Starts	5	4	6	7	6	6	7	41
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	1	0	2	2	2	2	3	12
	% Delayed +2 Hours	20%	0%	33%	29%	33%	33%	43%	29%
Philadelphia	Train Crew Starts	13	8	10	13	10	12	13	79
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	3	1	0	0	2	0	2	8
	% Delayed +2 Hours	23%	13%	0%	0%	20%	0%	15%	10%
Selkirk	Train Crew Starts	40	39	26	29	41	45	47	267
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	13	22	11	18	16	15	15	110
	% Delayed +2 Hours	33%	56%	42%	62%	39%	33%	32%	41%
Toledo	Train Crew Starts	25	29	21	21	27	28	26	177
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	6	5	4	1	1	6	2	25
	% Delayed +2 Hours	24%	17%	19%	5%	4%	21%	8%	14%
Willard	Train Crew Starts	40	42	33	36	40	44	37	272
	Crews Delayed +2 Hours	10	11	6	6	1	11	6	51
	% Delayed +2 Hours	25%	26%	18%	17%	3%	25%	16%	19%

Daily number of train crew starts from selected yards or terminals and the number of those originating train crews that were delayed in those yards or terminals for two hours or more after going on-duty. The percentage of those delayed starts.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Train Delay - Northern Region Lines

	Cause of Delay	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Trains / Hours	03/03/01	03/04/01	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Total
Train Delay	Originating Train Starts	96	100	92	87	103	111	129	718
	Delayed Hours - Power	12	1	0	0	3	5	0	21
	Delayed Hours - Crews	3	5	19	13	0	0	4	44

Daily number of originating train starts on the Northern Region and the hours delayed due to lack of power and crew of those originating train crews. The delayed train starts will be broken down between power and crew delayed hours.

Daily Crew Availability Percentage - Northern Region Lines

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Crew Availability	03/03/01	03/04/01	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Average
Crew Availability		86%	86%	85%	83%	85%	87%	86%	85%

Daily percentage of CSXT road train crews that are available for work on the Northern Region Lines.

Daily Number of Train Crew Starts and Recrews Required

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Weekly
Measure	Crew/Recrews	03/03/01	03/04/01	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Total
Crews/Recrews	Train Crew Starts	264	237	203	227	258	268	288	1745
	Recrews	3	12	5	2	7	11	13	53
	% Recrewed	1%	5%	2%	1%	3%	4%	5%	3%

Daily number of CSXT road train crew starts, the number of recrews and percentage of recrews for the Northern Region Lines.

Surface Transportation Board Performance Measures

CSXT Locomotive Fleet Condition

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Locomotives	03/03/01	03/04/01	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Average
Locomotives	Gross Fleet Size	3811	3796	3777	3781	3790	3803	3792	3793
	Avg. Number Available	3471	3445	3468	3450	3457	3479	3471	3463
	OOS Ratio	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.8	6.0	5.9	5.6	5.9

The measure for Gross Fleet will consist of CSX owned, leased, and foreign locomotives on-line. The Average Number Available will be the number of net fleet available to move traffic. The Out-of-Service Ratio (OOS) is the ratio of CSXT owned locomotives not available.

Shared Asset Areas Train Delay

		Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Daily
Measure	Shared Area	03/03/01	03/04/01	03/05/01	03/06/01	03/07/01	03/08/01	03/09/01	Average
Train Delay	Philadelphia/South Jersey	1	1	5	2	1	3	0	2
	North Jersey	5	2	1	2	1	2	3	2
	Detroit	1	2	1	0	2	0	0	1

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification. The measure will be a composite of CSX and NS trains.

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

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March 14, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001

Dear Mr. Clemens:

Pursuant to Decision No. 89 issued in STB Finance Docket No. 33388, for the week ending March 9, 2001, enclosed are schedules reporting Train Origination Performance, Yard Performance, and Trains Held in the Shared Assets Areas. Also enclosed is a schedule showing a daily snapshot of NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted, and our Locomotive Fleet Statistics. This schedule also includes NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays that are not limited to a snapshot period.

Another schedule incorporated into this transmittal shows NS Crew Starts and Delays, NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage, and NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews.

Additionally, this transmittal includes confidential reports containing performance statistics for NS's Chicago Gateway Interchange Operations, Corridor Train Performance and Yard Performance. In an effort to provide you with more detailed information regarding delays, I have included two schedules supporting NS's Chicago Gateway and Corridor Train Performance reports, which identify the number and total time for delays due to crew, power, or other issues. I also have supplied the Public Reporting Measures that we provide to the Conrail Transaction Council and the AAR.

As always, I am including a letter written by Tony L. Ingram, Vice President Transportation – Operations, which discusses delays in our rail operations. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me.

Sincerely,

George A. Aspatore
General Solicitor

Enclosures

March 14, 2001

Mr. Melvin F. Clemens, Jr.
Director, Office of Compliance and Enforcement
Surface Transportation Board
1925 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20423-0001


Dear Mr. Clemens:

Norfolk Southern's performance metrics remain within normal operating range. The number of cars on line increased, the average train speed decreased, and the average terminal dwell remained constant. On the monitored corridors and Chicago gateway operations, 63 trains were held for terminal delays, 15 trains were held for crews, and 13 trains were held for power.

In the Shared Assets Areas, daily average on-hand car volume decreased at Oak Island, Pavonia and North Yard. All volume counts were within expected operating norms. Overall average terminal dwell time increased slightly. The number of reported road train delays for crews and power decreased from last week. Eighteen trains were delayed 60 hours for lack of crews and 7 trains were delayed 19 hours awaiting power. Ten originating trains were delayed a total of 33 hours due to late arrivals from CSXT and/or NS. Together, these delays accounted for 30% of the delay hours reported in the SAAs.

Sincerely,






For the week ending 3/9/01

Shared Asset Area - Yard Performance


Yard	date	Fluid Capacity	On hand - Empty	On hand - Loaded	On hand - Total	Cars handled	Average dwell
North Yard MI	3/5/01	850	125	146	271	302	24.6
	3/6/01	850	99	128	227	228	14.5
	3/7/01	850	131	137	268	210	20.6
	3/8/01	850	135	111	246	183	23.4
	3/9/01	850	189	180	369	324	16.2
North Yard MI Average		850	136	140	276	249	19.7
Oak Island NJ	3/5/01	1200	241	425	666	420	31.4
	3/6/01	1200	304	384	688	466	40.2
	3/7/01	1200	335	359	694	566	28.8
	3/8/01	1200	335	318	653	600	31.9
	3/9/01	1200	385	395	780	652	27.8
Oak Island NJ Average		1200	320	376	696	541	31.6
Pavonia NJ	3/5/01	900	399	382	781	481	43.9
	3/6/01	900	300	252	552	431	31.0
	3/7/01	900	360	292	652	481	29.9
	3/8/01	900	287	220	507	266	27.1
	3/9/01	900	302	255	557	366	26.4
Pavonia Average		900	330	280	610	405	32.5



For the week ending 3/9/01

Shared Asset Train Origination Performance

location	date	Trains	On time	0-2 hours late	2-4 hours late	4-6 hours late	6+ hours late
Detroit Total	3/5/01	5	80%	20%	0%	0%	0%
	3/6/01	4	50%	50%	0%	0%	0%
	3/7/01	7	57%	43%	0%	0%	0%
	3/8/01	7	57%	43%	0%	0%	0%
	3/9/01	7	57%	43%	0%	0%	0%
Detroit Total		30	60%	40%	0%	0%	0%
North Jersey Total	3/5/01	7	57%	0%	14%	29%	0%
	3/6/01	2	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	3/7/01	7	43%	43%	14%	0%	0%
	3/8/01	9	33%	33%	22%	11%	0%
	3/9/01	8	50%	0%	50%	0%	0%
North Jersey Total		33	48%	18%	24%	9%	0%
South Jersey Total	3/5/01	2	50%	0%	50%	0%	0%
	3/6/01	3	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	3/7/01	3	0%	67%	33%	0%	0%
	3/8/01	3	67%	0%	0%	33%	0%
	3/9/01	4	50%	25%	0%	0%	25%
South Jersey Total		15	53%	20%	13%	7%	7%
Grand Total		78	54%	27%	13%	5%	1%




For the week ending 3/9/01

Shared Asset Area Trains Held

area	Sat 03-Mar	Sun 04-Mar	Mon 05-Mar	Tue 06-Mar	Wed 07-Mar	Thu 08-Mar	Fri 09-Mar	Grand Total
North Jersey	5	2	1	2	1	2	3	16
South Jersey	1	1	5	2	1	3	0	13
Detroit	1	2	1	0	2	0	0	6

Daily number of outbound trains ready for departure that are held for line haul carriers in each of the shared asset areas for more than one hour after notification.



NS Cars Offered in Interchange but not Accepted

offered	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Total
CSX	0	0	0	0	0	0
other	173	0	0	128	17	318
Total	173	0	0	128	17	318

Snapshot taken between 2:00 and 3:00 each day
NS acquired territory only

NS Northern Region Train Starts and Delays


	Saturday 3-Mar	Sunday 4-Mar	Monday 5-Mar	Tuesday 6-Mar	Wednesday 7-Mar	Thursday 8-Mar	Friday 9-Mar	Grand Total
# of Train Starts	161	146	146	158	158	163	162	1094
Delay Cause								
Crew Delays (hrs)	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9
Power Delays (hrs)	22.3	9.6	4.3	40.8	4.8	49.8	54.3	185.7

The delay numbers are expressed in hours

Locomotive Fleet Statistics

	Saturday 3-Mar	Sunday 4-Mar	Monday 5-Mar	Tuesday 6-Mar	Wednesday 7-Mar	Thursday 8-Mar	Friday 9-Mar	average
Fleet Size	3399	3412	3406	3422	3423	3417	3289	3395
available	3232	3233	3234	3235	3236	3237	3238	3235
out of service %	4.9%	5.2%	5.0%	5.5%	5.5%	5.3%	1.6%	4.7%

Snapshot taken at midnight
Fleet size is all locomotives on line. Includes owned, leased and foreign.



NS Crew Starts and Delays

		Saturday 3-Mar	Sunday 4-Mar	Monday 5-Mar	Tuesday 6-Mar	Wednesday 7-Mar	Thursday 8-Mar	Friday 9-Mar	Grand Total
Allentown	crew starts	11	14	13	16	17	17	14	102
	crews delayed	4	4	3	5	5	4	5	30
Bellevue	crew starts	38	32	33	32	33	36	38	242
	crews delayed	7	6	10	9	7	5	7	51
Buffalo	crew starts	28	18	21	23	24	24	20	158
	crews delayed	4	6	5	2	3	0	5	25
Chicago	crew starts	39	32	32	34	30	38	34	239
	crews delayed	16	13	11	11	9	10	10	80
Cincinnati	crew starts	33	34	29	36	34	37	38	241
	crews delayed	6	4	5	8	3	8	8	42
Cleveland	crew starts	11	11	9	9	10	12	13	75
	crews delayed	3	3	2	6	4	4	7	29
Conway	crew starts	57	50	43	47	47	50	60	354
	crews delayed	12	11	16	14	11	12	13	89
Detroit	crew starts	20	13	21	21	20	23	19	137
	crews delayed	8	4	9	4	7	9	6	47
Elkhart	crew starts	38	34	31	34	46	38	33	254
	crews delayed	14	14	16	7	15	15	14	95
Harrisburg	crew starts	46	48	42	49	53	48	52	338
	crews delayed	22	20	10	14	15	13	17	111
Toledo	crew starts	59	60	45	53	54	46	59	376
	crews delayed	22	11	10	14	13	8	19	97

Notes: Data source is T&E employees' "End of Trip" reporting
 A summary of all "E-O-T's" where departure time is reported as two or more hours after time crew ordered.
 Includes all trains for location, whether originating or run-through.
 A delayed crew is one delayed two hours or more after coming on duty

NS Northern Region Daily Crew Availability Percentage

	Saturday 3-Mar	Sunday 4-Mar	Monday 5-Mar	Tuesday 6-Mar	Wednesday 7-Mar	Thursday 8-Mar	Friday 9-Mar	average
availability%	79%	79%	80%	82%	82%	82%	82%	81%

Notes: A "snapshot" of percent of Train and Engineman available at approximately 5:00 AM

NS Northern Region Crew Starts and Recrews

	Saturday 3-Mar	Sunday 4-Mar	Monday 5-Mar	Tuesday 6-Mar	Wednesday 7-Mar	Thursday 8-Mar	Friday 9-Mar	Grand Total
crew starts	320	302	262	293	310	309	318	2114
recrews	6	12	2	6	5	15	10	56

Notes: A summary of trains ordered by field transportation using relief crew (recrew) train symbol
 Does not include recrews/trains pulled into terminals by yard crews or road crews called and used in regular service

