MR. MORENO: Good morning. I'm pleased to be here today on behalf of the National Industrial Transportation League in opposition to SMC's application for nationwide collective rate making

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authority. The grant of such authority would provide
SMC with anti-trust immunity with respect to its
collective rate making activities. Such rate making
activity is, per se, unlawful under the anti-trust laws
of the United States and only the SMC's grant of
immunity allows this conduct. Now I'm probably stating
obvious points to everyone here but I think it's
important not to lose sight of this fundamental fact
and the policy behind the, per se, unlawfulness of
collective rate making which is a policy that favors
market based competition. This places a substantial
burden upon SMC to demonstrate that nationwide
collective rate making authority is in the public
interest and that nationwide anti-trust immunity is
needed to promote that interest. The national
transportation policy should guide the board's
determination of the public interest. The statutory
predicate to each motor carrier transportation policy
is to promote competitive and efficient transportation
services. And the very first policy is to promote
competitive and efficient transportation services 1
order to encourage fair competition and reasonable

rates for transportation by motor carriers. The league strongly believes that the competitive market is the best means of determining motor carrier pricing and thus insuring reasonable rates.

There is no rational basis for treating motor carriers differently from other competitive industries. SMC has offered nothing to distinguish itself from other industries that must comply with the anti-trust laws. In order to demonstrate public interest in this case, SMC has chosen to create a straw-man problem and nationwide collective rate making offers a the According to SMC, nationwide authority will allow it to establish a nationwide baseline of class rates to better reflect its member carriers cost and revenue needs with the objective of offering, quote directly from SMC's pleadings here\*(11:12:55), "the objective of offering truly competitive rates." That statement is rather astounding, I believe, because the underlying premise behind the statement is that the current market base rates are not truly competitive. To accept this premise for which SMC offers no support, one also must accept the counter intuitive proposition

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that expanded anti-trust immunity is necessary for competition - for true competition.

SMC has offered no evidence that motor carriers require expanded anti-trust immunity to produce rates that are more competitive than those set in today's competitive marketplace.

While SMC purports to agree with the league that motor carrier rates should be established by the competitive marketplace, it does not explain how nationwide baseline of collectively established rates such competition beyond current competitive levels. Any motor carrier today can quote competitive rate between any two points today without nationwide baseline rate making. Any motor carrier today can assess its own cost in revenue needs price its services accordingly. Now, SMC has suggested morning that this is not true because small carriers don't have in-house costing expertise. other highly competitive industries function quite well without anti-trust immunity and they may lack such inhouse costing expertise as well.

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Thus SMC's claims that nationwide authority will enhance competition are actually baseless. SMC glosses over this fact by offering the convenience of a national baseline of class rates for carriers and justification shippers as а public interest and equate that convenience with being proto Any shipper convenience is substantially competitive. outweighed by the anti-competitive risks. Shippers do not need nationwide baselines to obtain competitive They obtain those rates today. Shippers do not rates. need nationwide baselines to compare competitive rate quotes they are able to do so today. A nationwide rate bureau. however, will increase the potential for carrier collusion. It could reduce baseline options by impacting the viability of regional rate perhaps leading to consolidation of those bureaus and attracting national carriers the large LTLnationwide rate bureau. Those are carriers whd currently set their baselines independent of the rate bureaus. That means ultimately that there are fewer baseline options that would exist for shippers choose from. A nationwide rate bureau also would enable

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carriers to shift today's market based rates closer to the above market, undiscounted class rate levels through general rate increases and reduced discounting. strongly The league extension opposes any above reasonably high class rate levels to the national The league does not doubt level. that national baseline of class rates would be more convenient to Anytime carriers can compare information and carriers. that information collectively, convenient.

beneficiary The principle of anti-trust immunity will be SMC and its Czar-Lite product. Bagileo's presentation this morning emphasizes and focused on Czar-Lite heavily. Thus anti-trust immunity would allow SMC to set and adjust Czar-Lite without relying upon other rate bureaus. Ιt would reduce SMC's administrative burdens costs and associated with Czar-Lite. But the commercial success of Czar-Lite has not been impeded by SMC's lack of anti-trust immunity in today's marketplace and SMC has not demonstrated that Czar-Lite even is in jeopardy if immunity is not granted. Anti-trust immunity is

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extreme measure to make Czar-Lite more convenient for SMC and the shippers and carriers who choose to use it.

The league represents many shippers who use This issue is not - the issue here is not the benefit of Czar-Lite but the issue is whether antiis necessary for Czar-Lite to accomplish its and that fact that Czar-Lite exists objective and permeates the market today is evidence that it is not necessary. Anti-trust immunity should be granted only sparingly and to the narrowest extent possible. anti-trust immunity must further the public interest, potential benefits meaning that the should substantially exceed the potential competitive harm. In order to meet this burden, SMC must show that antiimmunity will yield substantial benefits obtained lesser The cannot be by means. mere convenience does not meet this high standard and SMC's enhanced competition claims are baseless.

In this case, SMC seeks to broaden its cloak of anti-trust immunity without demonstrating a compelling public need and therefore the league

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L	believ	<i>r</i> es	the	board	should	reject	SMC's	application
2	Thank you.							