13 CHAIRMAN NOBER: Well, I have no further questions, so why don't we turn to Defendants. 14 15 thank you, very much for your presentation. You have five minutes left for rebuttal, and I'm sure we'll 16 17 have some additional questions then. 18 How are you all going to divide up your 19 time, Mr. Sipe, Mr. Meyer? 20 MR. MEYER: Our plan is that I will 21 address the trackage rights issue, initially. I'11 22 turn to Mr. Sipe, who will address revenue allocation

1	issues, and related matters, and then it will come
2	back to me for some operating expense issues.
3	CHAIRMAN NOBER: So you're going to just
4	kind of tag-team it?
5	MR. MEYER: And then back to Sam for DCF
6	and variable costs.
7	CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay. Well, as soon as
8	we get a
9	MR. MEYER: We don't really need this,
10	right?
11	CHAIRMAN NOBER: I've found when I do
12	speeches, that they don't work and, instead, they have
13	somebody at the computer and when I point it and push
14	the button, they watch for when I hit my thumb, and
15	just hit the computer screen. Maybe we should just
16	move to that.
17	MR. MEYER: Well, I think we'll get this
18	working momentarily. Just give me the green light.
19	CHAIRMAN NOBER: Are you ready?
20	MR. MEYER: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN NOBER: Okay.
22	MR. MEYER: Good morning Chairman Nober,

Vice-Chairman Mulvey, and Commissioner Buttrey. My name is David Meyer, on behalf of Union Pacific Railroad Company. With me today is Sam Sipe, on behalf of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway. We'll be sharing the burden of responding to AEPCO's points and explaining to you why this case ought to be decided in Defendant's favor.

I'd like to begin with a question that was of interest to all of the Board members today, and that is the issue of trackage rights, and AEPCO's choice regarding the routing and the design of its stand-alone railroad network.

We believe that this case should begin and end with the question of AEPCO's flawed stand-alone railroad network design. Despite the opportunity STB afforded to AEPCO in its November 2003 decision to supplement its case with evidence addressing the stand-alone costs for the portion of the proposed stand-alone network between Vaughn and El Paso, AEPCO did not do so. As a result, there is no evidence in this record -- AEPCO has placed no evidence in this record addressing the key issue underlying this and

any other stand-alone cost case, whether the revenues 1 2 from the issue traffic cover the full SAC costs of 3 building and operating the entire railroad network needed to handle that traffic. 4 We believe that AEPCO has failed to carry 5 6 its burden of showing what Mr. Rosenberg described as 7 a salient element of any stand-alone cost case, and we think as a result that AEPCO's stand-alone case must 8 9 now be rejected and its complaint dismissed. 10 Let me begin by providing a brief overview 11 of the stand-alone network that AEPCO has proposed. 12 Slide, please. What you see here is the actual route of 13 the issue traffic. From the mine in Defiance, New 14 15 Mexico, through Belen, following a BNSF line south to 16 Rincon, an interchange with the Union Pacific Railroad 17 at Deming, New Mexico, to the power plant at Cochise, 18 Arizona. 19 The line between Belen and Deming is a low 20 density line. AEPCO chose to do away with that line 21 when it rerouted the issue trafficed. As shown here

in the next slide -- this is the existing route --

AEPCO chose the blue route, extending the length of haul along BNSF's heavily traffic transcontinental main line, more than 100 miles east of Belen to Vaughn, New Mexico, and extending the length of haul along Union Pacific's southern quarter of transcontinental main line, almost 100 miles east of Deming to El Paso, New Mexico. That left it with a gap of over 200 miles in a stand-alone network.

Coal trains from Defiance via Vaughn, could not reach Cochise without connecting between Vaughn and El Paso. AEPCO chose not to build that line. Instead, it asserts that it would be entitled to use truckage rights for over 220 miles between Vaughn and El Paso.

This route, by the way, is far inferior to the existing route in every respect. It is far longer in distance, it has considerably more elevation change, considerably more curvature. Trains consume considerably more fuel, and their round trip cycle times are considerably longer. AEPCO went out of its way to avoid building a complete SARR network and to take advantage of these trackage rights. We believe

that that is impermissible. We believe that the route is -- as a matter of law, cannot be relied upon to support a stand-alone cost result in this case.

Chairman Nober, you asked what the November 2003 decision meant to the Plaintiffs. Well, to the Defendants, that decision was quite clear. It agreed with the proposition I just stated, that a complainant may not rely on trackage rights of one defendant over another defendant in order to achieve the purposes of a stand-alone cost test which are, after all, to determine the total investment cost and operating cost that the revenues from the issue traffic must recover.

That result should not have been surprising to anyone. The coal rate guidelines and the Board -- the ICC's, excuse me -- PEPCO decision from the 1980s made clear that groping for a trackage rights fee that is sufficient to cover the costs of a line, just restates the basic SAC test, but in a different guise. I refer to note 60 in the Coal Rate Guidelines, in particular.

In November 2003, therefore, this Board

AEPCO's design decided t.hat. was flawed but, nevertheless, allowed AEPCO another chance; one more chance, and it was given an option. It's first choice was to submit new evidence on stand-alone costs, a new It's second option was not to do so, case in chief. but to run the risk that Defendants could establish that the 3.2 mils trackage rights charge inadequate for purposes of a SAC test, a SAC analysis. Indeed, in the decision the Board noted, just a few sentences before, that it believed that that was likely the case, but the evidence had, up to that point, not addressed the issue.

Contrary to AEPCO's suggestion, we think it absolutely clear that the Board did not tell AEPCO that it could choose to stand pat, submitting no additional evidence, and then be entitled to rely on the same trackage rights that the Board had already said did not serve the objective of the SAC test, no matter what evidence the Defendant's put into the record. In the Defendant's supplemental rebuttal -- excuse me -- supplemental reply evidence, the Defendant's made the showing contemplated by the

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Board's November decision.

First, with evidence, we showed that the 3.2 mils fee yields only enough revenue to build approximately 12 miles of single track main line, based on very conservative assumptions. Clearly, the 3.2 mils trackage rights fee is not sufficient to recover the full SAC costs of building and operating the Vaughn/El Paso line.

Second, we showed that no calculation of a, quote, user fee, or trackage rights fee, could shortcut the process of determining the proper standalone cost rate ceiling. Why? Because calculating any trackage rights fee begs the ultimate question in the case, as the Coal Rate Guidelines explains.

Among the questions that must be asked to even consider what level of trackage rights fee are, what other traffic will share the line? Is it just the issue traffic or is there other traffic that would share the burdens associated with the line? What revenue — not trackage rights charges, but what revenue would that traffic contribute to the burdens of the line? What are the operating costs associated

with handling that traffic? What facilities does that traffic require to meet existing service requirements, and what is the cost of constructing those facilities?

These, and all of the other subsidiary questions in any stand-alone cost analysis, would have to be addressed in order to even begin to understand what the revenue requirement was for the line, and then to go from there to calculate, or attempt to calculate, what an average fee would be to recover that revenue requirement. It really simply restates the stand-alone cost test in different terminology. But here, as in prior cases, the Board made clear that it was AEPCO's responsibility, the shipper's responsibility, not the defendant's responsibility, to present a SAC case. That was what AEPCO was entitled to do, and chose not to do, to present a new SAC case in chief that included all of the elements, all of the salient elements, to use Mr. Rosenberg's term, of any SAC presentation. And certainly one of the salient elements is a complete route, all the way from origin to destination, not one with a 220-mile gap.

AEPCO responded to Defendant's reply

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evidence with no evidence of its own. First, it criticizes defendant's analysis for failing to take into account the fact that there is other traffic on UP's existing line between Vaughn and El Paso. that's certainly true but, the effort of identifying what traffic should share the stand-alone railroad system as cross-over traffic, precisely what traffic it will be, what the cost of handling that traffic are, what revenues from that traffic will be on the stand-alone cost system, again, simply re-introduces the stand-alone cost analysis, which was AEPCO's entitlement to bring forward in a new case in chief. It did not propose, and still has not proposed, to share the burden of that line with any other traffic.

Second, AEPCO simply re-argues the proposition that the Board in the UPSP merger case has considered and adjudicated the adequacy of a 3.2 mils trackage rights charge, or some other charge in the stand-alone cost context. Well, that's simply not the case. There has never been any analysis by this Board of whether any trackage rights fee comports with standalone cost principals, other than the analysis in this

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case, which determined that a stand-alone cost -- that a fee would not comport with such principals.

In a merger case, where the 3.2 mils standard was addressed and UPSP, the question whether the trackage rights charge is sufficiently low to allow the tenant to compete on a fair -- on a fair basis. There is no consideration of whether system average costs, investment costs, much less line specific costs, relating specifically to the assets needed to handle particular traffic and meet particular service needs, would be met by a 3.2 mils charge, an 8.32 mils charge, a 9.02 mils charge, or any other charge, UPSP's case and Union Pacific's presentation in that case, bears no relationship to any stand-alone cost issue.

Again, every calculation was a system calculation. Ιt did not address particulars of the line from Vaughn to El Paso, the traffic on that line, and the service needs relating did not to that line. Ιt even address true replacement cost, even in the context of system average cost that it was addressing.

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And, finally, a fundamental inconsistency between any trackage rights fee and the Board's standalone cost principal, is that a trackage rights fee assumes a proportionate sharing in the burdens of the line by all the traffic on the line. That is not — that is clearly inconsistent with the Coal Rate Guidelines, which recognize that traffic with lesser elasticity would be expected to bear a higher share of the burden of maintaining and operating a line than other traffic.

November 2003. Trackage rights fee in this case does not substitute for stand-alone cost analysis. No trackage rights fee could. And in this case, having come forward with no evidence whatsoever to establish what a stand-alone cost would yield for this line, there is a critical gap — not only in the route of the issue traffic, but in the case that AEPCO has put on. As a result, their complaint ought to be dismissed.