MR. O'CONNOR: I think we're ready to go, and thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. The slide presentation that I've got up on the screen, and I apologize for not giving you advance copies. I finished this this morning, and I was on another case yesterday.

I'll be glad to provide copies, and put copies into the record if you'd like, and I have provided copies for all the commissioners and staff, and AAR this morning, just a few minutes ago.

What the slide presentation does basically is it summarizes the points that we made in the testimony that we filed, and just a few additional points in there that, I think, support the advisability of going with the recommendations that we've made.

First of all, I'm appearing before you today on behalf of my company. We have more than a passing interest in the procedures that impact rail negotiations and litigation. It's a large part of

our business.

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We have been engaged in this business for about 34 years. I've been with this company for 17 years. I have participated in numerous negotiations, and I have appeared as a witness in two stand-alone cost cases. One of them -- I think of them both as successful, but ultimately in McCarty Farms, after a decade or so of appeal, went the other way. The other case was a coal case, which was successful.

Throughout that process, however, our practice relies primarily on commercial litigation, private negotiations, private negotiations. Very seldom if ever do I even consider bringing a matter to the Board.

What I would like to do is to recommend to you a fairly small adjustment in your process, that would enable my clients to access the wisdom that's built up here at the Board.

The first slide. First of all, I believe that small shipment rail rates is an important economic issues. There are many small

shipment rail rates, small shipment as we're 1 2 defining it, that are extraordinarily high. 3 Now what I'm describing is similar to the database or the experience base that Mr. 4 5 Rennicke referred to a few minutes ago, i.e., he was 6 referring to his experience, and I'm relying on 7 mine. Over the years, I've analyzed thousands 8 9 of lanes for dozens of companies. The data that we find there is that frequently we will find very high 10 RCRs on some of these lines. 11 12 Next slide. I also agree with Mr. 13 Rennicke that the rates, some are high, some are 14 Here's the pattern that we find. Where we low. 15 have competitive rail access at the origin, 16 hopefully also at the destination but even at the 17 origin, we will develop a baseline RCR for that 18 particular traffic group. That may move up or down, depending on 19 20 the commodity that we're talking about, depending on 21 the area of the country or what have you. So the 22 baseline RCR that we'll encounter for a given

shipper's traffic base will vary. 1 2 However, what tends not to vary is the effect of the absence of competition. If we have a 3 situation where there is access to only one 4 5 railroad, then we can look for a fairly substantial 6 increase in the RCR as we enter the situation. 7 If we have a situation where there is restricted access to competition, which I define as 8 9 trackage rights or haulage rights, then they'll be a 10 slight increase typically in the base level RCR. 11 So even the presence of moderate 12 competition has a fairly noticeable effect. Now these are basically STB (ph) data. 13 14 What we have here is the actual RCR as reported. 15 The footnote that's at the bottom of the screen, refers back to the STB decision on May 17th in this 16 17 particular case. These patterns hold over the 18 years. 19 If we were to use a different year or a 20 different group of years, these patterns would hold. 21 Overall, the actual RCR off-rate in this particular

year was 133 percent. On the highest rated freight,

1	that is to say the freight that has a revenue-cost
2	ratio greater than 180 percent, we find the RCRs
3	that are described here, which are considerably
4	higher.
5	The point that I'm driving at here is
6	the balance of the burden, if you will, between off
7	rate, lower rated freight, and the freight which is
8	bearing the highest revenue-cost ratio.
9	Now another way to look at that, and
10	this again, this is STB data that I'm presenting to
11	you, if you look at the share of revenue this is
12	off the waybill sample, the non-confidential sample
13	if we look at the share of revenue with RCR above
14	180 percent, we find that it varies widely by
15	commodity.
16	If we have chemicals at issue, and this
17	again these relationships are very stable.
18	CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay. You have to go
19	to your recommendations and try to wrap up. Let me
20	go to the next
21	MR. O'CONNOR: Sure.
22	CHAIRMAN NOBER: I'm holding everybody

to their time today.

MR. O'CONNOR: Okay, let me go to the next slide, because I want to show you one thing.

Back one slide. Chemicals as a commodity, 61

percent. If those chemicals go offshore and come back as intermodal, then only four percent of that traffic group is going to have an RCR above 180 percent.

Let me show you one more graph, and then we'll go to the recommendations. This graph is showing you chemicals trade. It's showing you that imports have now outpaced exports.

It's going in the wrong direction. When that particular traffic group, when that production capacity goes offshore, it tends to stay offshore. When it comes back into the U.S., it will tend to come back, from the railroad standpoint now, as lower rated traffic.

Now looking at the remedies. We've heard a fair amount of discussion about this already this morning. Commercial negotiations can be very challenging in captive lines. That's predictable.

1 The STB maximum rate case, \$3 million 2 and a three-year delay for an uncertain outcome 3 really isn't feasible for small shipments. assisted mediation, I would welcome that. 4 5 I would also make it binding, but make 6 it voluntary. I didn't specify those two points in 7 my testimony. I would make it binding and voluntary. 8 9 Now over the years we've participated in, it's hard to say, dozens, maybe hundreds of 10 negotiations. The two SAC cases that I've mentioned 11 12 to you. We have also participated as an expert witness in mediation, and have also participated as 13 an expert witness in arbitration. So I have 14 15 experience in all four of those. 16 The one that I would prefer and 17 recommend to you, largely for the reasons you've 18 already heard today, is mediation. recommended remedies, commercial negotiations. 19 20 would let that run. 21 We're doing fine, and usually we will 22 not need your help. In the vast majority of cases

we will not need your help, and we will not ask for But where we do ask for it, we like for it to have STB-assisted mediation. Now finally the recommended action plan, which is virtually verbatim out of my testimony; it appears in there three or four times. First of all the predicate is that we go first to commercial negotiations. We do not come first to the STB. Secondly, we focus on lanes. That is to say, I would recommend bringing to you only those lanes where we cannot negotiate; we've reached an impasse and we cannot negotiate to an agreement, a mutually acceptable agreement, and the revenue-cost ratio is at greater than the regulatory threshold, and rail or other modal competition is not available, not economically and practically

So I'm trying to address here the market dominance requirements, and the regulatory threshold requirements. Secondly, the traffic would not be exempt, would not be under contract, it would not be

available.

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one of the exempt commodities. That again is going to eliminate a fair amount of traffic.

I think if I was following correctly the numbers that Craig had, he had contract numbers in his \$3 billion. Of course, you would not address a contract case. Then we would use the RCR guidelines as a fact base upon which to begin discussions to call on in recommended mediation. So we need a fact base.

I would use the three that you've developed. The RCR on comparable moves, your RCM benchmark with an efficiency adjustment. Then part of what you would mediate and discuss would be whether it applies and if so, under what efficiency would you be operating. And then your RCR actual.

earlier today, in the earlier slide. Now the fourth point, a lot of the prior witnesses have commented upon, and from a public policy standpoint it almost cries out for some kind of a change.

From my standpoint, I'm not engaged in public policy. I'm engaged in trying to get one

1	transaction done after another. The fact that this
2	resource and recourse is not available to me is
3	regrettable, and I would like to in this
4	recommendation I would like to make it available to
5	you.
6	I have the greatest respect for the STB.
7	Indeed, I began my career here many years ago, and I
8	understand the railroad viewpoint. I was formally a
9	VP of Economics. I was Craig's predecessor, and as
10	a matter of fact recruited Craig to replace me, with
11	some resistance, I might add.
12	Prior to that, I was assistant director
12 13	Prior to that, I was assistant director of Cost and Economics for Conrail. Prior to that, I
13	of Cost and Economics for Conrail. Prior to that, I
13 14	of Cost and Economics for Conrail. Prior to that, I was on the team that created Conrail out of what was
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1 VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: Thank you. 2 Gordon MacDougall, first to you. I want to 3 apologize to you for not having copies of the testimony beforehand. 4 5 I think it's useful if the people that 6 are participating have seen what the others are 7 going to be saying, so that they can respond to I think it could improve the overall 8 that. 9 dialogue. This particular case, because of an 10 internal glitch, I didn't get the copies myself 11 12 until fairly late. But I think it's a good idea for you to get the stuff in advance. 13 14 You commented that we shouldn't have 15 staff-led hearings. I would like if you wanted to 16 expand on that a little bit, because to some extent, 17 we look at staff-led hearings, in part, because we 18 have resource constraints and time constraints, and 19 sometimes the staffs are the ones who are capable of 20 doing it, in some situations. 21 MR. MACDOUGALL: I think there's no 22 problem with staff, you know, assisting you.

have a hearing, a public hearing out in Wisconsin or
wherever, conducted by a person who doesn't have the
qualification or tenure that an ALJ has, or that the
public responsibility that the commissioner has, to
instead have an ordinary staff person.
Particularly when the staff is not a
separated staff. You'll have the staff of an
aggregate case judging a case. I just think that
this agency could have a higher qualified individual
for hearings than just an ordinary staff person.
I might say the FRA has staff people
hearings. I've been to some of those. Those are on
very technical matters in the field. It'll be like
a grade crossing or something like that.
Even there, the staff doesn't get the
same respect that you would with a person like an
administrative law judge coming out there or some
Board member coming out.
VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: Yes. I would
call them extraordinary staff rather than ordinary
staff, but
MR. MACDOUGALL: They don't have the

1	tenure that an ALJ has.
2	VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: I understand
3	that. You mentioned about how rates are determined,
4	and you know, basically the rates today are largely
5	market-determined rather than cost-determined.
6	You mentioned Ripley's formula or
7	Ripley, rather. Of course, Ripley developed his
8	formula for a railroad cost. At that time during
9	the ICC regulation, it was cost that drove rates.
10	We tend to rely on the market today,
11	than only rely on the cost analyses when we have a
12	market dominance and we have cases where market we
13	have market failure.
14	So I wasn't quite sure what you were
15	saying. I didn't understand you.
16	MR. MACDOUGALL: Well, you may be right.
17	But you may find that rates aren't made that way,
18	that the way you judge rates are not the way rates
19	are made. In the real world, it's rate comparisons.
20	What's the other guy getting?
21	You may find that, if you get into it,
22	that maybe the old system still applies today, and

1	the rates are not based on cost. They're based on
2	markets. They're based on geographic competition,
3	market competition.
4	You may find that this thing here is
5	just not the real world, what's going on here at the
6	STB. It's really not in the real world. Maybe
7	that's why the shippers don't want to file
8	complaints, the small shippers. They look at it and
9	say what's this? You know, what is all this.
10	That's not how rates are made.
11	Maybe you'll find, maybe I'm wrong. But
12	I suspect a little research might be helpful.
13	VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: Tom, I had a
14	question. On page three, I was a little bit
15	confused about your presentation here, when you said
16	the revenue to cost ratio, and then that 100 RCR
17	points covers all other variable costs.
18	You mean the rail to variable ratio,
19	right?
20	MR. O'CONNOR: Sure, that's right.
21	VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: So 180 is 80
22	percent of variable costs. 180 would be the RVC, in

1	your terms, of what we would use, 80 percent above
2	variable costs.
3	MR. O'CONNOR: Yes. Let's just refresh
4	on the map there. If we have a revenue cost ratio
5	of 100 percent, that means that that movement is
6	covering all of its variable costs, as determined by
7	IRCs.
8	VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: Then on your page
9	four, the 280, 236, 207 means they're all covering
10	more than twice variable costs?
11	MR. O'CONNOR: That's correct.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: Okay. That's all
13	I wanted. Okay.
14	CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, I have no
15	questions, and I think Commissioner Buttrey has one.
16	MR. O'CONNOR: I have a clarification.
17	The resistance to Craig came from Craig. Everybody
18	else was on board with that.
19	VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: Oh, okay. I have
20	another question, then, if you don't mind. You were
21	talking here about some of the commodities that are
22	going offshore.

Are you saying that these commodities are going offshore largely because they, because of railroad rates, and that this is a driving factor in us losing, say, chemical manufacturing? Are there really a lot of other issues driving this, rather than simply railroad rates.

MR. O'CONNOR: There are a lot of issues. Rail rates is a contributing factor here, and the tenor of the discussion with the railroads is also a contributing factor. I think that both of those would be assisted by your involvement, because you would be able to break an impasse that could contribute to this.

This is quite an unfortunate pattern, and in fact it has been -- we've been negative with Europe for quite some time. We're negative with parts of Asia now and losing ground in the race.

The only place where we have a positive trade with chemicals is in Africa, and we are investing hugely with chemical production in Africa.

So this is not a good pattern. Not a good pattern for chemicals, not a good pattern for

1	U.S. labor, not a good pattern for the railroads if,
2	when it comes back, if you give me that previous
3	slide, if they are losing traffic that's generating
4	RCRs, 61 percent of which are above 180 percent, in
5	order to win the return trip on miscellaneous mixed
6	shipments.
7	Now that is not all intermodal, but
8	it's, we believe, substantially intermodal. You
9	could check that with your staff. Only four percent
10	of that is above 180. That's not a good trade from
11	the railroad perspective. This should be something
12	we can work together and solve.
13	VICE CHAIRMAN MULVEY: Well, one last
14	point. Your system for mediation calls for it being
15	binding and voluntary, whereas the AAR was non-
16	binding but mandatory.
17	It strikes me that the AAR's suggestion,
18	would result in a lot of talk but does not require
19	us to do anything. In your situation, you're
20	required to do something, but you're not required to
21	talk.
22	MR. O'CONNOR: Here's where I would take

1	that, Vice Chairman Mulvey. In the mediation in
2	which I've participated, it concluded, that
3	particular case, which I won't go into the details
4	of, concluded a dispute that had been going on for
5	more than a decade.
6	The parties were not 100 percent happy
7	with the outcome. But they had finally exhausted
8	themselves so much that they agreed to binding
9	mediation, and they walked away from it, and the
10	deal stayed done. So that's what I'm driving at.
11	CHAIRMAN NOBER: I'm not sure the
12	difference between binding mediation and
13	arbitration. But I'm sure
14	MR. O'CONNOR: Arbitration really is
15	more like litigation. You have and here's the
16	basic premise.
17	CHAIRMAN NOBER: What's binding in the
18	mediation? The mediator's decision?
19	MR. O'CONNOR: Yes. The mediator will
20	walk the one party to the other.
21	CHAIRMAN NOBER: Do you know what
22	arbitration would be?

1	MR. O'CONNOR: I'm sorry?
2	CHAIRMAN NOBER: And the difference
3	between that and arbitration then is?
4	MR. O'CONNOR: Arbitration, you
5	basically put your case on, and you hope you have
6	been persuasive to your arbitration panel. But they
7	are really in quite a similar position to the three
8	commissioners now.
9	You will decide. You will take the
10	evidence before you and you will decide, as opposed
11	to trying to construct, working with the parties
12	that have come to you
13	CHAIRMAN NOBER: It's more interactive.
14	MR. O'CONNOR: Exactly. That's the key,
15	is the back and forth.